Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves an insurance claim filed by Christine and Roy Cosme after their insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange, cancelled their automobile insurance policy. The policy listed their son, Broyce Cosme, as a driver. The cancellation was due to a misunderstanding between Broyce and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, which led to the suspension of Broyce's license. The Cosmes were informed that their policy would be cancelled unless they submitted a coverage-exclusion form removing Broyce from the policy. However, due to conflicting advice from their insurance agent at Churilla Insurance, the Cosmes did not submit the form before the deadline. The policy was cancelled, and shortly after, the Cosmes were involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist. Erie denied their claim, stating that their policy was no longer in effect at the time of the accident.The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Erie and Churilla, reasoning that the Cosmes brought about their own lack-of-coverage injuries when they failed to sign the exclusion form before the deadline. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the Cosmes failed to present sufficient evidence to support their claims against Erie and Churilla.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's directed verdict for Erie, affirming as to Churilla, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that at the directed-verdict stage, the court can review whether inferences from the evidence are reasonable, but it cannot weigh conflicting evidence or assess witness credibility. Applying this standard, the court found that the trial court erred in directing the verdict for Erie as the Cosmes’ case-in-chief presented sufficient (though conflicting) evidence to prove Erie breached its contract and violated its duty of good faith. However, the court correctly granted judgment to Churilla because the evidence showed Churilla owed no special duty to the Cosmes to procure insurance or advise on the insurance policy. View "Cosme v. Warfield" on Justia Law

The case revolves around W.P. Productions, Inc. (WPP), a company owned by Sydney Silverman, and Sam's West, Inc. WPP, which sold kitchen products under the Wolfgang Puck brand to Sam's Club, owed significant debt to Sam's West. Despite this, WPP initiated a tort lawsuit against Tramontina U.S.A., Inc. and Sam's West. After a final judgment was entered against WPP, Sam's West filed a supplemental lawsuit to pierce WPP's corporate veil and hold Silverman personally liable for WPP's unpaid judgments. Silverman, who used a shared bank account for his personal and WPP's corporate funds, allegedly spent over $3 million from the shared account on personal expenses and transfers to himself and his relatives.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Sam's West, piercing the corporate veil and holding Silverman personally liable for the judgments against WPP. The court adopted a Report and Recommendation (R&R) that determined Silverman was the alter ego of WPP, but did not establish the remaining elements of improper conduct or causing an injury. Both parties then moved for summary judgment regarding these elements. The court adopted a second R&R stating that the undisputed facts showed Sam's West was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its veil piercing claim.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Silverman appealed the district court's decision, alleging that the court improperly pierced the corporate veil on summary judgment. After reviewing the case, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the three elements for piercing the corporate veil in Florida: Silverman was the alter ego of WPP; Silverman used WPP for the improper purpose of evading Florida's Rule of Priorities; and this improper use of WPP's corporate form caused injury to Sam's West. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Sam's West and pierced the corporate veil. View "Sam's West, Inc. v. Silverman" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Andrew Reynosa and his former employer, Advanced Transportation Services, Inc. (ATS). Reynosa had signed an arbitration agreement with ATS during his employment. After leaving the company, he filed a complaint for damages against ATS, which was then moved to arbitration as per the agreement. However, Reynosa later filed a motion to withdraw from arbitration, arguing that ATS had twice failed to pay the required arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day period, thereby waiving its right to compel him to proceed with arbitration.The Tulare County Superior Court denied Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court found that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the deadline for payment of the arbitration fees, and ATS had paid the fees within the extended deadline. Therefore, the court concluded that ATS had not materially breached the arbitration agreement.Reynosa then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, seeking a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and grant his motion to withdraw from arbitration. The appellate court granted Reynosa's request for a stay of the arbitration proceedings and issued an order to show cause why writ relief should not be granted.The appellate court concluded that the superior court had erroneously denied Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court found that ATS had materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay the arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day period. The court held that Reynosa was entitled to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and grant Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court also ordered the superior court to address Reynosa's requests for sanctions under the relevant code of civil procedure. View "Reynosa v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Gustavo Naranjo and other plaintiffs who worked as guards for Spectrum Security Services, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that Spectrum violated state regulations governing meal breaks by not providing legally compliant meal breaks and failing to pay an additional hour of pay, known as "premium pay," for each day on which this occurred. The plaintiffs also claimed that Spectrum violated Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, and 226 by not timely paying owed meal break premiums as wages to employees once they were discharged or resigned, and by not reporting the premium pay it owed as wages on employees’ wage statements.The case has been through multiple stages of litigation. Initially, the trial court granted summary judgment for Spectrum, but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal. On remand, the trial court certified a class for the meal break and related timely payment and wage statement claims and held a trial in three phases. The trial court found that Spectrum had violated sections 203 and 226 by failing to pay and report the missed-break premium pay as wages. However, it issued a split decision on the question of penalties. It ruled in Spectrum’s favor regarding section 203 penalties, finding that Spectrum’s defenses were presented in good faith and were not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. But it ruled against Spectrum regarding section 226 penalties, finding that Spectrum was liable for penalties because its failure to report premium pay for missed meal breaks in employees’ wage statements was “knowing and intentional and not inadvertent.”Both sides appealed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s holding that Spectrum had violated meal break laws between June 2004 and September 2007. But it reversed the trial court’s holding that Spectrum had violated section 203 and section 226 by failing to timely pay and report the meal break premium pay owed as “wages,” reasoning that the premium pay was instead in the nature of a penalty rather than compensation for work performed.The Supreme Court of California held that if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete and accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same conclusion. View "Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the dissolution of a marriage between Barbara Henderson Green and Jeffry Howard Green. The couple was married in Connecticut in 1982 and lived in Nebraska for most of their marriage. In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their pregnant daughter, while Mr. Green remained in Nebraska. The Greens purchased two houses in Denver, one for themselves and one for their daughter. Mr. Green financially supported Mrs. Green from Nebraska and listed one of the Denver houses as an asset on his personal financial statements. In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan secured by a mortgage on their Denver house, stating that his Nebraska home was his former residence and the Denver house was his primary residence. However, he continued to live in Nebraska. In 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce in separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado and Mr. Green in Nebraska.The Colorado trial court found that Mr. Green had the requisite minimum contacts to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. This decision was largely based on Mr. Green's assertion that the Denver house was his primary residence when he applied for a loan. The court concluded that Mr. Green's continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and thus it denied his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed the case and held that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. The court found that Mr. Green was not domiciled in Colorado and therefore was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re the Marriage of Green" on Justia Law

In this case, Austin Thompson Hughes, a former police officer and Uber driver, reported a drunk driver swerving across a highway in Houston. After the drunk driver crashed, Hughes, still on the phone with 911, performed a citizen's arrest in accordance with Texas law. However, when police officers arrived at the scene, they released the drunk driver and arrested Hughes, charging him with a felony for impersonating a peace officer. Hughes spent thousands of dollars defending against these charges before they were dropped by the City of Houston. Hughes then filed a § 1983 suit against the two officers who arrested him.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the officers moved to dismiss Hughes's complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the officers' motions, leading to an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, denying the officers' qualified immunity. The court found that Hughes had sufficiently pleaded that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting and prosecuting him without probable cause because they included material misstatements and omissions in their warrant affidavit and materials. The court also found that a corrected warrant affidavit could not have established probable cause to arrest and prosecute Hughes. The court concluded that no reasonable officer could have suspected Hughes committed a felony, given the inconsistencies in the drunk driver's statement, the driver's obvious intoxication, and the evidence supporting Hughes's account. View "Hughes v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The case involves John Doe, a student who was expelled from Loyola University Chicago after the university concluded that he had engaged in non-consensual sexual activity with Jane Roe, another student. Doe sued the university under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and Illinois contract law, alleging that the university discriminates against men.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Loyola. Doe appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court, however, raised questions about the use of pseudonyms by the parties and the mootness of the case, given that Doe had already graduated from another university and the usual remedy of readmission was not applicable.The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court to address these issues. The court questioned whether compensatory damages were an option for Doe, and if not, the case may not be justiciable. The court also questioned the use of pseudonyms, stating that while anonymity may be common in Title IX suits, it must be justified in each case. The court noted that the public has a right to know who is using their courts and that a desire to keep embarrassing information secret does not justify anonymity. The court also raised concerns about whether revealing Doe's identity would indirectly reveal Roe's identity. The court concluded that these issues should be addressed by the district court. View "Doe v. Loyola University Chicago" on Justia Law

Edward Johnson filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 and made payments to the bankruptcy trustee, Marilyn O. Marshall, under his proposed repayment plan. However, the bankruptcy court never confirmed his plan due to his inability to address an outstanding loan and his domestic support obligations, and ultimately dismissed his case for unreasonable delay. Before returning Johnson's undisbursed payments, the trustee deducted a percentage fee as compensation. Johnson filed a motion requesting that the trustee disgorge her fee, which the bankruptcy court granted, reasoning that the trustee did not have statutory authority to deduct her fee because Johnson's plan was not confirmed. The trustee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court analyzed the statutory text and agreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that the United States Bankruptcy Code requires the Chapter 13 trustee to return her fee when the debtor's plan is not confirmed. The court found that neither of the two exceptions in § 1326(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code applied to the trustee's fee. The court also rejected the trustee's argument that § 1326(b) authorized her to keep her fee when making pre-confirmation adequate protection payments to creditors, as this provision only addresses payments made after a plan has been confirmed. The court further found that the trustee had no right to keep her fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2), which only addresses the source of funds that may be accessed to pay standing trustee fees.The court concluded that the Chapter 13 trustee must return her fee when the debtor's plan is not confirmed, affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court. View "Marshall v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A group of former employees of Luxury Hotels International of Puerto Rico, operating as Ritz-Carlton Hotel Spa & Casino, sued the company for alleged violations of federal and Puerto Rico law in connection with their discharge after the hotel closed due to Hurricanes Irma and Maria. The employees claimed that Ritz-Carlton violated Puerto Rico Law 80 of 1976, which provides severance pay for employees wrongfully terminated, and the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, which requires employers to provide 60-day notice before mass layoffs.The case was initially filed in a Puerto Rico court but was later moved to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. After discovery, Ritz-Carlton moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Ritz-Carlton on all the employees' claims, denied the employees' motion to strike Ritz-Carlton's exhibits, and dismissed the case. The employees appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that the employees' termination was for "just cause" under Puerto Rico Law 80, as the hotel's closure constituted just cause for their discharge. Regarding the WARN Act claim, the court concluded that even if there had been a violation, various payments that Ritz-Carlton had made to the employees would completely offset Ritz-Carlton's monetary liability. View "Rivera-Pina v. Luxury Hotels International of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The City of Valdez in Alaska appealed two orders by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) related to the transfer of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) from BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. (BPPA) to Harvest Alaska, LLC. The first order (Order 6) approved confidential treatment of certain financial statements submitted by the oil company and its affiliates. The second order (Order 17) approved the transfer of a required certificate and the authority to operate the pipeline. The Superior Court dismissed Valdez’s appeals, concluding that Valdez lacked standing, failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, and the case was moot. The court also ordered Valdez to pay a portion of the attorney’s fees of the oil company and other companies involved in the proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the dismissal of the appeal of Order 6, affirmed the dismissal of the appeal of Order 17, and vacated the award of attorney’s fees. The court found that Valdez had standing to appeal both orders, the appeals were not moot, and Valdez had exhausted administrative remedies with respect to Order 6 but not Order 17. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Valdez v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska" on Justia Law