Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Rick Milteer, a disabled veteran and an observant African American Messianic Jewish believer, was employed by Navarro County, Texas, in its Texoma High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) division as an Information Technology (IT) manager. Milteer alleged that he faced discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. His claims were based on his supervisor's refusal to allow him to work remotely while recovering from surgery and during the Covid-19 pandemic, and his subsequent suspension and termination after he discovered a data breach and reported it.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Navarro County, dismissing all of Milteer's claims. The court found that Navarro County was Milteer's employer and that the County had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Milteer's employment. The court also found that Milteer had failed to produce any evidence that he had informed the County of his disabilities or requested an accommodation from the County.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court found that the district court erred in treating Navarro County and the Texoma HIDTA as separate entities and in failing to impute the actions of Milteer's supervisor to the County. The court held that the Texoma HIDTA was not a legal entity capable of employing individuals, and that the actions and inactions of Milteer's supervisor could be imputed to the County. The court concluded that this error impacted the district court's analysis of Milteer's claims, necessitating a remand for further proceedings. View "Milteer v. Navarro County" on Justia Law

The case involves William Schmidt, an employee of Tesoro Logistics, who was injured while working at a site owned and operated by Hess Corporation. Schmidt claimed that Hess required him to use breathing air equipment, installed by Basin Safety Consulting Corporation, which caused him to trip and fall, injuring his arm and shoulder. He filed negligence and premises liability claims against both Hess and Basin Safety.The District Court of McKenzie County dismissed Schmidt’s claims on summary judgment, ruling that neither Hess nor Basin Safety owed him a duty of care. The court determined that while Hess required Schmidt to wear an air hose, it did not specify the method of using it, thus Hess did not retain control over Schmidt. The court also ruled that Basin Safety did not owe a duty of care to Schmidt as it did not provide training regarding the air hose or have any control over the worksite.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment in favor of Basin Safety but reversed the judgment in favor of Hess. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Hess owed Schmidt a duty of care. The court concluded that evidence indicating Hess required the use of the air hose and prohibited its use in a manner preferred by the workers could be seen as Hess retaining control over the work. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Schmidt v. Hess Corp." on Justia Law

This case revolves around an employment dispute where Renee Vines sued his former employer, O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), alleging causes of action for race- and age-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. A jury found in his favor on his causes of action for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation, but against him on his other causes of action. Vines moved for statutory attorneys’ fees, which the trial court granted but awarded only a portion of the requested amount. Vines appealed, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its determination of the fees.The trial court had initially awarded Vines a reduced amount of attorneys’ fees, based on its determination that Vines's unsuccessful discrimination and harassment causes of action were not closely related to or factually intertwined with his successful retaliation causes of action. Vines appealed this decision, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its determination. On remand, the trial court awarded Vines a significantly larger amount in fees.O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, appealed from the order denying its motion to vacate the renewal of judgment, challenging only the amount of interest on the award of attorneys’ fees. O’Reilly argued that, because the appellate court's decision in the prior appeal was a reversal, not a modification, of the trial court’s initial order, interest on the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded should run from the date of the second order, not the first. The appellate court agreed with O’Reilly, reversed the order denying O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewed judgment, and directed the trial court to grant the motion. View "Vines v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2020, amid pandemic mask mandates and nationwide racial justice protests, Whole Foods Market, Inc. began disciplining employees who wore facemasks to work supporting the Black Lives Matter movement, citing its dress code. The three plaintiff-appellants, Savannah Kinzer, Haley Evans, and Christopher Michno, persisted in wearing these masks, among taking other actions, until the company terminated them, ostensibly for repeated violations of the dress code or attendance policy. The Employees sued under Title VII, alleging retaliation. The district court granted Whole Foods' motion for summary judgment against all three.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that summary judgment was improper against one of the Employees, Savannah Kinzer, an outspoken critic of Whole Foods whose termination arguably deviated from the company's disciplinary process, but affirmed the court's holding as to both Haley Evans and Christopher Michno. The Employees also asked the court to review a discovery order compelling the production of communications whose confidentiality they argue is protected by the National Labor Relations Act. The court declined to reach the merits of that issue. View "Kinzer v. Whole Foods Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2022, Workers United sought to represent 90 employees at a Starbucks Reserve Roastery in Seattle. Due to rising COVID-19 cases, the Regional Director ordered a mail-ballot election, which took place in April 2022. Starbucks refused to recognize and bargain with the union, arguing that the Regional Director should have ordered an in-person election. The Regional Director overruled Starbucks' objection and certified the election results. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Starbucks' refusal to recognize and bargain with the union constituted unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.The NLRB's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Starbucks argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement application because the NLRB had severed the question of whether to adopt a compensatory remedy. The court rejected this argument, holding that the NLRB's order was final and reviewable under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).Starbucks also claimed that the Regional Director abused his discretion by ordering a mail-ballot election instead of an in-person one. The court rejected this argument as well, holding that the Regional Director had correctly applied the NLRB's own law in deciding to hold a mail-ballot election. The court affirmed the NLRB's finding that Starbucks had violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain. The court granted the NLRB's application for enforcement of its order directing Starbucks to recognize and bargain with the union. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. SIREN RETAIL CORPORATION DBA STARBUCKS" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff, an employee of Frank Lill & Son, Inc., claimed to have sustained two separate injuries during his employment. He sent a written notice of claim to his employer and the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The employer, within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff’s notice of claims, mailed a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff’s right to compensation benefits. However, the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period had elapsed. The plaintiff then filed a motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, arguing that the employer had failed to commence payment of the claims or to file a notice of intention to contest the claims within the required timeframe.The administrative law judge granted the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the employer had failed to meet the requirements of the statute, and therefore, the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and were precluded from contesting his claims. The Compensation Review Board upheld the administrative law judge’s decision.The case was then brought before the Connecticut Supreme Court. The defendants argued that they had met their statutory obligation by mailing the notice within the statutory period, and that "mailing" should be considered the same as "filing" for the purposes of the statute. However, the court disagreed, stating that the statutory language was clear that the notice of intention to contest must be delivered, not just mailed, to the administrative law judge within the specified timeframe. The court also noted that the use of different terms in the same statute suggested that the legislature intended for the terms to have different meanings. The court affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board, ruling that the employer had not met its statutory obligation. View "Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Appvion, Inc., a Wisconsin-based paper company, which was sold to its employees through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) in 2001. The company declared bankruptcy in 2017. Grant Lyon, acting on behalf of the ESOP, filed a lawsuit against various individuals and corporations, alleging that they fraudulently inflated the price of Appvion in 2001 and that the price remained inflated until Appvion’s bankruptcy. The district court dismissed almost all the claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of some claims and reversed and remanded others. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims related to actions before November 26, 2012, as they were time-barred under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). However, the court reversed the dismissal of claims related to actions after November 26, 2012, finding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to ensure that the company's valuations were sound. The court also reversed the dismissal of claims alleging that the defendants engaged in prohibited transactions and co-fiduciary liability. The court affirmed the dismissal of state-law claims against the defendants, finding them preempted by ERISA. View "Appvion, Inc. Retirement Savings and Employee Stock Ownership Plan v. Buth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around June LaMarr, an employee at the University of California Davis Medical Center, who was transferred to a different department following performance issues and conflicts with her supervisor. The transfer was initially temporary, but later became permanent, resulting in a decrease in LaMarr's pay. LaMarr sued the Regents of the University of California, alleging that her due process rights were violated as she was not provided a hearing under Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. before her demotion.The trial court found in favor of the Regents. It concluded that LaMarr was not deprived of due process when she was offered the option to either transfer to a non-supervisory position with reduced pay or return to her higher paying supervisory position and face possible termination proceedings. The court reasoned that the Regents never issued a notice of intent to dismiss and that LaMarr's feeling of duress did not trigger due process protections.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, LaMarr appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the finding lacked substantial evidence. She contended that she was not informed of the adverse consequences of accepting a transfer and that her acceptance of the transfer was not voluntary.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. It found substantial evidence that the Regents did not violate LaMarr's due process rights because she was never notified of an intent to terminate and any demotion was voluntary. The court also noted that a difficult choice is not the same as an involuntary choice. It concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the Regents did not deprive LaMarr of due process. View "LaMarr v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Angel Mondragon, an employee of Sunrun Inc., who was required to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. The agreement covered most disputes related to Mondragon’s employment but excluded claims brought under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After his employment ended, Mondragon filed a complaint asserting several causes of action under PAGA. Sunrun filed a motion to compel arbitration of Mondragon’s claims, which the trial court denied. Sunrun appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling on whether Mondragon’s claims were arbitrable.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously denied Sunrun's motion to compel arbitration. The court ruled that it, not the arbitrator, should decide questions of arbitrability. The court also ruled that the arbitration agreement unambiguously excluded PAGA claims and did not differentiate between individual PAGA claims and PAGA claims brought on behalf of other employees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court concluded that Mondragon, an unsophisticated party, did not delegate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator. The court also concluded that the language of the arbitration agreement did not require Mondragon to arbitrate his individual PAGA claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel L. Renner, a groundskeeper for Saginaw County, Michigan, who was part of a bargaining unit represented by the Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Association of Michigan (the Union). Renner opted out of dues-paying membership with the Union in 2017. In 2018, Renner filed a complaint with his employer, alleging that a coworker smoked around him, which was injurious to his health. When Renner attempted to commence a formal grievance procedure, he was informed that only the Union could pursue the grievance procedure. The Union, however, required Renner to pay a fee for its assistance with the grievance under its pay-for-service policy for nonmembers. Renner refused to pay the fee, the Union did not provide assistance, and the deadline for pursuing the grievance expired.Renner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) against the Union, alleging that the Union violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent him in a grievance with his employer unless Renner paid a fee for direct representation services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Renner, concluding that the direct service fee was not permitted under the public employment relations act (PERA) or the collective bargaining agreement and that it constituted an unfair labor practice. MERC adopted the decision of the ALJ, and the Union appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed MERC’s decision.The Union sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the Union’s application in part. The Supreme Court held that under the 2014 version of PERA, a public sector union that is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit violates the union’s duty of fair representation by requiring an employee in that bargaining unit who is not a member of the union to pay a fee for the union’s representative services when the union’s pay-for-service policy denies the nonmember employee access to the grievance administration process under the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the decision of MERC. View "Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Assn v. Renner" on Justia Law