Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, an eight-year-old child disclosed during an interview with a detective in 2016 that her music teacher, defendant Donnie E. Harrell, had touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions during school hours. In 2019, a grand jury indicted Harrell on charges of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, with additional official misconduct charges added in a superseding indictment later that year. In 2021, the trial court approved the admission of the child's entire recorded statement under the "tender years" hearsay exception. However, while preparing for trial in 2022, the child could not recall most of the events she had originally reported.The trial court decided to limit her trial testimony to the one incident she recalled, ruling that her lack of memory rendered her unavailable for cross-examination on the incidents she could not recall, which would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the defendant's right of confrontation was not dependent on the child's ability to recall the details, but on the defendant's opportunity to probe her lack of recollection on cross-examination.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that the admission of the child's entire video-recorded statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, even if she doesn't recall all the details. The court also emphasized that it is essential for the State to act expeditiously in investigating and prosecuting matters that rely heavily on a young child's ability to recall events, to avoid memory decay over time. View "State v. Harrell" on Justia Law

In 2017, defendant Shlawrence Ross was indicted for attempted murder and other offenses following an alleged exchange of gunfire with police officers. During the incident, he was wounded and a bullet lodged in his abdomen. In 2022, on advice of his counsel, he underwent elective surgery to remove the bullet. The state applied for a search warrant to obtain the removed bullet from the hospital and sought all medical records regarding the defendant’s treatment. The trial court denied the applications, reasoning that the bullet was shielded from the State’s access as it resulted from defence counsel’s “conscious litigation choice”. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the Fourth Amendment, concerning search and seizure, rather than the Sixth Amendment and reciprocal discovery rules, was the appropriate legal framework.The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the proper analysis for determining whether the State can obtain this physical evidence rests within the principles of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment would preclude issuing a valid search warrant for the bullet in this case, and the trial court should have determined whether there exists probable cause on which to issue such a warrant. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of probable cause. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the State's witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, but it may have been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, William Hill, in this case. Hill was initially convicted of first-degree carjacking and third-degree witness tampering. While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the carjacking victim, A.Z., asserting his innocence and asking her to reconsider her identification of him as the perpetrator. A.Z. reported the letter to the police, resulting in a charge of witness tampering. The court concluded that Hill's letter did not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely or withhold testimony, leading the Supreme Court of New Jersey to rule that it may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill's case. The court vacated Hill's witness tampering conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge, but did not vacate his carjacking conviction. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

In the case State v. Calvin Fair, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to decide whether a prosecution for terroristic threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), based on a mens rea of recklessness, is constitutional. The defendant, Calvin Fair, following a conflict with the police, had made threatening statements on Facebook, including knowledge of where the police officers lived and what cars they drove. He was charged under a statute which made it a crime to threaten to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.The court held that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), as defined in this context as “morally culpable conduct, involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another.’” The state must also prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as threatening violence. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.The court also held that the jury must unanimously agree on whether the defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. This was because the terroristic threats statute listed in the disjunctive two separately enumerated, alternative crimes of terroristic threats. View "State v. Fair" on Justia Law

On April 28, 2020, defendant Amandeep Tiwana, while driving in Jersey City, struck a police officer and collided with two police cruisers. Defendant and three injured officers were transported to Jersey City Medical Center. Defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.268%, three times the legal limit. Detective Anthony Espaillat of the Regional Collision Investigation Unit of the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office arrived at the hospital and spoke first to the injured officers in the emergency room. Two uniformed police officers were stationed outside the curtain separating defendant’s bed from other patients. Detective Espaillat walked up to defendant’s bed, introduced himself as a detective with the Prosecutor’s Office, and explained that he was assigned to investigate the accident. Espaillat testified that, as soon as he had spoken, defendant immediately complained of chest pain and said “she only had two shots prior to the crash.” Espaillat directed defendant not to make any other statements. He clarified that he did not come to the hospital to ask her questions and that he wanted to interview her at a later date at the Prosecutor’s Office. The entire interaction lasted “less than five minutes.” The next day, defendant went to the Prosecutor’s Office and invoked her Miranda rights. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court consideration was whether the detective’s self-introduction to defendant at her bedside in the hospital initiated a custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent warranting the administration of Miranda warnings. Pretrial, the State moved to admit defendant’s statement at the hospital. The trial court denied the State’s motion and the Appellate Division affirmed. Both courts found that a custodial interrogation occurred at the hospital and the detective’s failure to give Miranda warnings rendered defendant’s statement inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed: defendant was in custody at the hospital in light of the police presence around her bed area. But no interrogation or its functional equivalent occurred before her spontaneous and unsolicited admission. Miranda warnings were therefore not required, and defendant’s statement -- that she “only had two shots prior to the crash” -- was admissible at trial. View "New Jersey v. Tiwana" on Justia Law

Defendants “Divina” and “Javier” were parents to “Ignacio,” born in 2015; “Josefina,” born in 2016; “Antonia,” born in 2019; and “Ian,” born in 2020. The record reflected extensive evidence of domestic violence involving Divina and Javier. In July 2018, the trial court granted the Division of Child Protection and Permanency care, custody, and supervision of Ignacio and Josefina, citing concerns about continuing domestic violence, Divina’s inability to provide a safe environment for the children, and Divina’s mental health. Antonia and Ian were each removed from the home shortly after birth. Ignacio and Josefina were placed together in a resource home; Antonia and Ian were each placed in different resource homes. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether trial courts could still consider the relationships between children and resource families under the fourth prong of the best interests of the child test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), despite a 2021 Amendment that precluded consideration of those relationships under the test’s second prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). The Court concluded that the New Jersey Legislature did not intend to bar trial courts from considering evidence of the child’s relationship with the resource family when addressing the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The Court determined the trial court properly considered the relationships between the children and their resource families, and its determination as to all four prongs of the test were grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the record. View "DCPP v. D.C.A. and J.J.C.B." on Justia Law

In New Jersey v. Olenowski ("Olenowski I"), 253 N.J. 133 (2023), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted for criminal cases a non-exclusive, multi-factor test for the reliability of expert testimony patterned after the standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The issue presented in this case involves whether Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testimony was reliable and admissible under that standard. The Court also considered the appropriate standard of review for Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals. Defendant Michael Olenowski was convicted of drug-impaired driving based in part on DRE evidence. His convictions were upheld on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether DRE testimony was admissible under the “general acceptance” admissibility standard established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Finding that the record was not sufficient to make that determination, the Court asked a Special Master to conduct a hearing. The Special Master concluded that DRE evidence should be admissible under Frye. In Olenowski I, the Court adopted a “Daubert-type standard” for determining the reliability of expert evidence in criminal and quasi-criminal cases and remanded this matter to the Special Master to apply that standard. After remand, the Special Master concluded that the twelve-step DRE protocol satisfied the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702 when analyzed under the methodology-based Daubert standard. The Supreme Court concluded after review that Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals would be reviewed de novo, while other expert admissibility issues were reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Here, the Court found the extensive record substantiated that DRE testimony sufficiently satisfied the Daubert criteria to be admissible, enumerating four limitations and safeguards to be followed in such analysis. View "New Jersey v. Olenowski" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a criminal defendant must be provided in-person interpreting services, rather than video remote interpreting (VRI) services, at his jury trial. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court announced amendments to the New Jersey Judiciary’s Language Access Plan (LAP) and expanded the circumstances in which remote interpreting services may be used. Prior to the update, VRI was allowed only for “emergent matters” or “short non-emergent matters of 30 minutes or less.” The 2022 LAP now allows VRI for both “emergent and routine proceedings,” subject to judicial discretion. In 2019, defendant Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native speaker of Kaqchikel -- a language spoken by approximately 450,000 people worldwide -- was charged with several offenses related to an alleged sexual assault. During pre-trial proceedings, he requested a Kaqchikel interpreter and one was provided. The interpreter, however, resided on the West Coast, so he appeared remotely. Additionally, the Kaqchikel interpreter did not speak English, only Kaqchikel and Spanish, so a second interpreter was required to translate to and from Spanish and English. After the court advised counsel that the Kaqchikel interpreter would continue to participate virtually during the jury trial, defendant moved for in-person interpretation services. During the motion hearing, the Kaqchikel interpreter expressed concerns about his ability to provide interpretation services remotely during the trial. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, advising the Kaqchikel interpreter that the court would give him “as much time as you need, understanding the complexities, not only of interpretations, interpreting through two individuals, and also virtually.” The trial court reasoned that proceeding with VRI during the trial was “what’s financially feasible, what’s fair, what’s just.” The Appellate Division denied defendant’s motion for leave to appeal in light of the VRI policy change. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "In a criminal jury trial, there is a presumption that foreign language interpretation services will be provided in person, which is consistent with the New Jersey Judiciary’s longstanding practice." The Court set forth guidelines and factors to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be used during criminal jury trials, and it remanded this matter for the trial court to reconsider whether VRI was appropriate in this case after assessing those factors. View "New Jersey v. Juracan-Juracan" on Justia Law

The Church of St. Theresa (St. Theresa’s) owned and operated the St. Theresa School. St. Theresa’s terminated art teacher and toddler room caregiver Victoria Crisitello for violating the terms of her employment agreement. That agreement required employees to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and forbade employees from engaging in premarital sex; Crisitello, who was unmarried, had become pregnant. In response to her firing, Crisitello filed a complaint against St. Theresa’s alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), based on pregnancy and marital status. St. Theresa’s countered that its decision to terminate Crisitello was protected by both the First Amendment and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: (1) the “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination; and (2) the uncontroverted fact was that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. The Court thus concluded St. Theresa’s was entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Crisitello v. St. Theresa School" on Justia Law

In November 2017, Defendant Stephen Zadroga was driving over the speed limit when he was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Defendant’s passenger, and best friend, died in the crash. Pursuant to a warrant, the State seized and tested what they thought was Defendant’s blood. The blood alcohol content (BAC) came back as 0.376%, more than four times the legal limit. Relying on that evidence, the grand jury charged Defendant with aggravated manslaughter, death by auto, and three counts of driving while intoxicated. After the nurse who drew defendant’s blood testified for the State at trial, the State realized that the blood they believed to be Defendant’s had actually come from a person who had died seven months before the accident. After the State discovered the error, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the grand jury had relied on false testimony to indict him. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion as to the counts of driving while intoxicated but denied the motion as to counts one and two, aggravated manslaughter and death by auto. The court found that allowing Defendant to be retried on the counts unrelated to intoxication would not violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause both because he consented to the trial’s termination and because there was a manifest necessity to terminate the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed on manifest necessity grounds, adding that while the State could present counts one and two to a new grand jury, it could not present any evidence that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision. Defendant appealed, arguing that a retrial, even on the counts unrelated to intoxication, was barred by both the New Jersey and federal constitutions. Finding no constitutional violation, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Zadroga" on Justia Law