Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Schulte, a co-owner of property in Cedar Lake, Wisconsin, challenged actions by Kenneth J. Leners, chairman of the Town’s Board of Supervisors. The Town maintained a website open to public comments, which Schulte used to criticize a post advocating stricter regulation of recreational vehicles. In response, Leners deleted Schulte’s and other critical comments, banned them from further commenting, and ultimately removed all comments from the post. After threats of legal action, the Board decided to eliminate comment sections from the website entirely, later restoring deleted comments in a separate thread unconnected to the original post.Schulte filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, alleging violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to viewpoint discrimination and vague criteria for regulating the comment section. She also claimed unlawful retaliation when the comment sections were shut down. Leners moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion regarding the counts related to selective deletion of comments, finding Schulte had pleaded viewpoint discrimination and rejecting Leners’s qualified-immunity defense. The court dismissed other unrelated counts and allowed Leners and the Town to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Leners’s selective deletion of comments. The appellate court held that it was clearly established in September 2022 that viewpoint discrimination in a public forum, such as a website comment section open to the public without content restrictions, violates the First Amendment. The lack of any policy regulating comment content made the speech private, not government speech. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Leners and dismissed the Town’s appeal. View "Schulte v Leners" on Justia Law

Several homeowners lost their properties through foreclosure after failing to pay property taxes to Oakland County, Michigan. Although the properties’ values exceeded the tax debts, the County retained all surplus equity rather than refunding the difference to the owners. The affected individuals, represented by attorney Scott Smith and later the McAlpine PC firm, brought suit alleging that this retention violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Both cases were initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed. In the Hall case, the Pacific Legal Foundation represented the plaintiffs pro bono. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the County’s actions constituted a violation of the Takings Clause. The district court subsequently denied motions for class certification and the parties settled for $500,000. Plaintiffs then sought attorney fees totaling over $4.2 million, including hours spent on failed class certification and appeals largely handled by other counsel. The district court reduced the fee request by 40% and applied a 1.1 multiplier, awarding $1,361,476.51.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the fee award for abuse of discretion and determined that the district court erred in several respects. The appellate court held that hours spent on failed class certification, litigation against other defendants, and certain other tasks were not properly billable and should have been categorically excluded. The court also found that the hours claimed for appellate work and by Mark McAlpine were grossly excessive, and that the district court failed to address the reasonableness of the hourly rates. The Sixth Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded, instructing the district court to recalculate fees with specific exclusions, a blended $325 hourly rate, and a 1.1 multiplier. No fees were awarded for the present appeal. View "Sinclair v. Meisner" on Justia Law

A South Carolina lender originates loans only within South Carolina but has extended credit to individuals with Pennsylvania addresses. Although the lender does not operate in Pennsylvania, it has engaged in activities connected to Pennsylvania, such as perfecting liens, collecting payments, and repossessing vehicles located in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities investigated the lender’s practices involving Pennsylvania residents, issuing subpoenas and ultimately initiating a formal administrative enforcement proceeding for alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s usury laws.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment for the lender, finding Pennsylvania’s subpoena violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Pennsylvania could investigate and apply its usury laws to conduct connected to Pennsylvania. Afterward, Pennsylvania enforced its subpoena and initiated the administrative enforcement proceeding. The lender responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking to enjoin both the enforcement proceeding and a new subpoena, raising constitutional claims including those under the Dormant Commerce Clause.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the lender’s complaint, holding that claims related to the enforcement proceeding were barred by issue preclusion or, alternatively, by Younger abstention. Claims challenging the second subpoena were dismissed as unripe due to lack of present injury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims challenging the administrative enforcement proceeding under Younger abstention, finding it was a quasi-criminal civil enforcement proceeding and that state interests and procedures were sufficient. The court also affirmed dismissal of claims challenging the second subpoena on ripeness grounds, but vacated the judgment insofar as those claims were dismissed with prejudice, remanding with instructions to dismiss them without prejudice. View "TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc. v. Spicher" on Justia Law

Several individuals affiliated with an organization headquartered in Florida, which advocates for the rights of African people worldwide, developed a close relationship with a Russian citizen who directed a Russian government-backed group. Over the course of several years, this Russian contact funded trips to Russia for organization leaders, sponsored events, and directed them to produce and disseminate pro-Russian statements and media. These individuals participated in activities at the direction of the Russian contact, including authoring petitions, organizing demonstrations, publishing statements, recording videos, and protesting at the request of their Russian counterpart. None of them notified the U.S. Attorney General as required by law for acting as agents of a foreign government.A federal grand jury indicted three organization members and one former member for acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government under 18 U.S.C. § 951(a), and for conspiracy to do so under 18 U.S.C. § 371. After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy but not of the substantive offense. The district court sentenced the former member to 60 months’ probation and the other three to 36 months’ probation. The defendants raised several arguments on appeal, including claims that the statute was unconstitutional as applied, that the evidence was insufficient, that evidentiary and jury instruction errors occurred, and that there was prosecutorial misconduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. §§ 951 and 371 are constitutional as applied, as they are content-neutral and survive intermediate scrutiny. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy convictions, ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion regarding jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and found no prosecutorial misconduct. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA v. Romain" on Justia Law

Todd Sutton, Jr. was arrested in Iowa for driving with a suspended license, an aggravated misdemeanor. He was taken to the Cerro Gordo County Jail, where officials intended to place him in a communal intake dormitory with other detainees due to his cooperative behavior. Prior to being housed in the dormitory, jail policy required a visual strip search for detainees arrested for at least a serious misdemeanor. During this search, officials discovered a plastic bag containing methamphetamine concealed beneath Sutton’s genitals. Sutton was subsequently indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.Sutton moved to suppress the evidence found during the strip search, arguing it was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The motion was first reviewed by a magistrate judge, who recommended denial. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa adopted the magistrate’s recommendation over Sutton’s objection. Sutton then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, applying a clear error standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions. The Eighth Circuit held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, jail officials may conduct strip searches of detainees who will be housed with others, even absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause, unless substantial evidence shows the search was unnecessary or unjustified. The court found no such evidence in Sutton’s case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding the strip search did not violate Sutton’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

In this case, several major third-party food delivery platforms operating in New York City challenged a city ordinance enacted in 2021. The law required these platforms to share specific customer information—including full name, phone number, email address, delivery address, and order contents—with restaurants upon request. Typically, platforms retain this data and provide only limited details to restaurants. The platforms argued that the law forced them to disclose information about their customers, implicating First Amendment protections against compelled speech.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court determined that the law compelled speech by requiring platforms to share customer data, and concluded that the deferential standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio did not apply. Instead, the court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York and found the law could not survive that review. The district court granted summary judgment to the platforms and permanently enjoined enforcement of the law against their Marketplace products.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The City argued that Zauderer’s deferential standard should apply and, alternatively, that the law was valid under intermediate scrutiny. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that Zauderer did not apply because the law compelled disclosure about third parties, not about the platforms’ own services. Applying Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny, the court found the law failed because the City had not shown a reasonable fit between its interests and the law’s means, especially given less burdensome alternatives. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the law unconstitutional as applied to the platforms’ Marketplace products. View "DoorDash, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

A legal resident of Florida, currently living in Illinois, applied for a Texas escrow-officer license. He is an attorney licensed in at least forty jurisdictions, including Texas, and holds title-producer licenses in twenty-four states. The Texas Department of Insurance denied his application solely because he did not reside in Texas or a state bordering Texas, despite admitting that he met all other licensure requirements. The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement prevented him from serving existing Texas clients, securing new clients, and maintaining relationships with clients who needed title and escrow services in multiple jurisdictions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that it would be “precipitous” to overturn a long-standing statute on a preliminary basis, inferred little irreparable harm due to the plaintiff’s litigation choices in similar cases elsewhere, and found the merits “unclear” given the present record and lack of factual clarity. The plaintiff timely appealed the denial of preliminary relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, determining escrow work is a protected common calling and that Texas had offered no substantial justification for its discriminatory residency requirement. The court also found that irreparable harm existed because sovereign immunity barred damages, and the equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the residency requirement against the plaintiff. View "Polk v. Crawford" on Justia Law

After Puerto Rico experienced several states of emergency, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the government amended its public safety law, Law 20, specifically Article 5.14(a), to criminalize knowingly or recklessly disseminating false information about imminent catastrophes. The law applies during a governor-declared state of emergency or disaster and covers statements made through any medium, including social networks and mass media. Violation of the law can result in misdemeanor or felony charges, depending on the harm caused. Two independent journalists, who had published critical coverage of the government’s handling of emergencies, challenged the constitutionality of Article 5.14(a), arguing it violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the journalists’ claims. The court found Article 5.14(a) to be a content-based regulation, as it distinguished between true and false speech, and applied strict scrutiny. While the government’s interest in public safety was recognized as compelling, the court determined that the statute’s broad restrictions were not narrowly tailored, lacking meaningful limiting features and being both overinclusive and underinclusive. As a result, the district court issued a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of Article 5.14(a). The government’s motion for reconsideration was unsuccessful, leading to a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Article 5.14(a) is a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny, and does not fall within any traditional exceptions to First Amendment protection. The First Circuit found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in public safety and failed to demonstrate necessity or a direct causal link between the restriction and the harm prevented. The injunction against enforcement of Article 5.14(a) was affirmed. View "Rodriguez-Cotto v. Gonzalez-Colon" on Justia Law

Halil Demir, a naturalized U.S. citizen and Executive Director of an international aid organization, frequently travels for work and has received security clearances for certain events. Since 2016, Demir experienced extended airport screening, leading him to suspect wrongful inclusion on the FBI’s Terrorist Watchlist and its Selectee List. After submitting five inquiries through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), he received generic responses that neither confirmed nor denied his watchlist status. Demir then filed suit, alleging violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights and challenging the adequacy of DHS TRIP procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Demir’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, challenges to TSA orders—including those relating to DHS TRIP—must be brought directly in a federal court of appeals. It reasoned that Demir’s claims were essentially contesting a TSA decision, as reflected in the DHS TRIP determination letter, and thus should have originated in the Court of Appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that § 46110 does not apply to Demir’s challenges to his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist and Selectee List, as the TSA does not control these lists—the FBI’s Threat Screening Center does. Thus, the district court has jurisdiction over those claims, and the appellate court reversed and remanded them for consideration on the merits. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Demir’s challenge to the DHS TRIP program itself, holding that the program constitutes an “order” under § 46110 and must be initially reviewed in a court of appeals. View "Demir v Mullin" on Justia Law