Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Darion Baker and Gregory Dees were driving a stolen car from California with plans to reach Tennessee. In Stratford, Texas, police officers Richard Coborn and Michael McHugh became suspicious of their vehicle, followed them to a gas station, and confirmed the car was stolen. As Baker and Dees returned to their car, the officers approached with weapons drawn and gave commands. Baker put the car in drive, and the officers fired shots—first before the car moved, then as Baker drove away. Baker was fatally shot from behind, while Dees was unharmed.The plaintiffs, including Baker’s estate and family, sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted qualified immunity for the shots fired before the car moved and ruled the second round of shots was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court regarding the first round of shots but disagreed about the second round, finding that a jury could decide whether the second round was objectively unreasonable. The panel remanded for the district court to decide whether the right was clearly established.On remand, the district court denied qualified immunity for the second round of shots, finding that the violation was clearly established. The officers appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Coborn’s conduct during the second round of shots constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Coborn was not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots. View "Baker v. Coborn" on Justia Law

A young adult defendant was charged with vandalism and vehicle theft in Santa Clara County. After the prosecution indicated the defendant met initial eligibility requirements for a young adult deferred entry of judgment program under Penal Code section 1000.7, the trial court referred the defendant to the county probation department for further assessment. The probation department determined the defendant was unsuitable for the program because he resided in Alameda County, which did not operate a corresponding program, and concluded that he could not benefit from Santa Clara County’s services due to his residency.The Superior Court of Santa Clara County accepted the probation department’s determination and continued the criminal cases, effectively denying deferred entry of judgment. The defense argued that section 1000.7 did not prohibit out-of-county residents from participating, that the trial court should have authority to make the final eligibility determination, and that if the statute granted exclusive authority to probation, it would violate the constitutional separation of powers. The trial court found the statute unambiguously vested eligibility determinations with the probation department.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or alternative relief. The court held that section 1000.7 gives the probation department—not the trial court—the authority to decide whether a defendant meets the statutory criteria for participation in the deferred entry of judgment program. The court also held that assigning this responsibility to the probation department does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Finally, the court determined that the probation department did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant entry into the program based on his out-of-county residence. The petition was denied. View "Armstrong v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Eric Smith was the majority owner, chairman, and CEO of Consulting Services Support Corporation (CSSC), which wholly owned CSSC Brokerage Services, Inc. (CSSC-BD), a registered FINRA broker-dealer. Although CSSC-BD was registered, Smith did not personally register with FINRA, claiming an exemption so long as he was not involved in managing the securities business. However, between 2010 and 2015, Smith actively managed CSSC-BD, including overseeing debt offerings, preparing offering documents with false statements, and soliciting investments totaling $130,000 from four investors. A FINRA examination and investor complaints uncovered these activities.Following an investigation, FINRA’s Department of Enforcement filed a complaint against Smith for violations of federal securities laws and FINRA rules. After a disciplinary proceeding, FINRA found against Smith and imposed sanctions, including $130,000 in restitution and a bar from associating with any FINRA member. Smith appealed to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which affirmed FINRA’s findings and sanctions. Smith then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that FINRA lacked jurisdiction over him and that the proceedings violated his rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that FINRA had statutory authority to discipline Smith because, despite not registering, he controlled a FINRA member firm and was therefore a “person associated with a member” under the relevant statute. The court found Smith’s constitutional claims barred because he failed to raise them before the SEC as required by statute, and none of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement applied. The petition for review was denied. View "Smith v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Jamaican national who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1971, was removed from the country in 2007 following a 1996 conviction under New York law for the attempted sale of a “narcotic drug.” Many years later, based on a recent Second Circuit decision—United States v. Minter—that held the relevant New York statute was broader than its federal counterpart, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider or reopen his removal order, arguing that the legal basis for his removal no longer applied. He filed this motion within thirty days of the Minter decision.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the petitioner’s motion, concluding that he had not demonstrated the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadlines for such motions. The BIA reasoned that an earlier Second Circuit case, Harbin v. Sessions, should have prompted the petitioner to file sooner. The BIA interpreted the petitioner’s arguments as asserting that Harbin constituted a fundamental change in the law sufficient to support his motion, and therefore found his delay unreasonable.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the BIA mischaracterized the petitioner’s arguments and misunderstood the legal significance of the Harbin and Minter decisions. The court held that the petitioner’s rights to relief did not arise until Minter, and he was not required to file earlier motions based on law that had not yet changed. The Second Circuit therefore held that the BIA abused its discretion, vacated the BIA’s order, granted the petition for review and motion to stay removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Ramsay v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged in Marshall County, West Virginia, with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two victims, one of whom was a child. Before trial, the circuit court allowed the child victim to testify via live, closed-circuit television, as permitted by state statute. However, the petitioner elected to leave the courtroom during the child’s testimony, after which he was convicted on all counts. Following his conviction, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief, raising several claims including the constitutionality of the closed-circuit testimony procedure, the validity of his indictments, his absence from certain pretrial hearings, allegations of improper jury communications, and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Circuit Court of Marshall County initially denied habeas relief without a hearing, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia remanded for an omnibus evidentiary hearing, particularly on ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing concerns. On remand, the circuit court granted relief only on the petitioner’s ex post facto sentencing claim, ordering resentencing on certain counts, and denied all other claims, finding that the petitioner either waived them by not raising them on direct appeal or failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The court held that because the petitioner did not raise his constitutional and procedural claims on direct appeal and failed to rebut the presumption of waiver, those claims could only be considered within the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded the petitioner’s counsel was not deficient under the standards set by Strickland v. Washington and State v. Miller, and that none of the challenged actions or omissions prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The court also held that Crawford v. Washington did not overrule Maryland v. Craig, and the statutory closed-circuit testimony procedure remained constitutional. View "Arthur C. v. Frame" on Justia Law

A man with two prior felony convictions crashed his car late at night in 2023. When law enforcement arrived, he admitted to drinking. Officers found a vodka bottle and a loaded handgun with a magazine on the ground near the vehicle, as well as a second magazine in the car’s front seat. Both magazines matched the firearm, which had been reported stolen. The man’s criminal record included a violent robbery and a prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, among other offenses. Based on these events, he was charged in the Middle District of North Carolina with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. The district court rejected this argument. The defendant then pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue. At sentencing, the Presentence Report determined that the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, setting his base offense level accordingly. The defendant did not object to the report and confirmed his agreement in open court. The district court adopted the report and sentenced him to 66 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed his constitutional and sentencing challenges. The court held that circuit precedent foreclosed both his facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). The court also held there was no error in applying the “large capacity magazine” sentencing enhancement, and that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. Holman" on Justia Law

An inmate in an Arkansas maximum-security unit, who is Muslim, challenged a change in prison policy regarding meals served during Ramadan. Previously, fasting Muslims received a “double-portion” dinner after sunset and a standard breakfast before dawn. In 2023, the prison discontinued the double-portion dinner, providing only standard portions for both meals, but continued to serve them at the appropriate times for religious observance. The meals together provided at least 2,000 calories per day. The inmate often skipped the provided breakfast during Ramadan, preferring to eat commissary food instead, which he could easily obtain.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, granted summary judgment to the prison officials, concluding that the new meal policy did not violate the inmate’s rights under the Eighth Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found that the inmate’s allegations of hunger and physical symptoms were not corroborated by medical evidence, and that the inmate’s ability to supplement with commissary food meant he was not denied adequate nutrition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the prison’s policy did not impose a substantial burden on the inmate’s religious exercise under RLUIPA. The court emphasized that the inmate’s claimed need for 3,000 calories was not rooted in religious belief, but rather based on the institution’s general meal plan. The record showed that the meals provided were nutritionally adequate and that the inmate voluntarily skipped breakfast, supplementing from the commissary. Because the inmate failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact regarding a substantial burden on his religious exercise, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Holt v. Payne" on Justia Law

Peace officers developed probable cause to believe that controlled substances were being distributed from a house in Des Moines. After conducting multiple controlled buys, officers obtained a premises search warrant for the house. On the morning the warrant was executed, Andrew Porter arrived at the house carrying a backpack. About forty minutes later, officers entered and found Porter in the living room; the backpack was in a corner, not within his immediate reach. During the search, Porter repeatedly denied ownership of or knowledge about the backpack, both when questioned outside and inside the house. Officers searched the backpack and found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Porter was arrested and charged with several drug offenses.Porter filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his backpack, arguing that the search violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the motion after reviewing evidence, including bodycam footage. Porter sought and was granted discretionary review to challenge this ruling.The Supreme Court of Iowa addressed whether the federal or state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches prohibits officers executing a search warrant from searching a container on the premises, such as a backpack, capable of holding evidence described in the warrant, when the container is not in a person’s physical possession. The court held that the search of the backpack was within the scope of the premises warrant because it was not in Porter’s physical possession at the time of the search and was a plausible repository for the evidence sought. The court further found that Porter’s repeated denials of any connection to the backpack constituted abandonment, negating any privacy interest. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Porter" on Justia Law

In 2018, a juvenile wardship petition alleged that E.J. committed several offenses, including assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm. E.J. admitted to that charge as part of a negotiated disposition, and the juvenile court found the allegations true, dismissed the remaining counts, declared E.J. a ward of the court, and placed him on probation. In 2019, the court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor, terminated probation, discharged E.J. as a ward, and sealed the record. Despite these actions, E.J. remained subject to a statutory firearm prohibition until age 30 under Penal Code section 29820.In 2025, E.J. filed a motion in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County to terminate the firearm prohibition. The juvenile court denied the motion. E.J. appealed, arguing that Penal Code section 29820 was facially unconstitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming it failed to align with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, improperly used age as a proxy for dangerousness, and did not provide a mechanism for individualized assessment regarding dangerousness.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that section 29820 is not facially unconstitutional. It found that firearm prohibitions based on juvenile adjudications for certain offenses are consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation and that the statute’s application based on prior adjudication—not age alone—does not offend the Second Amendment. The court also held that due process does not require an individualized assessment of dangerousness when the statute’s application is triggered solely by a prior adjudication. The court further found that any as-applied challenge was forfeited because it was not raised in the trial court or in E.J.’s opening brief. The order was affirmed. View "In re E.J." on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against an individual in July 2024, alleging multiple counts of lewd acts, forcible lewd acts, and continuous sexual abuse of four minors, all of whom are his grandchildren. The prosecution also alleged a multiple victim enhancement. At an initial arraignment, the magistrate court set bail and imposed protective orders. Later, the prosecution moved to have the defendant held without bail, citing the danger he posed to the community. At a Humphrey hearing, the prosecution presented testimony and evidence suggesting repeated sexual abuse over many years, including admissions by the defendant. The magistrate court found this evidence reliable and determined that nonfinancial conditions of release would not protect the public or victims, ordering the defendant held without bail.The defendant challenged the no-bail order in the Superior Court of Fresno County through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argued the magistrate court abused its discretion, particularly in considering the prosecution’s request for remand without bail absent a change in circumstances, and asserted there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of substantial likelihood of great bodily harm. The superior court issued an order to show cause on these specific issues but ultimately denied the petition after considering the parties’ responses.Upon further review, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, was directed by the California Supreme Court to address whether Penal Code section 292 constitutes an impermissible legislative extension of the constitutional terms “acts of violence” and “great bodily harm,” and whether, absent section 292, clear and convincing evidence supported denial of bail. The appellate court held that section 292 is a valid legislative implementation, not an invalid extension, of the bail exception in article I, section 12 of the California Constitution. The court further found that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant’s release would pose a substantial likelihood of great bodily harm, and denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Bergstrom" on Justia Law