Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A grand jury in the District of Maine indicted a noncitizen for knowingly possessing a firearm while being “illegally or unlawfully” in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). The statute prohibits firearm possession by noncitizens who are not lawfully present in the country. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights both on its face and as applied to him.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the motion to dismiss. It held that the defendant was among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, relying in part on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. The court then found that the government failed to demonstrate, under the test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, that the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation as applied to the defendant. The court concluded that the government had not met its burden because it did not provide direct historical analogues and relied on secondary sources. As a result, the indictment was dismissed, and the government appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s application of the Bruen framework de novo. The First Circuit determined that, even assuming the defendant was protected by the Second Amendment, the government had shown that § 922(g)(5)(A) fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on English common-law practices, colonial and founding-era laws, and analogues disarming groups considered outside the political community. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the statute is constitutional as applied in this case. View "US v. Rebollar Osorio" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for possessing a firearm while being an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that, as applied to him, the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The District Court denied his motion, finding that, even assuming the Second Amendment protected him, the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The appellant then pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and timely appealed his conviction, preserving his constitutional challenge.The appeal was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The government argued that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, both because the appellant was not among “the people” whom the Amendment protects, and because, even if he was, the statute was consistent with historical tradition. The First Circuit, like the District Court, did not resolve whether the Second Amendment’s text covered the appellant, relying instead on the second step of the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.Applying the Bruen framework, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi, the First Circuit held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical analogues, including laws disarming those without allegiance to the sovereign, supported the regulation. The court concluded that the government met its burden to show that the statute is relevantly similar to such historical regulations. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and rejected the appellant’s Second Amendment challenge. View "US v. Vizcaino-Peguero" on Justia Law

During a December 2023 election recount at the Oakland County Courthouse in Michigan, Andrew Hess, serving as an observer, raised concerns about ballot-box tampering with the county’s director of elections, Joseph Rozell. Following a tense exchange, Hess left the recount room and, in the courthouse lobby, remarked to another member of the public, “hang Joe for treason.” The comment was overheard by a county receptionist, who later reported it to law enforcement. Although Hess was not removed from the event, months later Oakland County prosecutors charged him with a felony under Michigan’s terrorist-threat statute for this statement. The charge was initially dismissed after the Michigan Court of Appeals found the statute facially unconstitutional, but the Michigan Supreme Court later vacated that decision, and the potential for prosecution was revived.In response, Hess filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, primarily arguing that the prosecution violated his First Amendment rights. He also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent any renewed prosecution under the statute. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding Hess unlikely to succeed on his constitutional claims and failing to demonstrate irreparable harm.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that while Hess was likely to succeed on the merits of his as-applied First Amendment claim—concluding his statement did not constitute a true threat—he had not shown irreparable harm because any threatened prosecution targeted only his past speech, not future speech. Furthermore, Michigan’s state-court procedures offered him a fair and prompt opportunity to litigate his First Amendment defense. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "Hess v. Oakland County" on Justia Law

A man who was born in India entered the United States illegally and sought asylum, which was denied. He then submitted a second asylum application under a false identity and later married a U.S. citizen, using the same false information to obtain permanent residency and, eventually, naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After obtaining a U.S. passport and reentering the country, he was questioned by border agents and gave false answers regarding his identity. As a result, he was charged with using a fraudulently obtained passport and making false statements to federal agents. He pleaded guilty to the passport charge, with the other charge dismissed, and was sentenced to probation. Both his plea agreement and the district court informed him of potential immigration consequences, including possible loss of citizenship.Later, the government initiated denaturalization proceedings, alleging that he had illegally procured citizenship through fraud and misrepresentation. The man petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not advise him that his guilty plea could lead to denaturalization. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding he had not shown a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would have chosen a different course. After a Second Circuit decision in Farhane v. United States adopted a broader view of counsel’s obligations, he sought reconsideration, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal and held that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense attorneys to advise naturalized citizens that a guilty plea may carry the risk of denaturalization and eventual deportation. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

A former software developer and naval reservist from Virginia, the defendant became the subject of a federal investigation after participating in the events of January 6, 2021, for which he was later pardoned. In the following months, he purchased several firearms and accessories, including devices labeled as “solvent traps” from an online retailer. These devices, although purportedly for cleaning firearms, were constructed in a manner similar to silencers, with features such as threaded ends and internal baffles. The defendant discussed with an undercover FBI employee how these devices could be converted into silencers, despite not possessing the necessary tools for such modification.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard the case after a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory definition of a silencer was unconstitutionally vague and that his conviction would violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied these motions and, after a mistrial, the second jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory definition of a silencer, which does not require operability or exclude dual-use devices. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as the devices’ design and the defendant’s statements supported their classification as silencers. The court also determined the NFA was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Finally, the court concluded that, even if silencers are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s shall-issue registration regime is presumptively constitutional and the defendant had not shown otherwise. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Hatchet Speed" on Justia Law

In June 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protestors established the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP), occupying a sixteen-block area in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. In response, the Seattle Police Department abandoned its East Precinct and significantly reduced police presence in the affected area, including Cal Anderson Park. The protests and encampments continued to cause disruption, vandalism, and crime for months, with CHOP forcibly disbanded on July 1, 2020, but neighborhood disturbances persisting until December 2020. Two businesses located near Cal Anderson Park, one a restaurant and the other a property owner, claimed that the City’s actions and inaction led to severe economic losses, including lost revenue, property damage, and tenant departures.Previously, these businesses were absent putative class members in the Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which raised similar claims. After class certification was denied and the case settled, the businesses filed individual lawsuits in April and June 2023, consolidated in the district court. The district court dismissed the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, and found their nuisance claims untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but did not initially decide on equitable tolling pending further guidance from the Washington Supreme Court. After the Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC decision, the district court dismissed the nuisance claims and entered final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not extend to purely economic harm and that the cessation of police services did not constitute a compensable taking. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the nuisance claims, holding that equitable tolling under American Pipe is available under Washington law, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Adam Blocker used Dropbox, a cloud storage service, to share files, some of which contained child pornography. Dropbox detected these illegal files through its own monitoring, as permitted by its terms of service, and reported them to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Following this report, NCMEC notified federal authorities, which led the FBI to obtain a search warrant for Blocker’s digital storage. The subsequent search uncovered additional illegal images. Blocker pleaded guilty to two counts related to possession and distribution of child pornography, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Dropbox and his devices.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Judge Lee denied Blocker’s suppression motion. The court concluded that Blocker had consented to Dropbox’s search and disclosure of his files by agreeing to its terms of service. Blocker argued that the terms were not specific or clear enough to constitute voluntary consent, especially because NCMEC is a government-affiliated entity. After Judge Lee’s elevation to the appellate court, the case was transferred to Chief Judge Kendall, who oversaw Blocker’s sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Blocker’s acceptance of Dropbox’s terms of service constituted effective consent for Dropbox to scan his files and disclose them for certain purposes, including reporting to authorities. The court rejected Blocker’s argument that the consent was invalid because the terms did not obligate Dropbox to search every file or regularly disclose information. The Seventh Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding of consent, and thus upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Blocker" on Justia Law

An adjunct clinical professor at a university dental school supervised students in a clinic that, during the summer of 2022, required faculty and students to wear heavy protective equipment as part of its COVID-19 response. Ongoing building renovations left the clinic without adequate air conditioning, making the protective gear uncomfortable and allegedly hazardous due to heat. The professor expressed his opposition to the policy through mass emails, a formal health complaint to the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MiOSHA), and remarks at a school meeting. Some colleagues agreed with his concerns, while others found his communications unprofessional. After an internal investigation found his behavior violated university policies, the professor was asked to complete educational modules on workplace conduct. When he refused, he was terminated.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the professor’s First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various dental school administrators. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that neither the MiOSHA complaint nor the professor’s statements at the meeting addressed matters of public concern and that his meeting remarks were made in his capacity as a public employee.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that neither the MiOSHA complaint nor the meeting speech involved matters of public concern as required for First Amendment protection in the public employment context. The court emphasized that the professor’s speech focused on workplace conditions and employee grievances rather than broader issues of public import or patient safety. Because the professor failed to show he spoke on a matter of public concern, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. View "Stanalajczo v. Perry" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in 2017, was charged with multiple felonies, including attempted murder, after stabbing his romantic partner 17 times while she was hospitalized. He pleaded guilty to willfully inflicting traumatic injury on a partner, having a prior conviction for the same offense, and the prosecution dismissed the other counts. The sentencing judge imposed the upper term of five years for this conviction, doubled it due to a prior strike, and added enhancements for prior convictions and weapon use, resulting in a 17-year prison sentence.Following legislative changes in 2021 that invalidated enhancements for prior prison terms and required full resentencing in affected cases, the defendant sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. During resentencing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the court struck the one-year enhancements for the prior prison term and weapon use but otherwise maintained the upper-term sentence for the underlying offense. The court justified the upper term based on the admitted prior conviction and weapon use, which were acknowledged in the defendant’s original plea.On appeal, the defendant argued that the resentencing court exceeded its authority by reimposing the upper term without a jury finding, or his stipulation to, the aggravating factors, citing Sixth Amendment concerns. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, considered whether Penal Code section 1172.75 required new factfinding for upper-term sentences at resentencing when the upper term had already been imposed in compliance with constitutional requirements.The Court of Appeal held that when a defendant was originally sentenced to the upper term, the resentencing court may reimpose that term without requiring a jury finding or a stipulation to the aggravating factors. The court concluded this result is consistent with the statutory language and constitutional requirements. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Moss" on Justia Law

A high school student in Wyoming was repeatedly suspended and eventually arrested for refusing to comply with her school district’s indoor mask mandate, which was implemented during a local COVID-19 surge. The student and her parents sued the school district, various trustees, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of their federal and state rights. Their federal claims asserted that the mask mandate compelled speech and resulted in unlawful retaliation against the student for protesting, both under the First Amendment, and that she was deprived of her property interest in a public education without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.The case was initially filed in Wyoming state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. That court first dismissed the federal claims for lack of standing, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient injury. On remand, the district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental state-law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the mask mandate compelled any specific message and thus failed to state a compelled-speech claim. The court also found that the student’s refusal to wear a mask was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that her participation in protest activities was not plausibly alleged to be the but-for cause of her discipline, defeating the retaliation claim. Regarding due process, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the student received sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before her suspensions, satisfying procedural due process. The court also concluded that no substantive due process violation occurred. Finally, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the state-law claims. View "Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1" on Justia Law