Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant was convicted by a jury in 2018 of several offenses, including aggravated assault, sexual assault, assault on a peace officer, escape, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. After initially having court-appointed counsel, he retained private attorneys under a fixed-fee contract, with his grandmother paying $150,000 upfront. Ten months later, the relationship between the appellant and his retained counsel deteriorated to the point of a complete breakdown, leading counsel to seek withdrawal. The court held a hearing, found an irreconcilable breakdown, allowed withdrawal, and appointed new counsel. The appellant was then represented by court-appointed attorneys through his trial and sentencing. His conviction and subsequent claims of error, including those relating to ineffective assistance of counsel, were affirmed on direct appeal, and his petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.In postconviction proceedings before the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, the appellant asserted numerous grounds for relief, focusing on claims of ineffective assistance by retained trial counsel (for seeking withdrawal but keeping the fixed fee) and by appellate counsel (for not arguing that separate counsel should have been appointed at the withdrawal hearing). After a bench trial and extensive litigation, the District Court denied all claims, finding no constitutional violations. The court also noted that the appellant’s dispute over fees had been separately resolved through mediation and civil proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the circumstances did not demonstrate a structural denial of counsel warranting a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, nor did the fixed-fee contract create an actual conflict of interest resulting in ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The Court further found that appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the claim regarding appointment of separate counsel at the withdrawal hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "Briggs v. State" on Justia Law

In January 2008, Michael L. King kidnapped Denise Amber Lee from her home, where she was caring for her two young children. King took her to his house, bound and sexually assaulted her over several hours, then forced her into his car to obtain supplies to dispose of her body. During this ordeal, Lee managed to call 911 while still bound in King’s car. King ultimately drove Lee to an abandoned construction site, shot her, and buried her. King was apprehended later that day after his car was identified by a witness. Forensic evidence linked King to the crime, and Lee’s body was recovered two days later.The case proceeded to the Circuit Court for Sarasota County, where a jury convicted King of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and kidnapping. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, and the trial court imposed a death sentence, finding four statutory aggravating factors and various mitigating circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed King’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. King’s subsequent motions for postconviction relief in state and federal courts were denied. His challenges included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, constitutional defects in Florida’s lethal injection procedures, and newly discovered mitigating evidence. These were consistently rejected by the lower courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.After a death warrant was signed, King filed a successive postconviction motion and sought additional records, arguing that alleged irregularities in the execution protocol violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights and that new evidence warranted relief. The Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit denied these claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that King was not entitled to additional public records, found his constitutional claims speculative and unsubstantiated, and determined his claims of newly discovered evidence were untimely, procedurally barred, and without merit. The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied a stay of execution. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

Four individuals alleged that they owned funds subject to Ohio’s unclaimed property regime and that their funds were set to escheat, or transfer, to the state as of January 1, 2026, due to recent amendments to Ohio’s Unclaimed Funds Act. The Act requires holders of unclaimed funds to remit those funds to the state after a period of dormancy, with additional amendments providing that funds held for ten years or more would escheat to the state, although owners would still have ten additional years to claim an equivalent amount, with interest, less expenses.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against state officials responsible for implementing the Act. They argued that the statutory regime violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and various Ohio laws. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the escheatment of their funds, claiming they received insufficient notice and would suffer irreparable harm. The district court denied the request, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm, particularly since they could still claim the funds from the state after escheatment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm because they retained a statutory avenue to recover their funds with interest after escheatment and could seek a monetary judgment if their constitutional claims succeeded. The court further determined that the plaintiffs either had actual notice of their funds or failed to identify specific property at risk, so no likelihood of irreparable harm was shown. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Bleick v. Maxfield" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic violence report in which a woman’s daughter informed emergency responders that her mother’s boyfriend had assaulted her mother and was armed with a gun. Officers were told the suspect’s name, his car model, and that he was armed. Upon arrival, the officers spoke with both the victim and her daughter, who confirmed the assault and that the suspect had threatened the victim with a gun, describing it as “small.” The suspect was seen leaving the apartment building, and despite a canine search and a pat-down after his detention near his orange Dodge, neither he nor the gun was initially located. A search of the car, using the suspect’s keys, revealed a pistol under the front passenger seat.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun found in the vehicle, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, holding that officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime—a gun used in a reported assault—would be found in the defendant’s vehicle based on the information provided by witnesses and police observations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether officers had probable cause for the search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court held that the officers had a “fair probability” to believe the gun would be in the car, given the eyewitness reports, the absence of the gun on the suspect or in the immediate area, and the fact that the suspect was found in the vehicle. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, concluding the search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

The case centers on events that unfolded after Isaias Valencia, under the influence of methamphetamine and cocaine, fled police attempting to stop him for suspected drunk driving in Pomona, California. After leading officers on a reckless high-speed chase that ended in a crash, Valencia ran to his apartment, barricaded himself in a bedroom, and refused to surrender. An overnight standoff ensued, during which Valencia fatally shot one officer and seriously wounded another. The police, including a SWAT team, eventually forced entry and apprehended him. Laboratory tests later confirmed the presence of drugs in his system.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County tried and convicted Valencia of multiple felonies, including murder, four counts of attempted murder, three counts of assault with a firearm, felon in possession of a gun, and felony evasion. The jury found that the officers were lawfully performing their duties and that the murder was committed to prevent a lawful arrest. The trial court sentenced Valencia to life without parole plus additional years. Valencia appealed, challenging the warrantless entry into his apartment, the number of convictions based on the number of bullets fired, and aspects of his sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that exigent circumstances—including hot pursuit of a fleeing felon and the need to preserve dissipating evidence—justified the initial warrantless entry, and police were not required to obtain a warrant during the standoff. The court also rejected the argument that the number of shooting convictions must match the number of shots fired, finding that assault with a firearm does not require a shot to be fired. However, the court agreed that sentencing errors occurred and remanded for correction, affirming the judgment in all other respects. View "People v. Valencia" on Justia Law

The case arose after a technology company, using hash-matching technology, flagged files uploaded to a user’s cloud storage account as child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and reported them to a national crimes center, as required by federal law. Some of the files were reviewed and confirmed by company employees, while others were not. The report was forwarded to law enforcement in Virginia, but after a delay, the investigation shifted to North Carolina, where the user had moved. There, local law enforcement conducted two consensual interviews with the user, obtained consent to search his devices, and later executed a search warrant at his home, discovering additional CSAM.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the user’s motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud storage files due to the service provider’s privacy policy, the contraband nature of CSAM, and the reliability of the hash-matching process. Alternatively, the district court found that even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, suppression was not warranted because the connection between the warrantless search and the later discovered evidence was too attenuated, citing the exclusionary rule’s attenuation doctrine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored in cloud-based accounts, and that law enforcement’s warrantless opening and viewing of such files violates the Fourth Amendment unless a warrant or exception applies. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of suppression, holding that the evidence eventually used against the user was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search due to significant temporal gaps and intervening voluntary acts, such as interviews and consent to search, making suppression unwarranted. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Lowers" on Justia Law

Several individuals who participate in West Virginia’s Medicaid program and have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria sought surgical treatments that are excluded from coverage under West Virginia’s Medicaid plan. The state plan expressly excludes coverage for “sex change” or “transsexual” surgeries, though it covers these procedures for other medical indications, such as cancer or congenital abnormalities. The plaintiffs, representing a class of similarly situated individuals, alleged that this exclusion discriminates against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, and certain provisions of the Medicaid Act.In proceedings before the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on all claims. The court found that the exclusion was unlawful under the Equal Protection Clause, the Affordable Care Act’s anti-discrimination provision, and the Medicaid Act’s comparability and availability requirements. The district court issued a declaratory judgment and enjoined enforcement of the exclusion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed the district court’s judgment. The state defendants then sought review by the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, vacated the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of two recent Supreme Court cases: United States v. Skrmetti and Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic.Upon reconsideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that, under Skrmetti, West Virginia’s exclusion does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Affordable Care Act, because the exclusion is based on medical diagnosis rather than sex or transgender status and is supported by rational, non-discriminatory reasons. Applying Medina, the court further held that the Medicaid Act’s comparability and availability requirements do not provide a private right of action, and thus plaintiffs could not sue under those provisions. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the defendants. View "Anderson v. Crouch" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement.After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and organizations challenged rules of decorum established by certain Colorado state legislators during public hearings on legislation concerning transgender rights. The rules prohibited misgendering and deadnaming—referring to transgender individuals in ways inconsistent with their gender identity or using names they no longer use. The plaintiffs asserted that these rules violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their speech during legislative hearings and by removing certain comments from the official legislative record.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case after the legislators, sued in both their official and individual capacities, moved to dismiss. The legislators argued that they were protected by legislative immunity, that the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits, and that the requests for relief were moot. The district court granted the legislators’ motion to dismiss, holding that the rules and their enforcement were within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and thus subject to absolute legislative immunity. The court also found the matter moot regarding prospective relief, concluding it was speculative whether the plaintiffs would face the same situation again.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs continued to seek relief and the legislators confirmed that the challenged rules would remain in effect. However, the Tenth Circuit found that legislative immunity applied, protecting legislators from suit for actions taken in their legislative capacity, regardless of whether the relief sought was prospective or retrospective, or whether the suit was brought against them in their individual or official capacities. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims due to the application of legislative immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Gays Against Groomers v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 1995, a woman was murdered in Houston, and Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Years later, Ayestas’s counsel discovered an internal memorandum from the prosecution recommending the death penalty in part because Ayestas was not a U.S. citizen. This memorandum had not been disclosed during Ayestas’s trial. Ayestas then sought to amend his federal habeas petition to add Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment selective-prosecution claims, arguing that the prosecution’s decision was improperly influenced by his non-citizen status.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Ayestas’s motion to amend, finding it constituted a “second or successive habeas corpus application” barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claims could have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the law on what constitutes a “second or successive” application, prompting Ayestas to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The district court granted this motion, allowed discovery on Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims, and ordered the Harris County District Attorney’s Office (HCDA) to produce decades of charging memoranda and the full prosecutorial file.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the discovery order was immediately appealable by the HCDA under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims because both his 2015 motion to amend and his later Rule 60(b) motion constituted successive habeas applications barred by § 2244(b). The court concluded that Ayestas had not shown the claims were based on a new rule of constitutional law or that the underlying facts could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the discovery order and dismissed the selective-prosecution claims. View "Ayestas v. Harris County" on Justia Law