Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple, acting on behalf of their minor child, challenged West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law after their daughter was disenrolled from a public virtual school because she was not fully vaccinated. The parents sought a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement, but were informed that only medical exemptions—based on specific medical contraindications or precautions certified by a physician—are permitted under state law. After being denied a religious exemption, the parents filed suit, claiming that the absence of a religious exemption violated their First Amendment right to freely exercise their Christian faith. They requested a preliminary injunction to allow their daughter’s re-enrollment in the virtual academy during the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the parents were likely to succeed on their free exercise claim. The district court applied the test from Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, concluding that the vaccination law was not generally applicable, and thus subject to strict scrutiny, which it found the law did not survive.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of preliminary relief. The Fourth Circuit held that West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law is a neutral and generally applicable measure enacted under the state’s police power to protect public health, as recognized in longstanding Supreme Court precedent including Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Prince v. Massachusetts. The court found that the medical exemption process does not constitute a “mechanism for individualized exemptions” that would undermine general applicability under cases such as Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the law is subject to rational basis review, which it easily satisfies, and that the Free Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions simply because medical exemptions exist. The court reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "Perry v. Marteney" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A sitting circuit court judge was the subject of an impeachment petition submitted to the Kentucky House of Representatives by a former legislator who was not a party to any of the cases he cited. The petition alleged that the judge abused her discretion in six cases; five of these cases were still pending in the judicial system at the time. The petition did not include an affidavit, as required by Kentucky statute. The House referred the matter to its Impeachment Committee, which held a hearing and ultimately issued articles of impeachment against the judge. The Kentucky Senate scheduled a trial on these articles.The judge sought a temporary injunction in Franklin Circuit Court to stop the impeachment proceedings. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the injunction. She then sought emergency relief and review from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also denied relief. The judge subsequently filed emergency motions and a petition for a supervisory writ with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, seeking a declaration that the impeachment articles and proceedings violated the separation of powers and her due process rights, and requesting that they be declared void from the outset.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted the petition for a supervisory writ. The Court held that the impeachment petition was invalid because it was not verified by affidavit, as required by statute. The Court further held that the allegations concerned discretionary judicial acts subject to correction through the appellate process or Judicial Conduct Commission proceedings, not impeachment, and that the Legislature’s actions violated the separation of powers. The Court also found that the impeachment process denied the judge due process, and that further proceedings would cause her irreparable harm. The Court enjoined the General Assembly from continuing the impeachment proceedings and ordered dismissal of the pending articles. View "GOODMAN V. NEMES" on Justia Law

A public hospital district in California established and recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) in 1991 for a common interest development known as the Tulare Medical Center. These CC&Rs included a prohibition on abortion clinics within the development. In 2001, certain property subject to these CC&Rs was transferred to individual owners, who later sought to lease it to a family planning organization that provides a range of services, including abortion. The property owners association, comprised of all parcel owners and authorized to enforce the CC&Rs, objected to the lease and sought to enjoin the operation of the clinic, arguing that any abortion services would violate the CC&Rs.The Superior Court of Tulare County reviewed the association’s request for a preliminary injunction. After considering the parties’ submissions and arguments, the court denied the injunction. The court found there was a credible threat that abortion services would be provided but concluded the association had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Specifically, the trial court noted unresolved legal questions regarding whether restrictions on abortion clinics in CC&Rs violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act or California constitutional protections, and found the association failed to demonstrate that the balance of harms favored an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the prohibition on abortion clinics, adopted by a public entity, constituted government action that interfered with the fundamental constitutional right to reproductive choice under the California Constitution. The court applied the compelling interest test, found no compelling interest justifying the restriction, and concluded the prohibition violated fundamental public policy. Additionally, the court held that the prohibition was void under Civil Code section 53 because it indirectly limited property use based on a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Tulare Medical Center Property v. Valdivia" on Justia Law

A retired public employee who was a participant in the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) filed suit against the State Treasurer, challenging the constitutionality of the Energy Discrimination Elimination Act of 2022 (EDEA). The EDEA required companies doing business with the state to certify they do not boycott energy companies, and it compelled state entities, including OPERS, to divest from financial companies that used ESG (environmental, social, and governance) principles if those companies were deemed to boycott energy companies. The plaintiff claimed the Act violated several provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution, particularly the requirement that public retirement system funds be used solely for exclusive purposes related to the retirement system.The District Court for Oklahoma County granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, issuing a permanent injunction preventing the Treasurer from enforcing the EDEA with respect to OPERS. The court found the Act violated multiple constitutional provisions, including the exclusive purpose clause of Article XXIII, §12 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The Treasurer appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, and the Supreme Court retained the appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the plaintiff’s death after the case was submitted did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. The Court concluded the plaintiff had standing as a retiree with a direct interest in OPERS. Most significantly, the Court determined that the EDEA is unconstitutional in its entirety when applied to OPERS, because it creates a dual purpose for retirement system funds, contrary to the exclusive purpose mandated by Article XXIII, §12 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part the District Court’s judgment, upholding the permanent injunction against enforcement of the EDEA as applied to OPERS. View "KEENAN v. RUSS" on Justia Law

This case involves several dialysis providers, a nonprofit organization, and individual patients challenging a California law (AB 290) aimed at regulating relationships between dialysis providers and nonprofits that assist patients with health insurance premiums. The law was enacted due to concerns that providers were donating to nonprofits to help keep patients on private insurance, which led to higher reimbursements for providers compared to public insurance. Key provisions of the law included capping provider reimbursements if they had a financial relationship with a nonprofit offering patient assistance, requiring disclosure of patients receiving such assistance, restricting nonprofits from conditioning assistance on patient treatment choices, mandating disclosure to patients of all insurance options, and a safe harbor for seeking federal advisory opinions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment. It upheld the constitutionality of the reimbursement cap, coverage disclosure requirement, and safe harbor provision, but found the anti-steering, patient disclosure, and financial assistance restriction provisions unconstitutional. The district court also ruled that the unconstitutional parts were severable from the remainder of the statute and rejected claims that federal law preempted the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the reimbursement cap, patient disclosure requirement, and financial assistance restriction violated the First Amendment because they burdened the rights of expressive association and were not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests. The court found the coverage disclosure requirement constitutional under the standard for compelled commercial speech, as it required only factual, uncontroversial information reasonably related to a state interest. However, it concluded that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the coverage disclosure requirement. The court also held challenges to the safe harbor provision moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "DOE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The defendant, a patient at a community mental health center, was informed by his career counselor that he had been dismissed from classes at UNH Manchester and would be removed by security if he returned to campus. Distressed by this news, he insisted he would still attend his evening class. In communications with his counselor and later his therapist, he reiterated his plan to attend, culminating in a statement asking if “doing a mass shooting” would be required for him to get what he wanted. When told his statement would be reported, he claimed it was a figure of speech. The counselor reported his comments to the treatment team and local police, in accordance with center policy. Law enforcement notified UNH Manchester, which took security precautions, and later apprehended the defendant. He was indicted for criminal threatening based on his statements.Prior to trial in the Superior Court, the defendant sought to exclude the testimony of his counselor and therapist regarding his statements, asserting the therapist-patient privilege, and also moved to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. The Superior Court denied both motions, finding an “essential need” for the privileged communications and concluding that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty. The jury convicted the defendant of criminal threatening.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the privileged communications and whether the evidence was sufficient for conviction. The court held that the State demonstrated an “essential need” to pierce the therapist-patient privilege due to the centrality of the communications to the charged offense and the compelling public safety interest in investigating threats of mass violence. The court also found the evidence sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for causing fear, terror, or public inconvenience. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle after observing what appeared to be a nonfunctional headlight. During the stop, the officer asked the driver for his license, but the driver stated he did not have it and instead provided his name, date of birth, and Social Security number. Soon after, the officers realized the headlight was actually working, but the stop continued so the officer could verify the driver’s information. Dispatch reported that the driver had failed to reinstate his license and had an outstanding warrant. The driver was then arrested, and a search of the vehicle uncovered drugs and a scale, leading to felony charges.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied. The defendant then entered a no-contest plea and was convicted. On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the officer should have ended the stop once it became clear the headlight was operational. The appellate court held that continuing to detain the defendant after the original reason for the stop was dispelled rendered the subsequent search and evidence unlawful.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that, under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may verify a driver’s license status as part of the mission of a lawfully initiated traffic stop, even if the suspicion that justified the stop is later dispelled. The court further held that the driver’s failure to produce a license provided new reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and investigate whether he was unlicensed. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Fips" on Justia Law

William Walls was found by an Illinois state court to be a sexually violent person in 2015, leading to his civil commitment under Illinois law. The commitment was based, in part, on statements he made or that were made by his treatment providers while he was incarcerated for a prior sexual assault conviction. Walls has argued that these statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. After his commitment, his case involved extensive delays, including a twelve-year period before the initial commitment decision and seven years before the state appellate court resolved the appeal filed by his counsel.After the 2015 commitment order, Walls—sometimes proceeding pro se despite being represented—filed a series of appeals and petitions. The Illinois Appellate Court eventually affirmed both the 2015 and a subsequent 2018 recommitment decision in a consolidated opinion. Walls’s first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois on procedural default grounds. He did not appeal that dismissal. After the 2018 recommitment proceeding, Walls filed a second federal habeas petition, which was dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) because it challenged the same 2015 order or did not raise new claims as required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Walls’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, to the extent Walls was once again contesting the 2015 commitment order, his petition was barred as a successive habeas application. Alternatively, if he was challenging later decisions, he had failed to raise or exhaust federal claims relating to those decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Walls’s petition. View "Walls v Posey" on Justia Law

After his wife disappeared in May 2020, the plaintiff became the primary suspect in her case. Significant evidence was collected, and law enforcement focused on the possibility that he had staged the scene to make it appear as an abduction. Despite his consistent claims of innocence and multiple meetings with investigators, prosecutors charged him with first-degree murder in May 2021, even though his wife's body had not been found. Before trial, the defense discovered that prosecutors had withheld exculpatory evidence, leading the State to dismiss charges without prejudice. The plaintiff then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against various officials involved in his arrest and prosecution, alleging fabrication of evidence, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and related claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the complaint, the lengthy arrest affidavit, and the parties' arguments. It granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff’s allegations failed to plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution. The court noted the presence of extensive inculpatory facts and determined that the complaint did not sufficiently link individual defendants to the alleged misconduct. Certain claims were also dismissed as conclusory, and some defendants were found to have immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s federal claims for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence under the Fourth Amendment, Franks violations, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and municipal liability all required plausible allegations that probable cause was lacking, which the complaint did not provide. The court also found the Fourteenth Amendment claims for fabrication of evidence and reckless investigation deficient due to lack of causal allegations. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Morphew v. Chaffee County" on Justia Law