Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

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A city ordinance criminalizes broadcasting obscene, profane, or vulgar language from commercial properties above certain volumes at specific times. A bar owner challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment. This appeal focuses on the restriction of "vulgar" language.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina declined to enjoin the vulgar-language provision, interpreting it as only restricting speech that is obscene under constitutional standards, which can be entirely prohibited. The court upheld the obscene-language and vulgar-language provisions but enjoined the profane-language provision. The bar owner appealed, arguing that the vulgar-language provision, properly construed, is unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with the district court's interpretation, concluding that the vulgar-language provision reaches some constitutionally protected speech and is not limited to obscene speech. The court held that the vulgar-language provision is content-based and fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. The court found that the provision is both overinclusive and underinclusive, affecting protected speech and not effectively serving the city's stated interests.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the vulgar-language provision is unconstitutional. View "Moshoures v. City of North Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

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Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker, had his law license suspended by the California Supreme Court in 2021 for misconduct. Following this, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against his real estate license. Roshan filed a federal lawsuit against the DRE, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to enjoin the DRE's disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Roshan's lawsuit, citing the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The district court held that the DRE's disciplinary proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and that Roshan could raise his federal claims during the judicial review of the DRE action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Younger abstention doctrine. The court noted that the state proceedings were ongoing, involved important state interests, and allowed Roshan to raise his federal claims. The court also determined that the DRE proceeding was quasi-criminal because it was initiated by a state agency following an investigation, involved formal charges, and aimed to determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned by suspending or revoking his real estate license.The Ninth Circuit concluded that all the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that Roshan had not demonstrated any bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. Therefore, the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case was proper, and the dismissal of Roshan's lawsuit was affirmed. View "ROSHAN V. MCCAULEY" on Justia Law

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Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge by eighteen states and other plaintiffs against the enforcement of Executive Order No. 14,160, which limits the recognition of U.S. citizenship for certain individuals born in the United States. The Executive Order specifies that individuals born to mothers unlawfully present in the U.S. or temporarily present mothers, where the father is not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, will not be recognized as U.S. citizens. The plaintiffs argue that this order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Executive Order. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction. The court issued a "universal" preliminary injunction, applying nationwide, to prevent the enforcement of the Executive Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the government's motion for a stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the stay, concluding that the government failed to make a "strong showing" that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, particularly regarding the plaintiffs' standing and the lawfulness of the Executive Order. The court also found that the government did not meet its burden on the other factors required for a stay, including irreparable harm and public interest. The court upheld the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, noting that the government did not adequately address the necessity of such broad relief to prevent harm to the plaintiffs. View "State of New Jersey v. Trump" on Justia Law

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A voter in Sarasota County, Florida, who is not affiliated with any political party, challenged Florida's closed primary election system. He argued that the system forces him to either join a political party to have a meaningful vote or forfeit his right to vote in primary elections, which he claimed was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed his case, concluding that he lacked standing and failed to state a claim for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the voter had standing to sue the Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections because his exclusion from primary elections was traceable to the Supervisor and could be redressed by a court order. However, the court determined that the voter lacked standing to sue the Florida Secretary of State, as the Secretary did not have direct control over the Supervisor's actions.On the merits, the court applied the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate the voter's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court concluded that the burdens imposed by Florida's closed primary system on the voter's rights were minimal. The court found that the state's interests in preserving political parties as viable and identifiable interest groups and enhancing candidates' electioneering efforts outweighed the minimal burdens on the voter's rights.The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the claims against the Florida Secretary of State without prejudice and to dismiss the claims against the Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections with prejudice. View "Polelle v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

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In 2020, the Vermont Superior Court transitioned to electronic filing and adopted a policy that delayed public access to newly filed civil complaints until a court clerk reviewed them for compliance with technical requirements and the absence of unredacted confidential information. Plaintiffs, consisting of news and media organizations, challenged this practice, claiming it violated their First Amendment right of access to court documents.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court found that Vermont’s pre-access review process violated the First Amendment and issued a permanent injunction preventing the Defendants from withholding complaints until the completion of the review process. The Defendants, administrators and clerks of the Vermont Superior Court, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that Vermont’s practice, as reviewed, violated the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. However, the appellate court found that the terms of the permanent injunction were not supported by the court’s findings. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment to the extent it found the practice violated the First Amendment but vacated the permanent injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings to reconsider the terms of an appropriate injunction. The court also addressed and rejected the Defendants' arguments regarding abstention and mootness. View "Courthouse News Service v. Corsones" on Justia Law

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In August 2022, Jamond Rush was charged with possessing an unregistered firearm, specifically an AR-15 rifle with a 7.5-inch barrel, in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). Rush moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was charged was unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court's decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. The government opposed, citing the Supreme Court's earlier decision in United States v. Miller, which upheld similar regulations. The district court denied Rush's motion, holding that Bruen did not affect the constitutionality of regulating unregistered short-barreled rifles. Rush entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, and was sentenced to 30 months in prison.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois reviewed the case and denied Rush's motion to dismiss, leading to his appeal. The court held that Rush's conduct was not protected by the Second Amendment's plain text or historical understanding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the NFA's requirement to register certain firearms, including short-barreled rifles, is constitutional. The court relied on the precedent set by United States v. Miller, which upheld similar regulations, and found that the NFA's provisions are consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court concluded that the regulation of short-barreled rifles does not violate the Second Amendment, as these weapons are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes like self-defense. The court affirmed Rush's conviction and the denial of his motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Rush" on Justia Law

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Lars Jensen, a math professor at Truckee Meadows Community College (TMCC), voiced concerns about a policy change to the math curriculum standards. He criticized the new co-requisite policy, which placed students needing remedial instruction in college-level classes, arguing it lowered academic standards. Following his criticism, Jensen faced several adverse actions, including reprimands, negative performance reviews, and a termination hearing.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed Jensen’s claims, including First Amendment retaliation, procedural due process, and equal protection violations. The court held that Jensen’s First Amendment claim was barred by qualified immunity and that his official capacity claim was barred by sovereign immunity. The court also found that Jensen failed to identify a protected interest for his due process claim and did not allege membership in a discrete class for his equal protection claim. The court dismissed all claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Jensen’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The appellate court held that Jensen’s criticism of the curriculum changes addressed a matter of public concern and was protected speech related to scholarship or teaching. The court found that the adverse actions against Jensen were motivated by his speech and that the state had not shown a substantial disruption to outweigh his First Amendment rights. The court also held that the Administrators were not entitled to qualified immunity and that Jensen’s official capacity claim for prospective relief was not barred by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the dismissal of Jensen’s due process and equal protection claims but reversed the denial of leave to amend, remanding for further proceedings. View "JENSEN V. BROWN" on Justia Law

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Edward Gibbs was indicted in August 2018 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture. He pleaded guilty in November 2020 and was sentenced to 200 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Gibbs appealed the sentence, and the case was remanded for resentencing due to a sentencing error. Before resentencing, the United States Probation Office recommended twenty-one conditions of supervised release, including conditions "m" and "r."The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division, resentenced Gibbs to 180 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. During the resentencing hearing, Gibbs confirmed that he had reviewed the proposed conditions of supervision with his attorney and had no objections. He also waived a formal reading of the conditions. The district court entered an amended final judgment on September 1, 2023.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Gibbs argued for the first time on appeal that two conditions of his supervised release were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court determined that Gibbs had waived his objections to these conditions by affirmatively stating at the resentencing hearing that he had no objections and by waiving the formal reading of the conditions. The court held that this waiver precluded appellate review of his claims. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Gibbs" on Justia Law

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The case involves two petitions for a writ of quo warranto filed against certain members of the Minnesota House of Representatives. The petitions claim that at the start of the legislative session on January 14, 2025, the House did not have a quorum to transact business. Secretary of State Steve Simon, who has statutory responsibilities in the House at the start of the legislative session, brought one petition. Representatives Melissa Hortman, Jamie Long, and Athena Hollins brought the other petition. The issue arose because, following a district court ruling that a DFL member did not meet the residency requirement, the House had 67 members from each of the two major political parties, and only the Republican members were present.The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated the cases and determined that Secretary of State Simon's petition was justiciable, thus not needing to address the justiciability of the other petition. The court held that the quorum clause in Article IV, Section 13, of the Minnesota Constitution requires a majority of the total number of seats of which each house may consist to constitute a quorum. Under current statute, the total number of seats in the Minnesota House of Representatives is 134, so a quorum is 68 members.The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the quorum clause's requirement of a majority of each house refers to the total number of seats prescribed by law, which is currently 134 for the House of Representatives. Therefore, a quorum requires 68 members. The court assumed that the parties would conform to this opinion without the necessity of issuing a formal writ. View "Simon v. Demuth" on Justia Law