Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A group of young activists in Oklahoma City participated in racial-justice protests in the summer of 2020. During one incident, they were involved in a confrontation with a police officer near a permitted mural painting. The activists were later charged under Oklahoma’s riot-related statutes, with allegations that they surrounded a patrol car, yelled threats and expletives, and confined the officer briefly. Several of the plaintiffs pleaded guilty to lesser misdemeanor charges, while one had charges dismissed after proving non-involvement.The activists subsequently filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against state and county officials, challenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma Statutes, title 21, section 1311 (the Riot Statute). They argued the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment and unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the statute. The district court denied their request, construing the statute to include intent elements based on Oklahoma case law, and found plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Because of unsettled state law questions, the Tenth Circuit certified questions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which clarified that the Riot Statute requires a showing of willfulness and a common intent to use or threaten violence, but does not require proof of recklessness. Relying on this construction, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on their facial overbreadth and vagueness challenges. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Terry v. Drummond" on Justia Law

The defendant, after joining a gang at age 14, participated in a drive-by shooting in Iowa that resulted in the death of a bystander. He was convicted by a state jury of first-degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. He subsequently pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and related charges and was sentenced to up to 25 years in state prison. Following his release in 2014, he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and later, after further criminal activity including high-speed chases and renewed gang involvement, conspired to distribute cocaine and participated in a shooting incident in 2020. Surveillance footage captured him firing a weapon, and he was later charged federally with RICO conspiracy and felon-in-possession offenses.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment. He had argued that the inclusion of his juvenile conduct in the RICO charge violated the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), and challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The district court rejected both arguments, and the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. It held that post-majority ratification of a conspiracy allows pre-majority conduct to be considered as part of a federal RICO prosecution, making the JDA inapplicable in this context. The court also held that circuit precedent foreclosed the defendant’s Bruen-based challenge to the felon-in-possession statute. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss. View "United States v. Bogan" on Justia Law

Benjamin Striplin was apprehended after leading police on a high-speed chase that ended with his arrest. During a search of his vehicle, officers found a loaded pistol and a makeshift device used for smoking methamphetamine. Striplin admitted to regularly using methamphetamine and to owning the firearm at the time of his arrest. Based on these admissions, a grand jury charged him with possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance, in violation of federal law.Before trial, Striplin moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was charged violated the Second Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. A magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion, reasoning that historical firearm regulations supported restrictions on possession by certain categories of persons, and concluded that vagueness challenges could not be resolved until trial. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri adopted these recommendations, denied the motion to dismiss, and later found Striplin guilty at a bench trial based on stipulated facts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The appellate court rejected Striplin’s vagueness challenge, finding the statute clear as applied to someone who admitted to regular drug use contemporaneous with firearm possession. However, regarding the Second Amendment claim, the Eighth Circuit noted that recent case law requires a fact-specific analysis to determine whether the application of the statute aligns with historical firearm regulation traditions. Because the district court did not conduct this analysis, the appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with current legal standards. View "United States v. Striplin" on Justia Law

A correctional officer with almost nineteen years of service was terminated by the state corrections department after he disclosed information about an upcoming search (“shakedown”) to his son, who was incarcerated at a different facility. The department conducted an investigation following a recorded phone call and statements gathered from both the officer and his son. The officer’s son allegedly boasted about receiving advance notice of the search, while the officer admitted in the investigation that he inadvertently shared information. After the investigation, the officer was fired for violating departmental policy. The officer attempted to appeal his termination, but filed his grievance with the wrong agency and did not follow up for over two years.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed the son’s First Amendment retaliation claim at the screening stage and later granted summary judgment in favor of the corrections department on the officer’s First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims. The district court determined that the officer’s speech was not protected because it did not address a matter of public concern, and that adequate pre- and post-termination procedures were available to the officer, despite his procedural missteps.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the officer’s statement about the shakedown was not protected speech under the First Amendment, as it was private and not of public concern. It also found that the officer received sufficient notice and opportunity to respond before termination, and that adequate avenues for post-termination review were available, even if he failed to properly use them. The court further concluded that the son’s claim did not state a constitutional violation. The district court’s dismissal and summary judgment orders were affirmed. View "Felton v Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple drug-trafficking and firearm offenses following a three-day trial, during which he was represented by court-appointed counsel. After the trial and before sentencing, the defendant filed a notice expressing his desire to remove his counsel and represent himself at sentencing. At a subsequent hearing, despite being advised against self-representation, the defendant maintained his wish to proceed pro se for sentencing. The sentencing hearing had not yet been scheduled at the time of his request.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing, finding it untimely because it was made several months after the jury verdict and after objections to the presentence report had been filed. The court relied on precedent that allows for denial of self-representation requests made after the commencement of trial and appointed new counsel to represent the defendant at sentencing. The defendant was ultimately sentenced with an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and he appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing on the basis of untimeliness. The appellate court clarified that a request to proceed pro se at sentencing, made after trial but before sentencing, is not untimely if sentencing has not yet been scheduled and the request does not disrupt proceedings. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to conduct a proper Faretta hearing to determine whether the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court did not address arguments related to the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement. View "US v. Jaqu" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who operated boarding schools and programs for troubled teens, was featured in a three-part documentary series that examined the troubled-teen industry and included depictions and commentary about his role in industry organizations and specific schools. The filmmaker, herself a former student at an affiliated program, created the series based on her personal experience and broader investigative reporting. The series, produced and distributed by a major streaming service, included segments which the plaintiff claimed falsely implied his responsibility for a teen’s death, omitted the ultimate dismissal of criminal charges against him following a facility raid in Costa Rica, and accused him of abusing children and committing crimes.The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, which included claims for defamation, defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. The court concluded that the challenged statements were either non-actionable opinions protected by law and the First Amendment, true, or not defamatory. The court also granted the defendants’ special motion to strike under anti-SLAPP statutes, awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, and declined to decide between Utah or California law because the outcome was the same under either.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that none of the challenged documentary segments were capable of defamatory meaning under Utah law or the First Amendment. The court found the statements to be either protected opinion, not materially false, or not objectively verifiable. The court also found the anti-SLAPP fee award appropriate and rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding amendment and anti-SLAPP procedure, holding that any errors on those points were invited by the plaintiff’s own positions below. View "Lichfield v. Kubler" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, after police discovered a loaded pistol on his person during a traffic stop. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on the defendant’s prior Oregon state felony convictions: two for third-degree assault and one for strangulation. The defendant challenged the use of these convictions as ACCA predicate offenses, arguing they did not meet the definition of “violent felonies.” He also argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the judge, rather than a jury, determined that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, a necessary finding to trigger the ACCA enhancement.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found that the prior convictions were for violent felonies and had been committed on different occasions, and imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant appealed, raising the same constitutional and statutory objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Erlinger v. United States, the district court had erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey by making the separate-occasions finding itself, rather than submitting it to a jury. However, the Ninth Circuit held that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the offenses occurred on different occasions. The court also held that the defendant’s Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The court therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Payton Gendron carried out a mass shooting at a supermarket in Buffalo, New York, killing ten Black individuals and injuring three others. He meticulously planned the attack to target Black victims, documenting his intentions and motives in a manifesto and online journal. Following the attack, a grand jury indicted Gendron on multiple federal charges, including hate crimes resulting in death and firearm offenses. The government sought the death penalty on certain counts and provided notice of both statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors, including the impact on surviving victims, Gendron’s racist motive, and his intent to incite further violence.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York struck the three contested non-statutory aggravating factors from the government’s notice. The court reasoned that the surviving victims’ injuries were irrelevant to the capital charges, that federal law precluded the government from presenting Gendron’s racist motive as an aggravator, and that citing his intent to incite further violence would violate his First Amendment rights by punishing protected speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed these rulings de novo. The Second Circuit held that all three non-statutory aggravating factors were permissible. It concluded that evidence of injury to surviving victims is relevant to the circumstances of the crime in a capital sentencing proceeding. The court determined that presenting Gendron’s racist motive does not violate statutory restrictions, as the motive itself, not the race of the victims, is at issue. Finally, the court held that referencing Gendron’s intent to incite further violence does not infringe upon his First Amendment rights when used to establish motive for the crime. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Gendron" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police while driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen leaving the scene of a shooting. Police found a loaded handgun in the glovebox. During questioning, the driver admitted to being at the scene and driving the car, but when asked for a DNA sample to compare with the handgun, he refused and ended the interview. At trial, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s decision to stop cooperating was evidence of a “guilty conscience,” displaying a board with that phrase to the jury and contrasting his actions with those of other occupants who continued their interviews.After closing arguments, the Macomb Circuit Court judge raised concerns that the prosecutor’s comments improperly used the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence against him. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court granted. The defendant argued that a retrial would violate double jeopardy, but the trial court denied this, finding no evidence that the prosecutor specifically intended to provoke a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution shifted its theory, and the defendant was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that retrial was not barred under the standard from Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667 (1982), because the prosecutor’s misconduct was not intended to goad the defense into requesting a mistrial but was instead reckless or negligent.On further appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Kennedy standard does not properly protect the double-jeopardy rights guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution. The Court rejected Kennedy and adopted the broader standard from Pool v Superior Court, 139 Ariz 98 (1984), holding that retrial is barred if a mistrial is granted due to intentional, prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct pursued for an improper purpose with indifference to the risk of mistrial, and the resulting prejudice cannot be cured short of a mistrial. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for application of the new standard. View "People Of Michigan v. Jennings" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who wished to protest outside a high-profile murder trial in Massachusetts were prohibited from doing so by a Superior Court judge’s order establishing a 200-foot buffer zone around the courthouse, including nearby sidewalks and streets. After the buffer zone was imposed, the plaintiffs—demonstrators—filed suit in federal court against various public officials and entities, alleging violations of their First Amendment and due process rights.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially denied a preliminary injunction against the buffer zone, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that denial and remanded, suggesting that a restriction more closely tailored to demonstrations intended to interfere with justice might be permissible. In response, the Superior Court judge amended the order to include a requirement of intent to interfere with the administration of justice or influence trial participants. The district court then partially granted and partially denied a renewed motion for a preliminary injunction: it found the revised order survived a facial First Amendment challenge but agreed with plaintiffs that there had been unconstitutional as-applied enforcement, granting limited relief.After the murder trial concluded and the buffer zone order expired by its own terms, the plaintiffs continued to appeal the denial of broader injunctive relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the case was moot because the order was no longer in effect and there was no reasonable expectation the same plaintiffs would again face a similar restriction. The court determined that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief was available and that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception did not apply. As a result, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s partial denial of the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of that portion of the case, leaving the remainder to the district court. View "Grant v. Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" on Justia Law