Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Jose E. Amstutz, a police officer employed by Harris County Precinct 6, was terminated after his wife filed a police report alleging domestic abuse. Amstutz was placed on leave and later terminated following an internal investigation that found he violated several policies. Amstutz claimed his wife had a history of making false allegations and had informed his supervisors about this potential. After his termination, Amstutz struggled to find other law enforcement employment, which he attributed to the General Discharge noted in his F-5 report.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Amstutz’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for not responding to the timeliness challenge. The court also dismissed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, finding that he had not pleaded a protected property interest in his at-will employment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the ADEA claims, agreeing that Amstutz failed to address the timeliness challenge, thus waiving opposition to that argument. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claims, concluding that Amstutz did not identify any independent source of law that would create a property interest in his employment. The court found that Amstutz’s employment was at-will and that he did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. Consequently, the court also dismissed Amstutz’s Monell claim against Harris County, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Amstutz v. Harris County" on Justia Law

In the early morning of January 8, 2021, two individuals dressed in black entered Samuel Johns' residence. Patrycia Labombard, a visitor, saw the intruders, one of whom was armed with a handgun. She described one as a teenaged girl or young woman. Labombard was restrained with a zip tie but managed to escape and hide. She heard a fight, yelling, and gunshots. After the intruders left, she found Johns with gunshot wounds. Johns died from his injuries. Police interviewed witnesses, including Johns' mother, Debra Moffat, and family members who suspected Clyde Ewing and his son, Demetri Ewing, due to an ongoing dispute over a stolen pistol and backpack. Surveillance footage showed two individuals on bikes near Johns' house. Clyde and Demetri were arrested, and a search of their motel room revealed incriminating evidence.The District Court of the Second Judicial District of Idaho denied Demetri's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search and arrest warrants, finding probable cause. The court also admitted statements from Moffat, who had died before trial, over Demetri's hearsay objections. Demetri was found guilty of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to life in prison with 25 years fixed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Demetri's motion to suppress, finding sufficient probable cause for the search and arrest warrants. The court also found that Demetri was not entitled to a Franks hearing, as he failed to show that any omissions or misstatements in the warrant affidavits were made intentionally or recklessly. However, the court agreed that admitting Moffat's statements violated the Confrontation Clause but concluded that this error did not affect the trial's outcome due to the substantial evidence against Demetri. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Richard Walker was arrested at his girlfriend Ramona Paulette's residence, where he was staying overnight. Officers conducted a protective sweep of the residence and found a loaded firearm under the mattress in Walker Jr.'s bedroom. Later, with consent from Paulette's mother, Laverne Shipp, officers conducted a second search and found drugs in Paulette's bedroom. Walker was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the searches violated the Fourth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Walker's motion to suppress, finding the protective sweep and subsequent search justified. Walker entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Walker argued that the firearm and drugs were discovered through an unconstitutional search. The court found that Walker had standing to challenge the search and that the protective sweep was unlawful in scope when officers lifted the mattress in Walker Jr.'s bedroom. The court also determined that the district court erred in applying the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule and did not address the inevitable discovery exception.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Walker's suppression motion and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the inevitable discovery exception applied and to reassess whether Shipp's consent justified the second search. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Logan Gregory Gosselin pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a child and was sentenced to three to eight years in prison, with a recommendation for the Youthful Offender Transition Program (YOTP). Nearing completion of the YOTP, Gosselin filed a motion for sentence reduction, which the district court denied. Gosselin appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by not honoring an earlier promise to reduce his sentence upon successful completion of the YOTP.The district court of Laramie County initially sentenced Gosselin and included a written judgment suggesting an expectation of sentence reduction if he completed the YOTP. However, the judge who issued the original sentence retired, and a new judge denied Gosselin's motion for sentence reduction without a hearing. Gosselin's appeal contended that the denial was an abuse of discretion and violated his due process and double jeopardy rights.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court clarified that the written judgment's language about an "expectation" of sentence reduction did not constitute a binding promise. The court also determined that the district court's oral pronouncement did not guarantee a sentence reduction but merely indicated that Gosselin would likely return to court to request it. The Supreme Court held that the district court's denial of the motion did not violate Gosselin's due process rights, as there was no protected interest in a guaranteed sentence reduction. Additionally, the court found no double jeopardy violation, as the denial of the motion did not increase Gosselin's original sentence. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Gosselin v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Florida’s 2022 congressional districting plan. The plaintiffs, consisting of civic organizations and individual voters, argue that the plan violates the Florida Constitution's Fair Districts Amendment (FDA) by failing to retain a two-hundred-mile-long congressional district that previously enabled black voters in North Florida to elect representatives of their choice. The plaintiffs claim that the new plan diminishes this ability, contrary to the FDA's Non-Diminishment Clause.The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the Enacted Plan unconstitutional under the FDA, enjoining its use, and ordering the Legislature to adopt a remedial map. The First District Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a sufficiently compact minority community in North Florida to merit protection under the FDA. The appellate court also questioned the binding nature of the Florida Supreme Court’s precedents on the Non-Diminishment Clause.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and upheld the Enacted Plan. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the possibility of drawing a North Florida district that complies with both the Non-Diminishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The court emphasized that compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is a superior obligation and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a non-diminishing district could be drawn without subordinating traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeal, though not its reasoning. View "Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Department of State" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted of the 2010 first-degree felony murder of an elderly woman, Janet Patrick, after being seen with her at a grocery store and later found in possession of her car and credit cards. The victim’s body was discovered in a wooded area, and forensic evidence linked the defendant to the crime scene and the victim’s vehicle. The defendant was also charged with robbery and kidnapping. His defense at trial was based on claims of mental illness or seizures. The jury found him guilty on all counts.The Florida Supreme Court previously affirmed the convictions and non-capital sentences but reversed the death sentence because the jury’s recommendation was not unanimous, as required by Hurst v. State. After subsequent legal developments, including State v. Poole and State v. Okafor, the defendant was granted a new penalty phase. During the new penalty phase, the defendant represented himself, waived a jury trial, and declined to present mitigation evidence. The trial court denied his motion for a continuance to secure a new mitigation specialist, finding that he had been given multiple opportunities to obtain such assistance. The court ultimately sentenced him to death, finding four aggravating factors and several mitigating circumstances.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed four claims: denial of the motion to continue, voluntariness of waivers of jury and mitigation, access to discovery, and the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty scheme. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, that the waivers were knowing and voluntary, that discovery obligations were met, and that the capital sentencing scheme was constitutional. The court affirmed the sentence of death. View "Williams v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Rifle Association of America (NRA) suing Maria T. Vullo, the former Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), alleging that Vullo violated its First Amendment rights. The NRA claimed that Vullo engaged in coercive and retaliatory actions against the NRA by pressuring financial institutions and insurers to sever ties with the NRA, thereby infringing on its free speech and equal protection rights. Vullo argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Vullo's motion to dismiss the NRA's First Amendment claims, finding that the NRA had sufficiently stated a claim and that Vullo was not entitled to qualified immunity at that stage. Vullo appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially reversed the district court's decision, holding that the NRA failed to state a First Amendment claim and that Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. The NRA then petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to address whether the NRA had stated a plausible First Amendment claim. The Supreme Court concluded that the NRA had plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to reconsider the issue of qualified immunity.Upon reconsideration, the Second Circuit concluded that Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that, although the general principle that a government official cannot coerce a private party to suppress disfavored speech was well established, it was not clearly established that Vullo's conduct—regulatory actions directed at the nonexpressive conduct of third parties—constituted coercion or retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to enter judgment dismissing the remaining claims against Vullo. View "Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Vullo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who owned real property in Southfield, Michigan, became delinquent on their property taxes between 2012 and 2014. Oakland County foreclosed on their properties under the General Property Tax Act (GPTA). The plaintiffs had the opportunity to redeem their properties by paying the delinquent taxes, but they failed to do so. Consequently, the properties were foreclosed, and the city of Southfield exercised its right of first refusal to purchase the properties for the minimum bid, which included the unpaid taxes and associated fees. The properties were then conveyed to the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (SNRI).The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging violations of their constitutional rights, including the Takings Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, citing lack of jurisdiction, lack of standing, and res judicata. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. However, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution.On remand, the trial court again granted summary disposition to the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Rafaeli applied retroactively and that the plaintiffs had valid takings claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that a taking occurs when a governmental unit retains property without offering it for public sale and the value of the property exceeds the amount owed in taxes and fees. The Court also held that MCL 211.78m, as amended, applies prospectively, while MCL 211.78t applies retroactively but does not govern this case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative" on Justia Law

A toll road operator in Loudoun County, Virginia, sought to increase toll rates, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (the Commission) misapplied statutory criteria and that denying the increase would constitute an uncompensated taking under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The toll road, known as the Dulles Greenway, was built with private funds and has faced financial difficulties due to lower-than-expected traffic volumes. The operator, Toll Road Investors Partnership II, L.P. (TRIP II), has refinanced its debt multiple times and has previously received approval for toll increases.The Commission had previously approved several toll increases but denied TRIP II's latest application. The Commission's decision was based on the statutory criteria that toll rates must be reasonable to the user in relation to the benefit obtained, must not materially discourage use of the roadway, and must provide the operator no more than a reasonable return. The Commission found that TRIP II's proposed toll increase did not meet the "reasonable benefit to the user" or "material discouragement" criteria. The Commission also noted that TRIP II had significant cash reserves and had not made equity distributions since 2006 due to indenture restrictions.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by credible evidence and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court also rejected TRIP II's argument that the denial of the toll increase constituted an unconstitutional taking, noting that the Commission had acted within its authority and had considered the overall circumstances, including the public's interest and the financial condition of TRIP II. The Court concluded that the Commission's decision did not violate the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Toll Road Investors Partnership II v. SCC" on Justia Law

Walmart, Inc. faced allegations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for 11,103 violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements at 20 locations. These cases were assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Before the ALJ could rule on the merits, Walmart filed a lawsuit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the "good cause" removal procedure for ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Walmart argued that this removal procedure infringed upon the President’s executive power under Article II of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in favor of Walmart, declaring § 7521(a) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the Department and its Chief ALJ from adjudicating ICE’s complaints against Walmart. The district court refused to sever § 7521(a) from the rest of the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the APA’s § 7521(a) is constitutional as applied to the Department’s ALJs in OCAHO. The court reasoned that the ALJs perform purely adjudicative functions, have limited duties, and lack policymaking or administrative authority. Additionally, the decisions of the ALJs are subject to plenary review by the Attorney General, who is removable at will by the President, ensuring sufficient executive control.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction and reversed its entry of summary judgment for Walmart. The court also noted that even if § 7521(a) were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to sever the "good cause" removal restriction, leaving the rest of the APA intact. View "Walmart, Inc. v. King" on Justia Law