Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals who are transgender women, one living in Montana and the other in Alaska, challenged recent Montana laws and administrative policies that restrict the ability to amend the sex designation on birth certificates and driver's licenses. These state actions, enacted in response to legislative changes, allow amendments to these documents only in limited circumstances such as clerical errors, not to reflect a person’s gender identity. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions forced them to carry identification that does not match their gender identity, resulting in concrete harms such as disclosure of their transgender status during routine activities and difficulties in verifying their identity.The case was filed in the First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of equal protection, right to privacy, and prohibition against compelled speech under the Montana Constitution, as well as violations of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had standing, demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, and satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the policies likely violated Montana’s Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against transgender individuals on the basis of sex, and that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the challenged state policies as applied to amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. It held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state policies likely constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, warranting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Kalarchik v. State" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a search of Albert Alexander’s residence by Lafayette Police Department officers, who had a warrant to search for firearms. Upon executing the warrant, the officers found only pellet rifles, but also observed a large quantity of electronics and appliances—many in unopened boxes or wrapped—inside the house. These observations, combined with prior tips from Alexander’s granddaughter and her girlfriend that stolen goods were stored there, led the officers to seize the items on suspicion they were stolen. The seized property was not listed in the original search warrant.After being charged with possession of stolen property and later acquitted at trial, Alexander filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. He alleged that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing items not listed in the warrant during the first search. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the officers’ seizure of the electronics and appliances was justified under the plain view doctrine, as their incriminating nature was immediately apparent given the circumstances and information available to the officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances—including the tips received, officers’ observations, and their experience—the officers had probable cause to believe the items were stolen, satisfying the plain view exception. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Alexander v. Arceneaux" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested and charged with multiple sexual assault offenses involving a 16-year-old girl. After being released on bail, he failed to appear at a scheduled arraignment, leading to a bench warrant and a delay of more than six years before he was returned to custody and the case moved forward. During jury selection for his trial, a prospective juror (PJ183) identified herself as a newly graduated nurse. The prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse her, stating, “she is a nurse.” Defense counsel objected, referencing California Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, but did not argue that the prosecutor’s stated reason was presumptively invalid under the statute. The trial court overruled the objection, focusing only on the reason provided.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant guilty of all charges, and the court found aggravating factors true. He was sentenced to 26 years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor’s reason for excusing PJ183—a nurse—was presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(10), because nursing is a field disproportionately occupied by women, a protected group under the statute. The Attorney General contended that the defendant forfeited this argument by not raising the presumptive invalidity at trial.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the defendant did not forfeit his argument. The Court explained that section 231.7 requires the trial court, when ruling on a peremptory challenge objection, to meaningfully consider whether any stated reason is presumptively invalid—even if not explicitly identified by the objecting party. Because the trial court failed to make this inquiry or create a record of doing so, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "P. v. Espiritu" on Justia Law

Several individuals, all enthusiasts of distilling spirits, and a non-profit organization devoted to legalizing at-home hobby distilling, sought to challenge longstanding federal laws prohibiting the operation of home distilleries. The plaintiffs, who had experience with lawful alcohol production for fuel or other beverages, expressed clear intent to distill spirits for personal consumption at or near their residences. They faced explicit warnings from federal authorities that such activity was illegal and punishable by substantial penalties, and that no permits would be issued for home-based distillation of consumable spirits.After contacting the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and receiving confirmation that home distilling would not be permitted, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the TTB and the U.S. Department of Justice. The district court dismissed several individual plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed the claims of one individual and the non-profit organization to proceed. On the merits, the district court determined that federal statutes barring home distilling for beverage purposes violated the Constitution’s Commerce, Taxation, and Necessary and Proper clauses. The government appealed, and the dismissed plaintiffs cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that all individual plaintiffs and the non-profit organization had standing to sue. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the statutory prohibition on home distilleries and associated criminal penalties exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Taxation Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the prohibitions were not “plainly adapted” to raising revenue and represented an improper federal intrusion into matters reserved to the states. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and injunction against enforcement of the statutes, as modified. View "McNutt v. Dept of Justice" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault against his niece, N.H., based on events that occurred between 2005 and 2011, when N.H. was a child. The charges alleged both oral and penetrative sexual contact. The main evidence at trial included N.H.’s testimony describing multiple assaults, with a focus on specific incidents that occurred in the defendant’s barn, particularly an incident when N.H. was in the sixth grade. N.H. also testified that the assaults stopped when she was around eleven or twelve years old.After the jury convicted the defendant on both counts in the Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant appealed. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that N.H. was under thirteen at the time of the barn assault (Count Two), that the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt violated his constitutional rights, and that the admission of prior-bad-act evidence was an abuse of discretion. The trial court had previously denied his motion for acquittal on Count Two, finding there was enough evidence for the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that N.H. was under thirteen at the relevant time, affirming the denial of acquittal. However, the Court determined that the trial court’s instruction defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” impermissibly lowered the government’s burden of proof, violating the defendant’s federal due process rights. This was deemed plain error, requiring reversal of the convictions and a remand for a new trial. The Court did not address the evidentiary issue regarding prior bad acts. The main holding is that defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” constitutes plain error warranting reversal and a new trial. View "State v. Kolts" on Justia Law

Jessie Farmer pleaded guilty in 2016 to two counts of using a communication facility to distribute methamphetamine, for which he received the statutory maximum sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Farmer began supervised release in 2024. The probation office later alleged that Farmer committed multiple violations of his release conditions, including missing drug tests and testing positive for drugs. The government petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on these violations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas reviewed the petition. Farmer argued that because he had already served the statutory maximum prison term for his offense, any additional imprisonment after revocation would violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights unless a jury found the violations beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied Farmer’s motion to dismiss, found by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed ten violations, revoked his supervised release, and imposed a new prison sentence of twelve months, the statutory maximum for his supervised release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether Farmer’s revocation sentence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and 3583(g) violated his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. The court concluded that the relevant Supreme Court guidance, particularly the controlling concurrence in United States v. Haymond, does not require application of the Apprendi line of cases to supervised release revocations under these sections. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court’s revocation and sentence did not violate Farmer’s constitutional rights, because the statutes did not require punishment for a new offense, preserved judicial discretion, and limited the sentence to the original statutory maximum. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute granting immunity to health care providers from civil liability for certain acts or omissions occurring between March 12, 2020, and July 11, 2020. Savannah Wren, whose pregnancy was considered high risk, experienced the stillbirth of her child after multiple visits to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital. She alleged negligent care and subsequently filed suit for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and associated medical professionals.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by WIS. STAT. § 895.4801. Wren challenged the statute’s constitutionality on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violations of her rights to redress, jury trial, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court struck her supplemental equal protection claim and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice, finding the statute constitutional.Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. It held that § 895.4801 was facially unconstitutional because it deprived litigants of their right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed only whether § 895.4801 facially violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that because the legislature has the authority to abrogate or suspend common law causes of action under Article XIV, Section 13, and because the statute eliminated Wren’s causes of action during the specified period, her right to a jury trial did not attach. The court concluded that § 895.4801 does not implicate the constitutional jury trial right, reversed the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved issues. View "Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged in two separate criminal complaints, filed by different prosecutors, for conduct arising out of the same incident. The first complaint, brought by a city prosecutor in county court, alleged violations of municipal ordinances—specifically assault and battery, and disorderly conduct. The defendant entered a no contest plea to disorderly conduct as part of a plea agreement, and the assault and battery charge was dismissed with prejudice. Shortly before this plea, the county attorney’s office had filed a separate complaint charging the defendant with felony assault based on the same incident. After the case was later amended to charge first degree felony assault, the defendant argued that prosecuting the felony charge would violate double jeopardy protections.In the District Court for Douglas County, the defendant filed a plea in bar, contending that double jeopardy attached to the dismissed municipal assault and battery charge, thus barring the subsequent felony prosecution. The district court denied the plea, finding that jeopardy never attached to the dismissed charge because the defendant did not plead guilty or face trial on that offense, and the dismissal did not entail a determination of the merits.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo. The court held that jeopardy did not attach to the municipal assault and battery charge because the defendant did not enter a plea to that charge, nor did the court make any factual findings regarding it. The court further explained that a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a plea agreement does not amount to an acquittal or the attachment of jeopardy unless the court resolves factual elements of the offense. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the plea in bar, holding that double jeopardy protections did not bar the felony assault prosecution. View "State v. Holland" on Justia Law