Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2022, Delaware enacted a statute raising the minimum age from eighteen to twenty-one for individuals to purchase, own, or possess certain firearms and ammunition, while exempting military personnel, law enforcement, concealed carry permit holders, and supervised recreational activities. The law was intended to address gun violence by individuals under twenty-one, citing evidence that this age group was disproportionately involved in firearm-related incidents as both perpetrators and victims. Plaintiffs, including an individual under twenty-one and two organizations, filed suit, challenging the law under the Delaware Constitution.Initially, the Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court, limiting their challenge to state constitutional grounds. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court applied Delaware Supreme Court precedent requiring means-end (intermediate) scrutiny for state constitutional challenges to firearms legislation. The court found that the law served an important governmental objective and was substantially related to that goal. However, it ultimately held the statute unconstitutional, concluding that it overburdened the right of individuals aged eighteen to twenty-one to bear arms in self-defense, particularly due to the law’s limits on handgun access and perceived deficiencies in the concealed carry permitting process.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware declined to adopt the federal “history and tradition” test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, reaffirming Delaware’s means-end scrutiny approach for state constitutional claims. The court found that the Superior Court erred by discounting the availability of concealed carry permits and other carveouts, which rendered the law a reasonable burden rather than a near-total ban. The Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate Article I, Section 20 of the Delaware Constitution and reversed the Superior Court’s decision. View "Department of Safety and Homeland Security v. Birney" on Justia Law

A minor, N.S., attending a public middle school, made a comment to a school liaison officer that he had a weapon, specifically stating, "I have a Glock, too." The liaison officer, who was a Fullerton Police Officer assigned to the school, interpreted this statement as an indication that N.S. might possess a firearm on campus, which posed a potential threat to students. The officer directed N.S. to the principal's office to be searched. N.S. verbally refused to comply, left the office, and walked toward the parking lot. The officer followed and repeatedly ordered N.S. to return for the search. N.S. continued to refuse for approximately ten minutes, only agreeing after another officer arrived. He was subsequently searched, arrested, and booked into juvenile hall.A petition was filed by the Orange County District Attorney in the Superior Court of Orange County, alleging N.S. violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), by willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. After a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found this allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt. N.S. was declared a nonward for up to six months and ordered to complete probation. N.S. appealed, arguing insufficient evidence supported the finding and that the officer’s search was unlawful.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It applied the substantial evidence standard and concluded that N.S.’s conduct—repeated refusals and physically leaving the scene—constituted willful resistance and delay under section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The court also held that school liaison officers are considered “school officials” for Fourth Amendment purposes, requiring only reasonable suspicion (not probable cause) to conduct a search. The officer had reasonable suspicion based on N.S.’s own statement. The order of the juvenile court was affirmed. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

During a traffic stop on Highway I-80 in Wyoming, George Ostertag was pulled over by law enforcement for failing to signal a turn. A K-9 officer deployed a narcotics-detection dog named Becky to sniff the exterior of Ostertag’s vehicle while a record check was being performed. Becky subsequently made physical contact with the vehicle, alerting to the presence of contraband, which prompted officers to search the vehicle. They discovered a 9mm pistol with an obliterated serial number between the driver’s seat and center console. Ostertag, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held a five-day suppression hearing. It found Becky to be sufficiently reliable and determined she exhibited a positive alert behavior before making physical contact with the vehicle. The district court concluded that while Becky’s contact with the vehicle constituted a search, the alert prior to contact provided probable cause to justify the search. The court also rejected Ostertag’s argument that Becky’s open-air sniff amounted to a search. Ostertag’s motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss the indictment—on both facial and as-applied Second Amendment grounds—were denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal, and the charge for possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number was dismissed. Ostertag was convicted on the remaining count and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that Becky’s open-air sniff did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and even if Becky’s physical contact with the vehicle was a search, probable cause existed. The court further held that binding precedent foreclosed both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ostertag" on Justia Law

A national firearms industry trade association challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute enacted in 2022, which imposes civil liability on gun industry members for certain “public nuisance” conduct related to the sale, manufacture, distribution, import, or marketing of firearms and related products. The law allows the state to bring enforcement actions against gun industry members for actions deemed unlawful or unreasonable, as well as for failing to implement “reasonable controls.” The association argued that the statute is unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the First and Second Amendments, and is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).Initially, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that injunction, holding that the association lacked Article III standing because enforcement of the law was speculative at that time. After the state initiated several enforcement actions under the statute—including suits against two members of the association—the association moved to reopen the case, amend its complaint, and again seek a preliminary injunction. The District Court found standing but abstained from ruling on the merits under the Younger abstention doctrine, which generally prohibits federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that the association now has standing due to the substantial risk of imminent enforcement against its members, evidenced by the state’s recent lawsuits. The court further held that Younger abstention does not apply because the association is not a party to any ongoing state proceeding and does not have the type of control or relationship with its members that would warrant abstention. Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s order. View "National Shooting Sports Foundation v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Lucid USA, Inc., which manufactures and sells electric vehicles, sought to sell its vehicles directly to consumers in Texas through its own retail studio. However, Texas law prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates from directly selling vehicles to consumers, instead requiring sales to occur through independent franchised dealers. In 2021, after the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles notified Lucid that it could not sell vehicles at its Plano studio due to this prohibition, Lucid filed suit against officials of the Department, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled against Lucid. The district court concluded that the Texas prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and, therefore, did not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Lucid appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Relying on its previous decisions in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, and Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association, the Fifth Circuit found those precedents controlling. The court held that the Texas law survives rational basis review because the legislature has a legitimate interest in curtailing vertical integration and preventing monopolistic practices in the automobile market. The court rejected Lucid’s arguments that its as-applied challenge was distinct from the facial challenges previously considered. The court also found that Lucid's substantive due process claim fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lucid Group USA v. Johnston" on Justia Law

After being stopped by Illinois State Police for speeding, a driver was questioned about his criminal history and denied a request to search his vehicle. The officer issued only a warning and allowed the driver to leave. However, the officer notified a nearby canine unit about his suspicions. Less than two hours later, the canine officer observed the driver commit another traffic infraction, pulled him over, and conducted a dog sniff that led to the discovery of drugs in the vehicle. The driver was subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied the driver’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, finding the second traffic stop was independently justified by a new traffic violation and that the dog sniff did not unreasonably prolong the stop. The district court also denied the driver’s motion to dismiss the indictment for vindictive prosecution and selective enforcement, concluding that there was no evidence of impermissible motives or that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. The driver entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal these rulings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the initial traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged but that the evidence from the second stop was attenuated from this violation, as the second stop was based on an independent traffic infraction. The court also found the second stop was not unlawfully prolonged and that the dog sniff occurred during the normal course of the traffic warning process. Regarding the motion to dismiss, the court held the driver failed to raise a reasonable doubt that enforcement was selectively or vindictively motivated and upheld the denial of an evidentiary hearing. View "USA v Pennington" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of forcible digital penetration after a sexual encounter with the complaining witness, Doe. The two had met on a dating website and had several dates before the incident at the defendant’s home, where they drank alcohol, used the hot tub, and engaged in consensual sexual activity before the alleged assault. During the encounter, Doe claimed the defendant forcibly penetrated her anus, causing pain and injury, despite her resistance and lack of consent. Security camera footage captured parts of the evening, but not the full incident. The defendant denied the assault, and character witnesses testified to his nonviolent nature.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court allowed the prosecution to introduce numerous crude, sexist, and racist electronic communications the defendant had sent to friends in the months before the offense. These messages were used to impeach defense character witnesses and, according to the defense, were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The jury acquitted the defendant of forcible sodomy but convicted him of forcible digital penetration, and he was sentenced to three years in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It found that most of the electronic communications admitted at trial were irrelevant to the issues of truthfulness, use of force, or intent, and their prejudicial impact substantially outweighed any probative value. The court concluded that the admission of this evidence, combined with the prosecutor’s focus on it, deprived the defendant of a fair trial and due process. Because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for possible retrial. View "People v. Stammers" on Justia Law

A former applicant for the position of police commissioner in St. Louis alleged that after a competitive selection process, he and another white male candidate were certified as the only eligible finalists. The mayor publicly stated she did not want to select either finalist because both were white males, emphasizing the city’s diversity. The city then abandoned the original selection process, reopened the search with lower minimum qualifications, and ultimately hired a different white male candidate after two Black finalists withdrew. The plaintiff, who was ranked first and asserted he was entitled to the position under civil service rules, claimed the process was reopened solely due to the race of the finalists.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a claim and qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged an adverse employment action and a violation of clearly established equal protection rights, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, which prohibits invalidating a selection process based on race. The defendants argued that the plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action since a white male was ultimately selected and asserted that the plaintiff had no entitlement to the promotion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held that, accepting the allegations as true, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants’ actions violated the plaintiff’s clearly established right to equal protection by reopening the hiring process for racial reasons and denying him promotion. The court also found the complaint adequately alleged personal involvement by each defendant. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying qualified immunity and left the underlying claims to be resolved in further proceedings. View "Sack v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Eric Flannery owns and operates The Big Board, a bar and restaurant in Washington, D.C. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the District imposed masking and proof-of-vaccination requirements for restaurants and bars. Flannery publicly criticized these policies, and The Big Board refused to comply. After the mandates were lifted, Advisory Neighborhood Commission 6C (ANC 6C) formally opposed renewal of The Big Board’s liquor license, citing concerns such as impact on property values and public safety. Flannery and The Big Board attempted to resolve the protest but received little cooperation. Investigators found no evidence supporting ANC 6C’s stated concerns. Ultimately, ANC 6C withdrew its protest after an unproductive mediation session.Flannery and The Big Board sued ANC 6C commissioners in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for Flannery's public criticism and the restaurant's noncompliance. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that The Big Board’s refusal to comply with the mandates was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a causal link between Flannery’s protected speech and ANC 6C’s protest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. The court agreed with the district court that The Big Board’s noncompliance was not inherently expressive conduct under the First Amendment. However, it found that the complaint plausibly alleged that Flannery’s public criticism—protected speech—was a but-for cause of ANC 6C’s protest, based on statements by a commissioner and lack of evidence supporting the protest’s grounds. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flannery v. Eckenwiler" on Justia Law

Police officers conducted a nighttime traffic stop of a car because its license plate lights were out. As they approached, one officer observed what he believed, based on his training and experience, to be a smoked-down marijuana “blunt” on the front passenger seat. The officers asked the driver, Barnes, about the object, and he handed it to them. Upon further inspection, the officers could not confirm it contained marijuana, and the item was never tested; Barnes was not charged with marijuana possession. The officers then asked Barnes to exit the vehicle and, after obtaining his verbal consent, conducted a full search of his person, finding methamphetamine in his zipped pocket. A subsequent search of his car revealed a scale with white residue.In the Johnson District Court, Barnes moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that his consent to the search was coerced, that the search exceeded any consent given, and that the plain view exception did not justify the seizure of the object from his car. The district court denied the motion, finding the officers had reasonable suspicion upon seeing what appeared to be a marijuana blunt and that Barnes’ consent was valid. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Barnes was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, concluding both the search of Barnes’ person and the seizure from the vehicle were justified under the consent and plain view exceptions.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that the officers had probable cause to seize the object under the plain view exception, as its incriminating character was immediately apparent. The court also found that Barnes’ consent to search was voluntary and that the search did not exceed its scope. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "State v. Barnes " on Justia Law