Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with possessing a firearm after having been convicted of felonies, including drug trafficking and DUI. At the time he allegedly possessed the firearm, he was on supervised release for the DUI offense. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by felons. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional on multiple grounds. After the district court denied his motion, he pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting his constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1). Following his guilty plea, the defendant appealed, raising several arguments: that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment (both facially and as applied), violated Equal Protection, exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and was unconstitutionally vague. The court noted that Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed all arguments except the vagueness challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved vagueness challenge de novo. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is not void for vagueness, emphasizing that the statute clearly defines the prohibited conduct—possession of a firearm by a felon. The court further held that recent developments in Second Amendment jurisprudence, including New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Diaz, did not render the statute vague in the defendant’s case, as these precedents did not affect the clarity of the statutory language or create confusion for ordinary persons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Landrum" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, following the fatal stabbing of his former girlfriend. The incident occurred after the defendant, who was intoxicated, engaged in a confrontation with the victim and her husband at their residence. The defendant admitted to stabbing the victim, and the victim died from her wounds. Law enforcement apprehended the defendant shortly after the incident.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County presided over the trial. During jury selection, the defendant raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the State used peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The district court denied the challenge at step one, finding insufficient evidence to raise an inference of discrimination. The defense also moved to exclude testimony from a substitute coroner, challenged the admission of a transcript of a 911 call, and disputed limitations placed on their expert's testimony about intoxication. The district court allowed the substitute coroner to testify to her own opinions based on photographs and hospital records, permitted the jury to use the 911 call transcript as a listening aid, and limited but did not exclude the expert's testimony.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying the Batson challenge at step one, as there was insufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose. The court found no Confrontation Clause violation in the substitute coroner’s testimony, as her opinion was based on independent review of admissible evidence. The court held that the limitation on the defense expert's testimony was erroneous under Nevada law but was harmless error. The court also found no abuse of discretion in providing the 911 call transcript to the jury and determined that no cumulative error warranted reversal. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the conviction. View "MATADAMAS-SERRANO (RUBEN) VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A transgender woman petitioned the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court in Hughes County, South Dakota, to amend her birth certificate. She requested that the certificate reflect her legal name change, already recognized by Minnesota, and to change the sex designation from male to female, matching her gender identity. The Department of Health did not initially participate in the proceedings. The petitioner’s main argument on appeal concerned only the sex designation, asserting a right to have her birth certificate reflect her gender identity, referencing her legal documents as proof and citing constitutional guarantees of equal protection.The circuit court denied the petition. It interpreted the governing administrative regulation (ARSD 44:09:05:02) as permitting amendments only if the data was incorrect at the time of or immediately after birth. The court found that the certificate correctly reflected the facts at birth and was not meant to record changes occurring later in life. Regarding the equal protection claim, the court determined that neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification was involved. It applied rational basis review, finding the rule rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as the accurate recording of newborn sex and the integrity of vital records.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both the regulatory interpretation and the equal protection claim de novo. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the administrative rule unambiguously limits amendments to correcting errors existing at the time of birth and does not permit changes based solely on a subsequent change in gender identity. Furthermore, the court held that the regulation neither classifies on the basis of sex or transgender status nor targets a suspect class, and rational basis review is appropriate. The court concluded that the rule is rationally related to legitimate state objectives and does not violate equal protection. The judgment was affirmed. View "Amended Birth Certificate Of Nielsen" on Justia Law

Following the discovery of Van Stevens’s brutal murder in Searcy, Arkansas, police identified Christopher Coy Gamble as a suspect based on his proximity to the crime and evidence tying him to the victim’s residence. Gamble, who was on parole at the time, was observed near the crime scene and was linked to incriminating items found at a neighbor’s property, including belongings previously returned to him by police. Surveillance footage, eyewitness accounts, and a custodial statement in which Gamble admitted being in the victim’s home further implicated him, although Gamble denied committing the murder.The White County Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, during which Gamble moved to suppress his custodial statement, arguing it resulted from a pretextual arrest, and sought to strike the venire after a potential juror expressed an opinion of his guilt. The circuit court denied both motions, finding no grounds for suppression or for striking the jury panel, and a jury subsequently convicted Gamble of capital murder and aggravated residential burglary, resulting in life and sixty-year sentences, respectively.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. On appeal, Gamble challenged the denial of his suppression motion, relying on State v. Sullivan, which barred pretextual arrests under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas overruled Sullivan, holding that Arkansas’s constitutional standard mirrors the federal “reasonableness” test: an arrest is lawful if supported by probable cause, regardless of the officer’s subjective motivation. The court concluded Gamble’s arrest was proper because he possessed drug paraphernalia in the officer’s presence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Gamble’s motion to strike the venire, as the circuit court’s admonition sufficiently cured any potential prejudice. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed Gamble’s convictions. View "GAMBLE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Richard Marschner and Roxane Marschner divorced in 2016 after reaching a settlement agreement dividing their marital property. Richard received a lump sum from Roxane’s retirement account, and Roxane was to receive a portion of Richard’s Army National Guard pension and Federal Employees’ Retirement System benefits upon his retirement. The divorce judgment included provisions that if Richard took action to prevent or reduce Roxane’s share of his military retirement pay—including by waiving retirement pay in favor of disability pay—he would be required to indemnify Roxane. Both parties waived spousal support in the original settlement.After Richard was separated from the National Guard for medical reasons, he began receiving military disability retired pay and waived all his retirement pay. When Roxane attempted to collect her share, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service denied her request, stating that disability pay was not divisible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act. Roxane then sought an amended judgment or redistribution of the marital estate from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court awarded Roxane spousal support equivalent to her lost share of Richard’s retirement pay, relying on the indemnification provision and reasoning that federal law did not prevent enforcement of the parties’ agreement.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether federal law preempts enforcement of the indemnification provision. The court held that federal law, as interpreted in Howell v. Howell, prohibits state courts from dividing military disability retired pay or enforcing indemnification provisions, even if contractually agreed upon. The district court’s award of spousal support was deemed an impermissible division of disability pay. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the amended judgment. View "Marschner v. Marschner" on Justia Law

A company sought to erect a digital billboard in a small Ohio municipality but was prevented from doing so by the local billboard ordinance, which included restrictions on size, location, and type of billboards permitted. The ordinance specifically banned “variable message” (digital) signs and implemented a “cap and replace” rule, allowing new billboards only if older ones were removed. The ordinance also contained several exemptions, including one for “public service” signs, which were allowed to display information like time or weather if not used for advertising.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the municipality, upholding the ordinance against the company’s First Amendment challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the exemption for public service signs was an unconstitutional, content-based restriction under the First Amendment, but remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the invalid exemption was severable from the rest of the ordinance.On remand, the district court found that the unconstitutional provision could be severed and that the remainder of the ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny, granting judgment again in favor of the municipality. The company appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the public-service exemption was severable under Ohio law, applying the three-part test from Geiger v. Geiger. The court further held that the remaining provisions of the ordinance were content-neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny because they were narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests such as traffic safety and aesthetics. The court also held that the company was not entitled to damages or attorney fees, as it was not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). View "Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in a Colorado state prison, the plaintiff, a practicing member of the Sac & Fox faith, brought suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief. He alleged that certain prison regulations and practices violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. His claims focused on being denied possession of sacred items, spiritual cleansing of his cell, use of donated firewood for religious ceremonies, and access to faith grounds during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff named numerous officials and employees, including the Governor of Colorado, in both their official and individual capacities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the Governor’s motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, rejecting his assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Governor argued he lacked the required connection to the challenged regulations to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception. During the appeal, the plaintiff was transferred to another facility within the Colorado Department of Corrections. The Governor raised the issue of mootness due to this transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the claims for injunctive relief against the Governor were moot because of the transfer and whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applied. The court held that the claims were neither constitutionally nor prudentially moot, as the plaintiff’s affidavit showed ongoing exposure to substantially similar conditions at the new facility. The court further held that, under Colorado law and the facts alleged, the Governor had sufficient authority and demonstrated involvement in the challenged practices to satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Eaves v. Polis" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate app-based delivery platforms challenged a Seattle ordinance enacted in 2023, which aims to protect gig economy workers from unwarranted account deactivations. The law requires “network companies” to provide workers with written deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ safe and efficient operations. The ordinance also delineates examples of impermissible deactivation grounds, such as those based solely on customer ratings or certain background checks. The companies did not contest the general bar on unwarranted deactivations but argued that the notice and deactivation policy requirements violate the First Amendment and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the companies sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance from taking effect. The district court denied their motion. It found that the ordinance regulates conduct (the act of deactivating accounts) rather than speech, and that any impact on expression is incidental. The court also concluded that the use of “reasonable” in the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, pointing to statutory context and specific examples for guidance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court held that the ordinance regulates nonexpressive conduct, not speech, and thus does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Alternatively, if the ordinance were seen as regulating speech, that speech would be commercial in nature, and the law would satisfy the lower level of scrutiny applicable to compelled factual commercial disclosures. The court further held that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides adequate notice of what is prohibited. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. View "MAPLEBEAR INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped a vehicle after observing a traffic violation near a gas station known for gang and drug activity. Upon running the vehicle’s registration, they identified Marwan Hamdan, a known gang affiliate on parole for a prior firearm offense, as a co-owner. During the stop, officers questioned the occupants about their parole status, relationships, drug and alcohol use, and the presence of weapons. As the stop progressed, police requested identification from all passengers and performed record checks, including for an individual in a nearby vehicle who was believed to be associated with violence. After backup arrived, officers conducted pat-down searches and discovered an open container of alcohol. A subsequent search led to the discovery of a firearm in the glove box, resulting in Hamdan’s detention and federal charge for being a felon in possession.A United States Magistrate Judge in the District of South Dakota held an evidentiary hearing and recommended denial of Hamdan’s motion to suppress evidence, finding officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop and for further investigation. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota adopted the amended report and recommendation, concluding the stop was valid and the officers lawfully developed reasonable suspicion during the encounter. The motion to suppress was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the officers did not impermissibly extend the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the use of radio dispatch for record checks, the request for a records search of a nearby individual, and the questioning of the driver did not unlawfully prolong the stop. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress the firearm evidence. View "United States v. Hamdan" on Justia Law

Michael Connor was convicted in 2013 after a bench trial in Livingston County, Illinois, of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The offenses involved his daughter and stepdaughter, occurring when they were between five and seven years old. The statutory penalty was six to sixty years per count, to be served consecutively, but if convicted of assaulting multiple victims, the law required a mandatory life sentence. After his conviction, Connor received the mandatory life term.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, Connor pursued postconviction relief in Illinois state court, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during plea negotiations by failing to inform him that he faced a mandatory life sentence. He claimed this omission led him to reject an 18-year plea offer. At an evidentiary hearing, Connor testified that he would have accepted the plea had he known about the life sentence. The trial judge, however, found this testimony not credible, noting that Connor had repeatedly asserted his innocence and had unequivocally stated at sentencing that he would not have pleaded guilty even if aware of the outcome. The trial court denied postconviction relief, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding no reasonable probability that Connor would have accepted the plea but for counsel’s alleged errors.Connor then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, which was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial. The Seventh Circuit held that federal habeas relief was not warranted because Connor failed to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the state court's credibility finding that he would not have accepted the plea. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Connor v. Greene" on Justia Law