Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
United States v. Ware
Dimaryn Ware was indicted on multiple firearms-related charges. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statutes violated the Second Amendment both on their face and as applied to him. The district court denied his motion, and Ware pled guilty while preserving his right to appeal the denial. He now appeals the denial and several sentencing decisions.The district court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, denied Ware's motion to dismiss the indictment. Ware pled guilty to two counts, and the remaining counts were dismissed on the government's motion. At sentencing, the court applied the Base Offense Level from the United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 2K2.1(a)(3), concluding that the offense involved a firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months but varied upward to 144 months' imprisonment, ordering the sentence to run concurrently with a state sentence for a related shooting but consecutively to other state sentences for unrelated offenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Ware's arguments against the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 932(b)(1) were foreclosed by precedent, specifically citing United States v. Jackson and United States v. Sharkey. The court also held that the district court did not err in considering conduct underlying an acquitted charge when determining Ware's sentence, as permitted by precedent. Additionally, the court found no clear error in the district court's application of USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) based on the evidence of the firearm's capability to accept a large capacity magazine. Finally, the court upheld the district court's decision to impose Ware's federal sentence consecutively to his unrelated state sentences and to not reduce his federal sentence based on time served for those unrelated state sentences.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law
McMurry v. Weaver
Officer Alexandra Weaver took a fourteen-year-old child, J.M., from her home during a child welfare investigation. The child and her parents sued, claiming Weaver searched the apartment and seized the child in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Weaver appealed the district court’s order denying her motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found that Weaver was not entitled to qualified immunity and denied summary judgment on three claims: the Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search of the apartment, J.M.’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure, and the Fourteenth Amendment claim for procedural due process. Weaver then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the warrantless search of the apartment was not justified by exigent circumstances, and no other exception applied. The court also found that J.M. was seized without a court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances, violating her Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, the court held that the procedural due process claim was valid because J.M. was seized without a court order or exigent circumstances, and this violation was clearly established by precedent.The Fifth Circuit concluded that Weaver was not entitled to qualified immunity on any of the claims and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment. View "McMurry v. Weaver" on Justia Law
People v. Bray
Daniel Bray pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to two years of formal probation with several conditions, including restrictions on Internet use, dating or socializing with individuals who have custody of minors, and prohibitions on possessing or frequenting places with pornography. Bray challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.The Santa Clara County Superior Court imposed these conditions, and Bray objected to the conditions regarding Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography. The trial court overruled his objections, finding the conditions reasonable and related to the offense. Bray then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the Internet use restriction was overbroad, as it unduly burdened Bray's ability to perform daily tasks and maintain employment. The court also found the condition on dating and socializing overbroad, as it infringed on Bray's right to freedom of association without being closely tailored to the goal of protecting minors. Additionally, the court agreed with the Attorney General's concession that the conditions regarding pornography were unconstitutionally vague and needed modification.The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to strike or modify the conditions on Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography to ensure they are narrowly tailored and specific. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Bray" on Justia Law
United States v. Edwards
Shadon Edwards was suspected of being a high-level organizer in a drug-trafficking organization in South Florida. After obtaining an arrest warrant, law enforcement officials observed Edwards driving, followed him, and arrested him. A search incident to his arrest revealed a loaded Glock 43 nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol. Edwards was indicted for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the gun and ammunition, which the district court denied. Edwards then pleaded guilty without expressly preserving or waiving his right to appeal.The district court for the Southern District of Florida accepted Edwards's guilty plea and sentenced him to 180 months in prison, applying an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior convictions. Edwards did not object to the ACCA enhancement at sentencing. He later sought to appeal the denial of his suppression motion and the ACCA enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Edwards argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not informed that he would waive his right to appeal the suppression motion. The court found no plain error, noting that there was no indication during the plea hearing that Edwards misunderstood the consequences of his plea. Edwards also contended that the ACCA enhancement was improper because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, as required by Erlinger v. United States. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that a jury would have found the offenses occurred on the same occasion, thus not meeting the plain-error standard.Lastly, Edwards challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause. The court reaffirmed its precedent that § 922(g) is constitutional both facially and as applied, given the firearm and ammunition had moved in interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law
In re D.D.
D.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for committing second-degree rape at the age of fourteen and was committed to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday. Upon release, he was required to register as a sex offender. D.D. challenged the constitutionality of this registration requirement, arguing it violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The juvenile court denied his motion.D.D. appealed to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, which affirmed both the adjudication and the denial of his constitutional claims. D.D. then sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted his writ application.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the sex offender registration requirement for juveniles does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as it is a civil regulatory measure intended to protect public safety rather than a punitive action. The court also found that the registration requirement does not implicate the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, as juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from adult criminal trials and do not require a jury trial for due process. The court affirmed D.D.'s adjudication and the denial of his motion to declare the registration requirement unconstitutional. View "In re D.D." on Justia Law
Trump v. CASA, Inc.
The case involves three separate lawsuits filed by individuals, organizations, and states to prevent the enforcement of President Trump's Executive Order No. 14160. This order specifies conditions under which a person born in the United States is not considered a citizen. The plaintiffs argue that the order violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. District Courts in each case issued universal injunctions, preventing the order's enforcement against anyone, not just the plaintiffs. The Government sought to limit these injunctions to the plaintiffs, arguing that the courts lacked the authority to issue such broad relief.The District Courts concluded that the Executive Order was likely unlawful and issued universal preliminary injunctions. The Courts of Appeals denied the Government's requests to stay these injunctions. The Government then filed emergency applications with the Supreme Court, seeking partial stays to limit the injunctions to the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority granted to federal courts by Congress. The Court granted the Government's applications for partial stays, limiting the injunctions to the extent necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. The Court emphasized that federal courts' equitable authority is confined to traditional remedies available at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and universal injunctions do not have a historical precedent. The Court directed the lower courts to determine whether narrower injunctions would be appropriate. View "Trump v. CASA, Inc." on Justia Law
FCC v. Consumers’ Research
The case involves the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its universal-service contribution scheme, which requires telecommunications carriers to contribute to a fund that subsidizes communications services for underserved communities. The FCC uses a formula to determine the contribution amount, and the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private entity, assists in managing the fund and projecting financial needs.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the contribution scheme unconstitutional due to a "double-layered delegation" of authority. The court expressed skepticism about Congress's delegation of power to the FCC and the FCC's delegation to the Administrator, suggesting that the combination of these delegations violated the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. It found that Congress provided sufficient guidance to the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments, which set clear policies and boundaries for the FCC's actions. The Court also determined that the FCC retained decision-making authority and that the Administrator's role was advisory, not a delegation of governmental power. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's combination theory, stating that the separate delegations did not compound to create a constitutional violation. View "FCC v. Consumers' Research" on Justia Law
Mahmoud v. Taylor
During the 2022-2023 school year, the Montgomery County Board of Education introduced LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks into the public school curriculum for kindergarten through fifth grade. Initially, the Board allowed parents to opt their children out of this instruction, consistent with its guidelines for respecting religious diversity. However, the Board later rescinded this opt-out policy, citing disruptions and potential social stigma for students who opted out. A group of parents from diverse religious backgrounds, who believe the curriculum undermines their religious teachings on sexuality and gender, filed a lawsuit seeking to reinstate the opt-out option.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the parents' request for a preliminary injunction, dismissing their reliance on Wisconsin v. Yoder and characterizing their claim as an objection to school indoctrination. The court held that the curriculum did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence that the storybooks coerced students to change their views or act contrary to their faith.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that the parents are entitled to a preliminary injunction. The Court found that the Board's policies substantially interfere with the religious development of the children and impose a burden on religious exercise similar to that in Yoder. The Court concluded that the parents are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that an injunction is in the public interest. The Board must notify parents in advance when the books will be used and allow their children to be excused from that instruction. View "Mahmoud v. Taylor" on Justia Law
Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton
In 2023, Texas enacted H.B. 1181, which requires commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content to verify that visitors are 18 or older. The law aims to prevent minors from accessing such content, with violations resulting in injunctions and civil penalties. Representatives of the pornography industry challenged the law, claiming it was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as it hindered adults' access to protected speech.The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the law was subject to strict scrutiny and that Texas had not shown it was narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to achieve its goal. The court suggested that encouraging parents to use content-filtering software would be a less restrictive alternative.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that the law was a regulation of the distribution of materials obscene to minors and only incidentally affected adults' privacy. The court applied rational-basis review, concluding that the age-verification requirement was rationally related to the government's interest in preventing minors' access to pornography.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that H.B. 1181 triggers intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens adults' protected speech. The Court found that the law advances important governmental interests in shielding children from sexual content and is adequately tailored to that interest. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment, concluding that H.B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of Texas's authority to prevent minors from accessing sexually explicit content. View "Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton" on Justia Law
Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC
Radio Communications Corporation (RCC), a telecommunications and media company, petitioned for review of a final order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implementing the Low Power Protection Act (LPPA). The LPPA allows low power television (LPTV) stations to apply for an upgrade to a Class A license if they meet certain criteria, including operating in a Designated Market Area (DMA) with not more than 95,000 television households. The FCC's order adopted this limitation and used Nielsen’s Local TV Report to determine a station’s DMA.RCC operates an LPTV station, W24EZ-D, in Connecticut, which is licensed to serve Allingtown, a neighborhood of West Haven with fewer than 15,000 television households. However, the station is part of the Hartford-New Haven DMA, which has approximately one million television households. RCC challenged the FCC's order, arguing that the size limitation should apply to a station’s community of license, not its DMA. RCC also raised other statutory and constitutional arguments, including claims that the order contravenes section 307(b) of the Communications Act, violates the Commerce Clause, improperly delegates legislative authority to Nielsen, and restricts programming content in violation of the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's order adheres to the best reading of the LPPA, which clearly limits Class A license eligibility to LPTV stations operating in a DMA with not more than 95,000 television households. The court found that the FCC properly defined DMA according to Nielsen’s data, as authorized by Congress, and that the statute does not reference "community of license." The court also rejected RCC's constitutional arguments, finding that the FCC's interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause or the nondelegation doctrine. Consequently, the court denied RCC's petition for review. View "Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law