Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A candidate for the Republican nomination for Governor of Georgia, who was not the incumbent, challenged a unique provision of Georgia’s campaign finance law. This law allows only the incumbent Governor and Lieutenant Governor to establish and control so-called “leadership committees” with the ability to receive unlimited contributions and coordinate spending directly with their campaigns, advantages not available to challengers or other candidates. The challenger entered the 2026 gubernatorial primary and quickly discovered that his opponent, the sitting Lieutenant Governor, had amassed substantial campaign resources through such a leadership committee, while the challenger remained subject to standard contribution limits.After filing suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the challenger sought a preliminary injunction to stop the Lieutenant Governor’s leadership committee from raising or spending further funds in support of his campaign. The district court initially issued a temporary restraining order, then, after further proceedings, granted a preliminary injunction, holding that the challenger was likely to succeed on his claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and that the leadership committee’s actions could be fairly attributed to state action. The district court determined that the law’s favoritism toward select officials could not be justified and that the harm to the challenger was irreparable. However, the injunction was stayed pending appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the selective fundraising advantage granted to certain incumbents by the leadership committee statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it imposed different contribution limits on candidates for the same office without sufficient justification. The court also found that the leadership committee’s conduct constituted state action, making it subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Jackson v. Jones" on Justia Law

A man was observed by Detroit police officers in a convenience store with a partially concealed handgun. Upon being questioned, he admitted he did not have a concealed pistol license. An officer ordered him to keep his hands raised, but he failed to comply and instead pulled out the weapon, pushing the officer and attempting to flee. Two other officers responded; one fired twice but missed, while another fired several shots as the man moved toward the exit, hitting him multiple times. The man survived and subsequently sued the officers for excessive force under both federal and Michigan state law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment for the officers, finding they were protected by qualified immunity. The plaintiff appealed, but only pursued claims against the two officers who fired their weapons, abandoning his claims against the third officer. The district court’s decision was based on its determination that the officers had not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and were entitled to immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the facts most favorably to the plaintiff and using video evidence to resolve disputed facts. The court held that the officer who fired and hit the plaintiff seized him, but that the officer who fired and missed did not seize him under the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the force used by the officer who struck the plaintiff was reasonable, given the circumstances and the officer’s perception of an immediate threat. The Sixth Circuit also found that both officers were entitled to state-law immunity for assault and battery claims under Michigan law. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Ward v. Brotzke" on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted under Iowa’s felon-in-possession law for carrying a .22 caliber handgun and ammunition into a police station after being informed he could not lawfully possess firearms due to a 2018 aggravated misdemeanor conviction for carrying weapons. He openly sought arrest to challenge the law’s constitutionality, arguing that his prior offense had been repealed and asserting rights under both the Second Amendment and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. The defendant’s criminal history also included guilty pleas to carrying weapons (again), domestic abuse assault causing injury, and felony criminal mischief.The Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County denied motions to dismiss based on constitutional arguments, finding both facial and as-applied challenges lacked merit. The court considered the defendant’s entire criminal record and determined that Iowa Code sections 724.25(1) and 724.26(1) were constitutional. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison, suspended to run concurrently with sentences in other cases.On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the conviction de novo. The Court rejected both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, holding that Iowa’s felon-in-possession law does not violate the Second Amendment or article I, section 1A. The Court found that disarming individuals with relevant criminal histories is supported by historical analogues and, under the Iowa Constitution’s strict scrutiny standard, is narrowly tailored to further the compelling interest of public safety. The Court noted that the repeal of the predicate offense did not affect the constitutionality of the current conviction. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "State of Iowa v. Mahana" on Justia Law

A childcare provider operating multiple daycare centers in Georgia participated in the state’s childcare voucher program, which is funded primarily by a federal grant and administered by the Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning. The provider agreement requires daycare centers to maintain arrival and departure records for each child and to make these records immediately available during on-site audits. In 2023, the Department conducted simultaneous audits at four of the provider’s locations. Only one location produced the required records during the audits, and the Department determined that the provider failed to comply with the investigation. The Department dismissed all of the provider’s centers from the voucher program, issuing notice that the dismissal was not appealable but allowing a grievance process. The provider attempted to contest the dismissal, but was repeatedly told it had no right to appeal.The provider brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against several Department officials, alleging a violation of due process and seeking a preliminary injunction for reinstatement in the program. The district court found that while the provider might suffer irreparable harm, it was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its due process claim because it lacked a property interest in continued participation in the program, and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. Assuming without deciding that the provider had a property interest in continued participation, the court held that the provider was not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing under the Due Process Clause. Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concluded that additional procedural safeguards would not significantly reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation in this context. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. View "iCare Child Development Center LLC v. Cicero-Brown" on Justia Law

Two individuals, each with multiple convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) within seven years in Washington State, challenged a state law that temporarily prohibits people with such convictions from possessing firearms. Their applications for concealed carry permits were denied based on this statute, and they subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the law violated their rights under the Second Amendment. The statute in question allows individuals disarmed under this provision to petition for restoration of firearm rights after five years of law-abiding conduct.The Spokane County Superior Court denied the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings but granted its request for further factual development, ruling that there were material issues of fact—specifically, whether either petitioner posed a credible threat to public safety. The trial court allowed the as-applied constitutional challenge to proceed, focusing on whether an individualized assessment of dangerousness was required under recent Supreme Court precedent.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted direct interlocutory review. It held that, under the Second Amendment, the state may temporarily disarm individuals convicted of multiple DUI offenses without requiring an individualized determination of dangerousness. The court examined the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, finding that longstanding analogs support disarmament of groups with a proven risk of dangerous conduct, such as repeated DUI convictions. The court reasoned that the law at issue is justified by the legislature’s determination that recidivist drunk drivers pose a special danger of firearm misuse, and that such temporary restrictions are consistent with historical tradition. The court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State. View "McLellan v. Brown" on Justia Law

A police officer in Aberdeen, South Dakota, stopped a driver after observing him make a right turn at an intersection. The officer initiated the traffic stop because he believed the driver had violated a statute requiring a turn signal to be activated for at least 100 continuous feet before turning. The stop led to an arrest for driving under the influence, and a subsequent blood test showed a high blood alcohol concentration. The driver moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked legal justification for the stop because the relevant traffic law did not require a turn signal under the circumstances.The magistrate court held a suppression hearing and denied the motion, finding the statute required use of a turn signal for at least 100 feet before any turn. A court trial on stipulated facts followed, resulting in a conviction for DUI. The driver appealed to the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, which affirmed the magistrate’s decision. The Circuit Court determined the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on his observation of what he believed to be a traffic violation, and concluded that the statutory language encompassed the circumstances of the stop.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed. The Supreme Court held that the statutes governing turn signals require a signal only when another vehicle may be affected by the turn, and that the officer’s belief that a signal was always required was an objectively unreasonable mistake of law. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion based on a valid interpretation of the law, the stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Hawley" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of two counts of capital murder and three counts of terroristic threatening, with firearm enhancements, following the deadly shooting of a woman, Sade Turner, and her unborn child. The prosecution’s evidence included testimony that the defendant, along with his brother, drove to a location in Little Rock and fired multiple shots into a car driven by Turner. After the incident, the brothers returned home, and a burned vehicle matching their Jeep was later found. A key piece of evidence involved a phone conversation overheard by Mykell McFee, who later recounted this conversation to law enforcement during an investigation into a separate murder.During the trial in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, McFee was called as a witness but claimed not to recall the details of his statements made during his interview with police. The prosecution played a recording of McFee’s interview over the defendant’s objection, which was based on the argument that McFee’s lack of memory rendered him unavailable for effective cross-examination, thus violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The Pulaski County Circuit Court overruled the objection, determining that because McFee was present and subject to questioning, there was no confrontation violation.On appeal, the defendant argued to the Supreme Court of Arkansas that the introduction of statements made by another individual, now deceased, within the recorded interview further violated his confrontation rights. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that this particular argument was not preserved for appellate review because it had not been specifically raised at trial. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that only the objection presented to the trial court was preserved and that the new confrontation argument could not be considered. View "HOLLOWAY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

At a school board meeting in Xenia, Ohio, a member of the public sought to use her allotted time during the public comment period to criticize the school district’s handling of alleged critical race theory instruction, as well as the conduct of the superintendent and board. Although her remarks were calmly delivered, board president Mary Grech interrupted her, threatened to cut her microphone, and eventually did so, recessing the meeting amid disruptions from the audience. The speaker was not permitted to complete her five-minute comment, nor was she allowed additional time after the meeting resumed.The individual who was silenced brought a lawsuit against the school board and its president under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that her First Amendment rights were violated. She sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the board’s public comment policy against her in the future. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio conducted a hearing and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, and found the facts and motives for the board president’s actions to be equivocal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the matter and reversed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s speech—critical of school officials—was protected by the First Amendment and did not fall into any unprotected category. The court found that the board president engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination by curtailing speech because of its critical content, and also ratified a heckler’s veto by silencing the speaker rather than the disruptive audience. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits and that irreparable harm to constitutional rights was presumed. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction. View "Boddy v. Grech" on Justia Law

Jewel Sanitary Napkins, a Georgia-based company, sells feminine hygiene products that it claims provide health benefits, including products containing graphene. The company developed a market among the Amish community and advertised its products through Busy Beaver Publications, which circulates regional advertising papers to that community. In August 2022, Busy Beaver published an ad submitted by a reader, Betty Lantz, that questioned the safety of Jewel's products, suggesting that graphene could attract electrical waves or radiation and pose health risks. The ad was published anonymously at Lantz’s request. Jewel asserted that the ad contained false statements and damaged its reputation.After the ad’s publication, Jewel contacted Busy Beaver to request a retraction, but Busy Beaver instead offered free advertising, consistent with its policy of not issuing retractions. Jewel declined and sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for libel and trade libel. During discovery, Jewel sought the original ad submission. Busy Beaver initially believed the form had been destroyed per company practice, but later obtained it from Lantz and provided it to Jewel. Jewel withdrew a related spoliation motion but then sought sanctions over the delay. The district court denied Jewel’s motions, including a request to reopen summary judgment briefing, and granted summary judgment to Busy Beaver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under Wisconsin law and the First Amendment standard for public figures, Jewel failed to present evidence that Busy Beaver acted with actual malice when publishing the ad. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions against Busy Beaver. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Busy Beaver. View "Jewel Sanitary Napkins, LLC v Busy Beaver Publications, LLC" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old girl, E.R., stayed overnight at her friend G.T.’s home, where G.T.'s uncle, Rayford Evans, also lived. The morning after the sleepover, E.R. saw a cell phone through a bathroom transom window while she was bathing, which was quickly withdrawn. She believed Evans had tried to record her and reported this to G.T., who, with E.R., informed G.T.'s father, Ancel Teal. Teal coordinated with E.R.'s parents, one of whom was a sheriff’s deputy. Law enforcement was notified, and Officer Smith from the Doniphan Police Department responded. He confronted Evans at the home, requested Evans’s phones, and ultimately seized one phone after Evans initially objected but then acquiesced. Evans then consented in writing to a search of the phone, which led to the discovery of videos of E.R. nude in the bathroom.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Evans was charged with attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence from the warrantless seizure and search of his cell phone, arguing his consent was involuntary and that neither exigent circumstances nor the inevitable discovery doctrine applied. The district court denied the motion, found Evans guilty after a bench trial, and sentenced him to 252 months’ imprisonment. Evans renewed his suppression motion and sought a new trial, both of which were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of Evans’s phone because there was a reasonable belief Evans could imminently destroy evidence, and probable cause existed. The subsequent written consent to search the phone was voluntary. The court also held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law