Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An online journalist residing in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, attended several Bossier City Council meetings in 2023 to speak on a petition for term limits for city officials. At these meetings, the City Council enforced a policy governing public comment, which barred “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and prohibited “boisterous” conduct. The policy was repeatedly invoked to interrupt the journalist’s remarks, and after a contentious meeting, several councilmembers met privately to discuss further restricting public comment. The journalist later filed an open meetings complaint and sued the city and individual councilmembers under federal and state law, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Louisiana’s Open Meetings Law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting all of the journalist’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the policy did not violate constitutional or statutory rights and that the conduct described did not support actionable claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the City Council’s policy was facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as its prohibitions on “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and “boisterous” conduct lacked clear definitions and chilled protected speech. The court also found that the policy constituted viewpoint and content discrimination, except as to the prohibition on “boisterous” conduct, which was deemed viewpoint neutral. The court determined that the journalist had plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation and an Open Meetings Law violation against certain councilmembers, but not against one councilmember or for civil penalties. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Merriott v. City of Bossier City" on Justia Law

Four individuals who regularly engage in panhandling in Daytona Beach, Florida, challenged the city’s 2019 ordinance that imposed wide-ranging restrictions on panhandling. They argued that the law, which defined panhandling as in-person requests for immediate donations, and which banned or restricted this conduct in various locations and circumstances, violated their First Amendment rights. Each plaintiff relied on panhandling for basic needs and had faced threats, arrests, or other enforcement actions as a result of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that the ordinance’s challenged provisions were content-based, failed strict scrutiny, and thus violated the First Amendment. It issued a declaratory judgment, a universal injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and awarded damages as agreed by the parties. The City of Daytona Beach appealed these decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on speech by targeting only in-person requests for immediate donations, distinguishing them from other types of solicitation. The court found that several provisions could not withstand strict scrutiny, as the city had less speech-restrictive means to achieve its public health and safety goals. However, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge only some, not all, of the ordinance’s provisions and that the district court’s remedy was overbroad. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the provisions where at least one plaintiff had standing, vacated it in other respects, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The damages award was affirmed because at least one provision was found unconstitutional. View "Scott v. City of Daytona Beach" on Justia Law

James Morgan was investigated by law enforcement for several years due to his online activity, which included posting instructions for making dangerous homemade weapons and advocating for violence against government officials and minority groups. His posts, while often protected speech, were accompanied by demonstrations of weapons such as pipe bombs, acid sprayers, and flamethrowers. In late 2023, federal agents sought and obtained a search warrant from a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin to search Morgan’s property, including a trailer parked in the Western District, based on an affidavit detailing his conduct and apparent intent to commit acts dangerous to human life.After executing the warrant, agents found pipe bombs in Morgan’s trailer. He was indicted by a grand jury in the Western District of Wisconsin for possession of unregistered destructive devices under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Morgan moved in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin to suppress the evidence, arguing the magistrate lacked authority to issue an extra-district warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b), and to dismiss the indictment, claiming the statute exceeded Congress’s taxing power. The district court denied both motions, finding the affidavit provided probable cause that Morgan’s activities constituted domestic terrorism under Rule 41(b)(3) and that established precedent foreclosed his constitutional challenge. Morgan entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held the affidavit supplied probable cause that Morgan’s activities met the statutory definition of domestic terrorism, authorizing the magistrate’s extra-district warrant under Rule 41(b)(3). It also concluded that Morgan’s constitutional challenge to 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) was foreclosed by Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, upholding the statute as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power. View "USA v Morgan" on Justia Law

An elected official in a Tennessee city, after selling her home and residing outside city limits for an extended period, faced a legal challenge to her eligibility to serve based on the city’s residency requirement. The challenge was initiated after a citizen petition, supported by over two hundred signatures, prompted the district attorney to file a quo warranto petition seeking her removal from office. Although she later purchased an unimproved lot in the city and began construction of a new home, questions remained about her intent to return and her actual residency during the contested period.The Tennessee state court found her claims of living on the undeveloped property unconvincing but ultimately determined that her efforts to build a residence demonstrated just enough intent to return, allowing her to retain her office. Following this outcome, the official sued two citizens, the city, the mayor, and the city administrator in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy for their roles in initiating the removal proceedings, along with a state law malicious prosecution claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, holding that she failed to show a conspiracy or retaliation connected to her protected speech, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, when a claim of First Amendment retaliation is based on the initiation of a civil action such as a quo warranto petition, the plaintiff must show a lack of probable cause for that action. The court concluded that probable cause existed to support the quo warranto petition, as there were reasonable grounds to doubt the official’s residency. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery deadlines. View "Amacher v. City of Tullahoma" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After initially being sentenced to death, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) granted him a new sentencing trial. At the resentencing, the state introduced evidence of his affiliation with Satanism, including personal writings and expert testimony, to argue he posed a future danger. The petitioner claimed this violated his First Amendment rights. He was again sentenced to death.Following the resentencing, the petitioner’s First Amendment claim was rejected on direct appeal by the CCA, and his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were denied by the state habeas court. The CCA adopted the habeas court’s findings. The petitioner then pursued federal habeas relief, but the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found his claims were either procedurally defaulted or reasonably rejected by the state courts, and denied relief. The petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on his First Amendment and IAC claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the highly deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court concluded that the CCA’s rejection of the First Amendment claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The court distinguished the evidence admitted in this case from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Delaware and found it was relevant to the question of future dangerousness, not just to abstract beliefs. The court further held that no relief was warranted on the IAC claims because counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and the state habeas court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Davis v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Two North Dakota residents, who were involved in sponsoring a 2022 ballot initiative that established legislative term limits in the North Dakota Constitution, challenged a subsequent action by the Legislative Assembly. In 2025, the Assembly adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 4008 to propose a constitutional amendment that would alter those term limits and repeal the provision prohibiting the Assembly from making such proposals. The Secretary of State accepted the resolution and planned to place the measure on the November 2026 general election ballot. The petitioners argued that the Assembly’s action exceeded its constitutional authority and sought a writ to prevent the measure from appearing on the ballot.Prior to this proceeding, the North Dakota Supreme Court had granted a writ of mandamus in Hendrix v. Jaeger, requiring the Term Limits Initiative to be placed on the 2022 ballot, resulting in voter approval and the addition of term limits to the constitution. After the Assembly adopted S.C.R. 4008, the petitioners filed directly in the North Dakota Supreme Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Secretary of State took no position on the constitutionality of the resolution but argued he lacked authority to withhold it from the ballot. The Legislative Assembly opposed the petition, disputing the petitioners’ standing and the ripeness of the issue.The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its discretionary original jurisdiction, finding that the petitioners had standing and that the matter was ripe for review because it concerned compliance with mandatory constitutional procedures. The court held that the Assembly’s adoption of S.C.R. 4008 violated Article XV, Section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution, which expressly prohibits the legislature from proposing amendments that alter or repeal legislative term limits, reserving that power to the people by initiative. The court declared S.C.R. 4008 and the proposed measure void ab initio, enjoined the Secretary of State from placing it on the ballot, and denied attorney’s fees. View "Bjerke v. North Dakota Legislative Assembly" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged and convicted of felony lewd and lascivious conduct after an incident involving an eighteen-year-old victim who was staying overnight at a friend’s house, where the defendant was also present. During the night, the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the sleeping victim, including touching her breast and genitals, and masturbating over her. The victim disclosed the incident days later, and the defendant subsequently admitted his actions. The jury found the defendant guilty of the felony offense and not guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor. The court sentenced him to two-to-four years, with all but ninety days suspended, and imposed probation.After sentencing, the defendant appealed, raising a constitutional challenge to the proportionality of his sentence and arguing it was disproportionate to his conduct, which he characterized as “misdemeanor-level.” The Vermont Supreme Court, in an earlier direct appeal, reviewed the proportionality argument for plain error due to lack of preservation and did not find plain error. Following that decision, the defendant filed a motion for sentence reconsideration under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in the Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, arguing his sentence violated the Vermont Constitution and seeking a reduction based on mitigating factors.The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority under Rule 35(a) to address constitutional challenges to the underlying conviction and that the arguments presented had already been considered at sentencing. On further appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 35(a) cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction or to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction, and that the defendant’s sentence was within the statutory limits. The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by South Dakota wildlife conservation officers while boating on the Missouri River between South Dakota and Nebraska in July 2024. The officers noticed possible impairment and, after a field sobriety test, arrested him for boating under the influence and other offenses. The events in question took place near the Nebraska shoreline, beyond the centerline of the river’s designed channel.The defendant moved to dismiss the charges in the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Union County, South Dakota, arguing the state lacked jurisdiction because the incident happened on the Nebraska side of the river. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court found that the arrest occurred on the Nebraska side, and concluded that South Dakota’s statutes giving conservation officers jurisdiction to the furthermost shoreline were preempted by the federally approved 1989 South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact, which fixes the state boundary at the centerline of the Missouri River. The magistrate court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.The State of South Dakota sought appellate review. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota first determined that the State’s petition for intermediate appeal was timely and that it had appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by receiving testimony and evidence to resolve the jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court further held that, based on federal law and the 1989 Compact, South Dakota does not have concurrent jurisdiction over the Missouri River beyond the centerline of the designed channel unless there is an agreement or reciprocal legislation with Nebraska, which does not exist. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s order dismissing the charges for lack of jurisdiction. View "State v. Ogden" on Justia Law

The case involved a mother whose parental rights to her youngest child were terminated by the Maine District Court. The Department of Health and Human Services initiated a child protection proceeding in June 2023, citing concerns about the mother's mental health, substance abuse, and neglect. The mother missed the preliminary hearing, and the child remained in the Department’s custody. Shortly before a scheduled jeopardy hearing, the mother’s attorney, without prior motion or notice to the mother, orally requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the mother. The court, relying solely on representations of counsel and without a hearing or evidence, appointed a GAL with broad authority to make binding decisions on the mother’s behalf.Following this, several hearings took place, including a jeopardy hearing and judicial review hearings. There was ongoing confusion among the court and the mother’s attorneys regarding whether direction should be taken from the mother or the GAL, especially when their positions diverged. In August 2025, at the termination hearing, the mother’s GAL consented to termination of parental rights on the mother’s behalf, over the mother’s absence and without her knowledge of the GAL’s intent to consent. The District Court entered the termination order based on the GAL’s consent, and the mother appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the process used to appoint the GAL violated the mother’s due process rights because she was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before the GAL’s appointment and before her decision-making authority was delegated. The Court further concluded that this error was prejudicial and required the judgment to be vacated. The case was remanded for a proper competency hearing and new proceedings beginning with the jeopardy phase, ensuring the mother’s due process rights are protected moving forward. View "In re Child of Mindy P." on Justia Law

In December 2017, William Roberts had an argument with his girlfriend, Elizabeth Hellstrom, after which she became unresponsive but was later revived. The next day, Roberts informed a friend that Elizabeth was dead and placed in the trunk of her car, also expressing an intent to commit suicide using a propane tank. Law enforcement was alerted and found Elizabeth’s body in her vehicle and evidence of violence in the camper she shared with Roberts. Roberts was indicted for first-degree murder, and the State sought the death penalty based on his prior violent felony conviction and the especially heinous nature of the crime.Following indictment, Roberts was represented by court-appointed counsel but expressed dissatisfaction and chose to waive his right to a jury trial and his presence at trial, both of which the trial court found to be knowing and voluntary. The case proceeded as a bench trial in the Circuit Court in and for Lake County, which found Roberts guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. During the penalty phase, Roberts waived the presentation of mitigating evidence, and the court eventually sentenced him to death, giving great weight to the statutory aggravators and only slight weight to limited mitigating factors.Roberts appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida, raising multiple claims including the admission of collateral crime evidence, the trial court’s rejection of a statutory mitigator, the use of certain penalty phase evidence, constitutional challenges to the death penalty and Florida’s sentencing scheme, and the lack of a contemporaneous competency hearing. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence or in its mitigator findings, found no constitutional violation, and affirmed the sufficiency of the nunc pro tunc competency determination. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed. View "Roberts v. State of Florida" on Justia Law