Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The federal government initiated a project to replace the East Wing of the White House, completing demolition in December 2025 and beginning construction of a new wing, which included both a below-ground military installation and an above-ground ballroom. The National Trust for Historic Preservation challenged aspects of the ongoing construction and sought a preliminary injunction to halt the above-ground work due to concerns about its impact on aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Trust’s motion for a preliminary injunction, allowing only construction strictly necessary for security purposes above ground but permitting below-ground work to continue. The government appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initially stayed the injunction, then ultimately affirmed the district court’s order. With the injunction set to take effect, the government sought relief from the Supreme Court of the United States.The Supreme Court granted the requested stay of the district court's injunction pending the government’s petition for certiorari. The Court held that the government is likely to succeed in showing the Trust lacks Article III standing, as the Trust’s asserted injury—distress at viewing the new ballroom’s design—does not constitute a concrete and particularized injury. The Court also found that the government would likely suffer irreparable harm from halting construction, given national security concerns and operational needs, while the Trust’s claimed harm was outweighed by these factors. The stay will remain in effect until certiorari is denied or, if granted, until the judgment is issued. View "National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States" on Justia Law

An attorney licensed in Utah challenged the state’s requirement that lawyers join the Utah State Bar and pay annual dues as a condition of practicing law. She argued that the Bar engaged in activities—such as lobbying, publishing a journal, and posting on social media—that were not sufficiently related to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. She also objected to the procedures used by the Bar for handling members’ mandatory dues, claiming they were inadequate to protect her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Utah first dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that mandatory dues violated her rights, relying on precedent from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Schell v. Chief Justice & Justices of Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court then reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims. It ruled for the defendants, finding that most challenged Bar activities were germane under the standard set in Keller v. State Bar of California, and that the Bar’s procedures for handling objections to expenditures and providing refunds were constitutionally sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that, under existing Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, mandatory bar dues are constitutional when used for activities germane to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. The court also held that the correct legal standard for evaluating the Bar’s activities is the “germaneness” test from Keller, not a heightened “exacting scrutiny” standard. Because the plaintiff did not adequately challenge the district court’s germaneness findings or show that the Bar’s procedures were constitutionally deficient, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal and summary judgment rulings. View "Pomeroy v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between homeowners who own property within a common interest development (CID) in the City of Indian Wells and the City itself. The City, responding to complaints about the negative effects of short-term rentals (STRs), enacted ordinances that effectively banned STRs by imposing a 29-night minimum stay requirement. To accommodate homeowners in CIDs who wanted to operate STRs, the City adopted an ordinance (No. 732) allowing CIDs to opt out of the minimum stay requirement through a vote of their members. The plaintiffs, owners of property in a CID with governing documents allowing rentals of any duration, sought an STR permit after their CID certified an opt-out vote. The City denied the permit, leading the plaintiffs to file suit, arguing that the City’s opt-out provision conflicted with state law and unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to private parties.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the City’s opt-out ordinance conflicted with provisions of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, particularly Civil Code section 4740, and with the Act’s voting requirements for amending CID governing documents. The court also found that the opt-out provision was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. As a result, the court ordered the City to issue an unrestricted STR permit and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the City’s opt-out provision is not preempted by Civil Code section 4740 because a CID’s vote to opt out does not amend its governing documents or conflict with the Act. The Court further held that the City did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority because it established a general policy and permissibly allowed CIDs to waive the restriction. The City’s enactment of the ordinance was not arbitrary or capricious. The judgment and attorney fee order were reversed. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

Businesses selling flavored e-cigarettes in Utah challenged a state law passed in March 2024 that banned the sale of any e-cigarette flavors other than tobacco or menthol. The plaintiffs, representing Retail Tobacco Specialty Businesses (RTSBs), argued that this “Flavor Ban” would severely affect their operations, as the majority of their sales involved flavored products. They asserted that the ban was preempted by the Federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and also contended that the law’s enforcement mechanism, which authorized warrantless searches by local health departments, violated the Fourth Amendment.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking preliminary injunctions against both the Flavor Ban and the enforcement mechanism. The district court denied the preliminary injunction regarding the Flavor Ban, concluding that federal law did not preempt the state’s action, but granted an injunction against the enforcement provision, finding the warrantless search mechanism unconstitutional. The court determined that the enforcement provision was severable from the rest of the Act, so it left the remainder of the law, including the Flavor Ban, intact. Both sides appealed the rulings adverse to them.After the Utah legislature amended the enforcement provision, both parties agreed that the Fourth Amendment issue was moot. The only remaining issue on appeal was whether the federal law preempted the state’s Flavor Ban. However, the plaintiffs failed to properly identify the relevant district court order denying the preliminary injunction against the Flavor Ban in their notice of appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal did not specify the order they sought to challenge, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the preemption issue. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Utah Vapor Business Association v. State of Utah" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey law requiring any doctor who wishes to provide telemedicine services to a patient located in New Jersey to first obtain a license from the state’s Board of Medical Examiners. The plaintiffs included two physicians licensed outside New Jersey and three New Jersey residents who wanted to receive virtual medical consultations from those doctors. The doctors argued that New Jersey’s licensing requirement placed an undue burden on their ability to provide telemedicine services, especially since they were already licensed in their home states. The patients and a parent also raised claims based on their rights to receive medical advice and direct their child’s care.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed all the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim. The court held that the licensing requirement did not violate the First Amendment, the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or substantive due process. The plaintiffs appealed, maintaining that the law, as applied, unconstitutionally restricted their right to free speech and imposed excessive burdens on interstate medical practice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all claims, with one modification. The Third Circuit held that requiring a medical license to provide telemedicine services is a content-based restriction on speech, but such regulations have a long tradition and thus do not warrant strict scrutiny. Instead, the law survives intermediate scrutiny because the burdens imposed are not substantial compared to New Jersey’s interest in ensuring competent medical care. The court further held that the law does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as it applies equally to all doctors regardless of their state of residence. The court also found that the plaintiff asserting a substantive due process right lacked standing, and that claim was ordered dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "MacDonald v. President NJ State Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations that engage in nationwide issue advocacy challenged Delaware’s Elections Disclosure Act, which requires groups spending over $500 on electioneering communications near an election to publicly disclose donors giving more than $100 during the relevant cycle. The law’s disclosure obligations are broad: they are not limited to donors earmarking funds for political ads, nor can donors avoid disclosure by restricting the use of their contributions. The law also looks back several years for purposes of disclosure. The organizations, which have not previously run such communications in Delaware but claim they intend to do so in the upcoming election, argue that the law violates the First Amendment.After the organizations filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, they sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the Act. The District Court denied the request, finding no likelihood of success on the facial challenge because prior Third Circuit precedent, Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General of Delaware, had upheld the Act and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta did not clearly abrogate that ruling. The court also doubted the as-applied challenge, citing the plaintiffs’ failure to offer specific evidence of harm to donors. The District Court emphasized the law’s decade-long enforcement and the lack of urgent need to change the status quo.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial. Applying a deferential standard, the court found that the plaintiffs had not made a clear showing of entitlement to a preliminary injunction. It held that even with some likelihood of success and possible irreparable injury, the balance of equities and the public interest favored preserving the longstanding status quo. The court affirmed the District Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence" on Justia Law

During the aftermath of George Floyd’s death, Tosun Fitil participated in a protest in Omaha, Nebraska, holding a sign to honor Floyd and Zachary Bear Heels. The Omaha Police Department deployed numerous officers, including SWAT member Justyn Riley. When unrest escalated, officers responded to thrown water bottles with pepper balls, which further intensified the confrontation. Amidst this, Fitil stepped forward to confront the officers. As rocks were thrown toward Officer Riley, he threw a flashbang device that detonated near Fitil’s head, causing serious injuries including burns, ruptured eardrums, concussion, and lasting hearing and balance problems.Fitil filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First Amendment rights (free speech and assembly) and the Fourth Amendment (excessive force). At summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity for both claims, finding that factual disputes remained and a reasonable jury could conclude Riley had effectuated a seizure by deploying the flashbang.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction only to address the denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, not the First Amendment claim, because the district court had not explicitly ruled on qualified immunity for the latter. The Eighth Circuit held that the law was not clearly established regarding whether the use of a flashbang in an open area to disperse protestors amounted to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, it reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim, dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fitil v. Riley" on Justia Law

Three teachers at a public high school, who openly identify as members of the LGBTQ+ community, were directed by school district officials to remove pride flags and stickers from their classrooms. The officials cited a district policy that restricted displays to only the American and New York State flags, characterizing other flags and certain stickers as “political.” While the teachers complied, they alleged that other non-sanctioned displays, such as sports flags and stickers for student organizations, were allowed to remain. The teachers also recounted differing treatment regarding permission slips for an LGBTQ+ club field trip. They filed suit, claiming violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as employment discrimination under federal, state, and local law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint. The court found the individual officials entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims, ruled that there was no plausible showing of discriminatory intent for the equal protection claims, determined no adverse employment actions occurred for Title VII purposes, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, though it relied on different reasoning for the First Amendment claim. The Second Circuit held that classroom wall and door decorations by teachers constitute speech pursuant to their official duties under Garcetti v. Ceballos, and therefore, the school district could regulate or restrict such speech without violating the teachers’ First Amendment rights. The court further held that the teachers failed to plausibly allege selective enforcement based on impermissible motives or any adverse employment actions, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions regarding the state claims and leave to amend. View "Dolce v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in the 1990s for bank and armored car robberies committed with a group that included Anthony Shea. These crimes involved frequent use of firearms, and in one particularly violent incident, two armored car guards were killed execution-style. The convictions included armed bank robbery, carjacking, Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy, gun possession by a felon or drug user, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The trial judge instructed the jury that several offenses were “crimes of violence” for the gun-use charge, but the verdict form did not specify which predicate offense the jury relied upon.Following his conviction, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire sentenced him to life imprisonment, applying enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior convictions. After the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States struck down ACCA’s residual clause, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed the appellant to file a successive habeas petition. The district court subsequently vacated the ACCA-enhanced sentence and imposed a lower term, but declined to grant a full resentencing or to vacate the § 924(c) conviction, reasoning that the jury instruction error was harmless because valid predicate offenses remained.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of § 2255 relief de novo and for harmless error. It held that the district court's reliance on the harmless-error standard was correct and that the error in instructing on an invalid predicate offense did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, given the interrelated and coextensive nature of the valid and invalid predicates. The court further held that the appellant was not entitled to a certificate of appealability or to a full resentencing, as no substantial constitutional claim was raised regarding the district court’s choice of remedy. The judgment was affirmed and the request for a certificate of appealability denied. View "McDonald v. US" on Justia Law

The case concerns Michael C. Hoffpowier, who was investigated after his estranged wife, B.H., reported to law enforcement that he had scheduled an appointment at her workplace under a false name and had a history of harassing her across multiple states. Officers responding to the scene located Hoffpowier’s vehicle in a nearby parking lot. Upon approaching, they observed behavior they interpreted as a potential flight risk, including the vehicle being put in reverse. Hoffpowier was handcuffed after failing to comply with commands to approach an officer. While detained, officers reviewed text messages between Hoffpowier and B.H. and, with his consent, observed binoculars and a gun magazine in his vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed firearms and a silencer.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied Hoffpowier’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, concluding that the handcuffing did not constitute an arrest and that there was a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contained evidence related to stalking. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to deny suppression was adopted after Hoffpowier’s objections were overruled, in part because he did not update his arguments in light of the report’s analysis. Hoffpowier subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered silencer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the officers’ use of handcuffs during the investigatory stop was reasonable given the circumstances and did not convert the stop into an arrest. It further held that the presence of binoculars visible in the vehicle provided a reasonable basis to believe that the vehicle contained evidence pertinent to the stalking offense, justifying the warrantless search under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. View "United States v. Hoffpowier" on Justia Law