Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A landlord operating a multi-family apartment complex in Montgomery County, Maryland, filed a summary ejectment action against a civilian tenant for unpaid rent. The landlord did not possess a residential rental license, as required by county regulations, but claimed exemption from those requirements because the apartment complex was located on land originally acquired by the United States in 1941 for military purposes. The complex primarily housed servicemembers assigned to a nearby military medical center, but also leased to civilians when units were available.The District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County found that the landlord was exempt from local licensure requirements based on correspondence from the county’s housing authority and entered judgment for possession and unpaid rent against the tenant. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County reversed, ruling that the landlord was required to obtain a local rental license, at least for units leased to civilians, and vacated the judgment for possession and unpaid rent.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the Enclave Clause of the United States Constitution preempted Montgomery County’s licensure requirements for this property. The court held that for the United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause, the State must consent, cede jurisdiction, and the United States must formally accept that jurisdiction. The record showed that, although the United States acquired title with state consent and cession, there was no evidence that the United States ever formally accepted exclusive jurisdiction as required by federal law at the time of acquisition. Thus, the Enclave Clause did not apply, and the landlord failed to prove exemption from county licensure. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed judgment for the tenant, holding that the landlord could not bring a summary ejectment action without demonstrating compliance with, or exemption from, local licensing requirements. View "Ft. Detrick/W. Reed Army Med. Housing v. Wynn" on Justia Law

In 1999, the defendant pleaded guilty to Class B felony child molesting after allegations that he engaged in sexual conduct with his ex-wife’s twelve-year-old niece. The trial court accepted his plea, sentenced him to ten years (with three years suspended), and required him to register as a sex offender for ten years, consistent with the law at the time. However, legislative amendments enacted shortly before sentencing created a new “sexually violent predator” (SVP) category, which eventually imposed lifetime registration on those convicted of certain offenses, including the defendant’s. Years later, the defendant was classified as an SVP “by operation of law,” without a court hearing or individualized determination.After completing his sentence and years of registration, the defendant petitioned the Lawrence Superior Court in 2024 for removal of his SVP status, citing compliance with registration, successful completion of therapy, a stable work history, and lack of subsequent offenses. The trial court denied the petition and, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to correct error, again denied relief, finding he remained a danger. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the opportunity to petition annually for reconsideration provided a meaningful review that satisfied constitutional requirements.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that the statute’s provision for annual petitions for review of SVP status precludes an ex post facto violation, as it ensures the opportunity for meaningful individualized review. The Court clarified that while expert evaluation is not always required, a hearing with expert testimony is necessary when the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of rehabilitation. In this case, the denial was affirmed because the defendant’s evidence did not meet that threshold. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, an independent journalist, entered the publicly accessible lobby of a New York City police precinct and began recording police activity on his cellphone. Despite posted signs and verbal warnings from NYPD officers about a policy prohibiting video recording inside police facilities, the plaintiff continued recording. He was arrested, charged with trespass, and detained for about six hours, but the charge was ultimately dropped and not prosecuted.After his arrest, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York, claiming violations of his First Amendment rights and the rights established under both New York State and City laws, known as the Right to Record Acts (RTRAs). The District Court found the plaintiff unlikely to succeed on his First Amendment claim but likely to succeed under the RTRAs, granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the NYPD’s no-recording policy in precinct lobbies. The City appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed most of the injunction and certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the scope of the RTRAs.The New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, held that neither New York Civil Rights Law § 79-p nor New York City Administrative Code § 14-189 grants individuals the right to record police activity inside publicly accessible lobbies of police stationhouses. The court based its holding on the ambiguity in the statutory text regarding location, legislative history emphasizing public spaces rather than police facilities, and significant privacy and safety concerns. Accordingly, the court answered the certified question in the negative, concluding that the RTRAs do not apply to recording police activities inside police station lobbies. View "Reyes v City of New York" on Justia Law

In response to a mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, that was planned, publicized, and broadcast via social media, the state legislature enacted the Hateful Conduct Law (HCL). This statute requires social media networks conducting business in New York to provide a clear, easily accessible mechanism for users to report "hateful conduct" and to maintain a public policy describing how the network will address such reports. "Hateful conduct" is defined as using a social media network to vilify, humiliate, or incite violence against groups based on protected characteristics. Plaintiffs, including operators of social media platforms, challenged the law before it took effect, arguing that it would compel them to speak against certain content and chill protected expression.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the HCL likely violated the First Amendment by compelling social media networks to endorse the state’s definition of hateful conduct and to publish policies about it. The court determined that the law could have a chilling effect on free speech, even though it did not require removal of the content itself. The Attorney General appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which determined that resolution of the constitutional issues depended on the proper interpretation of the HCL under New York law. The Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the statute’s requirements.The New York Court of Appeals concluded that social media networks comply with the law if their reporting mechanism and public policy do not explicitly reference or define "hateful conduct," as long as users can report such conduct and learn how reports will be addressed. The court further held that the law does not require networks to respond to reports of hateful conduct. The certified questions were answered accordingly. View "Volokh v James" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a 2025 policy by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that expanded the use of expedited removal nationwide. Under the new policy, certain noncitizens who lack valid documentation, have not been admitted or paroled, and cannot demonstrate at least two years of continuous presence in the United States are subject to expedited removal. The policy was accompanied by an internal memorandum providing guidance to immigration officers on its implementation. Plaintiffs, including Make the Road New York, alleged that some of their members were subject to removal under this policy and claimed it violated statutory and constitutional rights, specifically the Due Process Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705, halting the implementation and enforcement of the 2025 Designation and the accompanying memorandum. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their due process claim, reasoning that the procedures at issue posed a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty interests for affected noncitizens, and that additional procedural safeguards were warranted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s stay. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had standing, and the challenge was timely. However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the challenged directives did not violate due process under the applicable Mullane standard, which requires procedures reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, but not the additional protections the district court required. Finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s stay. View "Make The Road New York v. Mullin" on Justia Law

The Pung family owned a home in Isabella County, Michigan, which was their primary residence for decades. After a disputed reassessment, the local tax assessor imposed an additional property tax on the family, even though a Michigan tax tribunal had previously determined that the family owed only the ordinary tax rate. The assessor sent the additional tax bill separately, and the family was unaware of its existence until after the foreclosure deadline. The County initiated foreclosure proceedings for a debt of $2,241.93 and ultimately sold the home, assessed at $194,400, at public auction for $76,008. The County initially kept all sale proceeds.The family challenged the foreclosure and sale in state court, arguing insufficient notice. Although the trial court agreed and set aside the foreclosure, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the County had sufficiently tried to notify the family. The property was lost, and the family later sued in federal court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted partial summary judgment to the family on their Fifth Amendment claim, ordering the County to return only the surplus proceeds from the sale. The court rejected their Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the auction price—not the fair market value—was the proper measure of compensation.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment, following a tax sale, is measured by the auction sale price, not the property’s hypothetical fair market value, provided the sale is fairly conducted in keeping with historical practice. The Court also rejected the claim under the Eighth Amendment, finding no violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pung v. Isabella County" on Justia Law

Two registered voters in Massachusetts challenged the Attorney General’s certification of an initiative petition designed to overhaul the state’s election system. The petition proposed replacing the existing partisan primaries and separate nomination process for nonparty candidates with a single, all-party primary. In this new system, all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, would appear on one ballot in September, and all voters could vote for any candidate. The two highest vote-getters would advance to the general election, with the option for voters to write in alternative candidates.After the petition was certified by the Attorney General, and sufficient signatures were collected, the measure was transmitted to the House of Representatives by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. As the Legislature did not enact the petition by the required deadline, it became eligible for placement on the statewide ballot, pending the collection of additional signatures. The plaintiffs filed their complaint directly in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking to invalidate the Attorney General’s certification on the grounds that the petition contained “excluded matters” under Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, specifically that it was inconsistent with the “freedom of elections” guaranteed by Article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the proposed initiative does not significantly interfere with the constitutional rights of voters or candidates, as all candidates still have equal access to the ballot and all voters retain the right to participate fully, including through write-ins. Applying rational basis review, the court found the petition reasonably related to legitimate state interests and affirmed the Attorney General’s certification, remanding for entry of judgment in accordance with its decision. View "Jackson v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In May 1979, a six-year-old boy disappeared in Manhattan after stopping at a bodega where Pedro Hernandez worked. The case remained unsolved until 2012, when Hernandez, who had a low IQ and a history of mental illness, confessed multiple times to the crime following police questioning—initially without Miranda warnings and later after receiving them. Hernandez was charged with murder and kidnapping in New York. At trial, after a first mistrial, he moved to suppress his confessions, but the trial court found he was not in custody before receiving Miranda warnings and that he had knowingly waived his rights before later confessions. The trial court instructed the jury on voluntariness and Miranda but, consistent with New York law, did not instruct the jury to determine whether subsequent confessions were tainted by an initial, possibly involuntary confession.The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the confessions were admissible and the jury instructions proper under state law. The court also found that any failure to instruct on attenuation was harmless. The New York Court of Appeals denied further review.Hernandez sought federal habeas relief, arguing the trial court should have instructed the jury on the attenuation issue, citing Missouri v. Seibert. The U.S. District Court denied relief, finding no clearly established federal law requiring such an instruction. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on attenuation violated federal law as articulated in Seibert and was not harmless error.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Second Circuit, holding that no clearly established federal law required the trial court to instruct the jury about attenuation under Seibert. The Court concluded that the Second Circuit exceeded its authority under AEDPA, as Seibert did not address jury instructions and only governs judicial suppression determinations. The judgment was reversed and remanded. View "McCarthy v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

The case centers on Tyler Jon Taker, a resident of Maine, who became subject to a state court order for protection from abuse, which he agreed to. This order prohibited him from possessing firearms and certain other weapons until March 22, 2026. While the protective order was in effect, Taker applied for a concealed handgun permit, but his application was denied by the local police chief due to the existence of the order. Taker then filed a federal lawsuit against various federal, state, and local officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from federal and state statutes that prohibit individuals with certain convictions or protective orders from possessing firearms. He also sought damages against the police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the denial of his concealed carry permit.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed Taker’s claims. The court found that Taker was not a law-abiding citizen due to his prior felony drug conviction and that the statutes prohibiting his possession of firearms were consistent with historical tradition and thus constitutional. The District Court did not specify whether it dismissed for failure to state a claim or lack of subject matter jurisdiction but appeared to rule on the merits. Taker appealed this dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Taker lacked Article III standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief because the protective order itself independently barred him from possessing firearms, so the relief sought would not redress his alleged injury. As for the damages claim against the police chief, the court found that the chief was entitled to qualified immunity because Taker’s constitutional rights were not clearly established in this context. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the damages claim, vacated the dismissal of the declaratory and injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Taker v. Blanche" on Justia Law

The case centers on a lawsuit filed by the Attorney General of Florida against the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and other organizations, alleging that their advocacy for gender-affirming care violated several Florida statutes, including the state's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, RICO Act, and antitrust law. The Florida enforcement action targeted AAP's policy statements and legal filings that supported access to gender-affirming care for transgender youth, with the Attorney General seeking significant monetary penalties and organizational restrictions. Although the lawsuit was publicized, there was a three-month delay before the organizations were served.Following the initiation of the Florida state court action, AAP, an Illinois nonprofit, filed a separate suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. AAP claimed that the Florida enforcement proceeding was brought in bad faith to retaliate against its First Amendment–protected advocacy. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the Florida Attorney General from pursuing the enforcement action against AAP and denied the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, finding that personal jurisdiction and venue in Illinois were supported, and that the facts suggested the Florida action was brought in bad faith.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only whether to stay the district court’s injunction during the expedited appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion for a stay, holding that the Attorney General did not make a strong showing of likely success on the merits or irreparable harm. The court found that the bad-faith exception to Younger abstention applied based on the district court’s factual findings, and that jurisdiction and venue in Illinois were appropriate given the circumstances. The injunction against the Florida enforcement action remains in effect pending appeal. View "American Academy of Pediatrics v Uthmeier" on Justia Law