Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While serving a portion of his sentence at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, Derek Thomas was repeatedly assaulted by his cellmate, suffering serious physical and psychological harm. Thomas initially sought protective custody after other inmates threatened him due to his conviction as a sex offender. Despite being placed in the Special Housing Unit, he experienced continued threats, food tampering, and was eventually housed with an inmate who violently assaulted and allegedly raped him. Thomas reported these incidents through notes to prison staff and verbally to counselors and psychologists, yet he was not removed from his cell until after the alleged rape. Following his removal, Thomas sought medical and psychological care, but claims his injuries and trauma were not adequately addressed.After filing a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Thomas was allowed to proceed with claims that certain prison officials failed to protect him and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, both in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, raising qualified immunity as a defense. Thomas’s counsel did not address qualified immunity in the response to the motion, and Thomas later confirmed reliance on counsel’s submission. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding Thomas’s claims either presented a new Bivens context not recognized by precedent or failed because Thomas did not overcome the qualified immunity defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Thomas’s failure-to-protect claim could not proceed because it sought to expand Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics beyond existing precedent. Regarding the deliberate indifference claim, the court held that Thomas forfeited his opposition to qualified immunity by not raising it in the district court and did not meet the criteria for appellate review of a forfeited argument. View "Thomas v. Carmichael" on Justia Law

After the Missouri General Assembly enacted Senate Bill No. 22 (SB 22) in 2025, which made several changes to statutes governing ballot summaries and judicial proceedings, a Missouri resident and taxpayer challenged its constitutionality. SB 22 as introduced focused solely on amending the process for judicial review of ballot summary statements. During the legislative process, SB 22 was amended to include provisions expanding the attorney general’s authority to appeal certain preliminary injunctions, a subject unrelated to ballot summaries, and the bill’s title was changed from “relating to ballot summaries” to “relating to judicial proceedings.” After passage by both legislative chambers and the Governor’s signature, the bill became law.The Circuit Court of Cole County reviewed the case after the plaintiff alleged SB 22 violated the Missouri Constitution’s original purpose, single subject, and clear title requirements, as well as equal protection guarantees. The circuit court found the bill did not violate the procedural constitutional provisions, but it did find that the amendment to section 526.010 (concerning the attorney general’s appellate rights) violated equal protection and was severable from the rest of the bill. The court allowed the remaining portions, primarily those addressing ballot summaries, to stand. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the findings on the procedural requirements, while the State cross-appealed on standing and equal protection.The Supreme Court of Missouri heard the case and held that the plaintiff had taxpayer standing because SB 22’s provisions resulted in a direct expenditure of public funds. Upon de novo review, the Supreme Court found that SB 22 violated the original purpose requirement of article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution because the added provision regarding the attorney general’s appellate rights was not germane to the bill’s original purpose. The Court further held that the offending provision could not be severed, and therefore invalidated SB 22 in its entirety, reversing the judgment of the circuit court. View "Nicholson v. State" on Justia Law

After receiving an anonymous tip, law enforcement in Mercer County, Kentucky, stopped Steven Fellmy, who was driving a silver Ford Mustang matching the tip’s description. The stop was based on observed traffic violations, including a non-illuminated license plate and failure to signal a turn. After backup arrived, Fellmy was asked to exit the vehicle. He declined consent for a search, so a trained drug dog was led around the car. The dog briefly jumped up onto the car door and partially sniffed through the open window, ultimately alerting officers to drugs. A subsequent search revealed methamphetamine and heroin, leading to Fellmy’s arrest and charge for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reviewed and denied Fellmy’s pretrial motion to suppress the drugs. The court found that officers lawfully ordered Fellmy out of the vehicle after a valid traffic stop and that the dog’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search because the officers did not encourage the dog to intrude into the car’s interior. The court also denied Fellmy’s motion in limine to exclude the drug evidence, ruling that concerns about authentication and chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and could be addressed during cross-examination. The drugs were admitted, and Fellmy was convicted by jury and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Sixth Circuit held that ordering Fellmy out of the car after a valid stop was lawful and that the dog’s brief contact with the car did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search under prevailing legal standards. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug evidence or in denying an evidentiary hearing regarding the chain of custody. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Fellmy" on Justia Law

Ten nonprofit organizations that received federal grants through the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ “Citizenship and Integration Grant Program” filed suit after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) froze and subsequently terminated their grant funding. The freeze and termination followed an executive order issued by the incoming President in January 2025 directing DHS to pause and review grants that funded services to undocumented immigrants, with the aim of ensuring compliance with law and preventing waste, fraud, or abuse. DHS notified grantees of the freeze in February 2025 and terminated the grants in March 2025, prompting the plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction to restore the program and funding.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were essentially contractual—seeking disbursement of funds based on grant agreements—and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not identified a reviewable “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Additionally, it concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to provide adequate legal authority for their ultra vires and separation-of-powers claims.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was materially indistinguishable from relief denied in recent Supreme Court cases, Department of Education v. California and National Institutes of Health v. Public Health Association. It concluded that claims seeking to enforce contractual obligations to pay money must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their alternative constitutional or statutory claims. The district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Solutions in Hometown Connections v. Noem" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a homeowner during a burglary in 1985. The prosecution established that the defendant entered the victim’s home, stole property, and shot the victim in the back as he was fleeing. The case against the defendant was supported by fingerprint evidence, eyewitnesses, and testimony about his actions and statements before and after the crime. At trial, the defense argued alternative theories, including that another individual was the actual killer and that the shooting lacked intent. During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s prior felonies, while the defense offered extensive mitigating evidence regarding his abusive childhood and mental health issues.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The defendant subsequently filed state and federal habeas petitions, raising claims about his competency to stand trial, the effectiveness of his counsel, and alleged jury coercion. The California Supreme Court summarily denied these claims, and the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied his federal habeas petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying the deferential standard required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded the evidence did not sufficiently support the defendant’s claims of incompetence or ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit also found no basis to conclude the trial court coerced the jury’s verdict or that California’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Beeler v. Broomfield" on Justia Law

Two correctional officers witnessed the defendant physically assaulting two women outside a convenience store and intervened to stop the attack. Police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested the defendant. He was charged with three counts of aggravated battery, a felony. From the outset, there were questions about the defendant’s fitness to stand trial, leading to repeated delays as the court attempted, unsuccessfully at first, to obtain a fitness evaluation. Ultimately, the defendant was found fit, his counsel withdrew at his request, and he proceeded to represent himself. The court arraigned him, set bond, and scheduled a jury trial, at which he was convicted of aggravated battery.Prior to trial, the defendant never received a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause, nor was he indicted by a grand jury, as required by the Illinois Constitution for felony charges. The defendant did not object to this omission before or during trial, nor did he raise it in a posttrial motion. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, concluded that the absence of a preliminary hearing or indictment was a structural error reviewable as second-prong plain error, and it reversed the defendant’s convictions outright.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed whether the trial court’s failure to provide a prompt preliminary hearing constituted second-prong plain error. The court held that, while the trial court’s failure to provide a preliminary hearing was clear error, it did not amount to a structural error or deprive the defendant of a fair trial, given that his guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Therefore, the error was subject to harmless error analysis and was not reviewable as second-prong plain error. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the convictions and sentence imposed by the circuit court. View "People v. Chambliss" on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a California statute that makes it a crime to knowingly file a false allegation of police misconduct and requires complainants to sign an advisory warning of potential criminal liability before their complaint is accepted. The Los Angeles Police Protective League sought an injunction compelling the City of Los Angeles to enforce this advisory requirement. The City had previously entered into a consent decree with the federal government prohibiting enforcement of the advisory, and even after the consent decree expired, continued not to require the advisory due to concerns about the statute’s constitutionality.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, relying on the California Supreme Court’s earlier decision in People v. Stanistreet, granted the injunction and ordered the City to require the statutory advisory. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, adhering to Stanistreet’s reasoning that had upheld the statute’s constitutionality. The City then petitioned to the Supreme Court of California, arguing that subsequent federal decisions—especially Chaker v. Crogan by the Ninth Circuit—cast serious doubt on the continuing validity of Stanistreet and the constitutionality of the statute.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of California reconsidered its prior Stanistreet decision in light of more recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings, including United States v. Alvarez and Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton. The court held that the statutory scheme—combining criminal penalties with a mandatory and prominently worded advisory—created a consequential risk of chilling truthful or well-intentioned complaints of police misconduct. The court concluded that this risk triggered heightened constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment. The statute failed intermediate scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored and burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the state’s legitimate interests. The court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. View "L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

A worker was severely injured while operating a bulldozer during a nighttime firefighting operation on a fire line managed by the Oregon Department of Forestry. At the time, he was employed by a private company under contract with the state and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that two state employees supervising the site had negligently directed operations, resulting in his injuries. The complaint sought damages from the employees and the State of Oregon, which was alleged to be vicariously liable.The Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual state employees based on a provision of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.265(3), making the state the sole defendant. The court also dismissed the claims against the state under ORS 30.265(6)(a), which grants immunity to public bodies and their employees against tort claims when the injured party is covered by workers’ compensation. However, the court allowed the plaintiff’s wife’s loss of consortium claim to proceed. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statutory immunity barred the plaintiff’s claims and did not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. The court held that the statutory immunity provision in ORS 30.265(6)(a), which entirely bars a common-law negligence action by a privately employed worker injured by a negligent state employee, exceeds the limits imposed by Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The court concluded that this statutory immunity unconstitutionally denies such injured persons a substantive right to a remedy by due course of law and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crandall v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

Daniel Gantnier was convicted by a jury in 2006 of unlawful sexual contact, a sex offense that, under Maine law at the time, required lifetime registration as a sex offender. However, when the court imposed his sentence in 2007, the judgment and commitment form mistakenly indicated that he was obligated to register for only ten years instead of life. After Gantnier completed the ten-year term, the State Bureau of Identification reviewed his case, identified the error, and in 2019 notified him that his registration requirement was corrected to require lifetime registration. Gantnier did not comply with this requirement, and in 2022 the State charged him with failure to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999).Following his not guilty plea, Gantnier moved to dismiss the complaint in the trial court (Kennebec County), arguing that retroactively imposing a lifetime registration requirement violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and that the State’s correction should have been pursued under Rule 35(a), which governs correction of illegal sentences. The trial court (Daniel Mitchell, J.) denied his motion, finding that, due to a 2004 legislative amendment, SORNA of 1999 registration was not part of a criminal sentence for offenses like Gantnier’s. The court found that the correction was regulatory, not punitive, and thus not subject to ex post facto protections. After his motion for reconsideration was also denied, Gantnier entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The Court held that because Gantnier’s registration requirement was not part of his sentence, the retroactive correction to lifetime registration did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court also determined that the State acted properly under 34-A M.R.S. § 11222(1), and was not required to proceed under Rule 35(a). The judgment was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Gantnier" on Justia Law