Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Police in Gautier, Mississippi, used an automatic license plate reader (LPR) system to identify a vehicle associated with Elijah Porter, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Hoggard received an LPR alert, confirmed the vehicle’s connection to Porter through a computer check, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, Hoggard detained Porter and, while interacting with him, observed the barrel and slide of a firearm, as well as a silver automatic conversion switch, protruding from under the driver’s seat. The officer later retrieved the firearm—a Glock pistol equipped with a machinegun conversion switch—during an inventory search of the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Porter’s motions to suppress both the LPR-derived vehicle location data and the firearm, ruling that use of the LPR data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the plain view and inevitable discovery doctrines applied to the firearm. The court also rejected Porter’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of a machinegun, was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Porter waived a jury trial and was found guilty in a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that use of the LPR system to identify Porter’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on public roads or in license plate information, and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell-site location data. The court further held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, and Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o). The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

The defendant, employed as a daycare worker, took and distributed a sexually explicit photograph of an infant in her care. She pleaded guilty to one count of production and attempted production of child pornography under a plea agreement that included a waiver of her right to appeal, except in certain circumstances. At sentencing, the government advocated for the statutory maximum sentence and, in doing so, referenced the defendant’s sex as making her conduct more shocking and suggested that a lengthy sentence would prevent her from having children in the future. The district court ultimately imposed the statutory maximum sentence but did not mention the defendant’s sex as a reason for the sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the defendant to 360 months in prison, 10 years of supervised release, and restitution. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments regarding her sex at the sentencing hearing. She appealed, arguing that the government’s statements violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection and that the appeal waiver in her plea agreement did not bar her appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the plain-error standard, as the defendant had not objected to the statements in the district court. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not rely on the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s sex when imposing sentence. Because the defendant could not show that the government’s statements affected her substantial rights or that a structural error had occurred, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no reversible error. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

A group comprised of property owners from several Montana cities challenged the constitutionality of several zoning and land use laws enacted in 2023, including statutes requiring municipalities to permit accessory dwelling units and duplexes in single-family zones, and the Montana Land Use Planning Act (MLUPA), which imposed comprehensive planning requirements on larger cities. The group argued that these laws unfairly burdened single-family neighborhoods, undermined the right of citizens to participate in land-use decisions, and violated equal protection by creating arbitrary distinctions between citizens.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court initially granted partial relief to the challengers, enjoining certain statutory provisions it found violated the right to participate, and declared that the new laws could not supersede more restrictive private covenants. The court also held that the housing statutes did not violate equal protection. Parties on both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed these rulings. It first found that the public participation claims were justiciable, as a live controversy remained due to the likelihood of the challenged provisions recurring after temporary legislative amendments expired. The court held that the MLUPA’s public participation procedures did not, on their face, violate the Montana Constitution’s right to participate, as the statutes provided for notice and reasonable opportunity for public input, especially during the development of comprehensive plans, even if not at every stage of the process.The court also affirmed that the statutes did not violate equal protection, because the alleged classes—citizens in cities subject to MLUPA versus those outside, or those with versus without private covenants—were not similarly situated for constitutional purposes. Finally, the court vacated the lower court’s declaratory judgment regarding private covenants, finding it was an improper advisory opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the lower court’s judgment. View "M.A.I.D. v. State" on Justia Law

A vehicle reported stolen was located by police, who discovered Alejandro Flores-Reyes had been driving it and was in possession of its keys. Flores-Reyes stated he had purchased the car and that the items inside belonged to him. Police contacted the registered owner, who consented to a search of the vehicle. The officers, without Flores-Reyes’ consent, conducted a search, manipulated a concealed panel, and found a closed zippered pouch in a hidden compartment. Upon opening the pouch, they found pills suspected to contain fentanyl. The officers then obtained warrants based on this discovery and, during subsequent searches, seized additional narcotics from the vehicle and from Flores-Reyes’ motel room.After initial charges were filed in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, the case was dismissed to allow for federal prosecution, but was later reinstated at the State’s request when the federal case was abandoned. Flores-Reyes moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his constitutional rights and that the subsequent warrants were tainted by the prior unlawful search. The District Court denied the motion, ruling that Flores-Reyes had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle as he lacked a legitimate possessory interest, and convicted him of three counts of criminal possession with intent to distribute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the warrantless search of the closed pouch in the concealed compartment exceeded the scope of the owner’s consent because there was no mutual use or joint access to the pouch. The court held that the search violated both the Montana and United States Constitutions. As such, the court reversed the District Court’s order, vacated Flores-Reyes’ convictions, and remanded for suppression of all evidence obtained from the unlawful search and its fruits. View "State v. Flores-Reyes" on Justia Law

Two physicians who operated a pain management clinic and laboratory were indicted on multiple federal charges, including conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health care fraud, and making false statements relating to health care matters. In exchange for the government dropping the majority of charges, both defendants pled guilty to a single count of making false statements about health care matters. The plea agreements included stipulations that they submitted nearly 3,000 claims to government health benefit programs for unnecessary drug screens, receiving over $166,000 in payments, and contained waivers of their right to appeal the conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sentenced each defendant to five years of probation, ordered restitution of the full amount defrauded to be paid jointly and severally, and imposed a fine of $125,000 on each. At sentencing, the defendants objected to the fines as procedurally improper, unsupported by the record, and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected these arguments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the appellate waivers in the plea agreements barred the defendants’ challenges. The court held that the waivers precluded their arguments regarding procedural and substantive unreasonableness of the fines. Regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the court concluded that, even if not barred, the argument failed because the fines were not grossly disproportional to the stipulated offense conduct, which included the full fraudulent scheme and resulting harm. The court found the fines were well below the statutory maximum and appropriate given the seriousness and scope of the offense. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of the fines. View "United States v. Mukhdomi" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Nazaski Carrasco-Smith and Devin Delacruz, were shot while sitting in a vehicle in Providence, Rhode Island, on December 4, 2020. Carrasco-Smith survived; Delacruz did not. The investigation led police to a rented Nissan Altima and uncovered connections between the defendant, his girlfriend, and others through surveillance footage, GPS tracking, and extensive cell phone data analysis. Police also discovered a GPS tracker on Carrasco-Smith’s vehicle and recovered incriminating text messages between the defendant and his girlfriend, some of which contained accusations related to the murder.After a grand jury indictment, the case proceeded to trial in the Providence County Superior Court. The state presented forensic and digital evidence as well as expert testimony on local gang rivalries, suggesting a motive. During the trial, the prosecution introduced text messages from the defendant’s girlfriend accusing him of involvement in the murder. The defendant moved to exclude these messages, arguing they were hearsay and unfairly prejudicial. The trial justice denied the motion, admitted the messages, and issued cautionary instructions to the jury. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including first-degree murder and multiple firearm offenses. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and was sentenced to consecutive life terms and additional concurrent sentences.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case. It held that the trial justice abused her discretion by admitting the girlfriend’s accusatory text messages, finding that their probative value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The court determined that the cautionary instructions given did not cure the prejudice and that the error was not harmless in light of the prosecution’s emphasis on the messages. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Police stopped a car driven by a man with his girlfriend as a passenger due to traffic violations. The car was registered to the girlfriend, who was cooperative and provided valid documentation. The officers learned the driver was a recently released felon with gang ties and outstanding warrants, while the girlfriend had no criminal history or warrants. After arresting and handcuffing the driver, officers removed the girlfriend from the car, patted her down, and detained her. The officers then conducted a “protective sweep” of the car, discovering a loaded handgun and ammunition under the driver’s seat.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the sweep. The district court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the girlfriend-passenger was armed and dangerous, relying on her romantic relationship with the driver, who was associated with a gang and being arrested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of suppression de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the protective sweep of the car was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion must be based on the totality of the circumstances and cannot rely solely on a passenger’s association with a suspect. Here, the girlfriend was calm, cooperative, and not suspected of any crime. The court found that her romantic relationship with the driver did not justify a finding that she was armed and dangerous. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of suppression, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

A noncitizen defendant, who had lived in Colorado since childhood and was granted relief under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, was arrested and charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute after police found 16 pounds of heroin during a stop in Utah. The defendant was concerned about the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea and repeatedly asked his retained counsel for advice. Counsel told him he could not advise on immigration matters and that the defendant should not worry about deportation until after he was in prison, suggesting he could seek immigration counsel at that time. The plea agreement stated only that the defendant “may” be removed from the United States if not a citizen. Relying on this advice, the defendant pleaded guilty.After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him of the automatic immigration consequences of his plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The district court denied the motion, finding that the defendant was sufficiently advised of a risk of deportation and that this met constitutional requirements. The court did not reach the question of prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court held that, under Padilla, when the immigration consequences of a conviction are clear—as they are for a federal controlled substance offense—counsel must provide clear advice that deportation will be “automatic,” “presumptively mandatory,” or “practically inevitable.” The court found the defendant’s counsel failed to do so and provided misleading advice. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings on whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. View "United States v. Aguayo-Montes" on Justia Law

A group of parole investigators, acting on an arrest warrant for a parole absconder, approached Joseph C. Jones after mistakenly concluding, based on a vague physical resemblance and location, that he might be the wanted individual. The investigators, in plainclothes and in unmarked cars, observed Jones from a distance and saw him run when a team member pulled alongside him. They chased him, saw him discard a handgun, and arrested him. Only after taking him into custody did they realize he was not the subject of the warrant. A subsequent search yielded narcotics and two handguns. Jones moved to suppress this evidence, arguing the pursuit and arrest were unconstitutional.Monroe County Supreme Court denied suppression, applying the mistaken identity rule from Hill v California and finding the investigators reasonably believed Jones was the target of their warrant, citing his general physical similarity, presence in the area, and flight. Jones pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed, also applying the Hill rule and finding the officers' belief reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, though two justices dissented, finding insufficient specificity in the identification.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that, whether analyzed under the Hill “reasonable mistaken belief” standard or the De Bour “reasonable suspicion” framework, the record did not support the investigators’ pursuit or arrest of Jones. The Court found that Jones’s generic resemblance to the absconder and his flight did not provide the requisite reasonable suspicion, especially given the lack of evidence that Jones knew he was fleeing law enforcement. The Court held that the evidence should have been suppressed and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the suppression motion, and dismissed the indictment. View "People v Jones" on Justia Law

The case involved an individual who allegedly threw a liquid substance, later identified as urine, at a corrections officer while he was incarcerated for an unrelated offense. The incident was promptly investigated, and forensic testing was requested and completed within several months. After the test results confirmed the presence of urine, the matter was referred for prosecution, but there was an additional unexplained delay of approximately nine months before the defendant was indicted for aggravated harassment of an employee by an incarcerated individual, a class E felony.The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the pre-indictment delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process. The County Court granted this motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the delay unreasonable given the straightforward nature of the case, the availability of evidence, and the fact that the defendant had already served time in solitary confinement as institutional punishment. A dissenting Justice maintained that the delay was not constitutionally excessive and that the prosecution was justified in waiting for additional evidence. Leave to appeal was granted to the highest court.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and applied the five-factor test from People v Taranovich to assess the justification for the pre-indictment delay. The Court held that although there was some unjustified delay after the lab results were received, the overall 14-month period was not excessive under existing precedent, and the delay did not impair the defense or result in undue prejudice. The Court concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. The order dismissing the indictment was reversed, the motion to dismiss denied, and the case remitted to County Court for further proceedings. View "People v Tyson" on Justia Law