Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Minnesota sued a litany of fossil fuel producers1 (together, the Energy Companies) in state court for common law fraud and violations of Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes. In doing so, it joined the growing list of states and municipalities trying to hold fossil fuel producers responsible for alleged misrepresentations about the effects fossil fuels have had on the environment. The Energy Companies removed to federal court. The district court granted Minnesota’s motion to remand, and the Energy Companies appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Congress has not acted to displace the state-law claims, and federal common law does not supply a substitute cause of action, the state-law claims are not completely preempted. The court reasoned that because the “necessarily raised” element is not satisfied, the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply to Minnesota’s claims. Further, the court wrote that the connection between the Energy Companies’ marketing activities and their OCS operations is even more attenuated. Thus, neither requirement is met, there is no federal jurisdiction under Section 1349. View "State of Minnesota v. American Petroleum Institute" on Justia Law

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law

Pardoned felon Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. The court reasoned that no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction over a constitutional expungement where the alleged constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid arrest or conviction. Thus, the court found it does not have ancillary jurisdiction over his expungement claim. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

The primary source of incriminating information against Taylor was “Doe,” a woman with whom Taylor and his wife were intimately involved. Law enforcement presented a warrant application to an Indiana judge, seeking to search Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography and bestiality. The affidavit did not disclose that two officers involved in the investigation had been competing with Taylor for Doe’s affection. The judge signed a typed warrant that authorized the search of Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography; it did not mention bestiality. At a time unknown and under unknown circumstances, the lead detective apparently made handwritten alterations, adding “bestiality” to the warrant’s scope. When officers executed the altered warrant, they found substantial evidence that Taylor was producing and distributing child pornography. They found no evidence relating to bestiality. Taylor's motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing were denied. Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to 324 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated. An evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the judge approved the alterations before the warrant's execution. Questions surrounding those alterations are relevant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so the hearing must encompass false statements and material omissions in the affidavit and law enforcement’s subjective good faith in seeking the warrant. The affidavit did not support probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography but did support probable cause to search for evidence of crimes of bestiality. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. A jury found Defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, as well as one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. At sentencing, the district court deemed these offenses “controlled substance offense[s]” under Sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2—the career offender provisions—of the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant also had past convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 846 and assault. The district court considered the former to be a controlled substance offense and the latter to be a crime of violence under the career offender provisions. The district court applied the career offender enhancement to his sentence. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, he moved for a new trial based on newly discovered. The district court granted the motion, and the government appealed. On remand, the government moved to reinstate the judgment of conviction and Defendant’s sentence, to which Defendant’s counsel consented. Defendant now argues that, on remand, his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to make this objection. This failure resulted in prejudice to Defendant, whose 16-year sentence far exceeded the high end of what the Guidelines range would have been without the career offender enhancement. View "US v. Germaine Cannady" on Justia Law

Defendant Dominic Hunt appealed his convictions on two charges of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The ammunition was used in two shootings in early 2019. Investigators found three spent cartridges at the scene of one shooting and one spent cartridge at the other. A firearms expert testified that all four cartridges were fired from the same (undiscovered) weapon. Defendant’s sole issue raised on appeal was that the expert testimony should not have been admitted at trial: the expert’s field of firearm toolmark examination was not scientifically valid, and that the district court failed to perform its gatekeeping role in examining the admissibility of expert testimony because it relied on prior judicial opinions rather than the most up-to-date empirical evidence when it denied his pretrial motion to exclude the testimony without conducting a hearing. The Tenth Circuit held only that the district court adequately performed its gatekeeping role and did not err in admitting the testimony in light of the material presented on the pretrial motion and the expert testimony at trial. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Two groups of plaintiffs, the Quinn and Clayton plaintiffs (Plaintiffs), brought suit to facially invalidate a capital gains tax enacted by the Washington legislature on three independent constitutional grounds. They principally claimed the tax was a property tax on income, in violation of the uniformity and levy limitations on property taxes imposed by article VII, sections 1 and 2 of the Washington Constitution. They also claimed the tax violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution and the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The State argued that it was a valid excise tax not subject to article VII’s uniformity and levy requirements, and that it was consistent with other state and federal constitutional requirements. The trial court concluded the tax was a property tax, and did not address the constitutional questions. But the Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding the capital gains tax was appropriately characterized as an excise because it is levied on the sale or exchange of capital assets, not on capital assets or gains themselves. "Because the capital gains tax is an excise tax under Washington law, it is not subject to the uniformity and levy requirements of article VII. We further hold the capital gains tax is consistent with our state constitution’s privileges and immunities clause and the federal dormant commerce clause." View "Quinn, et al. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Respondent Camille Pool pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DUI in 2020. In May 2020, approximately two months following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Pool was sentenced at a hearing conducted over Zoom which she attended remotely. The State recommended Pool be sentenced to supervised probation with suspended jail time. The magistrate court ultimately sentenced Pool to 180 days in jail with 177 days suspended, granted her a withheld judgment, and placed her on supervised probation for 18 months. The magistrate court went on to explain some of the terms Pool would need to accept in order to receive probation. The following day, the magistrate court entered a written Judgment of Conviction: a form document for DUI cases. A paragraph next to the probation check box listed possible probation terms, which included: "Defendant specifically waives his/her 4th Amendment right to warrantless search of his/her person, vehicle, or residence by any law enforcement or probation officer." The form included a line for the defendant’s signature, but Pool was not personally present in the courtroom and, therefore, did not sign the Judgment. Instead, on the signature line, someone handwrote “mailed to defendant 5/27/2020.” While on probation, Pool failed to appear for drug and alcohol testing and failed to comply with other terms of her probation. On April 14, 2021, three probation officers went to Pool’s residence to conduct a residence check. One officer spoke with Pool, mentioned the Fourth Amendment waiver, and Pool indicated that she understood. Pool’s residence was searched and drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. Pool was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and a misdemeanor charge for possession of drug paraphernalia. Pool moved to suppress the items seized and the statements she made during the search of her home, arguing that, among other things, she had not waived her right against search and seizure under Article I, section 17 of Idaho’s Constitution and, therefore, the search violated her rights under the Idaho Constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the search was lawful and reversed the district court's decision granting the motion to suppress. View "Idaho v. Pool" on Justia Law

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

Two American Indian tribes – Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida and Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation – challenged as arbitrary and capricious the Secretary of the Treasury’s 2020 and 2021 Distributions of appropriations for relief from the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. The Tribes appealed only the 2021 Distribution.   The DC Circuit dismissed Miccosukee’s challenge as moot and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Secretary with instructions to remand Prairie Band’s challenge to the 2021 Distribution to the Secretary for further explanation. The court found that the Secretary has not explained why “substantial disparity” was measured by the degree the HUD data underestimated enrollment rather than the number of uncounted enrolled members, nor the Distribution methodology in relation to the statutory mandate to allocate funds “based on increased expenditures.” Further, the court wrote that on remand, the Secretary must explain the decision decided. To the extent the 2021 Distribution would treat some Tribes assigned HUD populations of zero differently, the Secretary corrected the error. Only Miccosukee had standing to challenge the error, and its claim is moot. View "Shawnee Tribe v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law