Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Taegan Ray Contreras was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, and Contreras was convicted and sentenced. He appealed, raising the same constitutional challenges.The District Court for the Western District of Texas initially sentenced Contreras to 24 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release for being a user in possession of a firearm. While on supervised release, detectives found Contreras in possession of a firearm and marijuana. He was arrested and indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Contreras moved to dismiss the indictment, but the district court denied the motion, finding § 922(g)(1) constitutional. Contreras entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reiterated that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional and concluded that it is constitutional as applied to Contreras. The court found that the Second Amendment extends to convicted felons but upheld the statute, noting historical traditions of disarming felons and those under the influence of substances. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is consistent with historical regulations and principles, affirming Contreras' conviction. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

Jose Gomez Quiroz was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) for making a false statement while purchasing a firearm, as he allegedly denied being under indictment for a felony. He was also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under indictment. A jury found him guilty on both counts. However, on the same day, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. Quiroz then moved to dismiss the indictment, and the district court granted the motion, ruling that § 922(n) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Consequently, the court also dismissed the § 922(a)(6) charge, stating that the false statement was immaterial.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Quiroz's motion to dismiss the indictment. After the jury's guilty verdict, the district court reconsidered its decision in light of the Bruen ruling and dismissed the indictment, declaring § 922(n) unconstitutional and the false statement under § 922(a)(6) immaterial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that § 922(n) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court noted that historically, individuals indicted for serious crimes were often detained pretrial, which effectively disarmed them. The court held that § 922(n) imposes a comparable burden on the right to armed self-defense as historical pretrial detention practices. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case, reinstating the charges under both § 922(n) and § 922(a)(6). View "United States v. Quiroz" on Justia Law

Paul Curry, Jr. pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence report (PSR) classified him as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), due to four prior Texas burglary convictions. Consequently, the district court sentenced him to 262 months of imprisonment, within the guidelines range of 210 to 262 months. Curry did not object to the PSR at the district court level.Curry appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing for the first time that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional and that the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal. He contended that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and violates the Second Amendment. Additionally, he argued that the district court should have submitted the question of whether his prior crimes occurred on separate occasions to a jury, and that it erred by relying solely on the PSR for the ACCA enhancement.The Fifth Circuit reviewed Curry's constitutional challenges for plain error, as they were not raised in the district court. The court found that Curry's arguments regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) were foreclosed by precedent. The court also held that Curry's facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment failed, as the statute was not unconstitutional in all its applications.Regarding the ACCA enhancement, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court clearly erred by not submitting the separate-occasions inquiry to a jury, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States. However, the court concluded that Curry failed to demonstrate that this error affected his substantial rights, given the substantial gaps in time and different victims involved in his prior convictions. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Curry" on Justia Law

Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law

Johnnie Franklin Wills, a state prisoner, filed a habeas petition challenging his life sentence under West Virginia’s recidivist statute. He argued that the judicially crafted test for determining whether a recidivist life sentence is proportional to the crime is unconstitutionally vague. Wills was convicted of grand larceny and conspiracy to commit grand larceny in 2016, and due to his prior eight felony convictions, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after fifteen years under the recidivist statute.The West Virginia courts denied Wills relief, stating that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply to their proportionality test. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, distinguishing Wills’s case from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya, which invalidated certain statutory provisions as unconstitutionally vague. The state court maintained that the proportionality test was clear and did not fall under the same scrutiny as the statutes in Johnson and Dimaya.Wills then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia also denied. The district court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the proportionality test serves as a judicial limitation on the recidivist statute, unlike the statutory mandates in Johnson and Dimaya.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the state court’s ruling was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended the void-for-vagueness doctrine to judicially crafted proportionality tests. Therefore, Wills’s habeas petition was denied. View "Wills v. Pszczolkowski" on Justia Law

Charles Pittman pleaded guilty to violating a federal law that criminalizes burning or attempting to burn buildings owned by institutions that receive federal funding. He was charged with aiding and abetting others in maliciously damaging and destroying the Market House, a building owned by the City of Fayetteville, which receives federal financial assistance. During his plea hearing, Pittman confirmed his understanding of the charges and admitted to committing acts constituting the elements of the crime.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted Pittman's guilty plea and later sentenced him to 60 months of imprisonment. Before sentencing, Pittman moved to dismiss Count 1, arguing that the statute required a nexus between the federal financial assistance and the damaged property, and that the criminal information failed to allege such a nexus. He also argued that the City of Fayetteville is not an "institution or organization" under the statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Pittman argued that his conduct did not violate the statute and that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. The court held that Pittman waived his statutory construction arguments by pleading guilty, as a guilty plea admits that the conduct violated the statute. The court also found that Pittman's as-applied constitutional challenge was forfeited because he did not timely raise it before the district court, and he failed to show plain error.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Pittman's guilty plea waived his statutory arguments and that his constitutional challenge was both forfeited and failed to meet the plain-error standard. View "United States v. Pittman" on Justia Law

In the 2024 general election for State Representative, District 39 in Hawaii, the two candidates were Republican Elijah Pierick and Democrat Corey Rosenlee. The election was primarily conducted by mail, with in-person voting available at voter service centers. The City Clerk of Honolulu was responsible for mailing and receiving ballots, while the State Office of Elections handled the counting. After the election, Pierick received 4,712 votes, and Rosenlee received 4,701 votes, with a vote differential of 11 in favor of Pierick. Rosenlee contested the election results, alleging mistakes in the handling of return identification envelopes and long lines at voter service centers.Rosenlee filed an election contest with the Supreme Court of Hawaii on November 25, 2024. He claimed that the Clerk made mistakes in reviewing signatures on return identification envelopes, only mailing notice of deficiencies, and managing in-person voting lines. He also alleged that the Clerk's actions violated equal protection and due process. The defendants filed motions for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that no mistakes were made and that Rosenlee failed to provide evidence to support his claims.The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the evidence and found that the Clerk followed the proper procedures for validating signatures on return identification envelopes. The court concluded that Rosenlee did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that any mistakes by the Clerk affected the election results. The court also found that the Clerk provided reasonable notice and opportunity for voters to cure deficiencies in their return identification envelopes. As a result, the court ruled in favor of the defendants and confirmed Pierick's election as State Representative, District 39. The court ordered the Chief Election Officer to deliver the certificate of election to Pierick. View "Rosenlee v. Takahashi " on Justia Law

Deborah Jane Clapp, a Minneapolis homeowner and taxpayer, filed a declaratory judgment action against the Minneapolis Public Schools and its officials. Clapp challenged the constitutionality of racial and ethnic preference provisions in a collective bargaining agreement between the school district and its teachers' union. She sought to stop the school district from implementing and spending public money on these provisions, alleging they violated the Minnesota Constitution's Equal Protection Guarantee.The district court dismissed Clapp's complaint, ruling that she lacked standing and that her claims were not ripe. Clapp appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, concluding that Clapp had taxpayer standing and that her claims were ripe for judicial review. The school district then petitioned for review by the Minnesota Supreme Court.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the issue of taxpayer standing. The court held that taxpayer standing exists only when the central dispute involves alleged unlawful disbursements of public funds. In this case, the court found that the alleged unlawful disbursements were merely incidental to the central dispute, which was the constitutionality of the racial and ethnic preference provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, Clapp lacked taxpayer standing to bring her claims. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the district court's dismissal of Clapp's complaint. View "Clapp vs. Sayles-Adams" on Justia Law

Berry Alexander Davis was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the attempted murder of her boyfriend, Jon, on New Year’s Eve in 2019. Baugh was abducted, placed in a U-Haul truck, and fatally shot. Davis and a co-defendant, Cedric Lamont Berry, were charged with first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and kidnapping. The State's theory was that Davis and Berry attacked Jon on behalf of Lyndon Wiggins, who had a falling out with Jon. Detective Briana Johnson testified about the relationship between Davis, Berry, and Wiggins, indicating they were involved in drug dealing together. Davis waived his right to testify, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.On direct appeal, Davis argued that the district court erred in joining his trial with Berry’s and that Detective Johnson’s testimony was inadmissible and prejudicial. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Davis also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several claims, including that his sentence violated his constitutional right to a sentencing jury under Blakely v. Washington. The court found these claims lacked merit.Davis subsequently filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and constitutional violations in his sentencing. The district court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if Davis proved the facts alleged, he would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, as his claims failed on their merits as a matter of law. View "Davis vs. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Mr. McClam, was charged with first-degree premeditated murder while armed and two counts of assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA) following two shootings that occurred within seconds of each other. The first shooting involved Mr. McClam firing at a car as it drove away, and the second shooting occurred shortly after when the car circled back. One of the bullets from these shootings killed an eleven-year-old boy, K.B., who was in the car.At trial, the United States presented the case to the jury on the theory that the fatal shot was fired during the first shooting, while the shots giving rise to the AWIKWA charges were fired during the second shooting. The jury found Mr. McClam not guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and could not reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser-included homicide charges and the AWIKWA charges. Before the retrial, Mr. McClam moved to bar the United States from proceeding on the theories that the shots giving rise to the AWIKWA charges were fired during the first shooting and that the fatal shots were fired during the second shooting. The trial court denied this motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the United States from arguing at retrial that the fatal shot was fired during the second shooting, as the United States had elected to proceed at the first trial solely on the theory that the fatal shot was fired during the first shooting. The court also accepted the United States' concession that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes arguing that the shots giving rise to the AWIKWA charges were fired during the first shooting. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McClam v. United States" on Justia Law