Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An informant informed law enforcement that a person named "Tom Collins" was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to use the informant in a controlled buy at the residence. Instead of waiting for the results of the controlled buy to apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for and obtained a search warrant that anticipated the controlled buy. The state argued that the warrant was an "anticipatory warrant" as approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs. The defendant argued that such warrants are incompatible with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.The Linn County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, ruling that anticipatory warrants were valid under both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that anticipatory warrants were permissible under Article I, section 9, and that the affidavit established probable cause.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to address the constitutional question. Instead, the court focused on Oregon's statutory warrant requirements, specifically ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6). The court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to comply with ORS 133.545(6), which requires that the facts and circumstances show that the objects of the search are in the places to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. As a result, the warrant did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

A firearms dealer in Madison County filed a lawsuit against the Illinois Attorney General, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Firearms Industry Responsibility Act. The plaintiff argued that the statute was preempted by federal law, void for vagueness, violated the Second Amendment, and violated the Illinois Constitution's three-readings rule. Additionally, the plaintiff contended that the venue provision, which limited venue to Sangamon and Cook Counties for actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from a constitutional challenge to a state statute, was unconstitutional as it violated federal due process rights.The circuit court of Madison County denied the Attorney General's motion to transfer the case to Sangamon County and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the venue issue. The court found that transferring the case to Sangamon County would be inconvenient for the plaintiff and would deprive it of its ability to effectively challenge the statute. The court concluded that the venue provision was unconstitutional as applied to individuals residing or injured outside of Cook or Sangamon Counties.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the venue provision did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights. The court emphasized that the inconvenience of traveling to Sangamon County did not rise to the level of a due process violation, especially considering the availability of remote court proceedings. The court also noted that the legislature has the authority to determine venue and that the state's interest in consolidating actions in certain counties was reasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Piasa Armory, LLC v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The appellant, Samuel Cocking, was skateboarding in Carson City with a concealed firearm that lacked a serial number. After tripping, he was ridiculed by a group of minors, leading to a verbal altercation. The minors' father, Philip Eubanks, approached, and Cocking shot and killed him. Cocking was charged with open murder, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number. He pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number, reserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the gun charges.The First Judicial District Court in Carson City denied Cocking's motion to dismiss the gun charges, ruling that the statutes did not violate his Second Amendment rights. Cocking was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 43-108 months.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Cocking argued that the statutes regulating concealed carry and unserialized firearms were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The court held that the concealed carry statute did not violate the Second Amendment because it only regulated the manner of carrying firearms, not the right to carry them openly. The court also held that the statute requiring firearms to have serial numbers did not infringe on the Second Amendment, as unserialized firearms are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing by relying on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "COCKING VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellants, Robin and Louie Joseph Aquilino, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in April 2020 and retained the law firm Spector Gadon Rosen & Vinci P.C. (Spector Gadon) as their counsel. They agreed to pay a flat fee of $3,500 and a $335 filing fee, which Spector Gadon disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court. However, due to the complexity of the case, Spector Gadon billed the Aquilinos for additional post-petition services, resulting in a fee agreement of $113,000, which was not disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court as required by 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b).The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey found that Spector Gadon violated the disclosure requirements and sanctioned the firm by ordering the disgorgement of collected fees and cancellation of the remaining fee agreement. Spector Gadon appealed, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reversed the Bankruptcy Court's decision, concluding that Spector Gadon was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Bankruptcy Court had "core" jurisdiction over the fee disclosure issue under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The Third Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment did not entitle Spector Gadon to a jury trial in the § 329(a) proceeding because the sanctions imposed were equitable in nature, designed to restore the status quo, and did not involve legal claims. The Third Circuit also found that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions, as it considered all relevant factors, including the Debtors' misconduct.The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court's sanctions order. View "In re Aquilino" on Justia Law

Police stopped Prince Irell Seuell in Van Buren County, Michigan, in November 2023, discovering drugs, a semiautomatic pistol, and an outstanding warrant. Seuell pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, and the government dropped the drug distribution charge. The presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, and the district court sentenced Seuell to 70 months.Seuell challenged his conviction and sentence. He argued that the felon-in-possession statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to him, but he waived this argument at sentencing. The district court offered to appoint new counsel to file a motion challenging the statute, but Seuell chose to proceed with sentencing without raising the motion. The court found this waiver binding.Seuell also contested the base offense level set by the presentence report, arguing that he did not know his pistol could carry a large capacity magazine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the relevant Guideline does not contain a state-of-mind requirement and applies whenever the firearm qualifies. The court noted that the Sentencing Commission knew how to add a state-of-mind requirement when it wished to do so and rejected Seuell's argument.Additionally, Seuell challenged the district court’s enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another offense. The Sixth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding that Seuell committed another felony offense and connected his pistol to drug trafficking. The court noted that the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in close proximity to the loaded pistol, supporting the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Seuell’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Seuell" on Justia Law

Brent Burton was charged with domestic violence, a class B misdemeanor, after a 911 call was made from his residence reporting an assault. The call was purportedly made by Burton's wife, who described being grabbed and slapped by Burton. The State filed a notice of intent to use the 911 call recording as evidence, supported by a certificate of authenticity from the records custodian of Central Dakota Communications. Burton pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.At the jury trial, the State was unable to locate or subpoena Burton's wife. Burton objected to the introduction of the 911 call recording, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. The district court admitted the recording, finding it addressed an ongoing emergency. The jury found Burton guilty, and the court sentenced him accordingly.Burton appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing the admission of the 911 call violated his Sixth Amendment rights and that the recording was improperly authenticated and contained inadmissible hearsay. The Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded the 911 call was nontestimonial, as its primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency. The court also found sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate the call and determined it fell under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the admission of the 911 call did not violate Burton's constitutional rights and that the recording was properly authenticated and admissible under the hearsay exceptions. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Kyle Zittleman and ShanaLea Bibler were married in 2010 and had one child in 2012. They divorced in 2016, with a Wyoming court granting Zittleman primary residential responsibility. Bibler filed motions to modify residential responsibility and child support in 2018 and 2020, but Zittleman retained primary responsibility. Zittleman moved to North Dakota in 2019, and Bibler followed in 2022. In 2023, Bibler again moved to modify residential responsibility, citing her relocation, Zittleman’s alleged non-compliance with a judgment, and the child's worsening demeanor.The Morton County district court held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, limiting each party to two and a half hours for their case. Bibler used all her time before cross-examining two witnesses and argued this violated her due process rights. The district court found no material change in circumstances and denied her motion. Bibler appealed, claiming the time limitation and the court's findings were erroneous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for constitutional claims and under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural matters. The court found that the district court did not violate due process by limiting the hearing time, as both parties were notified and did not object or request additional time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the time limitation.The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no material change in circumstances. The court noted that Bibler's move to North Dakota, Zittleman’s adherence to the judgment, and allegations of alienation did not constitute a material change. The court also found that the district court did not err in omitting a best interests analysis, as it was not required without a material change in circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Bibler's motion to modify residential responsibility. View "Zittleman v. Bibler" on Justia Law

Bruce Henry, who pled guilty to possessing child pornography in 2013, challenged Alabama Code § 15-20A-11(d)(4), which prohibits adult sex offenders convicted of a sex offense involving a child from residing or conducting overnight visits with a minor, including their own child. Henry, who has completed his prison term, married, and fathered a son, argued that the statute violated his First Amendment right of intimate association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Henry’s motion for a preliminary injunction but later partially granted his motion for summary judgment, finding the statute facially unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further Alabama’s compelling interest in protecting children and issued an injunction against its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the statute violated Henry’s fundamental right to live with his child. The court held that the statute was overinclusive, underinclusive, and not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. However, the court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in facially enjoining the statute, as Henry had not shown that it was unconstitutional in all its applications. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County" on Justia Law

Several adult-entertainment establishments and individual dancers in Jacksonville, Florida, challenged a city ordinance that effectively prohibits erotic dancers under the age of 21 from performing in adult-entertainment venues. The ordinance also requires dancers aged 21 and older to obtain a Work Identification Card through a licensing process. The plaintiffs argued that the age restriction and the licensing scheme violated the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida upheld both the age restriction and the licensing scheme. The court concluded that the age restriction is a content-neutral regulation aimed at reducing human trafficking and other criminal activities associated with adult-entertainment establishments. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the restriction furthered a substantial government interest and was appropriately tailored. The court also held that the licensing scheme did not impose an unconstitutional prior restraint, as it provided sufficient procedural protections, including a 14-day period for the sheriff to approve or deny applications and the ability for applicants to continue dancing while their applications were pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ordinance's age restriction must be treated as a content-neutral regulation of expressive activity and is thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it survives. The court found that the restriction furthers the city's substantial interest in combatting human trafficking and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Additionally, the court concluded that the licensing scheme includes sufficient procedural safeguards to avoid being an unconstitutional prior restraint, as it requires the sheriff to make licensing decisions within a reasonable time and allows dancers to continue performing while their applications are under review. View "Wacko's Too, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville" on Justia Law

Three criminal defendants in San Francisco, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenged the constitutionality of the San Francisco Sheriff's Office (SFSO) Pre-Trial Electronic Monitoring program (PTEM). They specifically contested Rule 5, which requires enrollees to submit to warrantless searches, and Rule 11, which allows SFSO to share participants’ location data with other law enforcement agencies without a warrant and to retain the data. The plaintiffs were divided into two subclasses: those enrolled in the program before May 2023 ("original rules subclass") and those enrolled after May 2023 ("revised rules subclass").The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Program Rules likely violated their rights under the United States and California constitutions. The court enjoined the enforcement of the challenged Program Rules for both subclasses. The Sheriff appealed the injunction, particularly the prohibition on enforcing the location sharing provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeals and that abstention was not warranted. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their facial challenges to Rule 11’s location sharing requirement for the revised rules subclass. The court determined that the Superior Court exercises a core judicial power in imposing PTEM and that the Sheriff’s program does not create separation-of-powers issues. The court also found that the location sharing provision was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution when ordered by the Superior Court following an individualized determination. The court vacated the preliminary injunction as to the revised rules subclass but affirmed it for the original rules subclass due to the lack of a clear record that location sharing was a condition of PTEM enrollment. The court also granted the Sheriff’s motion to stay the district court’s subsequent order enforcing the preliminary injunction. View "SIMON V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law