Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
BROWN V. ADAMSON
An inmate incarcerated in Nevada suffered a facial fracture after being struck by a softball in June 2018. He received prompt surgery and continued to be treated by prison medical staff, initially by Dr. Kim Adamson and, after Dr. Adamson’s departure, by Dr. Dana Marks. Over the following years, the inmate reported ongoing symptoms including pain, vertigo, and vision issues, some of which he believed were related to his original injury. While both doctors provided various treatments and medications, and ordered tests, they did not refer him to outside specialists despite persistent complaints. Eventually, after the inmate filed suit and obtained a preliminary injunction, he saw both a neurologist and an ear, nose, and throat specialist, resulting in new diagnoses and a revised treatment plan.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied summary judgment to Drs. Adamson and Marks, holding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether their failure to refer the inmate to outside specialists constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The court relied on earlier Ninth Circuit precedent that generally requires prison doctors to either treat medical problems or refer prisoners to others who can.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. It held that there was no clearly established law, under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, specifying when a delay in making an outside referral by prison doctors rises to the level of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Because existing precedent did not provide the required specificity to put the doctors on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks. View "BROWN V. ADAMSON" on Justia Law
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
A San Diego resident, who was a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, had his concealed-carry weapon (CCW) license revoked in December 2023 by the San Diego County Sheriff. The Sheriff cited the “good moral character” requirement in California law, stating that his association with the Boozefighters—a group characterized by the Sheriff as a “criminal street gang”—justified the revocation. The individual, who had no criminal record, was not given an opportunity to challenge this decision before his license was revoked, though he could seek reconsideration. Shortly after, California replaced the “good moral character” requirement with a new standard focused on dangerousness.The plaintiff sued both the County of San Diego and the Sheriff in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to free association and his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the claims, holding that the Sheriff was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity as an “arm of the state,” that the County was not liable because the revocation was a state policy, and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a First Amendment claim. The district court also found the Second Amendment claim moot after the license expired and the law changed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the San Diego County Sheriff is not an “arm of the state” and thus is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that revocation of a CCW license under the “good moral character” requirement was a county policy, making the County potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that the Second Amendment claim was not moot because effective relief, such as destruction of revocation records, remained possible. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff adequately pleaded a First Amendment violation by alleging his license was revoked solely due to his lawful association with the club, absent evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law
Obermiller v. Shoop
The case centers on Denny Obermiller, who pleaded guilty in Ohio state court to multiple counts of murder and rape involving his grandparents. Following his guilty plea, a three-judge panel conducted a thorough evidentiary hearing, found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentenced him to death after Obermiller waived his right to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Obermiller later sought to challenge his conviction and mitigation waiver, arguing that his mental illness, specifically bipolar disorder, prevented his plea and waiver from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.After sentencing, Obermiller appealed his conviction and sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed his direct appeal, but Obermiller did not raise issues related to his guilty plea or his mitigation waiver at that stage. Subsequently, he pursued post-conviction relief in state court, attaching new evidence regarding his mental health. The Ohio Court of Appeals, the highest state court to rule on his post-conviction petition, held that Ohio’s res judicata law barred Obermiller from raising these claims because he failed to present them in his direct appeal, even though they could have been raised with the information available at the time.Obermiller then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The district court found his claims procedurally defaulted and rejected them on the merits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that Obermiller’s claims were barred by Ohio’s res judicata rule as an independent and adequate state ground. Obermiller failed to show cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, holding that federal review was precluded due to procedural default. View "Obermiller v. Shoop" on Justia Law
NetChoice v. Fitch
The case centers on a challenge to the Walker Montgomery Protecting Children Online Act, a Mississippi law enacted to protect minors from online sexual predators by imposing regulatory requirements on certain internet platforms. The Act applies to platforms that allow user interactions, visible profiles, and content sharing, but excludes sites mainly focused on news, sports, commerce, or career development. The law requires platforms to verify users’ ages, obtain parental consent for minors, and implement strategies to mitigate minors’ exposure to harm. Violations can result in civil and criminal penalties. Before the law could take effect, a trade association representing major internet platforms challenged its constitutionality under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi initially granted a preliminary injunction, finding a likelihood of success on NetChoice’s facial challenge to the Act. However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC clarified the analysis required for facial challenges, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded. On remand, NetChoice amended its complaint to pursue an as-applied challenge and again secured a preliminary injunction, but this time the relief was limited to nine member platforms. The state appealed, and the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction pending review.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that NetChoice had not provided sufficient, particularized evidence showing how the Act was unconstitutional as applied to each specific member platform or its functionalities. The court held that the district court erred by granting broad, undifferentiated as-applied relief without a developed factual record or tailored analysis. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion and the Supreme Court’s guidance. View "NetChoice v. Fitch" on Justia Law
Lawrence v. State of Florida
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1994 first-degree murder of Michael Finken, in addition to conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petit theft. The murder involved severe violence and was committed after the appellant learned that the victim had slept with his wife. The sentencing court found aggravating circumstances, including that the murder was heinous and premeditated, and also identified several mitigating factors, such as the appellant’s learning disability and deprived childhood.Following the initial conviction, the appellant pursued multiple postconviction motions under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his initial postconviction claims and habeas petition, and subsequently denied relief on his first and second successive motions. The second motion was denied based on precedent set in Hall v. Florida, and the first on Hurst v. State. In the third successive motion, the appellant raised newly discovered evidence claims related to the Dozier School for Boys and the Okeechobee School Victim Compensation Program, arguing both for a disproportionate death sentence and for a new penalty phase.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the summary dismissal of the appellant’s third successive postconviction motion de novo. The Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the claims were untimely and procedurally barred, as the Dozier Act did not constitute newly discovered evidence and the facts underlying the claims had previously been available or could have been discovered with due diligence. The Court relied on prior decisions, including Cole v. State and Jones v. State, to conclude that the appellant’s claims could have and should have been raised earlier. The dismissal by the postconviction court was affirmed, and the procedural bars were found dispositive, with no need to reach the merits of the claims. View "Lawrence v. State of Florida" on Justia Law
State v. Amsden
Walter Amsden was charged with felony violation of a court order for allegedly violating a no-contact order protecting an intimate partner. Before trial, he stipulated to having two prior convictions for violating protection orders with domestic violence findings. At trial, the State was required to prove not only the violation of the order but also that Amsden had at least two prior convictions for similar offenses. The jury found him guilty and determined that the offense involved an intimate partner. During sentencing, the State submitted evidence of Amsden’s prior convictions, including some from other states, and argued for a standard range sentence based on an offender score of nine. Amsden challenged some prior convictions, claiming they had "washed out" and should not count toward his score. The sentencing court accepted the State’s calculation and imposed a sentence of 30 months’ confinement followed by 30 months’ community custody.Amsden appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing procedural errors and insufficient proof of his criminal history for sentencing. The State conceded it had not proved all prior convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reversed the sentence, and remanded for resentencing, allowing the State to present new evidence of Amsden’s criminal history. Amsden argued that this remand would violate the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, which limits judicial factfinding that increases punishment.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that Erlinger applies to Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act but does not require a jury to decide whether prior convictions have "washed out," as that determination does not increase punishment. The court further held that prior domestic violence designations do not violate Erlinger if they were pleaded and proved to a prior jury. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded for resentencing consistent with these principles. View "State v. Amsden" on Justia Law
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
A fitness center in Yakima County, Washington, was subject to a temporary closure order during the COVID-19 pandemic under a gubernatorial emergency proclamation. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) received a complaint that the gym was operating despite the closure order. L&I safety inspectors went to the gym, which displayed an illuminated “open” sign but was accessible only by key card. The inspectors unsuccessfully attempted to contact the business by phone, then entered the gym by following a key card holder inside. Once inside, they observed employees and customers and requested consent to inspect the premises. The employee they spoke with declined consent and asked the inspectors to wait for the general manager, who also denied consent. The inspectors left after being refused consent.L&I cited the gym’s owner for willfully violating the emergency workplace safety rule. An industrial appeals judge vacated the citation due to insufficient evidence, but the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals reinstated it, finding the inspectors’ entry proper for the sole purpose of seeking consent. The owner then sought review in Yakima County Superior Court, which vacated the citation, holding that the gym had a reasonable expectation of privacy due to the key card entry system, making the inspectors’ observations inadmissible. The State appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, finding the inspectors’ entry improper.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the inspectors did not violate the relevant statute, RCW 49.17.070, because they entered through a “reasonably recognizable entry point” to seek consent, as permitted by law. The court further held that the entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as the gym’s front entrance impliedly invited the public to enter and there was no evidence of an enforced policy excluding nonmembers. The court reversed and vacated the trial court’s order dismissing the citation and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus." on Justia Law
CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS
Paul Calvert owned several rental properties in Conway, Arkansas. Over several years, the City cited these properties for various code violations, including the presence of trash, dilapidated structures, and health hazards. When Calvert did not resolve the violations, the City performed cleanups, billed him for the costs, and, after hearings, placed liens on three properties—512 Third Avenue, 1135 Ash Street, and 1900/1902 Dave Ward Drive. Calvert did not always attend the hearings, and some invoices were paid by tenants or through sale proceeds when the properties were sold.Calvert filed suit in the Faulkner County Circuit Court, challenging the liens and raising additional claims, including alleged violations of due process, unlawful search and seizure, excessive fines, and seeking a declaratory judgment. The circuit court found that Calvert’s appeals of the liens for the Third Avenue and Ash Street properties were untimely and dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The lien on the Dave Ward property was found to be moot because it was paid when Calvert sold the property and there was no evidence the lien affected the sale price. On Calvert’s other claims, the court granted summary judgment to the City, finding adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, that the search was conducted under a valid warrant, and that the City acted within its authority.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the lien appeals, agreeing that the first two were untimely and the third was moot. The court also affirmed summary judgment on Calvert’s constitutional and statutory claims, holding that he did not present sufficiently developed legal arguments or evidence, and that the City acted under the appropriate statutory authority. View "CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
United States of America v State of Illinois
Illinois enacted a law requiring certain nonprofit organizations that make substantial grants to publicly post aggregated demographic information about their directors and officers, including categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation. The American Alliance for Equal Rights, representing two member organizations, filed a pre-enforcement challenge, claiming that the statute compelled speech and encouraged discrimination, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States also intervened, pressing the Fourteenth Amendment claim under specific statutory authority. Both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions to prevent enforcement of the law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed all motions together. It dismissed the Alliance’s claims related to the posting requirement for lack of standing and dismissed the United States’ complaint entirely on the same ground, also denying both preliminary injunction requests. The district court reasoned that the Alliance lacked standing because its members declared they would not provide demographic information, meaning there would be nothing to post. It also found the United States had not shown an injury in fact, as required for standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court found that the United States had standing to enforce federal constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause, even if a private plaintiff might not. The court also determined that the Alliance had standing because it was likely that at least one member’s officer or director would respond to the demographic survey, triggering the posting requirement. The court further held that using pseudonyms for member organizations did not defeat standing at this stage.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissals, vacated the denial of preliminary injunctions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States of America v State of Illinois" on Justia Law
Rene v. Mustafa
A woman experiencing persistent medical symptoms visited a state-run hospital complaining of chest pain, weakness, nausea, headaches, and jaw pain. After psychiatric evaluation, a psychiatrist determined she posed a substantial suicide risk and arranged for her involuntary transfer to a private psychiatric hospital. Two staff psychiatrists at the private hospital also assessed her suicide risk and ordered her continued commitment. The woman later disputed the accuracy of the medical notes regarding her statements and the thoroughness of the evaluations, asserting that the doctors performed only brief assessments and did not sufficiently investigate mitigating factors such as her religious beliefs and supportive family.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, declining jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The court excluded the plaintiff’s affidavit and supplemental expert report, finding the affidavit to be a “sham” that contradicted her deposition testimony. It held that no reasonable jury could find the evaluations unreasonable or that the private hospital doctors acted under color of state law for purposes of federal liability. The court also ruled that a Section 1983 claim could not be predicated solely on violations of state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in applying the sham affidavit doctrine to exclude the plaintiff’s affidavit and expert report, concluding that disputes of fact preclude summary judgment for the psychiatrist at the state hospital regarding the Fourth Amendment claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the private hospital doctors, finding insufficient evidence that they acted under color of state law. The court reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against the state hospital psychiatrist and reinstated the state-law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Rene v. Mustafa" on Justia Law