Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After divorcing in 2022, Eric and Tiare experienced escalating harassment and abuse beginning in late 2023. Tiare repeatedly sent manipulative and threatening messages, made suicide threats, and harassed Eric’s new girlfriend. The harassment intensified, culminating in Tiare entering Eric’s property, physically attacking him, and being arrested for battery and unauthorized entry. Various protective orders were issued, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), an emergency protective order, and a criminal protective order. Despite these, Tiare violated the orders and continued contacting Eric.The Marin County Superior Court initially granted Tiare three continuances for the hearing on Eric’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, citing reasons such as giving Tiare time to respond, her attorney’s absence, and her participation in residential treatment. At the fourth hearing, Tiare requested another continuance, arguing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges. The trial court denied this request, found that Eric had proven acts of abuse, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting both Eric and his girlfriend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the fourth continuance. The appellate court held that respondents in Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings who intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right are not automatically entitled to a continuance. The trial court must balance the respondent’s Fifth Amendment interests against other interests, including those of the petitioner, judicial efficiency, nonparties, and the legislative purpose of prompt resolution. The appellate court found the trial court had properly weighed these competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Irvine v. Irvine" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico limited liability company, Berkey International, LLC, manufactures water filters known as Black Berkey Filters, which contain silver—a substance recognized as a pesticide. Berkey distributed these filters without EPA registration, claiming the silver was intended only to protect the filters themselves, not for pesticidal purposes. Inspections by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed that Berkey and associated distributors made claims on product labels and websites indicating the filters could remove viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens, suggesting pesticidal intent. As a result, the EPA issued a Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Order prohibiting Berkey and other distributors from selling or distributing these filters.Reviewing the matter, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered Berkey’s request for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the EPA’s order. The district court evaluated the administrative record, held hearings, and reviewed extensive briefing. The court found that Berkey had not substantiated its claims that the silver was not intended for pesticidal use and denied Berkey’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Berkey’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Berkey to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Applying a highly deferential standard to the EPA’s technical determinations, the appellate court concluded that Berkey had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including its assertions of arbitrary and capricious agency action and violations of notice-and-comment and due process requirements. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the EPA had reason to believe Berkey’s filters were unregistered and misbranded pesticidal products under federal law. View "Berkey International, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed an initiative petition with Wilmington city officials, proposing a new ordinance to regulate data centers and their campuses. The ordinance would set standards for noise, lighting, emissions, generator-testing, water use, and heat generation, among other things. A key feature of the proposed ordinance was the creation of a “private right of action,” allowing residents within certain distances of a data center to sue its owner or operator for alleged violations of these standards, with the possibility of injunctive relief, penalties, and attorney’s fees.After the petition was filed and signatures validated, the Wilmington city auditor certified its sufficiency and validity, but did not opine on whether it was within the city’s initiative power. The Clinton County Board of Elections declined to certify the petition for the ballot, determining that the ordinance was not within the municipality’s power because it sought to create a new private cause of action. The board reaffirmed this decision after a hearing requested by one petitioner.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the mandamus action seeking to compel the board to certify the petition. The court held that the proposed ordinance was outside the municipal initiative power because it would create a new cause of action, which municipalities are not authorized to do. The court relied on its prior decisions, including State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse and State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, and rejected arguments that the ordinance merely restated existing statutory remedies. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge, finding no unconstitutional prior restraint. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus, upholding the board’s decision not to certify the initiative for the ballot. View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who entered the United States without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings after being detained by immigration authorities. While in custody, he was properly served with a Notice to Appear and provided the detention center address as his location. Shortly before his release, his relatives posted a bond and filled out a bond form with his residential address and telephone number, but not his mailing address. The relatives were unaware that the individual received mail via a P.O. Box and not at his residential address. After release, the government sent a hearing notice to the residential address listed on the bond form, but the notice was returned as undeliverable since mail could not be received at that address.An Immigration Judge ordered the individual removed in absentia after he failed to appear at the hearing, relying on the assumption that he had received written notice. The individual, who did not know about the hearing, promptly moved to reopen the proceedings, providing his correct mailing address and explaining, via sworn statements, that he had notified the court of his address for receiving notices and had lived at the same location since release. The Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen, applying a presumption of delivery based on regular mail. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that the government had complied with statutory notice requirements by sending notice to the last known address and rejecting the argument that he was entitled to actual notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the government violated the petitioner’s due process rights by relying solely on a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form, which was not reasonably calculated to provide notice. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the removal order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed a later petition for review as moot. View "MEDINA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

A university professor in Oxford, Mississippi sought to host a nighttime art exhibition on the grounds of the local courthouse, which is frequently used by the public for varied activities, including political protests and social gatherings. The county had implemented a Facility Use Policy requiring permits for use of courthouse grounds, including a ban on nighttime events, advance notice, security fees, insurance, and granting discretionary authority to deny permits based on the nature of the event. The professor’s permit request was denied due to the curfew provision, prompting him to file suit alleging violations of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held a bench trial and permanently enjoined enforcement of the curfew provision against the professor, finding it an unreasonable restriction on speech. However, the court dismissed the professor’s other claims for lack of standing, concluding he had not suffered sufficient injury to challenge the remaining policy provisions or to bring a vagueness challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the injunction against the curfew provision, holding that the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and burdened more speech than necessary. The court rejected the county’s argument that subsequent policy amendments mooted the case, finding the amended curfew provision still posed the same fundamental issues. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the professor’s facial challenges to the other policy provisions, holding he had standing to challenge them under the First Amendment, though not on vagueness grounds. The case was remanded for further proceedings, requiring the professor to demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the policy substantially outweigh constitutional ones. View "Rash v. Lafayette County" on Justia Law

Two inmates who identify as transgender women brought a class action against the Oregon Department of Corrections and related officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations for purportedly exposing transgender women inmates to substantial risk of harm by housing them in men’s prisons. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary mandatory injunction on behalf of a class of all current and future transgender women in Oregon prison facilities, requesting that they be presumptively assigned to the state’s women’s prison and given additional protections.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified the class. The injunction required Oregon to presumptively assign transgender women inmates to the women’s prison unless a specific security justification was documented, along with other measures for safety and privacy. Defendants moved for reconsideration, and the district court amended but largely maintained the injunction. Defendants appealed and obtained a stay of the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the injunction and de novo review to underlying legal issues. The Ninth Circuit found the district court committed clear error by basing its injunction on an unsupported finding that the defendants employed a default presumption of housing transgender women in men’s prisons. The appellate court determined that the record showed individualized assessments for inmate placement and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or commonality for class certification. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, ordered the class to be decertified, and remanded the case. The mandate was issued forthwith. View "S.D. V. REESE" on Justia Law

A software company managing cloud storage accounts detected that a user had uploaded material suspected to be child sexual abuse content. As required by federal law, the company reported this to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which in turn forwarded a CyberTip containing the information, including the suspect’s phone number, to law enforcement. A detective from the Tallahassee Police Department reviewed the CyberTip and submitted an affidavit to a Florida state court judge to obtain a warrant to search the suspect’s cloud account. The affidavit referenced the reliability of NCMEC’s processes and the detective’s experience, but did not describe the alleged illicit images. The warrant was granted, and the subsequent search uncovered child sexual abuse images. Further investigation led to the identification of a victim and the arrest of the suspect, who was later charged federally.The defendant moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The district court agreed, finding that the affidavit was too vague and conclusory, lacking sufficient details to support probable cause or reasonable reliance. As a result, the court suppressed all evidence obtained from the searches.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, assuming without deciding that the affidavit was deficient in establishing probable cause. The court held that the affidavit contained enough indicia of probable cause, particularly due to the general trustworthiness of NCMEC’s CyberTip program and the detective’s reasonable reliance on established procedures. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "USA v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with several serious crimes, including second-degree murder and aggravated assault, following an incident in which he allegedly attacked his parents with a baseball bat, killing his father and injuring his mother, before fleeing in a vehicle and colliding with a game warden's truck. After his arrest, the court ordered a neutral psychiatric examiner to conduct a competency examination to determine whether the defendant was fit to stand trial. The examiner interviewed the defendant multiple times but concluded that further psychometric testing was necessary. The examiner stated that defense counsel must be excluded from the testing, citing copyright and professional ethics concerns, and warned that she would otherwise submit a report without a competency finding.The defendant objected, asserting that his attorney had a constitutional right to be present during the competency examination, referencing both the Sixth Amendment and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The State argued that the competency examination was not a critical stage of the prosecution, and thus the right did not attach. The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division denied the defendant's motion, holding there was no constitutional right to counsel’s presence during the examination. The defendant sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo for constitutional questions and for abuse of discretion on procedural rulings. The Court held that a competency examination is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, citing United States Supreme Court precedent and the practices of numerous jurisdictions. The Court further held that Vermont law and the Fifth Amendment adequately protect defendants’ rights during such examinations. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude counsel, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. View "State v. Lawyer" on Justia Law

An inmate serving a sentence for second-degree murder in Vermont challenged the constitutionality of a statutory amendment affecting earned-time credits. The original law allowed inmates to earn sentence reductions for good behavior, and this petitioner received such credits for several months in early 2021. However, a 2021 amendment excluded inmates convicted of second-degree murder and other serious offenses, if they were sentenced on or before January 1, 2021, from earning further reductions after April 26, 2021. The petitioner, who falls into this category, retained credits earned before the amendment but was prohibited from earning future credits.The petitioner initially filed a pro se complaint in the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, seeking declaratory relief to continue earning sentence reductions. After a parallel federal case, Baird v. Deml, decided in favor of the Department of Corrections, the petitioner amended his complaint to assert violations of his due process rights and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. Both parties sought summary judgment, and the civil division adopted the reasoning of Baird, granting summary judgment to the Department of Corrections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that procedural due process requirements do not apply to legislative actions such as statutory amendments, and the legislative process provided all the process that was due. Regarding substantive due process, the Court found that the law did not implicate a fundamental constitutional right and was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—protecting victims’ expectations about offenders’ sentences. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Common Benefits Clause, concluding that the exclusion of certain inmates from earned-time credits was reasonably and justly related to the legislative purpose. The judgment was affirmed. View "Murphy v. Deml" on Justia Law