Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Cesar Meneses appealed after a jury found him guilty of four counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age and found true, as to each count, the multiple victim sentencing enhancement allegation. Meneses argued: (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding consideration of evidence of charged sex offenses with CALCRIM No. 1191B; and (2) the prosecutor committed error in her closing and rebuttal arguments. Meneses further argued, to the extent his trial counsel’s failure to object on these grounds results in forfeiture of these arguments on appeal, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed as to all issues. View "California v. Meneses" on Justia Law

The Swartzes acquired horses, goats, and a donkey on their Washington County, Indiana hobby farm. In 2013, the county’s animal control officer, Lee, contacted Dr. Lovejoy, an Indiana State Board of Animal Health veterinarian, for help evaluating a thin horse he observed on the Swartzes’ property. Lee and Lovejoy visited the Swartzes’ farm to evaluate the animals four times. Lovejoy reported a significant decline in the animals’ welfare and expressed concerns about the conditions in which they were kept. Lee sought, in a standard, ex parte proceeding, a finding of probable cause to seize the animals. The Superior Court of Washington County determined that there was probable cause to believe animal neglect or abandonment was occurring and entered an order to seize the animals (IC 35-46-3-6). The animals were seized and the state filed animal cruelty charges against the Swartzes. The court eventually ordered permanent placement of the animals for adoption. The state deferred prosecuting the Swartzes with a pretrial diversion agreement. The Swartzes filed a federal suit, alleging a conspiracy to deprive them of their property. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s rulings (in favor of the defendants) and remanded for dismissal due to a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The Swartzes’ claims are inextricably intertwined with state court judgments, requiring dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for extraordinary writ sought by advocates for a statewide ballot initiative called the Direct Primary Initiative, holding that Petitioners' statutory claims and all but one of the constitutional claims failed on the merit and that Petitioners failed to carry their burden of identifying an undisputed basis for the relief requested. Petitioners - Count My Vote, Inc., Michael O. Leavitt, and Richard McKeown - were advocates for a proposed initiative that would establish a direct primary election path for placement on the general election ballot for persons seeking a political party's nomination for certain elected offices. The lieutenant governor refused to certify the initiative for the November 2018 ballot, finding that Petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements of Utah Code 20A-7-201(2)(a). Petitioners then brought this petition for extraordinary writ on statutory and constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) the majority of Petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims failed on the merits; (2) one of the constitutional claims implicates an underlying dispute of material fact on the nature and extent of any burden on the right to pursue an initiative under Utah Const. art. VI, 1; and (3) Petitioners failed to carry their burden of establishing an undisputed basis for the requested relief. View "Count My Vote, Inc. v. Cox" on Justia Law

Ohio H.B. 214, signed into law in 2017, prohibits any person from purposefully performing or inducing or attempting to perform or induce an abortion if the person has knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part, because of a test result indicating Down Syndrome in an unborn child; a prenatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome in an unborn child; or “any other reason to believe” that an unborn child has Down Syndrome, Ohio Rev. Code 2919.10(B). Violations constitute fourth-degree felonies. The law requires the state medical board to revoke the license of a physician who violates it and makes that physician liable for damages. The performing physician must attest in writing that he is not aware that fetal Down Syndrome is a reason for the woman’s decision to terminate. The district court ruled in favor of opponents, finding that under Supreme Court precedent, a woman is expressly and unambiguously entitled to a pre-viability right to choose whether to terminate or continue her pregnancy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction. The state’s interest in preventing discrimination does not become compelling until viability. Plaintiffs’ patients would be irreparably harmed as a matter of law by the loss of their constitutional right to seek an abortion before viability. View "Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his Nevada conviction and death sentence for four counts of first degree murder. Given that petitioner's underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit, the panel need not resolve whether the relevant Nevada law was adequate or if it is, whether petitioner can overcome his procedural default and obtain federal review of the merits of his ineffective assistance claims. Even if the panel held in petitioner's favor in either of those questions and reached the merits of the claims, the panel would affirm the district court's denial of relief. The panel also held that the Nevada Supreme Court's determination -- that petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated when the state's expert made reference during his testimony to test results that he had obtained from petitioner's expert -- was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court case law. Furthermore, the panel rejected petitioner's claim regarding change of venue, the testimony of the mother of the victim, and improper statements by the prosecutor. Finally, the panel declined to expand the certificate of appealability. View "Floyd v. Filson" on Justia Law

A juvenile from a small village could not afford to travel to the site of his juvenile delinquency proceeding. His attorney with the Public Defender Agency (the Agency) filed a motion asking the superior court to require the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to pay the travel expenses for both the juvenile and one of his parents. The superior court denied the motion and required the Agency to pay the expenses. The court of appeals upheld the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the Agency’s authorizing statute could plausibly be interpreted to cover client travel expenses and that this reading was supported by administrative guidance in the form of two Attorney General opinions and a regulation governing reimbursements by the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA). The Alaska Supreme Court granted the Agency’s petition for hearing, asking the Agency and DJJ to address two questions: (1) whether the Agency has a statutory obligation to pay its clients’ travel expenses; and (2) whether DJJ has a statutory obligation to pay those expenses. The Supreme Court concluded neither entity’s authorizing statutes required the payment and therefore reversed the court of appeals. The Court did not address the question of how these necessary expenses were to be funded; the Court surmised that was an issue for the executive and legislative branches. View "Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

President Trump filed suit alleging that the House Committee on Oversight and Reform's investigation into his financial records serves no legitimate purpose. He sued to prevent Mazars, an accounting firm, from complying with the Committee's subpoena. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Committee, holding that the Committee possesses authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution to issue the subpoena, and Mazars must comply. The court held that, in issuing the challenged subpoena, the Committee was engaged in a legitimate legislative investigation, rather than an impermissible law enforcement inquiry; at bottom, the subpoena is a valid exercise of the legislative oversight authority because it seeks information important to determining the fitness of legislation to address potential problems within the Executive Branch and the electoral system; it does not seek to determine the President's fitness for office; and the documents sought are reasonably relevant to the Committee's legitimate legislative inquiry. Finally, the court held that it had no need and no authority to interpret the House Rules narrowly to deny the Committee the authority it claims. View "Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP" on Justia Law

Tokyo Valentino filed suit against the County, challenging certain business licensing and adult entertainment ordinances, and seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. At issue in this appeal was the district court's second dismissal of Tokyo Valentino's claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Tokyo Valentino's claim for compensatory damages relating to the appeal of the ordinances, because Tokyo Valentino's second amended complaint does not contain factual allegations that establish it suffered a cognizable injury in fact for which compensatory damages might be warranted. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Tokyo Valentino's request for a declaratory judgment regarding whether its sale of sexual devices constitutes a lawful prior nonconforming use authorized under the repealed ordinances and whether the new ordinances' failure to include provisions grandfathering in prior lawful uses violates federal and state law. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by abstaining under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), from hearing Tokyo Valentino's claims stemming from the County's new ordinances. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment convicting Defendant of first-degree murder, holding that Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation or compulsory process were not violated when the district court refused to permit Defendant during trial to call a witness who intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on all questions. In his retrial for murder, Defendant sought to call a witness so that the jury could him him "take the Fifth" and thus infer the witness's guilt. The district court refused to permit Defendant to call the witness because, pursuant to State v. Bedwell, 417 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1987), the jury is not entitled to draw inferences favorable to the defense from a witness's decision to exercise his constitutional privilege. The court of appeals reversed, distinguishing Bedwell on grounds that the witness had testified in Defendant's prior trial and the district court failed to ascertain the scope of his privilege question by question. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the district court, holding (1) under the circumstances, Bedwell provides a categorical rule against compelling the witness to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "State v. Heard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court judge allowing Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence related to an illegal seizure on the ground that the stop of his motor vehicle was not reasonable, holding that the police officer's stop of Defendant's motor vehicle for failing to drive entirely within a marked traffic lane was reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. Defendant was charged with a marked lanes violation in accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 89, 4A and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The judge allowed Defendant's motion to suppress, ruling that Defendant had not violated section 4A, and therefore, the stop of his motor vehicle was not reasonable. The Supreme Court vacated the judge's order, holding that Defendant violated section 4A when he crossed the right-side fog line one time for two or three seconds, and therefore, the ensuing traffic stop was reasonable. View "Commonwealth v. Larose" on Justia Law