Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A woman was stopped by police in Idaho for driving with an expired vehicle registration. During the traffic stop, a drug detection dog named Edo was deployed to conduct a “free-air sniff” around her vehicle. While sniffing, Edo briefly touched the vehicle’s door handle with the tip of his nose and alerted to the presence of drugs. Based on this alert, officers searched the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, alprazolam, and drug paraphernalia, leading to her arrest and subsequent charges for possession.After an earlier appeal concerning discovery issues related to Edo’s performance records, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that the dog’s contact with her vehicle transformed the sniff into a trespassory search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Ada County heard testimony and reviewed video evidence, ultimately granting the motion to suppress. The court concluded that the brief nose contact constituted trespassing and an unlawful search under Idaho precedent, specifically State v. Dorff, 171 Idaho 818, 526 P.3d 988 (2023).The State appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s suppression order, finding that the contact was not trespassory and that Edo’s alert provided probable cause for the search. The defendant then petitioned for review, which was granted by the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. The Supreme Court held that the drug dog’s fleeting, momentary nose contact did not amount to “intermeddling” or trespassory conduct under the property-based Fourth Amendment analysis established in Dorff. Therefore, the contact did not transform the free-air sniff into a search, and the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Pendleton " on Justia Law

A group of parents, authors, a free speech organization, and a book publisher brought a lawsuit against a county school board, challenging the removal of certain library books from public school libraries. The school board had adopted policies, as required by Florida law, mandating the removal of materials deemed pornographic or describing sexual conduct, and established procedures for reviewing objections to specific books. After objections were raised to various titles, review committees and the superintendent made recommendations, and the school board ultimately voted to remove several groups of books based on its existing policies and a directive aligned with state guidelines.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida considered whether members of the school board could claim legislative privilege to avoid being deposed about their reasons for voting to remove the books. The district court ruled that legislative privilege did not apply in this context, finding that the board members’ votes to remove specific books constituted administrative acts—applying established policy to particular facts—rather than legislative acts involving the creation or amendment of policy. The district court denied the board members’ motion for a protective order and subsequent motions to quash deposition subpoenas.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether legislative privilege shielded the school board members from testifying about their decisions to remove the books. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the board members’ votes to remove specific books, as applications of existing policy to individual cases, were administrative rather than legislative acts. Therefore, legislative privilege did not bar their depositions regarding those specific removal decisions. The court emphasized its holding was limited to the particular facts of this case and did not address whether other privileges or rules might limit such discovery. View "Pen American Center, Inc. v. Adams" on Justia Law

A Ukrainian Catholic parish near Pittsburgh owns two plots of land, one containing its church and the other, a cemetery and mausoleum. The parish sought to build a large shrine dedicated to Mary and the sanctity of life on its second plot in Collier Township, but the township’s zoning code did not allow such a use. The parish applied to amend the code and rezone its land to facilitate the project, submitting plans and a traffic study. After a public hearing, the township’s Board of Commissioners denied the application, citing traffic concerns, fundraising issues, and objections to the shrine’s pro-life message. The parish then proposed a smaller chapel, which was approved but with restrictive conditions. Initially, the parish appealed in state court, but it abandoned that appeal to file a federal lawsuit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and RLUIPA.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the parish’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the parish was not substantially likely to succeed on the merits, the requested relief was unclear, and granting an injunction would disrupt the status quo rather than preserve it. The court also found that no injunction was necessary to keep the case viable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. Applying a deferential standard, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that although the parish had a strong likelihood of success on its RLUIPA substantial-burden claim, it failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or the necessity of preliminary relief. The court emphasized that preliminary injunctions are meant to preserve the status quo pending trial, not to grant final relief. The denial was affirmed. View "Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church v. Township of Collier" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

An IT analyst who is openly gay was hired by a large, Catholic-affiliated nonprofit based in Maryland. At the time of hiring, he was told his husband would be covered under the organization’s dependent health benefits. However, several months after his employment began, the organization informed him that providing benefits to his same-sex spouse was contrary to its religious beliefs and terminated those benefits. The employee declined alternative compensation and ultimately resigned from the organization after several years.The employee sued in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, bringing claims under federal and state employment discrimination laws, including Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the employee on the Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims and, after certifying questions to the Maryland Supreme Court regarding the scope of the MFEPA’s religious exemption, held a bench trial and entered judgment for the employee on the remaining MFEPA claim. The parties stipulated to damages, but the employer reserved the right to appeal on liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the employer’s statutory and constitutional defenses. The court held that Title VII’s religious employer exemption does not shield religious organizations from liability for discrimination based on sex, even if the employment decision is rooted in religious belief. Similarly, under MFEPA, the court found the exemption applies only to employees whose duties directly further the core mission of the organization; the employee’s roles did not meet this test. The court also held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not apply to suits between private parties. Constitutional arguments based on the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and church autonomy doctrine were rejected as grounds for immunity. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on Title VII and MFEPA claims and dismissed the Equal Pay Act appeal as moot. View "Doe v. Catholic Relief Services" on Justia Law

A Texas-based energy company, structured as a subsidiary of a Chinese corporation, sought to develop renewable energy projects in Texas, including the Blue Star Solar Project, and to interconnect these projects to the Texas electric grid managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The Texas Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (LSIPA), enacted in 2021, prohibits entities majority-owned or controlled by Chinese citizens or corporations from owning or controlling critical infrastructure, including the state’s electric grid. In 2022, ERCOT, applying LSIPA, denied the company’s request to interconnect the Blue Star project and rejected subsequent efforts to repurpose the project.The company sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that LSIPA was preempted by federal law—specifically, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regime under the Defense Production Act and its amendments. The company also asserted constitutional claims, but ultimately narrowed its appeal to the preemption issue. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that LSIPA was not preempted by the federal CFIUS regime, finding no conflict or field preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the federal CFIUS regime does not impliedly preempt LSIPA. The court found that LSIPA and CFIUS operate in purposive harmony, with LSIPA providing additional state-level protections without conflicting with federal objectives. The court also held that CFIUS is not a pervasive federal regulatory scheme that would field-preempt state law in this area. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the preemption claims. View "GH America v. Fohn" on Justia Law

Antoine Cook was arrested after his then-girlfriend, E.C., contacted his parole officer and reported both his arrest for domestic violence and their recent drug use. When parole officers arrived at the hotel, E.C. had Cook’s cell phone and stated it was her only means of communication. She provided the officers with the phone’s passcode and consented to their request to search the device. On the phone, officers found incriminating images and videos depicting drugs and firearms. Based on this evidence and a subsequent consent search of the hotel room, officers discovered ammunition and controlled substances.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Cook’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the cell phone, holding that Cook’s parole conditions permitted warrantless searches. The district court also rejected Cook’s challenges regarding the authority to consent to the phone search and permitted the evidence from the hotel room. Cook was later convicted by a jury on counts of possessing methamphetamine and cocaine with intent to distribute, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. He appealed, arguing improper denial of the suppression motion, ineffective assistance of counsel, and judicial bias.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that E.C. had common authority over the cell phone and could consent to its search, obviating the need to consider parole-based search arguments. The court also found no plain error in the seizure of the phone, as officers had probable cause and Cook’s possessory interest was not meaningfully interfered with while he was in custody. The court declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to an insufficient record and found no evidence of judicial bias by the district judge. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

A police officer in Decatur, Alabama, was involved in a fatal shooting that occurred while a tow-truck driver attempted to repossess a vehicle from a homeowner’s property. The tow-truck driver had experienced a prior confrontation with the homeowner, who allegedly pointed a gun at him and ordered him to leave. When the tow-truck driver returned with several police officers prepositioned for safety, the homeowner again emerged armed and pointed his gun, first at the tow-truck driver and then in the direction of one of the officers. The officer fired, resulting in the homeowner’s death.After being indicted for murder, the officer moved for pretrial dismissal, claiming statutory immunity under Alabama’s defense-of-persons statute, which justifies the use of force under certain conditions and provides for immunity from prosecution if the statute’s requirements are met. The Morgan Circuit Court held a pretrial hearing but denied the motion, reasoning that the peace-officer-specific use-of-force statute was the applicable law rather than the more general defense-of-persons statute. The court focused on whether the officer acted as a “reasonable police officer” and whether he was acting within the scope of his police authority, ultimately setting the case for trial but staying proceedings pending appellate review. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this approach, also applying the peace-officer statute.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the incorrect legal standard by relying on the peace-officer statute instead of the defense-of-persons statute. The Supreme Court held that the officer had a clear legal right to have his immunity claim evaluated under the defense-of-persons statute, which applies to all persons, not just police officers, and provides for pretrial immunity. The Court issued a writ of mandamus, directing the circuit court to vacate its previous order and reevaluate the officer’s claim under the correct statute. View "In re: State of Alabama v. Marquette" on Justia Law

Eric Holmes was convicted by an Indiana jury in 1992 of two counts of murder, attempted murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery, stemming from an incident at a restaurant. During sentencing, the jury could not unanimously recommend the death penalty, so the trial judge, as allowed by Indiana law at the time, found aggravating circumstances and imposed a death sentence. Holmes exhausted his direct appeals and post-conviction relief in state court, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition.While that federal petition was pending, Indiana amended its death penalty statute in 2002 to require jury findings on aggravating circumstances, in response to Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona. In Saylor v. Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated a death sentence for a defendant whose jury had unanimously recommended against death, holding it inappropriate to execute someone sentenced under the old procedure. Holmes sought similar relief in state court, but the Indiana Supreme Court denied his request, distinguishing his case because his jury had not reached a recommendation at all, as opposed to Saylor’s unanimous recommendation against death.Holmes then filed a second federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. The district court dismissed the petition as “second or successive,” lacking jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s procedural ruling, finding Holmes’s equal protection claim was not “second or successive” because it was not ripe during his first petition. However, the court affirmed the dismissal on the merits, holding the Indiana Supreme Court had a rational basis for treating Holmes differently, since his jury had not reached a unanimous recommendation, and thus there was no Equal Protection violation. View "Holmes v Neal" on Justia Law

Three individuals departed from Dana Point Harbor in Southern California at night, ostensibly for a lobster-fishing trip. When the boat returned, one person was missing, and his body was later found floating in the ocean with evidence of drowning, gunshot wounds, and blunt force trauma. Location data placed the incident within three nautical miles of the California coast. The surviving participants did not report the death. Following an investigation, federal authorities charged one of the surviving individuals with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of murder.The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case. The defense argued that the federal government lacked jurisdiction because the death occurred within the three-nautical-mile territorial sea, which they claimed was under California's exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The district court rejected this argument, finding that federal jurisdiction extended twelve nautical miles from shore under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. At trial, the jury was instructed accordingly and convicted the defendant on all counts. During jury deliberations, a juror experiencing distress and mental health concerns, which were linked to pressure from other jurors regarding the verdict, was excused and replaced by an alternate, with the agreement of both parties. The reconstituted jury returned guilty verdicts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government’s jurisdiction under Title 18 did extend to the first three nautical miles from shore. However, the appellate court found that the removal of the juror violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict because her dismissal stemmed from her views on the merits of the case. The Ninth Circuit vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. LE" on Justia Law