Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Walker was involved in a scheme with two others to distribute cocaine. He arranged for cocaine to be mailed from a supplier near the U.S.-Mexico border, using one co-conspirator to send the packages and a postal worker whom he paid to deliver them along his mail routes. Law enforcement intercepted two cocaine packages, observed Walker conducting drug sales from his girlfriend’s home, and later searched that residence, finding drugs, paraphernalia, and Walker’s phone. Walker confessed to drug activities after the search.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Walker’s motion to suppress evidence from the residence, finding probable cause for the search warrant and, alternatively, that the good-faith exception applied. At trial, the jury convicted Walker on all counts related to the drug conspiracy, and he was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.Walker appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, raising three main issues. First, he argued that the evidence from the search should have been suppressed. The Sixth Circuit found the warrant affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and, even if not, that the officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable under the good-faith exception. Second, Walker challenged the admission of statements he made during a proffer session, asserting protection under Federal Rule of Evidence 410. The appellate court held that Walker, through counsel, had waived this argument by conceding that certain statements were admissible due to their inconsistency with his trial defense. Third, Walker argued a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights regarding a co-defendant’s testimony. The court found this right was also waived when Walker and his counsel agreed to a curative instruction for the jury to disregard the testimony. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

A financial services company operating a designated contract market began offering sports-event contracts, which allowed users to buy and sell positions based on the outcome of various sporting events. These offerings attracted the attention of Ohio and Tennessee state gambling regulators, who asserted that the company was violating state gambling laws by operating without appropriate licenses and by allowing underage users to participate. Both states sent cease-and-desist letters to the company, demanding it stop offering sports-event contracts to their residents. The company, which claimed to be federally authorized under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), argued that federal law preempted state regulation of its activities.In Ohio, the company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of state gambling laws against it. The district court denied the injunction, finding the company had not demonstrated that its sports-event contracts were “swaps” subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and, even if they were, had not established federal preemption. The company appealed. In Tennessee, a similar suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted a preliminary injunction, holding the company was likely to succeed because the contracts constituted “swaps” and conflict preemption applied. Tennessee officials appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both cases together. It held that the company’s sports-event contracts did not satisfy the statutory definition of a “swap” under the CEA and thus did not fall within CFTC exclusive jurisdiction. The court further held that, even assuming the contracts were swaps, the CEA neither expressly nor impliedly preempted Ohio’s or Tennessee’s gambling laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction in Ohio, vacated the grant of the injunction in Tennessee, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler" on Justia Law

A man who served as a confidential informant for the Department of Homeland Security became involved in criminal activity by continuing to deal drugs while cooperating with law enforcement. He developed a corrupt relationship with his handler, a special agent, who was later convicted of federal corruption charges. The informant’s unauthorized criminal conduct was uncovered when he became the target of two separate narcotics sting operations. Following his arrest, law enforcement searched his home and cell phone, and he was charged with multiple drug-related crimes.In proceedings before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant moved to suppress his post-arrest statements and evidence obtained from the warrantless searches of his home and cell phone. The district court suppressed his post-arrest statements as involuntary but denied suppression of the physical evidence, holding it admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court also denied his motions to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, sever various counts for trial, and quash a subpoena to his former handler, who invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted on three drug counts but acquitted on one. His post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial were denied, and he was sentenced to 156 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoena, that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the search evidence, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court also determined that the defendant’s other claims were either waived or without merit, and it found no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed. View "USA v Howard" on Justia Law

Two police officers attempted to execute a felony arrest warrant for a man believed to be affiliated with a local gang. The officers were aware of a recent incident in which the man had fled a traffic stop and believed he was an active fugitive wanted for serious drug-related offenses. Although the warrant had been recalled days before, the police database had not been updated, and the officers were unaware of this development. They located the man in a backyard, approached from ten to twenty feet away with their guns drawn, and ordered him to climb a fence and submit to arrest. The man claims both officers aimed their guns at his head, causing him fear and shock, but he complied without incident.After the arrest, the man was detained and later released when it was confirmed the warrant was no longer active. He filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging the officers used excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude they used excessive force by aiming their weapons at the man’s head, and that this conduct was a clear violation of an established constitutional right.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that, under the circumstances, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching with weapons drawn, given their reasonable belief that the man was a serious and potentially dangerous fugitive who might resist or flee. The court further found that, even if excessive force had been used, there was no clearly established law making the officers’ conduct unlawful in these circumstances. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the officers. View "MEDRANO V. ACOSTA" on Justia Law

A technology company developed an artificial intelligence system and imposed contractual and technical restrictions to prevent its use for fully autonomous lethal military operations and mass domestic surveillance. The company had previously adapted its product to meet some government needs but refused to remove these two key restrictions when the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) sought contractual terms allowing all lawful uses of the AI system. This disagreement coincided with a dispute over the product’s use in a sensitive military operation and previous incidents where the AI’s restrictions prevented it from fulfilling government requests. As a result, the Secretary of War determined that continued use of the AI posed a national security risk and ordered its removal from the Department’s supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018.The Department promptly notified the company, offered an opportunity for reconsideration, and began implementing the exclusion. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and raised statutory and constitutional challenges, arguing that the exclusion was arbitrary, beyond statutory authority, and violated due process and First Amendment rights. The company also sought a stay, which was denied, and later requested rescission, which was also denied by the Secretary.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the statute to review the procurement action. The court found the Department’s determination reasonable, concluding that the company’s ability and willingness to restrict the AI’s use posed a covered “supply chain risk” under the statute, even without evidence of malicious intent. The court also held that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that any procedural deficiencies in notice did not prejudice the company. The court further held that the exclusion did not violate the Fifth or First Amendments. The petitions for review were denied. View "Anthropic PBC v. United States Department of War" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after pleading guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS, was released on bail but later violated release conditions, including absconding from supervision and failing to appear at a court-ordered status conference. Her conduct included removing an electronic monitoring device and attempting to flee, resulting in her rearrest. She later entered into a plea agreement, waiving indictment and pleading guilty to failure to appear under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, as well as agreeing to an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 for committing the offense while on release. In exchange for her plea, the government agreed not to pursue additional charges carrying potentially higher penalties.After her guilty plea but before sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw her plea, arguing her conduct did not fall within the scope of § 3146 because she was not released under the Bail Reform Act. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied her motion, finding a factual basis for her plea, rejecting her arguments, and sentencing her to 230 months’ imprisonment, including consecutive sentences for failure to appear and the § 3147 enhancement.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued the district court erred in denying her plea withdrawal and that applying the § 3147 enhancement violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Second Circuit held that the defendant’s appellate waiver, which expressly foreclosed challenges that her conduct was outside the statute’s scope, barred her first claim. The court further held that applying the § 3147 enhancement to a § 3146 conviction does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, as Congress clearly intended cumulative punishments. The Second Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal in part and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both originally from Pakistan, married there in 2008 before moving to Houston, Texas, where they accumulated substantial community assets during their marriage. The wife alleges she suffered ongoing abuse from the husband. In 2012, the husband sent the wife back to Pakistan under the pretext of renewing her visa, and in early 2013, he divorced her without her knowledge via a unilateral Islamic talaq proceeding in Pakistan. The wife was not informed of the proceedings, was not served with process, and only learned of the divorce two years later. Upon returning to Houston, she filed for divorce and sought a division of marital property in Texas.The 295th District Court of Harris County dismissed the wife’s divorce petition for lack of jurisdiction, granting comity to the Pakistani divorce judgment. The trial court found that under Pakistani law, the wife was precluded from further property claims, and since Pakistan does not recognize community property, the court rendered a take-nothing judgment against her. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed this judgment, agreeing that the Pakistani proceedings were conclusive.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that the notice provided to the wife—five days of publication in a small Pakistani newspaper—was constitutionally inadequate when the husband could have easily provided direct notice. The court determined that such notice failed to satisfy fundamental principles of due process and natural justice, and that Texas courts may not afford comity to a foreign judgment obtained through procedures that violate constitutional guarantees. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "AZHAR v. CHOUDHRI" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s Dobbs decision, Tennessee enacted a near-total abortion ban and later passed the Underage Abortion Trafficking Act, which included the “Recruitment Provision.” This provision criminalizes intentionally recruiting an unemancipated minor for an abortion that would be illegal in Tennessee, even if the procedure is legal where performed. Two advocates for abortion rights, Welty and Behn, regularly provide counseling and information to minors about obtaining legal abortions, including out-of-state options. Concerned that the new law would criminalize their advocacy and speech, they filed a pre-enforcement suit against several district attorneys general, alleging First Amendment violations.The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. After a preliminary injunction hearing and cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Welty and Behn, holding that the Recruitment Provision is both unconstitutional as applied and facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The district court issued an injunction preventing enforcement of the Recruitment Provision by the defendants, but rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the law was unconstitutionally vague.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding, concluding that the Recruitment Provision constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and is substantially overbroad, thus facially violating the First Amendment. The court determined that the statute impermissibly restricts protected speech regarding legal abortions and cannot survive strict scrutiny. The court also affirmed the scope of the district court’s injunction, which barred enforcement of the Recruitment Provision. View "Welty v. Dunaway" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after jury trials in 2011 and 2012 of attempted murder, evading an officer, unlawfully taking a vehicle, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Each count included enhancements for gang involvement and firearm use, and he was sentenced to a total of 46 years and eight months to life in prison. Following direct appeal, the judgment was modified to reflect life with the possibility of parole on two counts, with a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, and otherwise affirmed.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that as a juvenile at the time of the offense and having served over 15 years, his lengthy sentence was effectively a life without parole (LWOP) term. He relied on appellate decisions holding that juvenile offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP terms should be eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), on equal protection grounds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the petition, considered recent appellate decisions and parties’ arguments, and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review, it held that the defendant’s sentence did not constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP, as he was eligible for youthful offender parole under section 3051 at age 41. The court determined that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) only applies to explicit LWOP sentences for juveniles and does not violate equal protection by excluding those sentenced to lengthy indeterminate terms. It affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law

A group of Riverside County residents, having voted in the November 2025 special election on Proposition 50, challenged the actions of the county sheriff’s department. The sheriff, responding to claims by a community group of a significant discrepancy between unofficial poll worker ballot intake logs and the Registrar of Voters’ final certified count, obtained search warrants and seized approximately 650,000 voted ballots. The Registrar of Voters maintained any discrepancy was minimal and within normal bounds, and no party disputed that the alleged discrepancy could not have changed the election outcome.After the sheriff’s department seized and began examining the ballots, the voters filed a petition for a writ of mandate directly in the Supreme Court of California. They argued the sheriff’s actions violated the Elections Code’s strict rules regarding the custody of ballots and requested the court order the immediate return of the ballots to the Registrar. The Registrar did not oppose this relief, and both the Secretary of State and Attorney General supported the petitioners’ position. The sheriff argued his actions were lawful as part of a criminal investigation supported by search warrants.The Supreme Court of California held that the seizure and removal of the ballots from the Registrar’s custody was unlawful under Elections Code section 15551, subdivision (d). The Court explained that the Elections Code specifically requires that voted ballots remain in the custody of the elections official at all times and that this rule applies even during criminal investigations. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the sheriff to return all packages containing voted ballots to the Registrar and to refrain from further handling of the ballots, but denied the request for additional relief regarding non-ballot election materials and chain-of-custody reporting. The Court’s order superseded the previously issued superior court search warrants to the extent of any conflict. View "Cervantes v. Bianco" on Justia Law