Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute restricting interstate transfers of handguns, 18 U.S.C. 922(b)(3); a federal regulation implementing that statute, 27 C.F.R. 478.99; and a Virginia law prohibiting Virginia firearms dealers from selling handguns to non-residents of Virginia, Va. Code section 18.2-308.2:2. Because the challenged laws did not burden plaintiffs directly, and because plaintiffs were not prevented from acquiring the handguns they desired, they did not allege an injury in fact. Even if plaintiffs established an injury in fact, they were unable to demonstrate traceability. The court also held that there was no organizational standing. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on standing grounds. View "Lane v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, Bryan Carrier pled guilty to three counts of vehicular manslaughter and three counts of aggravated operating under the influence. The judgment and commitment notified Defendant that his license was suspended for life on the manslaughter counts. In 2011, Carrier petitioned for reinstatement of his license. After a hearing, a hearing officer of the Secretary of State's Bureau of Motor Vehicles denied Carrier's petition based on the opposition of the victims' families. The superior court denied Carrier's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reinstatement statute allows for consideration of the opinions of the victims and their families. View "Carrier v. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

When Restaurant was denied a requested liquor license by the Town of Bingham, Restaurant appealed to the Department of Public Safety. After a hearing, a Department hearing officer also denied the license. On appeal, Restaurant asserted various independent claims alleging constitutional and statutory violations by the Department and Town. The appellate court found in favor of Defendants on Restaurant's independent claims but, on the merits, remanded the matter to the Department after concluding that an appeal of a municipality's denial of a liquor license could only be decided by the Commissioner of Public Safety and not a hearing officer. On remand, the Commissioner of the Department denied the license application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the deficiencies in the Department's notice to Restaurant of the hearing on Restaurant's requested liquor license constituted harmless error in the circumstances presented by this case; (2) The Department had sufficient grounds on which to deny Restaurant's liquor license; and (3) the court did not err in entering a judgment against Restaurant on its 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claims. View "Antler's Inn & Rest., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for touching the faces, hair, arms, and legs of two young girls, who were playing outside a movie theater. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence of a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), which provides that aggravated indecent liberties with a child is engaging in any lewd fondling or touching of a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the touches did not tend to undermine the children's morals and were not so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Ta" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) it was error for the district judge not to give a second-degree intentional murder instruction, but Defendant's failure to object or otherwise call the judge's attention to this error in the district court placed upon him a burden he could not bear, as the judge's failure to so instruct was not clearly erroneous; (2) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his aggravated kidnapping conviction; (3) the district court did not err in its instruction on aggravated robbery; and (4) the Kansas hard 50 sentencing scheme was constitutional. View "State v. Haberlein" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two criminal charges. The court placed Defendant on probation, but his probation was subsequently revoked. Defendant appealed, arguing that his attorney's position as the guardian ad litem for the victim of one of Defendant's crimes created a per se conflict of interest that denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation proceeding. Relying on State v. Jenkins, Defendant argued this conflict so offended his rights that reversal was automatic and he was not required to show the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation. The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mickens v. Taylor, the court held (1) Defendant had to show the multiple representation had an adverse effect on the attorney's representation because Defendant did not object to the multiple representation; and (2) Defendant did not meet his burden and was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mickens overrules portions of Jenkins; (2) the lower court correctly concluded that Defendant must establish that the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation; but (3) this determination cannot be made on the record on appeal. Remanded. View "State v. Galaviz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1989 of aggravated sodomy, indecent liberties with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child. More than a decade later, while Petitioner was still imprisoned on these convictions, he was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2005, Petitioner petitioned for discharge or transitional release. Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to show probable cause that his mental abnormality had changed to the extent that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a de novo standard of review applied to the court's denial of Petitioner's petition; (2) Petitioner bore the burden of proof in this case; and (3) Petitioner here failed to establish the requisite probable cause entitling him to a full evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge or transitional release. View "In re Burch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this consolidated case to consider whether a plaintiff may recover delay damages on the full amount of a jury verdict in his favor, or whether delay damages are limited to the amount of the legally-recoverable molded verdict, as it was adjusted by the trial court to reflect insurance policy limits. This case stemmed from a 2002 accident in which the vehicle operated by Richard and Marleen Marlette, stopped in traffic, was hit when vehicle operated by Herman Jordan crossed the center line and sideswiped them. Mr. Marlette sustained serious physical injuries, as well as lost wages and impairment of his earning capacity. The Marlettes filed suit against Jordan, who was uninsured, and their own insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), for uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage. Liability was uncontested, and the case proceeded to trial on damages. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff may recover delay damages only on the amount of legally-recoverable damages to which he is entitled pursuant to the molded verdict. The Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for remand to the trial court for reinstatement of its original award of delay damages. View "Marlette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a superior curt order that affirmed a trial court's grant of post-conviction relief (pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)). The lower courts held that appellee's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge jury instructions at his 1993 trial for first-degree murder and related charges. The superior court concluded the jury charge at issue violated "Commonwealth v. Huffman," (638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994)). On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that in deeming counsel ineffective, the lower courts failed to account for the Supreme Court's more recent case law that effectively overruled "Huffman." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the panel failed to appreciate basic distinctions between this case and the Huffman case, "distinctions made clearer by subsequent decisional law the panel failed to consider." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the PCRA court for the entry of an order denying appellee PCRA relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Appellant James Baldwin appealed a superior court order that affirmed his sentence for first degree murder and abuse of a corpse. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request to testify on his own behalf after the evidentiary phase of the trial was closed, and after he waived such right the previous day, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Baldwin" on Justia Law