Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, an affidavit of complaint was issued charging "John Doe" with an aggravated rape that occurred in 1994. The affidavit led to the issuance of an arrest warrant. In 2008, law enforcement officers discovered that fingerprints taken from the scene of the crime matched those of Defendant. Later, police determined that the DNA profile of "John Doe" contained in the affidavit was that of Defendant, and a superseding indictment was issued in his name. Defendant was subsequently convicted of attempted aggravated rape. Defendant appealed, arguing that the "John Doe" warrant with the DNA profile was insufficient to identify Defendant and commence prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a criminal prosecution is commenced if, within the statute of limitations for a particular offense, a warrant is issued identifying the defendant by gender and his or her unique DNA profile; and (2) furthermore, a superseding indictment in the defendant's name provides the requisite notice of the charge. View "State v. Burdick" on Justia Law

Appellants both had their driver's licenses suspended, and both requested a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to challenge the suspension. Appellants made several arguments regarding the validity of Laramie Enrolled Ordinance 1592, which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to submit to a chemical test and enhances the penalties for driving under the influence if a chemical test reveals a certain elevated blood alcohol level. In each case, the OAH determined it did not have the authority to consider the validity of the ordinance and upheld the suspension of Appellants' driver's licenses. The district court upheld the OAH's decision and dismissed Appellants' request for a declaration that the ordinance was unenforceable and unconstitutional on the basis that Appellants failed to raise a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OAH appropriately found that the ordinance did not change the nature of the advisements law enforcement officers were required to provide an individual pursuant to the state's implied consent statutes; (2) the OAH also properly upheld Appellants' driver's license suspensions; and (3) the district court did not err when it dismissed Appellants' petition for declaratory relief. View "Sandoval v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose out of three biting incidents involving a dog owned by Respondent. After the first bite, the City of Lino Lakes designated Respondent's dog as "potentially dangerous," and after the second bite, the City designated the dog as "dangerous." After the third bite, the City ordered the dog to be destroyed. The court of appeals reversed the City's decisions, holding that Appellant's inability to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation violated his right to procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upheld the City's designation of the dog as "dangerous," and affirmed the City's order to destroy the dog, holding (1) Respondent was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation; and (2) substantial evidence supported the City's decisions. View "Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of child molesting and sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty years. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to impose an aggregate term of forty years, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion sentencing Defendant. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the decision of the court of appeals, and summarily affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision concerning the majority of Defendant's claims. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court regarding Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant's sentence. View "Kimbrough v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved three consolidated lawsuits filed by plaintiffs who challenged the lawfulness of various ordinances enacted by the City of New Orleans regulating that city's taxicab industry. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on their claim that sections 162-59 and 162-321 of the Municipal Code effected a regulatory taking. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order insofar as it granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of these sections. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in connection with all aspects of plaintiffs' impairment of contract claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would be irreparably injured by the denial of an injunction. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order insofar as it denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Upgrade Ordinances. View "Melancon, et al v. City of New Orleans, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Appellee Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) is considered an "arm" of the state which under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution would confer upon it sovereign immunity from lawsuits brought by injured employees. After review of the applicable statutory authority, the Supreme Court concluded that SEPTA could not be deemed an "arm" of the state, and thus is not entitled to sovereign immunity from suits under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the Court reversed an order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Wendell Lund appealed a district court order dismissing his action against his mother Betty Lund for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wendell is the son of Orville and Betty Lund. Orville and Betty Lund owned real property in Bottineau County. Wendell claimed that in 1985 he entered into an implied contract with his parents whereby he agreed to provide certain labor and supplies to maintain the real property and to pay half of the real estate taxes, and that in exchange his parents agreed to convey the property to him. In 1991, Orville and Betty signed a deed purporting to convey their interest in the property to Orville and Wendell. When Orville and Betty divorced in 2010, the trial court found the 1991 deed was not a legitimate transaction, but rather had been an attempt to deprive Betty of her interest in the property and her homestead rights. The court included the entire value of the real property in the marital estate and awarded it to Orville. Betty received other offsetting property, and each party ultimately received approximately one-half of the marital estate. Betty Lund moved to Arizona in 2010. Since then, she held an Arizona driver's license, registered her vehicle in Arizona and where she registered to vote. In 2011, Wendell brought this action against his parents alleging they failed to comply with the 1985 implied contract. He sought damages and transfer of the real property to him. Wendell claimed that Betty could not be located for service of process, so service was made by publication. Betty entered a special appearance through her attorney and moved to dismiss the action against her, arguing she was a permanent resident of Arizona and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. The district court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty and subsequently dismissed Wendell's claims against both of his parents, to which Wendell appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Betty Lund resided in North Dakota, owned real property, and allegedly entered into a contract regarding her property in North Dakota. Those contacts were sufficient under Rule 4(b)(2) to assert personal jurisdiction over her for the transactions related to those activities, and she was not immune from suit because she left. The Court concluded the district court erred in concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty Lund. View "Lund v. Lund" on Justia Law

B.N. appealed juvenile court orders terminating his parental rights to J.N. and J.N. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court failed to make a required finding of fact and the court's findings did not adequately explain the basis for its decision. View "Interest of J.N." on Justia Law

K.H. appealed a juvenile court permanency order extending placement of his daughter, T.H., in the custody and control of Barnes County Social Services until June 1, 2012. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed because the hearing to extend the permanency order was not held before the prior permanency order expired as required under N.D.C.C. section 27-20-36. View "Interest of T.H." on Justia Law

M.D. appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. M.D. argued the court's finding that he remain a sexually dangerous individual was clearly erroneous and the court abused its discretion in granting the State's motion for a continuance. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the district court's discretion and affirmed its decision. View "Matter of M.D." on Justia Law