Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Fireman's Fund Insurance Company and Zurich Insurance Company Ltd., as subrogees of Boart Longyear, Inc., sued Defendants Thyssen Mining Construction of Canada Ltd. and Mudjatik Thyssen Mining Joint Venture (MTM) in New Mexico for negligence relating to the collapse of a mine that MTM was excavating in Canada. The district court dismissed MTM for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the entire case under the forum non conveniens doctrine. The Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that Plaintiffs' arguments "stretch[ed] the agency theory too far," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of MTM for lack of personal jurisdiction, but reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint under forum non conveniens. "The district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims was premature because [a] Canadian court has not yet ruled on Defendants' statute of limitations defense. Until this ruling occurs, the availability of the Canadian court as an adequate alternative forum is unclear and dismissal of the case in New Mexico risks depriving the Plaintiffs of any forum." View "Fireman's Fund, et al v. Thyssen Mining Construction, et al" on Justia Law

Appellants Hobson Fabricating Corp. (Hobson) and SE/Z Construction, LLC (SE/Z) appealed a district court decision in their case against the State of Idaho, Department of Administration, Division of Public Works (DPW) regarding costs and attorney fees. Prior to the district court's decision, the parties had settled all of their claims but for costs and attorney fees. The district court declared that all parties had prevailed in part and were to bear their own costs and fees. Hobson and SE/Z appealed the decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion and should have found that they were the overall prevailing party. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order that the Contractors and DPW bear their own costs and fees and its order that Hobson pay the individual defendants' costs. View "Hobson Fabricating Corp v. SE/Z Construction" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Cortez Brown was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine, which was seized from a duffel bag after his arrest for an open container violation during an automobile stop. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis the search was improper under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly applied "Gant" and found the warrantless police search conducted incident to Defendant's arrest for an open container violation was illegal. Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's subsequent pronouncement in "United States v. Davis," (131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)) that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to this case because the officer relied upon existing appellate precedent at the time he conducted his search. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant George Blackshear was charged with possession of a controlled substance enhanced by two prior convictions for state-jail felonies. The guilt phase of the trial consisted of approximately three hours of testimony from five witnesses. After deliberating for approximately an hour and a half, the jury returned a guilty verdict. During the punishment phase, the State presented no new witnesses, and appellant stipulated to ten prior convictions. After an hour of deliberation, the jury was released for the day. The following morning, after two additional hours of deliberation, the jury informed the trial judge that they were unable to reach a verdict on punishment. The trial judge granted appellant's motion for a mistrial as to the punishment phase and informed the parties that the retrial on punishment would commence later that same day. Appellant's defense counsel stated on the record, "it's my understanding that I should ask for a continuance based on the fact that I do not have a copy of the transcript from the prior trial, and it would be ineffective assistance of counsel without having it, unless she can make it at lunchtime, a copy of the transcript to refer to the testimony." The court denied the "motion." After a new trial on punishment, appellant was sentenced to eight years in prison. On appeal, he claimed that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a continuance. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, finding that, because the State presented the same witnesses at retrial on the punishment as it presented at the guilt phase of the first trial, the defense could have used the transcript from the first trial to impeach those witnesses on retrial. As a result, the court concluded that the State had failed to rebut the presumption that a defendant needs a transcript of prior mistrials to mount an effective defense. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that because the alleged error was not properly preserved, the court of appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court. View "Blackshear v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a pathologist was competent to testify as an expert witness regarding the standard of care in a medical malpractice action asserted against a board-certified general surgeon. Decedent Mildred Anderson sought treatment from surgeon Gary McAfoos, M.D. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Anderson took a turn for the worse and died from sepsis in response to surgery ultimately conducted by Dr. McAfoos and his practice partners. Mrs. Anderson's estate sued, and at trial proferred the testimony of a pathologist, who asserted that Dr. McAfoos and his agents' acts fell below ordinary standards of care by allowing Mrs. Anderson's discharge from the hospital despite certain indicators that she was suffering from a serious infection (that ultimately lead to her death). The doctor objected to Mrs. Anderson's use of the pathologist as an expert, arguing he was incompetent to assess the standard of care on a doctor who sees patients, "[h]e can't possibly second guess care and treatment on a patient when he doesn't see patients." The trial court sustained the objection to the expert's testimony; subsequently the doctor moved for nonsuit which was granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mrs. Anderson did not properly preserve her claim that the expert's credentials satisfied the requirements of the state competency statute, and accordingly, could not advance her contention that he should have been allowed to render standard-of-care testimony against a board-certified surgeon. View "Anderson v. McAfoos, et al" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether proceedings in aid of execution or judgment collection pursued within an action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) must be preceded by registration of a foreign judgment in the county of the district court from which execution issued. In 2002, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma entered summary judgment against Debtors and denied a discharge of the debt to Bank based on Debtors' fraudulent concealment of assets. The Bank initiated various collection procedures against Debtors including garnishment and a hearing on assets in an attempt to satisfy the two judgments. The bankruptcy judgments were registered in Payne County, the location of Debtors' homestead, in July, 2002. Meanwhile, the UFTA action continued to proceed in Oklahoma County against Debtors' relatives. In September, 2007, the trial court entered an order in the UFTA action which determined that a portion of Debtors' income had been fraudulently diverted to a sham corporation for the purpose of avoiding garnishment of that income. However, it was not until November, 2007, that Bank's second amended petition in the UFTA action added Debtors and the corporation as defendants. In December, 2009, a contempt trial against Debtors generated an order filed 2010. That order expressly withdrew and superseded the September, 2007, order. It found one of the Debtors guilty of contempt for failure to obey the 2007 order. In April, 2011, Bank sought contempt to enforce the 2010 order. On August 18, 2011, Bank registered one of the bankruptcy judgments, and one for costs and attorney fees, in Oklahoma County. On March 15, 2012, a trial judge entered an order on Bank's motion to enforce the 2010 contempt order. The trial court found open and wilful violations of the withdrawn 2007 order as well as the 2010 order. The trial court acknowledged that Bank had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of registration of foreign judgments in the county of the court which issued execution, but it determined that those requirements did not apply in a UFTA action. Debtors brought then brought this original proceeding asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to impose the relief granted to Bank. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the belated registration of the foreign judgment in 2011 did not authorize the trial court to retroactively enforce orders which were void for lack of jurisdiction. "When a judgment was registered in Oklahoma County in 2011, the trial court did not retroactively acquire jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the 2007 and 2010 orders that granted remedies in the nature of execution, including contempt, and threatened incarceration for failure to pay the judgments. The 2011 judgment registration did not make the void portions of the prior orders any less so." Furthermore, the Court held that a trial court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law encompassed within a void judgment. New findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding any attempt to enforce the bankruptcy judgments are required. View "Vaughn v. Graves" on Justia Law

In 1988, Thompson was murdered in Detroit. Bell was found guilty of felony murder and possessing a firearm while committing a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal he argued that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to interview two alibi witnesses and present them at trial. The conviction was affirmed on the merits by the Michigan Court of Appeals in 1992 and the state supreme court denied review. In 2006 Bell sought habeas corpus. Counsel was appointed and, while investigating, found what was believed to be material, relevant evidence not disclosed by the prosecution, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court granted a stay and Michigan courts denied Bell’s claims on the merits. The district court granted Bell’s petition with regard to Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court did not properly defer to the trial court with respect to the alleged Brady violation and that Bell did not prove that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Equitable tolling was not appropriate; Bell’s ineffective-assistance claim remains precluded by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. View "Bell v. Howe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted theft and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in finding a sufficient chain of custody for the admission of latent fingerprint evidence and forensic analysis. At issue was two fingerprint cards used to take the prints. In specific, in contention was discrepancies between dates written on the back of the cards and their storage in a law enforcement officer's patrol car and office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the State adequately established the chain of custody of the prints cards, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the latent print evidence. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an ordinance imposing a fixed tax on businesses with gross receipts over a certain threshold violated a statute prohibiting business privilege taxes "on gross receipts or parts thereof." Appellants argued that, because the ordinance imposed a flat tax for businesses earning over $1,000,000, while exempting businesses with gross receipts below that amount, it constituted a tax "on gross receipts or part thereof." The common pleas court upheld the ordinance, explaining that it imposed a flat tax with an exemption for any business earning no more than $1,000,000 in a particular year. Thus, because the tax is not levied as a percentage of a business's gross receipts, the court reasoned that it does not constitute an improper tax "on" gross receipts. The Commonwealth Court affirmed in an unpublished disposition, rejecting Appellants' contention that the ordinance levied a tax on that part of a taxpayer's annual gross receipts in excess of $1,000,000. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that, regardless of how well intentioned, the taxing authority's actions were contrary to statute. Accordingly the order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed, and the matter was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. View "Shelly Funeral Homes v. Warrington Twp." on Justia Law