Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a medical malpractice action brought by Appellant Thomas Bruckshaw as Administrator of the Estate of Patricia Bruckshaw (Decedent) and in his own right, against Appellees Frankford Hospital of Philadelphia (Frankford Hospital), Jefferson Health System, Inc., Brian P. Priest, M.D., and Randy Metcalf, M.D. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a court was empowered to remove a principal juror without any reason and without any notice to the parties, and replace her with the last possible alternate, without notice, after all evidence was submitted and the jury had already retired to deliberate. Upon review, the Court concluded that the removal of a juror can only be done by a trial court, on the record, with notice to the parties, for cause. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court committed reversible error for which the aggrieved party was not required to demonstrate prejudice. View "Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hospital" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Tax Commission appealed a ruling by the District Court of Grady County which found a decedent's outstanding 1978-1985 income tax liability was barred from collection through Decedent's probate case. The trial court's ruling was based on the ten-year limitation imposed by 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding the statute operated as a statute of limitations and did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution. The Court also found that the Oklahoma probate code required satisfaction of the tax debt before distribution of the estate assets. The decedent's estate appealed that ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court correctly held that 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A) was a statute of limitations and did not extinguish an underlying debt to the state in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, the Court concluded that neither 58 O.S. 2001 section 591 nor 58 O.S. 2001 section 635 of the probate code require payment of a debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. View "In the matter of the Estate of Bell-Levine" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Ada Electric Cars, LLC filed suit against Defendants-Appellees Thomas Kemp Jr., Jerry Johnson, Dawn Cash, and Rick Miller, members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), in their individual capacities, in response to the OTC's denial of a statutory tax credit for certain models of Tomberlin low-speed electric vehicles (LSVs) sold by the Appellant to its customers. The statutory tax credit provided for a one-time credit against income tax for investments in qualified electric motor vehicle property. The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity from suit for their determination that LSVs sold by Appellant did not qualify for the tax credit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendants did qualify for immunity, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ada Electric Cars, LLC v. Kemp" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Bruce M. Jones, II appealed a district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He sought to suppress all evidence that Kansas law enforcement obtained from searches of his residence and vehicle pursuant to search warrants issued by a Kansas state court, including multiple marijuana plants. Defendant contended that officers of the Missouri State Highway Patrol violated his Fourth Amendment rights when the officers: (1) engaged him in an accusatory conversation outside of his residence in Kansas City, Kansas; (2) later took his driver's license; and (3) then entered his residence without a warrant or consent. Defendant argued that the information that the Missouri officers obtained from their Fourth Amendment violations provided the essential foundation for the Kansas search warrants issued for his residence and vehicle. Without this tainted information, Defendant argued that the warrants lacked probable cause to support the searches. After thorough review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit rejected all of Defendant's contentions on appeal and affirmed the order denying suppression of the evidence. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant Sturgeon Stewart appealed a district court's judgment in favor of defendants on his claims under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. Appellant was an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) and confined at the El Dorado Correctional Facility (El Dorado). In accordance with his Rastafarian religious beliefs, he does not cut or comb his hair, which he keeps in dreadlocks. In December 2006, Stewart learned that his mother had been diagnosed with cancer. To be closer to her, Stewart requested a voluntary transfer to the Lansing Correctional Facility (Lansing). His request was granted. On the day of the transfer, one of the defendants, Officer Agnes Beach, refused to allow Stewart to board the transport vehicle because he could not comb out his dreadlocks, as was required by the KDOC policy then in effect. Beach consulted with her supervisor who gave Appellant a choice: either cut his hair or forego the transfer. Appellant told defendants of his religious beliefs; in lieu of cutting his hair, Appellant offered that the officers pat down his hair and use a metal detector to search for contraband. Wilson cancelled the transfer and sent Appellant to administrative segregation. Appellant filed multiple unsuccessful grievances. Appellant eventually cut his hair and was transferred to Lansing the next day. In 2008, acting pro se, Appellant filed this action asserting that defendants essentially forced him to choose between adhering to his religious beliefs and transferring closer to his ailing mother, and that this violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. Claims against defendants were dismissed. Upon review of the applicable legal authority implied by this case, the Tenth Circuit largely agreed with the district court's decision and affirmed. View "Stewart v. Beach" on Justia Law

In 2003, the City of Salt Lake asked voters to approve Proposition No. 5, which proposed the issuance of bonds to finance construction of a regional sports, recreation, and education complex. Voters approved the bonds. In 2011, the City authorized issuance of the bonds with Resolution No. 5 and then filed a petition to validate the Proposition No. 5 bonds in district court. Appellants, the Jordan River Restoration Network and several citizens, appeared pro se to oppose the City's petition, challenging the bonds' validity on several statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court denied Appellants' claim and granted the City's validation petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the City's validation petition, holding (1) the district court conducted the validation proceedings in compliance with due process and the Validation Act; and (2) the district court correctly applied the Local Government Bonding Act. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network" on Justia Law

Three police officers pulled over Defendant's vehicle because of a defective rear brake light. While the vehicle was stopped, one of the officers asked the vehicle's occupants if they possessed any weapons. The offices subsequently discovered weapons in the vehicle. An ensuing misdemeanor information charged Defendant with two counts of misdemeanor possession of an air pistol or rifle. Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the air rifles recovered from his vehicle, holding that the officer's inquiry into the presence of weapons required suspicion of criminality and that mere nervousness on the part of occupants did not give rise to such suspicion. Upon reargument, Supreme Court reversed its prior order, finding that the officer's inquiry was permissible even though the officer lacked a foundation of criminality. The Appellate Division reversed, granted Defendant's suppression motion, and dismissed the information. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the appellate division did not err in suppressing the air guns; but (2) the case should be remitted for consideration of the People's alternative claim that officers would have inevitably discovered the disputed physical evidence. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree. Before trial, a third amended information was filed that charged Defendant as a predatory sex offender on Counts I and III. A factual basis of Defendant's guilt and status as a predatory sex offender was established at the plea hearing. Defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) his constitutional right to a jury trial was denied when the circuit court overruled his motion challenging the trial court's determination of his classification as a predatory sexual offender under Mo. Rev. Stat. 558.018, and (2) his due process rights were violated when the trial court overruled his motion challenging the hearing classifying him as a predatory sexual offender under Mo. Rev. Stat. 558.021.2 before the commencement of the scheduled jury trial. The motion court overruled Defendant's post-conviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in determining Defendant waived his constitutional challenges when he pleaded guilty. View "Garris v. State" on Justia Law

In 1983, Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree sexual assault. In 1995, Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) became effective, requiring Respondent to register as a sex offender. In 2010, Respondent filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that SORA violates Mo. Const. art I, 13 and that he was not required to register pursuant to the federal Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The trial court (1) entered a declaratory judgment finding that, as applied to Respondent, SORA violated the bar against the enactment of retrospective state laws set forth in article I, section 13; and (2) declined to address the applicability of SORNA, therefore declining to order Defendants to remove Respondent's name from the registry and to destroy all registration records. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment to the extent it held that the trial court was without authority to address the applicability of SORNA and that the SORA registration requirements violated article I, section 13 as applied to Respondent; and (2) affirmed the judgment to the extent that it did not order Defendants to destroy the registration records. View "Doe v. Toelke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion in limine to admit evidence that, shortly after he had declined to take a breathalyzer test, he changed his mind and requested the test but was not given it. After the judge's denial of the motion, Defendant neither proffered such evidence nor renewed his objection to its exclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence, as the minimally probative evidence proffered could have diverted the aim of the trial, causing the jury to focus unduly on whether Defendant recanted his refusal to take the breathalyzer test rather than on whether his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor. View "Commonwealth v. Jones " on Justia Law