Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. After the conviction was affirmed, Petitioner filed several pro se motions for a new trial and sought appointment of counsel with respect to these postconviction, postappeal claims. The Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) declined to appoint counsel, and the trial judge denied Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a motion in the county court seeking relief in the nature of mandamus, challenging CPCS's decision not to appoint counsel and the trial judge's denial of his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was no clear cut duty to appoint counsel in this situation, mandamus was not proper. View "Ardon v. Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of not criminally responsible to charges of first-degree attempted murder and was found incompetent to stand trial. Defendant was committed to the Perkins Hospital for several years waiting to become competent to stand trial. The charges against him were eventually dismissed pursuant to Md. Code Crim. Proc. 3-107(a), which requires dismissal of charges upon passage of certain time period. The State subsequently re-indicted Defendant, who was again found incompetent and placed at Perkins for another round of incompetency-to-stand-trial (IST) treatment. Defendant challenged his re-indictment, arguing that the State could not continue to confine him by re-indicting him on the same charges that were required to be dismissed. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's ruling and remanded, holding (1) section 3-107 expressly provides that a dismissal of charges is without prejudice; but (2) nevertheless, Defendant's IST committment was improper, as (i) the passage of five years without Defendant's becoming competent and the resulting dismissal of his original charges under section 3-107 created the presumption that Defendant could not be restored to competency, and (ii) ordering Defendant in IST commitment, while the presumption that he was unrestorable was in place, was error. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of larceny in the second degree by embezzlement from a person who is sixty years of age or older. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the ownership of funds in a jointly held account is a factual issue for the jury to resolve. Defendant argued that the instruction was improper because a joint holder of an account, as a matter of law, jointly owns the funds in the account and, consequently, cannot be charged with stealing those funds. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court's jury instruction was legally correct, where the ownership of a joint account, as between its coholders, is not controlled by statute, but, rather, is a question of fact dependent on the intent of the joint account holders and all of the circumstances surrounding the joint account's creation and maintenance. View "State v. Lavigne" on Justia Law

The Office of the Racing Commissioner regulates the Michigan horse-racing industry. The ORC hires racing stewards as independent contractors to perform regulatory, judging, and enforcement functions in conjunction with three types of horse races. The plaintiffs were appointed as racing stewards in the 1980s and 1990s. Hall currently works as a state steward for the Michigan Gaming Board. Dye was appointed in 1988 and was promoted to Administrative Liaison Steward in 1998, but was demoted to State Steward in 2006 and was terminated in 2009. Perttunen was appointed in 1994, and remains employed as a racing steward for the Gaming Board. Erskine was appointed in 1999, and was terminated in 2009. The four claim that their Democratic supervisors retaliated against them for voicing support for or being perceived as affiliated with the Republican candidate in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Although certain stewards openly endorsed the candidate in the workplace, others remained silent. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Dye’s protected-speech, holding that retaliation based on perceived political affiliation is actionable under the political-affiliation retaliation doctrine. View "Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue in this discretionary appeal was whether a police officer violates the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act ("Wiretap Act" or "Act") when he communicates directly with a suspect via cell phone text messages while pretending to be the suspect's accomplice. "Because an officer who directly communicates with another person by text-messaging is not eavesdropping or listening in on a conversation, but is himself engaging in the communication, and because for purposes of the Wiretap Act, it is irrelevant that an officer intentionally misrepresents his identity to the person with whom he communicates," the Supreme Court held that no violation of the Wiretap Act occurred in this case. View "Pennsylvania v. Cruttenden" on Justia Law

Appellants Charles and Agnes Messina, and Lehigh Asphalt Paving and Construction Company appealed the Commonwealth Court's affirmation of the order of the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas, which held appellants' challenge to East Penn Township Zoning Ordinance No. 1996-94 was time-barred. Charles and Agnes Messina own 114.4 acres in East Penn Township where they reside in a single-family residence. Lehigh Asphalt Paving and Construction Company is the equitable owner of the property pursuant to an option contract, and it uses a portion of the property as a quarry. In 2008, appellants filed a lawsuit in the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas asserting the Ordinance was void ab initio because East Penn Township failed to strictly adhere to procedural requirements for adopting a zoning ordinance as required by section10610(b) of the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). Appellants specifically argued East Penn Township made changes to the zoning map on the night of the Ordinance's adoption and failed to provide notice to the public of these changes before enacting them. The trial court was unable to determine what changes had been made to the Ordinance on the night of its adoption, due to the record's vagueness, and offered to hold an evidentiary hearing on what changes had been made, but the parties declined. Consequently, the trial court held appellants failed to show a substantial change made and found the claim was statutorily time-barred. Upon review of the lower courts' records, the Supreme Court affirmed the holdings that appellants' claim was time-barred because they failed to meet their burden of proof that the township did not substantially comply with statutory procedure as required by the applicable statute. View "Messina v. East Penn Twp." on Justia Law

The government appealed a district court order granting Defendant-Appellee Manuel Santistevan's motion to suppress statements made after invoking the right to counsel. Defendant was indicted on three counts of interference with commerce by robbery, using and carrying a dangerous weapon during the commission of a violent crime, possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. The district court held that Defendant unambiguously invoked the right to counsel when he gave an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") a letter from his attorney indicating that he did not wish to speak without counsel. Because the agent continued to interrogate Defendant, the district court suppressed the incriminating statements that Defendant subsequently made. Upon review of the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendant indeed unambiguously invoked the right to counsel when he gave the letter drafted by his attorney to the agent, and affirmed the district court in suppressing the statements. View "United States v. Santistevan" on Justia Law

Defendant Skoshi Farr was convicted by a jury of violating 26 U.S.C. 7201 for willfully failing to pay a trust fund recovery penalty that the Internal Revenue Service assessed against her after she, as the manager of an alternative medical clinic, failed to pay quarterly employment taxes owed by the clinic. Defendant appealed her conviction, contending she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by the district court's rulings which permitted the admission of certain Rule 404(b) evidence. She also contended the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal, which argued that the government's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, and in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to charge the offense under the appropriate statute. Finally, Defendant contended her prosecution in this case was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a result of the government's prior unsuccessful prosecution. Upon review of the case and the applicable statutory authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendant's arguments lacked merit, and affirmed her conviction. View "United States v. Farr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, eight operators and a supervisor at the City of Albuquerque's 311 Citizen Contact Center (CCC), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees City of Albuquerque, Ed Adams, and Esther Tenenbaum, on claims arising from their termination. The City's Merit System governed Plaintiffs' employment; section 3-1-6 of the Merit System Ordinance (MSO) divides employees into classified and unclassified service, and defines unclassified employees as "employees at will." When the City created the 311 CCC, it designated all positions as unclassified. Upon joining the 311 CCC, each Plaintiff signed a form that listed their Employment or Position Status as "Unclassified." Between 2005 and 2009, Plaintiffs were terminated from the 311 CCC. Some Plaintiffs were subject to Progressive Disciplinary Action, while others faced Immediate Termination. In April 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court for (1) breach of employment contract, (2) denial of due process and equal protection, (3) wrongful termination, (4) violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (5) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In a lengthy opinion, the district court found that summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs, as unclassified employees, were employed at will, and (1) had no protected property interest in continued employment; (2) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they had an implied employment contract; and (3) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they were terminated in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. With respect to the FMLA claim, the court found that whether treated as a claim for retaliation or interference, Plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the City's reason for termination was pretextual or that the City had interfered with Plaintiffs' right to FMLA leave. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because the court weighed the evidence and failed to construe the facts in Plaintiffs' favor when determining that they were at will employees and thus rightly terminated. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' arguments lacked merit and affirmed the district court decision. View "Gonzales v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In 1982, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery, among other crimes, in both Sweetwater and Uinta Counties. In subsequently federal court proceedings, the convictions in both counties were set aside. In the following state court proceedings, Appellant once again pled guilty to the charges. Upon resentencing in 1989, Appellant was sentenced to forty-five to fifty years for the Uinta County aggravated robbery charge. After serving thirty years in prison, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Appellant argued that the aggravated robbery statute, amended in 1983, applied retroactively, and thus, his forty-five to fifty year sentence was illegal because it exceeded the new statutory maximum. The district court granted the motion and reduced Appellant's sentence in the Uinta County aggravated robbery charge. On appeal, Appellant challenged various aspects of the district court's rulings on his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) ruling that Appellant did not have the constitutional right to be present at the hearing in which the district court considered his motion and reduced his sentence; and (2) modifying Appellant's sentence without allowing him to withdraw the guilty plea. View "Osborn v. State" on Justia Law