Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Alaska Supreme Court issued an order that remanded redistricting cases to the redistricting board to formulate a new plan in compliance with our case law. The Court agreed with the superior court that, in drafting its plan, the board failed to follow the process the Supreme Court mandated in order to ensure that the redistricting plan would be constitutional. Upon remand, the board was instructed to follow a process so that the Court could appropriately judge whether its violations of the Alaska Constitution were absolutely necessary for compliance with federal law. The board then submitted a modified plan to the superior court that changed only four out of forty house districts from the original plan; this amended plan was similarly rejected by the superior court because, among other reasons, the board failed to follow the process that the Supreme Court required in order to ensure compliance with the Alaska Constitution. The board petitioned for review of the superior court's decision. The Court concluded that because the board failed to follow the process that it ordered upon remand, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision and required the board to draft a new plan for the 2014 elections. View "In Re 2011 Redistricting Cases" on Justia Law

Appellant BVF Partners L.P. ("BVF") appealed a Chancery Court certification of Appellee New Orleans Employees' Retirement System ("NOERS") as class representative in this action challenging the acquisition of Celera Corporation ("Celera") by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"). BVF also appealed the Court of Chancery's approval of a class action settlement without an opt out right for BVF between NOERS and Defendants-Appellees Richard H. Ayers, Jean-Luc Belingard, William G. Green, Peter Barton Hutt, Gail M. Naughton, Kathy Ordonez, Wayne I. Roe, Bennett M. Shapiro, Celera Corporation, Quest Diagnostics Incorporated, and Spark Acquisition Corporation ("Spark"). BVF contended that the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as the class representative, because NOERS lacked standing to represent the class. BVF argued that when NOERS sold its stock in Celera on the public market (before the merger was actually consummated and nearly a year before the Court of Chancery certified the class) NOERS no longer had a legally cognizable stake in the outcome of the litigation. BVF raised multiple other grounds for why the Court of Chancery erred in certifying NOERS as class representative, including that NOERS was uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses and was therefore an improper class representative. Even if that certification was proper, BVF argued that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretionary powers to allow BVF to opt out of the class in order to pursue its individual claims for monetary damages against the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that NOERS had standing to represent the class. The Court declined to adopt a rule of law that a shareholder class representative in a breach of fiduciary duty action must own stock in the corporation continuously through the final class certification. With regard to BVF's other arguments regarding NOERS' certification as class representative, the Court found them "unconvincing." The Court concluded that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, however, there was merit to BVF's claim that the Court of Chancery should have exercised its discretion to allow BVF to opt out of the shareholder class under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "In Re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation, et al. v. New Orleans Employees' Retirement System, et al." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is a 'Potentially Responsible Party' ('PRP') letter from the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA'), in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ('CERCLA') provisions, sufficient to satisfy the 'suit' requirement under a liability policy of insurance?" The plaintiff in the underlying action is Alabama Gas Corporation ("Alagasco"). Defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company are all direct and indirect subsidiaries of defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al. v. Alabama Gas Corporation " on Justia Law

Defendant Cory Washington pled guilty to two firearms charges. Before sentencing, the government filed a notice of prior convictions to support a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The probation office identified three predicate violent felonies: an adult conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, an adult conviction for second degree burglary, and an Oklahoma juvenile adjudication for pointing a weapon. Defendant objected to the application of the juvenile adjudication, but the district court ultimately concluded that the juvenile adjudication qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA. The court therefore applied the enhancement and sentenced Defendant to the minimum sentence under the Act. On appeal, Defendant raised his issue with the juvenile adjudication to support his sentence enhancement. Finding that the juvenile adjudication was appropriately applied as a predicate conviction under the ACCA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kathleen and Terry Kirch appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants United Telephone Company of Eastern Kansas and Embarq Management Company (collectively "Embarq") on their claim that Embarq intercepted their Internet communications in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). Embarq is an Internet service provider (ISP). The alleged interceptions occurred when Embarq authorized NebuAd, Inc., an online advertising company, to conduct a technology test for directing online advertising to the users most likely to be interested in the ads. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment: "Although NebuAd acquired various information about Embarq users during the course of the technology test, Embarq cannot be liable as an aider and abettor. And it was undisputed that Embarq's access to that information was no different from its access to any other data flowing over its network. Because this access was only in the ordinary course of providing Internet services as an ISP, this access did not constitute an interception within the meaning of the statute." View "Kirch v. Embarq Management Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Elizabeth E. was a student in the Jefferson County, Colorado school system with substantial behavioral and emotional issues for which she required special education under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"). In November 2008, Elizabeth's parents, Roxanne B. and David E. enrolled her at Innercept, LLC, a residential treatment center in Idaho, and sought reimbursement from Plaintiff-Appellant Jefferson County School District R-1 (the "District"). An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) concluded Parents were entitled to reimbursement for the placement under the Act. That decision was affirmed by a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose decision was, in turn, affirmed by the Colorado federal district court. The District appealed, arguing Innercept was not a reimbursable placement under the IDEA and that Parents' conduct precluded reimbursement. Finding that Innercept was indeed a reimbursable placement, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Jefferson County School v. Elizabeth E." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a county ordinance for permitting stevedores at the Port of Miami in Miami-Dade County. FTS filed suit against the County, which owns and operates the Port. FTS alleged that the County's Port Director did not follow the ordinance's requirements at all but instead protected incumbent stevedores and kept out new entrants and competition, like FTS, by rubber-stamping and automatically renewing permits for all existing stevedore permit holders at the Port and automatically denying permits to all new applicants in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that the ordinance as applied violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the market-participant exception was not applicable. The court also held that the evidence provided a sufficient legal basis for the jury's damages award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Florida Transportation Service v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Appellant alleged that the District of Columbia violated rights conferred upon him by Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Appellant is a national of Jamaica and currently incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. Assuming without deciding that Article 36(1)(b) conferred individually enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court concluded that appellant's suit was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia. View "Earle v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Poole, an Illinois prisoner, believed that a required $2 co-payment for dental care furnished at the prison violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment. After paying the fee, he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Poole’s complaint “frivolously” accuses defendants of “committing strong arm robbery” against a “captive market of inmates.” After screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A, the district court dismissed Poole’s claims against several defendants with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed against Isaacs, the prison healthcare administrator, because Poole alleged that he “didn’t have any money” for the co-payment. That allegation was false, and following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Isaacs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that both the original lawsuit and the appeal were so lacking in merit that they warrant the imposition of two strikes under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Isaacs did not deny dental care for Poole, nor is she to blame for the delay in treatment. Poole had sufficient funds in his trust fund account but opted to refuse treatment rather than part with his money. View "Poole v. Issac" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree rape. Defendant appealed a number of issues involving hearsay and the denial of a requested jury instruction, a Batson challenge, and an objection regarding the State's use of the word "rape" during trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's challenges to testimony admitted at trial were either not preserved for appeal or were without merit; (2) the instructions that were given to the jury accurately stated the law and were not prejudicial to Defendant; (3) the trial court correctly denied Defendant's Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of a juror; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's objection to the use of the word "rape" during trial. View "State v. Roach" on Justia Law