Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a labor union began picketing on a supermarket's privately owned walkway in front of the store's customer entrance, the supermarket owner sought a court injunction to prevent the picketing. The owner argued that because the union was using the walkway for expressive activity without complying with the supermarket's regulations, the union was trespassing on its property. The trial court denied relief, concluding that the supermarket owner had failed to satisfy Cal. Lab. Code 1138.1's requirements for obtaining an injunction against labor picketing. The court of appeal reversed, holding (1) the walkway was not a public forum, and therefore, the store owner could regulate speech in that area; and (2) both the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 violate free speech and equal protection because they give speech regarding a labor dispute greater protection that speech on other subjects. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a union's picketing activities in the supermarket's privately owned entrance area do not have state constitutional protection; (2) however, those picketing activities do have statutory protection under the Moscone Act and section 1138.1; and (3) these statutory provisions do not violate the federal constitutional prohibition on content discrimination in speech regulations. View "Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8" on Justia Law

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed an order that remanded this case to New Mexico state court. They originally filed an action against Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, LLC, two of its agents, and several New Mexico state officials in New Mexico state court. Plaintiffs alleged that state investment decisions were made under a corrupt “pay to play” system benefitting politically connected individuals at the expense of public pensioners. The case was removed to federal court. However, the district court remanded the entire case back to state court, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that standing could be colorably characterized as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Hill, et al v. Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Gary Blehm brought a copyright infringement action against Appellees Albert and John Jacobs and the Life is Good Company (collectively “Life is Good”). Appellant created copyrighted posters featuring cartoon characters called “Penmen.” He contended that numerous Life is Good depictions of a cartoon character called “Jake” infringed on his copyrighted works. The district court granted Life is Good’s motion for summary judgment, holding that no infringement occurred because the copyrighted and accused works are not substantially similar. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: " Copying alone is not infringement. The infringement determination depends on what is copied. Assuming Life is Good copied Penmen images when it produced Jake images, our substantial similarity analysis shows it copied ideas rather than expression, which would make Life is Good a copier but not an infringer under copyright law." View "Blehm v. Jacobs, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1995. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court in California challenging a state court's denial of his request to obtain additional DNA testing pursuant to a state statute. Plaintiff alleged that he was the target of a conspiracy involving members of the county sheriff's department and others. The district court dismissed on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under that doctrine, the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his first claim, which sought federal relief from the state court's determination in the DNA proceeding, and over his second and third claims, which were inextricably intertwined with the first. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that his complaint was properly dismissed. The court also held that the district court did not err in implicitly denying plaintiff's request to amend his complaint. View "Cooper v. Ramos, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

During routine examinations, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) raised an issue with Frontier State Bank Oklahoma City's use of a "leverage strategy" whereby the bank funded long-term investments with short-term borrowing in order to generate profits from the "spread" between long-term and short-term interest rates. The FDIC's enforcement staff obtained a cease-and-desist order from the FDIC Board which required the Bank mitigate the risks associated with its leverage strategy. Frontier appealed the Board's mitigation order to the Tenth Circuit. The FDIC argued that the Court lacked authority to review the order's leverage capital requirements, and defended the order as a reasonable exercise of the FDIC Board's authority. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Board's order was not arbitrary or capricious, and denied its petition for review. View "Frontier State Bank Oklahoma v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Willie Barlow, Jr., appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, C.R. England, Inc., on his claims for race discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy, and failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). England employed Plaintiff as a security guard and also paid him to perform janitorial work through a company Plaintiff formed. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation benefits after he sustained an injury at work in June 2007. In November, England terminated its janitorial services contract with Plaintiff's company. A few months later, England fired Plaintiff from his security guard position after he failed to notice and report a theft of several trailer doors from England’s premises. The district court concluded that: (1) there was no evidence England fired Plaintiff for race-based reasons, or in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim; (2) Plaintiff performed his janitorial work as an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus could not assert a claim for wrongful discharge from that position; and (3) Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor precluded an FLSA claim for overtime. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed with regard to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and violation of the FLSA. The Court reversed, however, Plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful discharge. View "Barlow, Jr. v. C.R. England Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. At issue was whether a court in Connecticut could properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant who, while domiciled and working in Canada, was alleged to have accessed a computer server located in Connecticut to misappropriate confidential information belonging to her employer. The court held that Connecticut district court had long-arm jurisdiction over defendant; defendant had sufficient minimum contacts in Connecticut; and the exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity from plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive-force and state-law claims. The district court denied summary judgment, concluding that there were issues of material fact as to whether the force used by the officers was clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable. Under the applicable law, the court had no jurisdiction to review a district court's determination that there were genuine disputes of fact where the court had decided, as a matter of law, that those factual issues were material. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the appeal. View "Newman v. Guedry, et al" on Justia Law