Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and two counts of failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Appellant appealed, arguing that probable cause did not exist to stop his vehicle and that consent to search the vehicle was not properly given because of the illegal stop. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the conviction and sentences for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, as (i) the law enforcement officer properly stopped Appellant for violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,142, and (ii) because at the conclusion of the lawful stop, the officer asked if he could search Appellant's car and Appellant gave consent, there was no violation of Appellant's rights, and the evidence was properly admitted at trial; but (2) reversed Defendant's conviction and sentences for failing to affix a drug tax stamp, as the record contained no evidence regarding the absence of drug tax stamps. Remanded with directions to dismiss the charges for failure to affix a tax stamp. View "State v. Magallanes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by partially denying his motion in limine to exclude video footage depicting administration of the Preliminary Alcohol Screening Test (PAST) administration without sound over Defendant's objection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission of the PAST evidence by video was prejudicial error, as (1) the video was impermissibly used as substantive evidence of Defendant's intoxication without the State satisfying the requirement of State v. Damon and Mont. R. Evid. 702 to call an expert to testify regarding the reliability and accuracy of the PAST; (2) the potential of unfair prejudice in admitting the evidence outweighed its probative value, as it prompted the inference that Defendant failed the PAST; and (3) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Lozon" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff brought her daughter to play in a city park, the child fell from a slide in the playground area and suffered a severe head injury. Plaintiff sued the City for negligently failing to maintain a safe depth of impact-absorbing material in the area under the slide. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, (1) determining that the "public duty doctrine" applied in this case, that the City owed no duty to Plaintiff's daughter, and therefore, the City could not be held liable for the accident; and (2) rejecting Plaintiff's argument that the recreational use statute applied to this case and imposed liability upon the City for willful or wanton misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based upon an analysis of foreseeability, it was reasonable and proper to hold the City to a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its public parks, and thus, the public duty doctrine did not apply here; and (2) the recreational use statute applied to this case, and the determination of whether the City's conduct rose to the level of willful or wanton misconduct should be decided at trial. View "Gatlin-Johnson v. Miles City" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress out-of-course photographic identifications made by four witnesses even though the officers who conducted the identification procedures did not follow the protocol adopted in 2009, where the out-of-court identifications took place in 2007; (2) admitting testimony that two witnesses feared for their lives; and (3) admitting testimony that Defendant sold drugs, as the testimony could not have resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the Court held that Defendant was not entitled to relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Borgos" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in the district court with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and various civil motor vehicle infractions. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant sought leave to appeal from that ruling pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied. Defendant's application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 15 has no application where a trial court judge denies a defendant's motion to dismiss in a criminal case; and (2) nor was Defendant entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws 211, ch. 3, as it was well established that, unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under chapter 3, section 11 from the denial of his motion to dismiss. View "Azubuko v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Chukwuma Azubuko for failure to pay rent. Azubuko, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Commonwealth, two cities, and a town, asserting various constitutional, statutory, and common-law claims and contending that these governmental entities were liable for paying his rent. A district court judge dismissed the third-party claims and later dismissed the underlying complaint when Plaintiff and Azubuko failed to appear. Azubuko subsequently sought mandamus relief. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied Azubuko's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the single justice correctly denied the request for mandamus relief, as Azubuko had another remedy, namely, an appeal from the final judgment of the trial court dismissing his third-party complaint. View "Azubuko v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving while suspended (DWS). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district court violated his due process rights and his right to present his defense by interfering with a defense witness' decision to testify, (2) DWS is an alternative means crime, and (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the alternative means of committing DUI and DWS. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not substantially interfere with a defense witness' choice to testify or violate Defendant's constitutional right to present a defense; (2) DWS is not an alternative means crime; and (3) Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567(a) does not contain alternative means of committing DUI, and the State presented sufficient proof to sustain Defendant's conviction for DUI. View "State v. Suter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district judge erred in admitting evidence of other crimes and in giving a cautionary accomplice witness instruction over a defense objection, (2) the prosecution engaged in misconduct requiring reversal, (3) the cumulative effect of these errors required reversal, and (4) his convictions and sentences were multiplicitous. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the disputed evidence and in instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor's repeated references to the "truth" during closing argument did constitute misconduct, but the error was harmless; (3) and Defendant's multiplicity argument was without merit. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, concluding that evidence of an attempt to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the State charged him with alternative means of committing DUI, the jury was instructed on both means, and the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish both means on which the jury was instructed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' determination that the phrase "operate or attempt to operate" in Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1564(a) creates alternative means of committing a crime, thus holding that the State is not required to prove both sets of factual circumstances; and (2) affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the State presented sufficient proof that Defendant operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. View "State v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of DUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the State charged him with, and the jury was instructed on, alternative means of committing DUI, i.e., operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, but the State failed to present evidence sufficient to show he attempted to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed Defendant's DUI conviction but under different reasoning, holding (1) the legislature did not intend the phrase "operate or attempt to operate" to create alternative means of committing the crime of DUI, and the court of appeals erred in finding otherwise; (2) the district court's inclusion of that phrase in the charging instructions in this case did not create a jury unanimity problem; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Ahrens" on Justia Law