Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in 2012
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated intimidation of a victim. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Defendant sought review, claiming that the State erred in failing to present sufficient evidence to support the alternative means of committing the crime of aggravated intimidation of a witness under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3833, and the error required reversal of his conviction for this crime pursuant to State v. Wright. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3832, which defines the crime of intimidation of a witness, does not contain the alternative means alleged by Defendant; (2) the statutory definition of malice does not create alternative means; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant attempted to prevent or dissuade his victim from reporting his crimes and that he acted with the requisite malice in doing so. View "State v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual abuse and child endangerment causing bodily injury after he admitted to sexually abusing a seventeen-month-old. Defendant moved to suppress his confession, claiming it was involuntary because the detective made promises of helping Defendant if he admitted to the crime. The district court denied the motion, holding that a promise to get help for a defendant does not constitute a promise of leniency. Defendant was found guilty of the charges. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the detective's statements about getting Defendant help were not impermissible promises of leniency. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded the case for a new trial on both counts, holding (1) the interrogation of Defendant crossed the line into an impermissible promise of leniency, rendering the confession that followed inadmissible; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff worked for over ten years for Dentist. When Dentist's wife found out that her husband and Plaintiff often texted each other, she demanded that he terminate Plaintiff's employment. Dentist subsequently terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff brought this action against Dentist, alleging that Dentist discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The district court granted summary judgment for Dentist, finding that Plaintiff was not fired because of her gender but because she was a threat to Dentist's marriage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dentist's conduct here did not amount to unlawful sex discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. View "Nelson v. Knight" on Justia Law

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Defendant Daniel Thompson appealed his conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI) for which he was sentenced to enhanced penalties for a third offense. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in sentencing him for a third DWI because the State failed to submit evidence of his two prior convictions in its case-in-chief. Finding no merit to Defendant's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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Defendant Thavone Souksamrane appealed his convictions for criminal threatening and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to question him about the veracity of other witnesses. The State conceded that the questioning in this case was improper. However, because of the "overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt," the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Souksamrane" on Justia Law

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Defendant Alan Lathrop appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that Alderberry Lane in Moultonborough, where the accident took place that ultimately resulted in his arrest, was a "way" (and therefore not open for public use) for purposes of the DWI statute; because only members, guests and a loose category of invitees are permitted to use the road, it is not "open." After review of the statutory authority, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant's contention: " it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe the statute to provide that a private road in a lakeside community that is used by residents…. Is a DWI-free zone." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lathrop" on Justia Law

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Defendant Peter Gibbs appealed his convictions on two counts of criminal restraint and one count of being an armed career criminal. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his right against double jeopardy was violated when he was twice convicted of a single criminal restraint; (2) his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of being an armed career criminal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts of this case demonstrated that the victim was continuously confined from the time he was tied in the basement until the point at which he was able to free himself and, therefore, the defendant engaged in only one episode of criminal restraint. Accordingly, one of the two criminal restraint convictions and sentences must be vacated. The Court vacated one count of Defendant's conviction, but affirmed in all other respects. View "New Hampshire v. Gibbs, Jr." on Justia Law

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Defendant Cory Furgal appealed his conviction of second-degree murder. At trial, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury that defendant was entitled to use deadly force against the victim for self-defense. The State objected, arguing that the language of "the statute" and case law did not support the defendant's requested instruction. Defendant objected to the instructions the trial court ultimately used, outside the presence of the jury. But the trial court explained that it did not include defendant's "in-concert" instruction because it was not consistent with the language of "the statute." The Supreme Court was not satisfied that defendant's request was inconsistent with statutory law. However, based on the entirety of the instruction, the Court concluded that a reasonable juror would have understood whether the victim, acting alone or in concert with others, was about to use unlawful deadly force against defendant. View "New Hampshire v. Furgal" on Justia Law

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Defendant Elliott Bell appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence that he possessed less than one ounce of "ecstasy." Defendant argued that he was unlawfully seized under the State and Federal Constitutions when the arresting officer said the officers would be “on their way” as soon as the defendant produced identification. He contended that the trial court erred in concluding the police had the requisite reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, and that the evidence obtained following the seizure must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Bell" on Justia Law

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Respondent Joan M. appealed a family division order that terminated her co-guardianship over minor Matthew L. filed by Mary S., Matthew's biological mother and co-guardian. The parties were in a serious relationship from 2004 to 2008. In 2006, Mary became pregnant and gave birth to Matthew in 2007. At that time, the parties petitioned the court to appoint them as co-guardians. In early 2008, however, Mary ended her relationship with Joan and subsequently petitioned the court to terminate Joan's co-guardianship. The motion was denied in late 2009. In 2010, Mary filed a new motion to terminate. While proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court had decided "In re Guardianship of Reena D." (163 N.H. 107 (2011)). The parties agreed that "Reena D." applied to the 2010 motion to terminate guardianship. The trial court ultimately granted termination of Joan's guardianship, and she subsequently appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Guardianship of Matthew L." on Justia Law