Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner New Hampshire Independent Pharmacy Association (NHIPA) appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the New Hampshire Insurance Department. At issue were the requirements of RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII which were enacted by the legislature in 2007. When these statutes first took effect, NHID interpreted them to require health benefit plans and health insurers providing prescription drug benefits to permit their insureds to purchase 90-day supplies of prescription drugs from retail pharmacies, provided that certain conditions were met. Under this construction, health insurers and health benefit plans could not limit coverage of 90-day supplies to those filled through mail-order pharmacies. In 2010, NHID changed its position and began reading these statutes as permitting health insurers and health benefit plans to limit coverage for 90-day prescription quantities to mail-order pharmacies. In response, NHIPA brought this action for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, asking the trial court to direct NHID to enforce RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII in a manner requiring health insurers and health benefit plans to cover 90-day supplies of prescription drugs filled at retail pharmacies. NHID moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted its motion, ruling that RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII did not impose such a requirement on health insurers and health benefit plans. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the language of RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII to be plain and unambiguous, and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. View "New Hampshire Independent Pharmacy Assn. v. New Hampshire Ins. Dept." on Justia Law

Anne Bates Gibbons appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Vincent ("the Town"), the town's planning commission, and White Rock Quarries, LLC ("White Rock") (collectively, "appellees"). This matter stemmed from a zoning change impacting 86 acres of undeveloped land owned by White Rock that were annexed into the Town. Gibbons's complaint challenged the Town's rezoning of the land based on a rezoning application submitted by White Rock and its annexation of the 86 acres. White Rock sought the rezoning and annexation so that it could construct and operate a rock quarry on the property. Gibbons alleged that the Town did not satisfy the notice requirements of the applicable statutes that give municipal corporations in Alabama the power to enact zoning ordinances and that set out the requirements for enacting such ordinances in adopting a 2009 amendment. In the alternative, assuming that the 2009 amendment was validly adopted, Gibbons sought a declaration that White Rock's proposed use of the land was covered under section 5.5, not section 5.14.5, of the Town's zoning code. The circuit court ultimately granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and Gibbons appealed. Finding that the Town complied with the applicable statutes in its annexation of the 86 acres, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees. View "Gibbons v. Town of Vincent" on Justia Law

In case no. 1110439, the Town of Gurley ("the Town") appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N Materials, Inc. ("M & N"), on M & N's inverse-condemnation claim against the Town. In case no. 1110507, M & N cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Town and Stan Simpson on other claims. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the matter, the Court found that the applicable statute upon which M&N maintained did not support its claim of a regulatory taking. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N on its inverse-condemnation claim and rendered a judgment in favor of the Town. The Court's conclusion pretermitted the other issues raised by the Town in case no. 1110439. In case no. 1110507, the Court found no error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed its decision. View "Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court’s admission of a videotaped deposition of a key state witness who was out of the country but willing to travel to the trial violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation where defendant personally objected to admission of the testimony on the record, but his counsel stipulated to the videotape’s admission. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s rights were violated by the admission of the hearsay testimony and, accordingly, reversed.  Because the issue was "very likely" to arise on remand, the Court also considered defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in permitting defense counsel to raise a diminished capacity defense over defendant’s objection, concluding that the decision should have been left to defendant.  For similar reasons the Court concluded that defendant, having been found competent to assist in his own defense, retained final authority over the decision to present a diminished capacity case. "Plainly, as other courts have recognized, the fundamental right to maintain a plea of complete innocence would be impaired, if not eviscerated, if counsel were allowed, over defendant’s objection, to assert a defense seeking a less serious conviction. . . .The basic right to contend for outright acquittal that bars defense counsel from overriding a defendant’s objection to instructing the jury as to lesser-included offenses applies with equal force to preclude the assertion of a theory, such as diminished capacity, that supports conviction on a lesser-included charge contrary to a defendant’s express wishes." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in authorizing defense counsel to assert the defense contrary to defendant’s wishes. View "Vermont v. Tribble" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was the question of whether defendant Hieu Tran was in police custody when two detectives questioned him in a police cruiser for one hour as part of an investigation into an assault and attempted robbery. The trial court concluded that the interview was a custodial interrogation conducted without the warnings guaranteed by "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and granted defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, the State argued that no warnings were necessary because defendant voluntarily spoke with detectives and was not in custody during the interview. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, and because such warnings were not provided, defendant’s statements made during the March interview should have been suppressed. View "Vermont v. Tran" on Justia Law

A Mother appealed a superior court's decision that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.C. D.C. spent the first years of his life with both parents, who at the time were not married. When his parents separated, the father took D.C. to stay with him. Although a child-custody order granted mother parental rights, she allowed father to take the child because she had difficulty finding a residence, and she knew that father had the support of his mother in caring for D.C. This arrangement lasted for a few years longer when mother obtained police help to assert her custodial rights to D.C. Mother moved into a motel with D.C., and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned that D.C. was a child in need of care due to a lack of proper parental care. The affidavit in support of the petition stated that: (1) five years earlier mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to an older child because of unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the child’s exposure to the risk of being sexually abused; (2) mother had a relationship with a known, untreated sex offender who had been seen frequently with mother at her motel room; (3) the motel room was filthy and unsanitary; (4) D.C. was suffering from an untreated respiratory illness; and (5) school officials had reported D.C. arriving at school hungry and not dressed properly for the cold. On appeal, mother argued that the termination order is invalid because the court failed to: (1) consider whether the State had met its burden of showing changed circumstances, which was required because the State’s termination petition sought modification of the initial disposition order; (2) determine by clear and convincing evidence that mother was presently unfit to care for D.C.; and (3) find that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of D.C. from his home. Finding that the record supported the family court’s undisputed findings that during the lengthy period when mother played a limited role in D.C.’s life and agreed to other family members assuming custody of the child, she made no progress in reaching a point where she could care for the child.  The Court concluded that Mother could not challenge the TPR order through a belated claim that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent D.C.’s removal from his home. Accordingly, the Court affirmed termination of Mother's rights. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

The primary issue in this appeal was whether boroughs have the implied or incidental authority to record a real property lien to secure payment of garbage-collection fees. In 2007 Virgilio and Rosemarie Sabado hired had a fire-damaged house on their property in Kodiak torn down. The contractor opened a commercial garbage account with the Kodiak Island Borough (Borough) and paid a deposit for placement of a construction dumpster near the property. Approximately $5,000 in garbage-service charges accrued. The Borough applied the deposit to this amount and began sending the contractor monthly bills for the balance. No payment was made and the account became delinquent. In October 2008 the Sabados sold the property to Cedric Cutler, who was unaware of the garbage account with the Borough. In December the Borough sent the contractor a letter advising him that a lien could be placed on the property if the account remained unpaid. No payment was made, and in January 2009 the Borough recorded a lien against the property. The Borough then sent lien-notice letters to the contractor and the Sabados, who were still listed as the property owners in the Borough’s tax files. In February 2010 the Borough petitioned to foreclose outstanding tax and garbage-service liens for years 2009 and prior. Cutler learned of the foreclosure proceeding and filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting the lien against his property was invalid and seeking damages for wrongful recording of a nonconsensual common law (NCCL) lien. Cutler appeals the superior court’s summary judgment ruling and default judgment entry with respect to the other garbage-service liens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that boroughs did not have the authority to record liens to secure payment for garbage collection fees. View "Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough" on Justia Law

In 2008 Robert Rude, then a sitting Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI) director, and three other candidates ran as an independent “New Alliance” slate for positions on the CIRI board of directors. Shortly before the election, CIRI filed suit, claiming that the New Alliance proxy materials contained materially misleading statements. Rude and his co-defendants counterclaimed, alleging that CIRI’s election procedures were unfairly tilted toward the interests of the current board and that the directors had improperly refused to disclose shareholder and corporate information to Rude and the other New Alliance candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims in favor of CIRI. As a result, the New Alliance proxies were voided, and Rude was not re-elected to the board. Rude appealed the rulings both on CIRI’s claims and his counterclaims. Although Rude’s claims were technically moot, the Supreme Court addressed them insofar as they potentially affected prevailing party status. Because no issue of material fact existed as to the claims at issue and because CIRI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. In a separate appeal, Rude challenged four other rulings of the superior court: (1) the award of attorney’s fees to CIRI; (2) denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment; (3) the superior court’s exclusion of exhibits filed with that motion; and (4) dismissal of New Alliance as a party to this suit. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in any of these rulings, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc." on Justia Law

A father challenged a superior court’s decision to terminate his parental rights, arguing that the court’s conclusions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was not in the best interests of the child, and that the court improperly considered certain facts. Because the record supported the superior court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights, and because the superior court properly considered the record as a whole, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman B. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Walter Tate appealed a district court order that reversed a suppression of evidence order. In a prosecution of Defendant for Driving Under the Influence, the trial court found that he had been stopped without reasonable articulable suspicion the moment a patrol car parked behind him, hemming in his car, even though he was asleep and unaware of the officer at the time. On interlocutory appeal by the State, the district court concluded that the earliest moment at which the defendant could have been seized occurred when he awoke and became aware of his circumstances, and by that point in time the officer had acquired at least reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a person cannot be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if his freedom of movement is actually restricted, without perceiving a show of authority as directed at him or his car. The Court affirmed the district court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tate v. Colorado" on Justia Law