Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, Petitioner Yanick Kazadi, a legal permanent resident born in the Congo, sought post-conviction review of his felony plea leading to a deferred judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to notify him of possible deportation consequences for pleading guilty to obtain a deferred judgment and sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, concluding Petitioner could not seek review of his deferred judgment and sentence under Crim. P. 35(c) while in the deferred judgment period because, in a deferred judgment situation, there has not been a judgment of conviction that makes Crim. P. 35(c) review available. View "Kazadi v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order striking the testimony of plaintiff's rebuttal expert witness, and portions of two of plaintiff's previously disclosed expert witnesses. The underlying case centered on a medical malpractice claim brought by the parents of a minor child against a hospital, its management and the doctor that delivered the child. The minor was allegedly injured at birth after his umbilical cord wrapped around his neck, depriving his brain of oxygen. The parties disputed the cause of the child's injuries: Plaintiffs argued the child was injured by preventable intrapartum events (namely Defendants' alleged negligence); defendants argued the injuries occurred days, or possibly weeks prior to birth. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded plaintiff's expert's rebuttal testimony because her testimony properly refuted a central theory of the defendants' case. The trial court also abused its discretion when it excluded the disclosed experts' testimony because the late disclosure of their testimony did not harm the defendants, as required for sanctions under Rule 37. Accordingly, the Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Warden v. Exempla" on Justia Law

Defendant Abraham Scraggins appealed two district court orders revoking his probation. Defendant was convicted of sexual battery of a minor in 1993, which required that he register as a sex offender in Idaho. In 2009, the State charged him with failure to register when he moved to Ada County in 2008. Defendant pled guilty and received a unified sentence of ten years, five of which were fixed. The sentence was suspended, and Defendant was placed on probation. Under the terms of his probation, Defendant was to serve time in jail at his probation officer's discretion without prior approval of the court. A month after sentencing, the State moved to revoke Defendant's probation, alleging he violated the terms of probation by drinking alcohol and failing to stay at his registered address for a nine-day period. Later in 2009, the State charged Defendant again with failing to register as a sex offender. In a plea agreement, Defendant admitted to violating the terms of his first probation, and pled guilty to failing to register in the second case. The district court revoked Defendant's probation in the first case, and imposed a unified ten-year sentence, with five and one-half years fixed. Less than two months later, probation officers performing a "residence check" found Defendant had contacted his victim, and that he had consumed alcohol. In lieu of filing a report of violation of his probation, Defendant served ten days of the discretionary jail time previously authorized by the district court. At a disposition hearing, Defendant objected to the district court revoking his probation based on these last violations. He argued that because he "had been punished already for this exact same conduct" by serving discretionary jail time, and because "there [was] no new conduct that he has been found in violation for," that a revocation of probation would be a violation of his due process rights. The district court rejected this argument, and accordingly revoked his probation in both cases. It then ordered that the sentences in both cases be executed. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which consolidated the cases on appeal. Upon review, the Court concluded that nothing the probation officers or district court did "affected any articulable due process right." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to revoke Defendant's probation. View "Idaho v. Scraggins, Jr." on Justia Law

The Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists (board) issued a final order suspending petitioner Rachel Weldon's license for two years and assessed costs against her. Petitioner asked the board to stay enforcement of that order pending judicial review. A few months later, the board issued an amended final order of suspension. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated irreparable harm and had failed to show a colorable claim of error, and that substantial public harm would result if it entered a stay, the board also entered a final order denying petitioner's request for a stay. Petitioner appealed the board's order assessing the fine and denying the stay. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to enter an emergency stay to permit her to continue to practice until appellate court proceedings were complete. The Appellate Commissioner granted petitioner a temporary stay pending the board's response to petitioner's motion. In its response, the board asserted that ORS 676.210 precluded the Court of Appeals from entering a stay. The commissioner accepted the board's understanding of ORS 676.210 but, sua sponte, decided that, by precluding the exercise of the court's inherent authority to grant a stay, the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. The board appealed the part of the commissioner's order that declared ORS 676.210 unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals ultimately granted review of the matter and determined that petitioner demonstrated a colorable claim of error. It denied petitioner's motion for a stay and vacated that part of the appellate commissioner's order that permitted petitioner to file a supersedeas matter to stay the board's fine. Upon review of the appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the board erred when it argued, and the Court of Appeals erred when it decided, that the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue a stay pending its decision on the merits of petitioner's appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court stayed the board's order suspending petitioner's license until the Court of Appeals issued its decision on petitioner's request. View "Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Synectic Ventures I, LLC, Synectic Ventures II, LLC, and Synectic Ventures III, LLC, entered into a loan agreement regarding money that they had loaned to defendant EVI Corporation. The loan agreement provided that the loan, secured by a security interest in essentially all of defendant's property, would be converted to equity ownership in defendant, if defendant obtained additional financing by a certain date. Shortly before that deadline, the managing member of plaintiffs (who was also chairman of the board and treasurer of defendant and financially interested in defendant) entered into an agreement purporting to extend the loan period by an additional year. During the extension period, defendant obtained the additional financing and converted the debt to equity. Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant, asserting that they were not bound by the extension because the managing member had had a conflict of interest and defendant knew of the conflict. The trial court rejected that argument and granted summary judgment for defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary judgment, and reversed the court's judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Synectic Ventures I, LLC v. EVI Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Enio Rivera and Michael Talton, employees of Lift Line, a subsidiary of RGRTA, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of RGRTA and a supervisor and dismissing plaintiffs' claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1981, and New York state law. Considering the evidence, together with the evidence of a racially hostile work environment for Talton, his co-worker, in the light most favorable to Rivera, and resolving all ambiguities in his favor, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Rivera's hostile work environment claim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Talton and accepting his version of the events as true, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Talton's hostile work environment claims pursuant to Title VII and section 1981. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Rivera's retaliation claims but vacated the grant of summary judgment on Talton's retaliation claim against RGRTA and vacated its grant of summary judgment dismissing Talton's retaliation claim against the supervisor under section 1981. The court also vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Talton's state law claims. View "Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Building Official for the Town of Marlborough from 1994-2010, sued the Town, as well as its Board of Selectmen, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was deprived of his procedural due process and free speech rights when his position was reduced from full to part time after he made certain statements regarding the use of wood-burning stoves. The court held that the district court erred in determining that Selectmen Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as plaintiff had not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. The court also held that the district court erred in determining that the Selectmen defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, as plaintiff did not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Looney v. Marlborough et al" on Justia Law

Kyle Regan and Joseph Parsons, in separate incidents, were both arrested for driving while under the influence. Each appellant consented to chemical testing, and based on the test results, each Appellant had his driver's license administratively suspended. Both Appellants challenged their suspensions, claiming that their consent to chemical sentence was invalid because they had been threatened with jail time under a Laramie ordinance if they did not consent to the testing. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension in each case. Each Appellant challenged the implied consent advisement as affected by the Laramie ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH ruled in accordance with law in determining that Appellants were given the statutorily required implied consent advisements, and it properly declined to rule on their remaining contentions as beyond the scope of the administrative proceeding and outside the jurisdiction of the OAH. View "Regan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of making a false written statement to obtain property and was sentenced to a two to five year period of incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Appellant later filed a motion entitled "Motion to Execute Sentence." The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court's sentence should be ordered to be executed to give effect to subsequent sentences in other jurisdictions and to avoid an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant's motion, as it was not a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and it was not a motion otherwise expressly provided for by rule or statute. Consequently, the Court was without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. View "Kurtenbach v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1991 after pleading guilty to murder and rape. In 2010, Petitioner filed a petition seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceeding on the ground that he possessed new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. His evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. test score purporting to show he could not be executed because he was intellectually disabled. The trial court denied the petition, determining, as a matter of law, that Petitioner's I.Q. test score was not new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. The court of criminal appeals affirmed because the I.Q. test score did not amount to scientific evidence of actual innocence for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-117(a)(2) and because Coleman v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law under section 40-30-117(a)(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the General Assembly, when it enacted section 40-30-117(a)(2), did not intend for the phrase "actually innocent of the offense" to include ineligibility for the death penalty because of intellectual disability; and (2) Coleman v. State does not establish a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively under section 40-30-117(a)(1). View "Keen v. State" on Justia Law