Gramiak v. Beasley

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A jury convicted Isaac Beasley of rape, aggravated sodomy, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to 20 years for the rape offense, 10 years for aggravated sodomy, to be served consecutive to the rape sentence, life imprisonment for kidnapping with bodily injury, to be served concurrent with the sentence for rape, and 10 years for aggravated assault, to be served concurrent with the sentence for aggravated sodomy. Beasley’s direct appeal was affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. Beasley then filed a pro se habeas petition in which he asserted he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise on direct appeal Beasley’s claim that trial counsel failed to advise him that he faced a mandatory life sentence if convicted of the kidnapping charge. He claimed that if he had been properly advised by trial counsel, he would have accepted the State’s offer of a twenty year sentence, to serve ten years in prison, with respect to the rape charge and to nolle pros the remaining charges. After the habeas court hearing at which Beasley appeared pro se, but did not testify, Beasley obtained counsel who submitted a proposed order granting the habeas petition. The habeas court adopted counsel’s proposed order setting aside the convictions and sentences. The final order concluded that Beasley’s trial counsel provided deficient representation when he failed to advise Beasley that he would face a mandatory life sentence if convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury. The order also concluded that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal because there was a reasonable probability of a different result on appeal if the issue had been raised. The warden appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the habeas court’s order granting Beasley relief, finding the trial court needed to determine prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s deficient representation. On remand, the habeas court was instructed to apply the prejudice test for trial counsel’s performance set forth by the United States Supreme Court; only if both deficient representation by trial counsel and prejudice as a result of that deficiency were found would there be a reasonable probability that Beasley would have prevailed had he raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal. “And even if the habeas court reaches this conclusion and determines that Beasley was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel requires a finding that counsel’s performance was deficient by his failure to raise that issue. Additionally, if the habeas court concludes both prongs of the ineffective assistance test for appellate counsel are met, then the habeas court must consider the remedy for that violation of Beasley’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” View "Gramiak v. Beasley" on Justia Law