Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Noland Hospital Montgomery, LLC ("NHM"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying NHM's motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in NHM's favor. NHM contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations for this wrongful-death action barred the claims asserted against it by Wheatton K. Pynes, individually and as executor of the estate of Houston Earl Pynes. "The disposition of this petition require[d] an interpretation of the interplay between Rule 9(h), Ala. R.Civ. P., relating to fictitiously named parties, and Rule 15(c), pertaining to the relation back of amendments to pleadings." Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ.

This appeal arose from a circuit court's dismissal of Brandon Johnson's action against Gary Hetzel, warden of the Donaldson Correctional Facility; Sean Carlton, a correctional officer trainee at the facility; and correctional officers Dennis Johnson and Joe Binder. Johnson was serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole following a conviction for murder. He was seen fighting with another inmate and placed under "house arrest" pending a disciplinary hearing. Johnson argued that the defendants "deliberately plac[ed] him in 'house arrest' two cells from [another inmate with whom he had the fight], and [that] the defendants were responsible for the protection of both inmates, but instead opened the door to both cells at which time [Johnson] and [the other inmate] got into another fight," in which, Johnson argued, he was injured. Johnson filed an affidavit of substantial hardship, requesting that the initial docket fee for his case be waived. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed Johnson's complaint. Johnson has appealed the circuit court's judgment of dismissal, arguing, in pertinent part, that the circuit court never had jurisdiction over his case because he did not pay the necessary filing fee and the circuit court never approved either of the affidavits of substantial hardship he had filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the filing of a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship was not met in this case. Therefore, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment dismissing Johnson's complaint. The Court ruled the circuit court's judgment void. "[B]ecause a void judgment will not support an appeal," the Court vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Highlands of Lay, LLC ("Highlands") appealed a default judgment entered in favor of Edward O. Murphree. Murphree sued Highlands and John J. Miller, who Murphree alleged was a member of Highlands and its authorized agent. Murphree alleged fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract, arising out of a real-estate transaction. After he amended his complaint, Murphree was not able to obtain service upon Highlands or Miller, and the trial court granted a motion to serve them by publication. Highlands and Miller answered, and Highlands filed a counterclaim alleging negligence. Murphree then served discovery requests on Highlands. Murphree later sent additional discovery requests to Highlands and Miller; Highlands and Miller did not respond. When Highlands and Miller continued to be unresponsive to the suit, Murphree moved for a default judgment. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court found that some of the issues presented in the then-still pending claim against Miller were the same issues presented in this appeal by Highlands. Highlands argued that the trial court erred in not setting aside the default judgment against it because it had a meritorious defense to Murphree's claims based on Miller's statements or e-mail from Miller and the timing of statements or e-mail to Murphree. "Appellate review in piecemeal fashion is not favored." The Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment entered against Highlands as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Highlands' appeal was therefore dismissed.

Defendant Amy Bishop Anderson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Madison Circuit Court to compel the Office of Indigent Defense Services and the Comptroller's Office within the Department of Finance to comply with the circuit court's orders and disburse interim payments of fees to her retained experts. Upon review, the Supreme Court denied the petition. Anderson was indicted on charges of capital murder and attempted murder after she shot several of her colleagues during a biology-department faculty meeting at the University of Alabama in Huntsville in 2010. Defendant's defense counsel served notice that they indended to argue that Defendant was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The circuit court entered an order granting defense counsel's ex parte motion for extraordinary expenses. The circuit court authorized defense counsel to retain the services of a neuropsychiatrist who evaluated Defendant, and ordered the comptroller to make immediate payment to cover the expert's retainer. According to Defendant, the expert began working on the case with a reasonable expectation of being paid at a later date. No payment was made. The Supreme Court concluded that while the circuit court entered the orders directing interim payments for Defendant's experts, Defendant did not show that the circuit court refused to enforce those orders. Based on this, Defendant did not satisfy her burden that the circuit court refused to enforce its orders.

The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the appellate court's decision in this case conflicted with the parameters of appellate review set out in "Ex parte McInish," (47 So.3d 767 (Ala. 2008)). This case arose from Windell Caldwell, Sr.'s suit against West Fraser, Inc. for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court held that Caldwell suffered a compensable injury; West Fraser appealed, arguing Caldwell did not meet his burden of proof in establishing compensability. The appellate court agreed and reversed the trial court's judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's finding that Caldwell's injury was compensable was supported by substantial evidence. Because the trial court's decision was supported by substantial evidence, Caldwell established that the appellate court's decision conflicted with "Ex parte McInish." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision

Defendant Sandoz, Inc. appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the State of Alabama. The State alleged at trial that Sandoz, a manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals, purposely reported inflated pricing information for generic drugs in third-party publications and that the State, using those published prices, overpaid certain reimbursements to providers of prescription drugs made pursuant to the Medicaid program. The State thus sued Sandoz seeking damages under various theories of fraud. Previously, in "AstraZeneca LP v. Alabama," (41 So. 3d 15 (Ala. 2009)), the State unsuccessfully sued manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals under the same theories. Because in this case, as in "AstraZeneca," the State knew that the prices reported by Sandoz were not what the State claims they should have been, Alabama law does not allow the State to claim that its reliance on that information was reasonable. Further, the State's reimbursement decisions were not based on the allegedly false information provided by Sandoz; instead, its decisions were based on policy concerns and certain requirements of the federal Medicaid program. Thus, as was the case in "AstraZeneca," the State's claims should not have been submitted to the jury, and Sandoz was entitled to a judgment in its favor. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Sandoz.

Defendant Amy Bishop Anderson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Madison Circuit Court to compel the Office of Indigent Services and the Comptroller's Office within the state Department of Finance to comply with the circuit court's orders and disburse interim payments of fees to her retained experts. Anderson was indicted on charges of capital murder and attempted murder after she shot several of her colleagues during a biology-department faculty meeting at the University of Alabama in Huntsville on February 2, 2010. Anderson's defense counsel served notice that they intended to argue that Anderson was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The circuit court entered an order granting defense counsel's ex parte motion for extraordinary expenses, but no payment was made in response to the court's order. Finding that Anderson did not show that she satisfied her burden of showing a refusal by the circuit court to enforce its orders, the Supreme Court denied Anderson's petition for the writ of mandamus.

Bridget Weaver and two other school administrators sued the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County ("the Board") and Roy D. Nichols, in his official capacity as superintendent of the Mobile County Public School System (collectively, "Defendants") seeking a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. Weaver alleged that she had been partially terminated or demoted from her employment as an assistant principal pursuant to a reduction-in-force policy implemented by the defendants; that she was entitled to the benefit of policy no. 6.44, which mandated that "any tenured employee terminated or demoted pursuant to [a reduction-in-force policy] shall have a one-time recall right to a position for which he or she is certified and legally qualified"; and that, since the time of Weaver's partial termination or demotion, several assistant principals with less seniority than her have been placed in available assistant-principal positions. The trial court awarded backpay and ordered that she be offered an assistant-principal position once one became available. Defendants moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its final judgment which was ultimately denied. Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs sued the wrong entities: the Board and Superintendent were entitled to immunity from suit with regard to their cases. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against the board. Because both the Board and Superintendent appealed from void judgments, the Court dismissed their appeals for want of jurisdiction.

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("the BAP") certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "In Alabama, is a 'default' judgment premised upon discovery sanctions or other post-answer conduct of the defendant sufficient to support the application of issue preclusion in a later proceeding?" Debtor-Defendant Anthony Malfatti was one of three principals of TA Financial Group ('TAF') purportedly designed to assist credit card holders in arbitration of disputes with the card issuers. The arbitration providers were selected by the card holders from a list provided by TAF. Among the arbitration providers was Arbitration Forum of America, Inc. ('AFOA'). AFOA was not conducting legitimate arbitrations; every arbitration resulted in an award in favor of the card holder, which was then reduced to judgment. Malfatti claims he was unaware that AFOA's practices and the judgments stemming therefrom were illegitimate. At some time after the banks involved learned of the judgments, they filed cross-complaints against the card holders to set aside the judgments as fraudulently obtained. In September 2005, the banks, including Bank of America, N.A. (USA) filed Amended Third Party Complaints against, among others, Malfatti and TAF, alleging tortious interference with contract, abuse of process, wantonness, and civil conspiracy, and sought an injunction against further arbitrations. The Banks moved for default judgments against Malfatti and TAF for failing to comply with discovery orders, repeated failures to appear for depositions, and failure to respond to written discovery. Malfatti and TAF filed a motion to set aside the defaults. The court found Malfatti and TAF to be jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages, awarded punitive damages against Malfatti, and found Malfatti to be liable for punitive damages awarded against TAF under the alter ego doctrine. Malfatti filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy the Banks filed an adversary proceeding alleging the debt owed to them by Malfatti was nondischargeable. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: "[f]or purposes of determining whether an issue is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Alabama law makes no distinction between a simple default and a penalty default."

Clay Slagle appealed the Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of his action against the seven members of the Montgomery County Board of Education ("the Board") and the superintendent of the Montgomery County School System alleging that they violated the Alabama Open Meetings Act. The conflict arose from a June 2009 meeting in which the Board was scheduled to discuss and vote on the selection of a new superintendent. There was conflicting evidence as to the nature of the discussion that occurred at the meeting between the Board members who attended it. Slagle testified that, at a meeting of the Board held on July 1, 2009, one Board member made a comment about a previously held "secret meeting" of Board members, apparently referring to the June 2009 event at which four members of the Board were present. None of the Board members present at the June 2009 event confirmed that they deliberated about filling the superintendent position or other Board business at the event. At a July meeting, the Board voted to hire Barbara Thompson as superintendent of the Montgomery School System. In December 2009, Slagle filed this action against Board members Ross, Snowden, Sellers, Meadows, Dawkins, Briers, and Porterfield in their official capacities and against Thompson in her official capacity as superintendent, alleging that the Board members violated the Act in June 2009. The trial court concluded that, because a quorum was not physically present and discussing Board business at any given time at the June event, the Board did not hold a "meeting" as defined in the Act. Based on this finding, the trial court dismissed Slagle's claims against the Board members and Superintendent Thompson. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a plain reading of the Open Meetings Act showed that neither the presence of Board members at the June 2009 event constituted a "gathering" of a quorum of the Board itself. Therefore, the trial court's judgment in this case was affirmed.