Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Mary Ann Wilkinson was employed by the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama for several years, until the Board terminated her employment in December 2009. In July 2010, Wilkinson sued the Board, seeking compensation she alleged was due her pursuant to her employment contracts. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Wilkinsons complaint, in which it alleged that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board, as a State agency, is immune from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, sec. 14; that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it failed to state a claim; and that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., for improper venue. In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Board argued this case presented an issue of first impression regarding whether the Board is a State agency that is entitled to section 14 immunity and whether the Board was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment. The Board argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it concluded that the Board was not a State agency entitled immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board was a State agency and therefore entitled to immunity pursuant to section 14, the courts of this State were without jurisdiction in this case, and the Board of Adjustment would have jurisdiction over Wilkinsons claims. For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it reversed the trial courts judgment dismissing Wilkinsons complaint against the Board and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Marcus Lydell Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriffs Department, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter an order holding him immune from suit based on Art. I, sec. 14, Ala. Const. 1901. He further asked the Court to direct the Macon Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against him by Miguel Harris. While acting within the scope of his duty for the Sherriffs Department, Walker and Harris were in a vehicle accident in which Harris was injured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Walker demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief he sought. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the claims asserted against Walker.

Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC (Southeast), and Michael J. Smith petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Chambers Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer the underlying action to Lee County on the ground of forum non conveniens. In 2011, a vehicle driven by Patricia Webster allegedly collided with timber that had come loose from a tractor-trailer rig owned by Southeast, driven by its employee Smith. She sued Southeast and Smith for negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. Southeast's principal office is located in Chambers County. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Southeast and Smith's motion for a change of venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court granted their petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to transfer the case to Lee Circuit Court.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Supreme Court: whether Ala. Code 11-81-3 (1975) required that an Alabama municipality refund or fund bond indebtedness as a condition of eligibility to proceed under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended to authorize every county, city, town and municipal authority to file for Chapter 9, and therefore, they are not required to have indebtedness prior to filing for Chapter 9 protection.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a defendant in a civil case pending in the Escambia Circuit Court, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the case on the ground that venue in Escambia County was improper or in the alternative, on the ground of forum non conveniens. This case arose from a in incident at Wal-Mart's Franklin, North Carolina store, wherein Escambia County resident Plaintiff Gloria Renee Wolfe was shopping with her sister. She was injured when a bolt of cloth fell from a display shelf and struck her upper body, including her neck and shoulder, exacerbating a preexisting condition in her cervical spine and also causing additional injuries. Upon returning home to Alabama, Gloria sought medical treatment from doctors in Mobile County, Escambia County, and Jacksonville, Florida. In 2010, Gloria and her husband sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and fictitiously named defendants. Gloria asserted claims of negligence and wantonness; her husband asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Wal-Mart resisted the complaint, arguing that it had been incorrectly named in the complaint and that it was filed in the wrong court. Wal-Mart East further asserted in its motion that because neither of its partners resided in Alabama and because Gloria's alleged injuries occurred in North Carolina, venue in Escambia County was improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., has not shown a clear legal right to the order to the trial court to dismiss the Wolfes' action on the ground that venue is improper in Escambia County and/or on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Aziz and Karima Mohabbat sued Sanjay and Ramendra P. Singh in Circuit Court asserting claims of suppression and unjust enrichment. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a $630,000 judgment in favor of the Mohabbats. The Singhs moved for a new trial; however, their motion was ultimately denied by operation of law. The Singhs appealed to the Supreme Court, and moved the trial court to enter a stay of execution of the $630,000 judgment pending the appeal even though, the Singhs alleged, they did not have the resources to execute a supersedeas bond in the amount required by Rule 8(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. The trial court granted the motion and accepted a supersedeas bond in the amount of $100,000, as opposed to the $787,500 presumably required by Rule 8(a)(1). The Mohabbats moved the trial court to reconsider its decision that same day; however, the trial court denied their motion. The Mohabbats petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to require the Singhs to execute a bond in the amount of $787,500 before a stay of execution of the judgment could be entered. The Court granted the Mohabbats' petition, and ordered the Singhs to file a response to that petition. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court had a duty to apply Rule 8(a)(1) and to require the Singhs to execute a bond in the amount of $787,500 before granting their motion for a stay of execution of the judgment entered against them. Because the trial court failed to do so, the Mohabbats had a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and their petition was granted. The trial court was directed to vacate its order granting the Singhs' motion to accept a supersedeas bond was directed not to accept any supersedeas bond in an amount less than $787,500 (as required by Rule 8(a)(1)).

Several Citites and their employees, police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O. Commander, and N.W. McMahon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel Johnson. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a traffic stops conducted by the City officers. Each of plaintiffs suffer from a type of paralysis that inhibited their abilities to respond quickly and directly to officers' orders incident to the officers' initial investigations. Plaintiffs sued the City and the individual officers alleging assault and battery, wantonness, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent training and negligent supervision. A trial court entered an order denying the City and officers' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the City and officers argued they were immune to Plaintiffs' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officers Oglesby and McMahon showed a clear legal right to the relief sought, and, as to them, their petition was granted and the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and, as to them, their petition was denied. However, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey, and its petition was denied as to those claims. Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and its petition was denied as to those claims.

The State Director of Finance Marquita Davis and the State Comptroller Thomas L. White, Jr. appealed a preliminary injunction entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in response to a declaratory-judgment action brought by the Alabama Education Association (AEA); Alabama Voice of Teachers for Education (a political-action committee affiliated with the AEA (A-VOTE)); the Alabama State Employees Association (ASEA); and the State Employees Association Political Action Committee (a political-action committee affiliated with the ASEA (SEA-PAC). In 2010, the comptroller implemented a new policy regarding salary deductions. Under this new policy, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions designated for contributions to SEA-PAC; the comptroller continued making deductions designated for the payment of dues to the ASEA. Likewise, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions to a political-action committee affiliated with the Alabama State Troopers Association. Portions of an employee's salary no longer deducted as a result of this policy change were included in the employee's paychecks. The AEA and A-VOTE filed a complaint against the finance director and the comptroller in circuit court seeking a judgment declaring that deductions designated for the AEA that benefited A-VOTE were not prohibited by law and seeking a permanent injunction to force the comptroller to resume the previous practice of executing salary deductions designated for the AEA. The ASEA and SEA-PAC filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs in the action. The circuit court ruled that, without the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm through the actions of the finance director and the comptroller. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction and ordered the circuit court dismiss the complaint: the action before the Court was one that challenged the practices adopted by the finance director and the comptroller based on their interpretation of Alabama statutory law as it existed before the the statutory authority under which they acted became effective. The Court concluded the injunction was moot.

Plaintiffs Jacklyn and Donald McMahon sued Defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.; Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America; Yamaha Motor Co., LTD. ("the Yamaha defendants"); and Montgomery Outdoor Power Products, Inc., d/b/a Montgomery Yamaha-Honda. They asserted a products-liability claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"), as well as negligence, wantonness, breach-of-warranty, and loss-of-consortium claims. Jacklyn was injured in July 2007 when the 2007 Yamaha Rhino 660, a two-passenger off-road utility vehicle that the McMahons had purchased from Montgomery Yamaha-Honda, rolled over while she was driving it, resulting in injuries to her arms and legs when she extended them out of the vehicle in an attempt to support herself and/or the vehicle during the rollover. At the close of evidence, the McMahons withdrew their breach-of-warranty claim and the Yamaha defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claims. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Yamaha defendants, the McMahons appealed the judgment on the negligence and wantonness claims. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the McMahons produced substantial evidence to support their wantonness claim and that the trial court accordingly erred by entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on that claim. However, any error the trial court may have committed in entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on the McMahons' negligence claim was harmless because the jury's verdict on their AEMLD claim established that their negligence claim would have been unsuccessful.

Following a 1987 conviction for first-degree theft of property and his unsuccessful direct appeal of that conviction, Defendant Joseph Pate filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim P. petition (Rule 32) for relief. The circuit court summarily denied his petition. Defendant filed a second Rule 32 petition in 2010. In the petition, he asserted that: his sentence was illegal because the trial court improperly used two of his prior controlled-substance convictions as sentence enhancements; and, that the State failed to provide notice that it intended to proceed under the Habitual Felony Offender Act for sentence enhancement. The State moved to dismiss, asserting that the petition was barred because those claims could have been, but were not, raised at trial, and because those claims could have been, but were not, raised on appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of Defendant's Rule 32 petition without an opinion. On appeal, Defendant contended that in not addressing the denial of his motion for sentence reconsideration the Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly applied the law to the facts of his case. Because the record supported Defendant's claim that his request for sentence modification was made in a separate motion, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the claim was not proper for appellate review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment to the extent it held that the trial court's ruling on Defendant's request for sentence reconsideration was not properly before it, and remanded the case for the Court of Criminal Appeals to review the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion for sentence modification.