Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Melvin Jarrett petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirming the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Jarrett challenged his 2006 guilty-plea conviction for one count of failing to comply with the requirement of the Community Notification Act (CNA) that he provide notice of his intent to move his legal residence. Jarrett alleged, as he did before the Court of Criminal Appeals, that his 15-year sentence imposed following his conviction for violating the CNA was illegal. Specifically, Jarrett contended that his offense was complete before October 1, 2005, the effective date of the amendment to the CNA which changed the violation from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C felony. Jarrett argued that the offense to which he pleaded guilty was, at the time he committed it was only a misdemeanor, not a Class C felony, thus, his 15-year sentence was not authorized by law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Jarrett and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' sentence.

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin.

Defendant Melvin Gene Hodges petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's summary denial of Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (alleging juror misconduct during the voir dire examination) conflicted with the Court's decision in "Ex parte Burgess." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did: "The rule of 'Burgess' is that a petitioner seeking relief under Rule 32 for the alleged failure of jurors to respond accurately or truthfully to voir dire questioning is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, unless it appears on the face of the record that he knew or reasonably should have known of the inaccuracy in time to raise it on appeal." When the State sought a summary dismissal of the claim, Defendant replied that his counsel could not have known about the alleged juror misconduct in time to raise the issue at trial or on appeal. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether an indigent defendant, who has no right to initially choose a particular court-appointed attorney, had a right to continued representation by a particular court-appointed counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an indigent defendant had such a right. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ because the trial court, when it considered the State's motion, did not evaluate the evidence regarding the question of disqualification and did not weigh the constitutional rights at issue. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the record of Defendant Thomas Lane's case, the Supreme Court concluded "an indigent defendant is not entitled to legal counsel of his choice, when counsel is to be paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent legal representation." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A circuit court judge petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to quash a writ of mandamus it issued to the circuit court through an unpublished order. Kevin Byrd pled guilty to first-degree assault. He was sentenced to 10 yearsâ imprisonment. That sentence was suspended, and Mr. Byrd was ordered to serve 180 days in âboot campâ followed by years on probation. The Mobile County District Attorneyâs office began collecting unpaid restitution from Mr. Byrd. In 2007, the DAâs office requested a hearing for Mr. Byrd to show cause why he should not have been held in contempt for failing to pay restitution. The trial court held hearings in January and October 2008, and May and September 2010. In October 2010, Mr. Byrd petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to set aside all orders respecting restitution since December 2000, the date which Mr. Byrd said his probation expired. In February 2011, the court granted Mr. Byrdâs petition and issued the writ. In its unpublished decision, the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Byrd. Upon careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found that nothing in the state restitution act prevented the trial court from taking the action it took in this case. "The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding otherwise." Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus to quash its decision.

Defendant Wakilii Brown was convicted on three counts of capital murder. The jury returned a death sentence. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Defendantâs convictions and sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admissibility of the testimony of a child witness and alleged that there was an error in the trial courtâs instructions to the jury. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the record did not support the conclusion that the childâs testimony should have been excluded. Furthermore, the Court did not commit plain error when instructing the jury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs conviction and Defendantâs sentence.

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether sufficient evidence on the element of "serious bodily injury" for the purposes of a first-degree assault offense could be established by the testimony of a lay witness, or, as a matter of law, it could be presented only through medical testimony or the victimâs testimony. The appeals court held that a motherâs testimony concerning her childâs suffering "serious and protracted disfigurement" was not sufficient evidence of the serious-bodily-injury element of first-degree assault to present the question to the jury. Defendant Timothy Reck was intoxicated when he drove his vehicle into the vehicle of Donna Loving. Her sons were passengers in the vehicle. She explained that her sonâs face sustained numerous little scars caused by shattered glass that nicked his face. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that "serious bodily injury" in the form of "serious and protracted disfigurement" could be established by the testimony of a lay witness. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs holding and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Beverly Scannelly petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate all orders it entered after she filed a notice of dismissal. Furthermore, Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from future attempts to exercise jurisdiction over her case. Petitioner sued her brother, Respondent Gary Toxey, in 2009, seeking to void certain real-estate transfers her father made to Mr. Toxey. Petitioner filed, sought dismissal, and refilled her complaint three times in three different circuit courts. Mr. Toxey "answered" Petitionerâs complaint approximately one year later by filing a responsive pleading that collaterally attacked her complaint under "res judicata." The circuit court dismissed her case in 2010, finding that Mr. Toxey essentially filed a motion for summary judgment and that Petitionerâs claims presented no issues of material fact. In affirming the circuit courtâs decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate she had a clear legal right to her requested writs. Accordingly, the Court denied her petition.

In 1991, Defendant Carl Ward was convicted on murder charges and sentenced to life in prison. Acting pro se, Defendant challenged his conviction to the Supreme Court, alleging that recently discovered material facts warranted his conviction to be vacated. Central to Defendant's "newly-discovered facts" were the results of forensic tests performed on the key evidence that convicted him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "the newly discovered facts at issue here relate[d] not to some procedural violation, but to [Defendant's] actual guilt or innocence." The evidence against Defendant was largely circumstantial; the only physical evidence in the record tying Defendant to the crime scene was the evidence subject to the forensic tests. Accordingly, the Court found that Defendant sufficiently pled a claim of newly discovered material facts, and that he was entitled to an opportunity to prove his allegations. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Town of Boligee appealed a circuit court judgment that denied it a declaration that certain acts by the Greene County Water & Sewer Authority (the Authority) were not properly authorized. In 2008, the Town brought suit complaining that the Authority's excavation, tree cutting and installation of water pipelines in Boligee's right-of-way were unlawful because the Authority did not obtain the town's permission first. The Town also sought tort damages to recover for all of the allegedly unauthorized excavation work. In 2003, the Town Council and the Authority had discussed building the pipeline, but ultimately voted against it. However, the Mayor signed a written agreement permitting the Authority to start construction. The trial court ruled that the Mayor had the authority to bind Boligee to the agreement, and dismissed its tort claims. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that although the Mayor is authorized to enter into and execute the type of contract at issue in this case, the Mayor was only allowed to do so to the extent directed by the Town council. The Court found the Mayor acted without authorization, and accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.