Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Grandparents, E.R.G and D.W.G., challenged the constitutionality of the state Grandparent Visitation Act. The Grandparents and E.H.G. and C.L.G (the Parents) had a very close relationship. The failure of a business shared by the father and the grandfather caused financial difficulties for both families, and eventually the relationships between all involved disintegrated. Desirous to maintain relationships with their grandchildren, the Grandparents petitioned the circuit court for visitation under the Act. The Parents argued in their response to the Grandparents' petition that the Act was unconstitutional on both its face and as it applied to them. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court held the Act was unconstitutional. "Because the Act authorizes a court to award visitation to a grandparent whenever doing so is 'in the best interests of the minor child,'" the Act could potentially override a parent's decision to deny the grandparent visitation without regard for the fundamental right of a fit parent to direct the upbringing for of his or her child.

Plaintiffs Leroy Bandy and David Russell appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham. In 2009, Plaintiffs challenged the results of the City Council and Board of Education elections on the basis that a change in a local ordinance governing the election was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs argued that only the legislature could make changes to the local laws pertaining to elections. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the swearing in of the newly elected council members. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the City had the authority to change its election procedure by ordinance rather than through the state legislature. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly entered its judgment in favor of the City. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.

In 1993, Defendant James Knight was convicted on theft and burglary charges. He was sentenced under the state Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) to life in prison for theft and to fifteen years for burglary, both sentences served concurrently. In 2000, the legislature amended the HFOA to make certain sentences less severe. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his life sentence under the new HFOA. The judge who sentenced Defendant had since left office. Another judge was assigned pursuant to a standing administrative order that was entered in 2007. Without requiring an answer from the State, the court summarily dismissed Defendantâs motion. Defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, among other things, that the judge was not the "sentencing judge" and that the administrative order did not appoint the judge to decide his motion as required by law. The appellate court was not persuaded by Defendantâs argument and affirmed the lower courtâs decision. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the administrative order gave the judge who decided Defendantâs reconsideration motion authority over his case. Upon review of the administrative order, the Court found that the order does not select the judge for any given case. The order provided that motions for reconsideration would be assigned to the judge holding the sentencing judgeâs seat. The circuit clerk did not assign a judge to hear Defendantâs motion. Therefore, the judge that dismissed Defendantâs motion acted without authority. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further consideration.