Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Lowell and Deborah Fuller, and Ronald Sheila Turner, appealed a circuit court judgment that found that although the Town of Magnolia Springs held no riparian rights in or to the Magnolia River, the Town was entitled to construct improvements on the shores and to construct a boat launch, dock and/or pier to be used in connection with "Rock Landing," a public landing on the River, and that Rock Street (a public street adjoining land owned by the Fullers and Turners) could be used as temporary parking for the purpose of launching a boat or other float at Rock Landing. The Town cross-appealed that portion of the judgment which declared that the Town held no authority to convert a portion of Rock Street from a public street to a parking facility and recreational area. The Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were contradictory to the remedy it ultimately fashioned. Because of this contradiction, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for revision of either the conclusion of law or the relief ordered. With regard to the Town's cross appeal, the Court found that because the issue of parking along Rock Street directly related to the issues on appeal, it too should have been reconsidered. View "Fuller v. Town of Magnolia Springs " on Justia Law

Immediately following the release of the Supreme Court's previous decision in this case, the Alabama Legislature passed Act No. 2012-198, Ala. Acts 2012, which repealed the statutory provision that underpinned the decision in "Perdue I." In the prior case, the Court vacated the circuit court's judgment that approved a settlement agreement that ended class-action litigation involving the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition (PACT) program. Class member Carol Perdue objected to the trial court's approval of the settlement; the Supreme Court originally rejected plaintiffs' argument that Ala. Code 16-33C-19 did not prohibit the PACT Board from entering into the settlement, and that the agreement was "clearly contrary to state law." The Legislature specifically repealed 16-33C-19 and caused the Court to revise its previous decision. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in finding the settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable, found the retroactive application of the 2012 Act constitutional, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Mobile Gas Service Corporation, pipeline operators and several other companies over the release of an odorant containing mercaptan. Mobile Gas, stated that, in fall 2011, Mobile Gas started receiving complaints about natural-gas leaks in the Eight Mile area; that the complaints centered around the facilities of Gulf South and Mobile Gas. plaintiffs, who resided in the Eight Mile area, filed their complaint, alleging nuisance, aggravated nuisance, negligence, and wantonness against the defendants arising from the release of mercaptan. A dispute arose over the issuance of a subpoena to the engineering firm that did the initial survey of the leak for Mobile Gas in response to an investigation by State Department of Environmental Management (ADEM). Mobile Gas objected to plaintiffs' attempt to subpoena the engineer; Mobile asserted that the engineer's report was privileged and therefore protected by the work-product privilege. The trial court denied Mobile Gas' objection. Mobile then filed its mandamus petition with the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mobile Gas has established that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it disregarded the work-product privilege and entered an order compelling Mobile Gas to produce the documents included in the privilege log and when it denied Mobile Gas's motion for a protective order. Thus, Mobile Gas has established a clear legal right to a protective order regarding the production of the documents listed on the privilege log it submitted to the trial court. Accordingly, the Court granted Mobile Gas's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to set aside its order compelling the production of documents included in the privilege log and to order those documents protected (including the engineer's report) from discovery. View "Parker et al. v. Mobile Gas Service Corporation et al." on Justia Law

Daniel Ernest Hegarty, M.D., and the Monroeville Medical Clinic appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Dixie Hudson in her medical-malpractice action. Dr. Hegarty delivered Hudson's baby via cesarian-section ("C-section") in 2004. During the operation, but after the baby had been delivered, the placenta became detached from the baby's umbilical cord. Dr. Hegarty searched within and beyond Hudson's uterus but was unable to locate the placenta. Dr. Hegarty requested assistance from his partner at the time, who also tried to locate the placenta but was unsuccessful. Following the operation, Hudson experienced severe pain in her abdomen and dramatic weight loss. Dr. Hegarty eventually ordered a CT scan to be performed and at that time, a mass was located in Hudson's abdomen. Dr. Hegarty then referred Hudson to Dr. Fahy, who subsequently referred her to a doctor in Mobile, who identified and surgically removed the retained placenta from Hudson's abdomen. Hudson sued in 2006 alleging medical negligence. The defendants contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing Hudson's expert witness to testify as an expert regarding the applicable standard of care and Dr. Hegarty's alleged breach of it. Defendants also argued that the trial court's charge to the jury was improper and that the judgment against Dr. Hegarty violated public policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing Hudson's expert to testify, and as such, erred in denying the doctor's motions for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of Dr. Hegarty. View "Hegarty v. Hudson " on Justia Law

Jermaine Parker was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime (the unlawful distribution of cocaine), and of obstructing governmental operations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the convictions in an unpublished memorandum, conflicted with "Ex parte Williams," (468 So. 2d 99, 101 (Ala. 1985)) regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Parker's conviction for conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime. The Court denied certiorari review with regard to Parker's conviction for obstructing governmental operations. After review of the trial court record and the unpublished appellate court opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented in this matter "speculative" in nature: "Such proof is always insufficient, unless it excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis, but that of the guilt of the accused. No matter how strong the circumstances, if they can be reconciled with the theory that some other person may have done the act, then the defendant is not shown to be guilty, by that full measure of proof which the law requires...." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Parker" on Justia Law

Harold Keith Hunt, the surviving son of Harold Guy Hunt, who died testate in 2009, appealed a November 2011 circuit court order among other things, refused to issue him a deed to the real property devised to him in his father's will until all debts, claims, and costs of administration of the estate had been paid. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment. View "Hunt v. Estate of Harold Guy Hunt" on Justia Law

Alamo Title Company ("Alamo"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied Alamo's motion to dismiss an action filed against it by P.B. Surf, Ltd., and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. This dispute concerned the disbursement of proceeds from the sale of the an apartment complex in Houston, Texas. According to P.B. Surf, at the time the sale was scheduled to close in late 2011, a dispute arose over who was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale and where the net proceeds were to be deposited after the closing. After the closing, Alamo wired a portion of the net proceeds from the sale to a Birmingham Wells Fargo bank account pursuant to instructions from several of the sellers. P.B. Surf sued Alamo and several other defendants, alleging, among other things, conspiracy. Alamo moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss P.B. Surf's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an amended complaint, P.B. Surf alleged that Alamo was partially responsible for what it alleged was the improper distribution of the proceeds among Defendants Guy Savage and Willem Noltes, and P.B. Surf. When the trial court denied its motion to dismiss, Alamo moved to reconsider which was also denied. Considering the minimum-contacts analysis in the context of specific personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded that the requisite minimum contacts for the trial court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over Alamo did not exist. Furthermore, the Court found that Alamo's contacts with Alabama were not continuous and systematic so as to support the trial court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Alamo. Therefore, the petition for a writ of mandamus established clear legal right to dismissal of P.B. Surf's complaint. View "In re: P. B. Surf, Ltd. v. Savage" on Justia Law

First Commercial Bank of Huntsville appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of various defendants on claims alleged by the Bank against those defendants. Because the summary judgment did not resolve all claims against all parties and because no part of the summary judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "First Commercial Bank of Huntsville v. Nowlin, III." on Justia Law

Cocina Superior, LLC owned a restaurant in Birmingham that sold alcoholic beverages to the public. Cocina appealed two final assessments of the Jefferson County Department of Revenue. The assessments reflected that, for the years 2008-2010, Cocina owed money pursuant to the "Alabama Liquor Tax." The parties filed cross-motions for a summary judgment at the circuit court, agreeing that there were no disputed issues of fact and that the issue to be resolved was a question of law. Cocina argued that the applicable legislation called for the imposition of a tax on the gross receipts derived from the sale of "alcoholic beverages," but, it said, the Department's assessments were erroneously based upon the taxpayer's gross sales of mixed drinks that were composed of both alcoholic beverages and nonalcoholic mixing agents such as colas, sodas, and juices. Cocina asserted that its internal policy and procedure dictated that each mixed drink contain 1.25 ounces of alcohol, and, it maintained, the taxes were due only on the alcohol portion of the mixed drinks, exclusive of any nonalcoholic mixing agent. Cocina also argued that the Department's assessments denied it due process and equal protection of the law because its restaurant was a more upscale establishment with higher overhead expenses than many other facilities that sell alcoholic beverages and was therefore required to charge higher prices and, consequently, pay more taxes for the mixed drinks it sold. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court correctly held that the plain meaning of "alcoholic beverage" was a beverage containing alcohol, and that the Department's assessments did not violate the restaurant's right to due process or equal protection of the law. View "Cocina Superior, LLC v. Jefferson County Dept. of Revenue " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nandean Sanders appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Defendants E.I. Campbell, Averline Campbell and Jerry Lawrence. The parties owned adjoining properties in Dallas County. Sanders sought declarative and injunctive relief regarding a disputed strip of property that the the parties all claimed to own. Defendants counterclaimed to ask the court to establish a boundary line between Sanders and their property and to enjoin Sanders' "encroachment." Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's judgment was nonfinal, and therefore the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction for further consideration. The appeal was dismissed. View "Sanders v. E. I. Campbell et al. " on Justia Law