Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A school principal used the school's printer after hours to create a coaster as a retirement gift for a friend. The coaster design contained the School District's official logo but altered the District's motto in a disrespectful manner. A custodian took pictures of the coaster, which were shared on social media, leading to public outrage. The principal left the community the next day. The District proposed to terminate him for incompetence and violating anti-harassment policies. After a brief pretermination hearing, the District terminated the principal. The principal appealed, and the Board upheld the termination following an additional hearing.The principal then appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed his termination. The court found that the District had grounds to terminate the principal due to substantial noncompliance with District rules and regulations and that the community's reaction to the coaster was reasonable. The court also rejected the principal's free speech arguments, stating that his speech was not protected under the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that the pretermination hearing process was flawed but deemed the error harmless due to the subsequent post-termination hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the Board had a reasonable basis to terminate the principal for incompetency under AS 14.20.170(a)(1) due to his inability to perform his duties effectively after the incident. The court also concluded that the principal's termination did not violate his free speech rights under AS 14.20.095 or the First Amendment. However, the court found that the pretermination hearing process did not provide sufficient due process, as the principal was not informed of his right to call witnesses. The court affirmed the termination but reversed the superior court's decision denying back pay, awarding back pay through the date of the Board's post-termination hearing decision. View "Stirling v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

A resident of Alaska filed a lawsuit challenging amendments to the State’s predator control program. The resident claimed that after the changes were implemented, she observed a noticeable decrease in the brown bear population at Katmai National Park, where she frequently visited to view bears. She argued that the Board of Game violated its constitutional and statutory duties by not providing adequate notice and opportunities for public input before adopting the changes, which expanded the program to target bears.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, dismissed the complaint, concluding that the resident lacked standing and was not entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulatory change. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the Board of Game and the Commissioner of the Department of Fish & Game.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that the resident had standing because she demonstrated an injury to her interest in viewing bears at Katmai National Park, which was sufficient to show standing. The court also concluded that she was entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint, vacated the associated award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bittner v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Joseph Rivera's driver's license was permanently revoked by New York authorities after he was convicted of three alcohol-related driving offenses between 2000 and 2010. Rivera moved to Alaska in 2011 but did not apply for an Alaska driver's license until 2021. His application was denied by the Alaska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) because his license was still revoked in New York. Rivera sought reinstatement of his driving privileges in New York, but his requests were denied. He then requested an administrative hearing with the Alaska DMV, which upheld the denial of his application.Rivera appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, arguing that the DMV misapplied Alaska's licensing statutes and that the statutes conflicted. The superior court affirmed the DMV's decision, rejecting Rivera's arguments.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that Alaska's driver’s license statutes do not conflict. The court found that the statutes operate in harmony, with the Compact providing a framework for considering out-of-state driving records and Alaska's statutes imposing additional requirements. Specifically, Alaska Statute 28.15.031(b)(1) prevents the DMV from issuing a license to anyone whose driving privileges are revoked in any jurisdiction, including out-of-state revocations. The court concluded that the DMV properly applied this statute in denying Rivera's application.The court also addressed Rivera's arguments regarding equal protection and manifest injustice, finding them unpersuasive. The court noted that Rivera had not exhausted all available appeals in New York and that the DMV's decision did not result in manifest injustice. Consequently, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court's judgment and upheld the DMV's decision to deny Rivera's application for a driver's license. View "Rivera v. State" on Justia Law

A pretrial detainee at Goose Creek Correctional Center was asked to provide a urine sample for random drug testing. Under the Department of Corrections (DOC) policy, inmates have two hours to provide a sample. The detainee attempted to comply but was unable to urinate within the required time. Consequently, he was charged with refusing to provide a urine sample, which is considered a high-moderate infraction, and was disciplined.The detainee pled not guilty at a disciplinary hearing, arguing that he tried to comply but could not urinate. The prison tribunal found him guilty using the preponderance of the evidence standard and imposed punitive segregation. The detainee appealed to the facility’s superintendent, who upheld the decision. He then appealed to the superior court, arguing that the preponderance of the evidence standard violated his due process rights and that he should have been offered a saliva test instead of a urine test.The superior court affirmed the administrative decision, concluding that the preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional. The court also noted that the detainee did not raise the saliva test argument until his reply brief, thus it was not preserved for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the Alaska Constitution permits the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in prison disciplinary proceedings, balancing the inmate’s interest in avoiding harsher conditions against the prison’s interest in maintaining order. The court also declined to address the saliva test argument, as it was not properly preserved during the administrative proceedings or raised in a timely manner in the superior court. The decision of the superior court was affirmed. View "Valoaga v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A man was unable to purchase a firearm because a background check revealed he was subject to a long-term domestic violence protective order (DVPO). He sued the State, claiming he was no longer subject to a protective order as defined by federal statute and sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to have the Department of Public Safety (DPS) notify a national database that he was no longer subject to a protective order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross-motion, and the man appealed.The superior court found that the DVPO had not expired and remained a qualifying order under Section 922(g)(8). It also concluded that the man’s constitutional claims were not ripe because he had not initiated modification or dissolution of the order. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the State.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the DVPO remained in effect and was a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that DVPOs issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) are effective until further order of the court. The court also concluded that the man’s remaining claims were not ripe for adjudication because he had not attempted to dissolve or modify the DVPO. View "Eng v. State" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the State, arguing that the statutory definition of "sustained yield" under AS 16.05.255(k) violates the Alaska Constitution’s sustained yield provision. The plaintiff contended that the legislature lacked the authority to define sustained yield and that the statutory definition contradicted the constitutional provision. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting the court to declare the statute unconstitutional and to enjoin the State from enforcing it.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, reviewed the case. The court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, which was based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, determining that the issues raised were not precluded by prior litigation. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the statutory definition of sustained yield in AS 16.05.255(k) complies with the Alaska Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case on appeal. The court analyzed the plain meaning of the constitutional and statutory provisions, the intent of the framers of the Alaska Constitution, and relevant precedent. The court found that the legislature had the authority to define sustained yield in statute and that the statutory definition was consistent with the broad principle of sustained yield as intended by the framers. The court emphasized that the Constitution allows for legislative discretion in establishing management priorities for natural resources.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding that AS 16.05.255(k)’s definition of sustained yield does not violate the Alaska Constitution and that the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. View "West v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A couple owning a lot in Homer, Alaska, added a second dwelling made from a shipping container and obtained a permit from the city. A neighboring property owner challenged the permit, arguing that the container dwelling required a conditional use permit and was a nuisance under the city’s zoning code. The city’s zoning board determined that the container dwelling was an accessory building to the existing mobile home and did not require a conditional use permit. The board also found that the container dwelling was not a nuisance because it had been modified and no longer functioned as a shipping container.The neighboring property owner appealed to the Homer Board of Adjustment, which upheld the zoning board’s decision. The Board of Adjustment concluded that the container dwelling was an accessory building and did not require a conditional use permit. It also agreed that the container dwelling was not a nuisance. The neighboring property owner then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the city.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Board of Adjustment’s interpretation of the zoning code was reasonable and that the container dwelling qualified as an accessory building. The court also found that the Board’s conclusion that the container dwelling was not a nuisance had a reasonable basis. However, the court vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further proceedings, noting that fees cannot be awarded for defending against nonfrivolous constitutional claims, and some of the challenger’s constitutional claims were not frivolous. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

The case involves the Alaska Trappers Association and the National Trappers Association (collectively, the Trappers) who challenged a city ordinance enacted by the City of Valdez. The ordinance regulated animal trapping within the city limits, barring trapping in certain areas for the purpose of protecting public safety and domesticated animals. The Trappers argued that the ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional, asserting that it was preempted by state law and violated the Alaska Constitution.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Valdez, granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Valdez. The court concluded that the legislature's delegation of authority to the Board of Game was limited and did not grant the Board exclusive control of trapping. The court also determined that the ordinance did not directly contradict state regulations.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not prohibited by the Alaska Constitution or the legislature’s delegation of authority over fish and game to the Board. The court concluded that the ordinance was not impliedly prohibited by state law, as it was enacted pursuant to Valdez's authority to regulate land use and public safety, and was not substantially irreconcilable with the State's authority to regulate the conservation, development, or utilization of game. View "Alaska Trappers Association, Inc. v. City of Valdez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether law enforcement officers violated the Alaska Constitution by conducting warrantless aerial surveillance of a private property with high-powered optics to investigate a tip about marijuana cultivation. The property was located in an isolated area near Fairbanks and was surrounded by trees that obstructed ground-level view. The officers' aerial surveillance aided by a high-powered zoom lens led to a search warrant, which uncovered marijuana plants, methamphetamine, scales, plastic bags for packaging, a loaded AK-47 rifle, and a large amount of cash. The defendant, McKelvey, was subsequently charged with criminal offenses.The Superior Court denied McKelvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the aerial surveillance, holding that although McKelvey had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was objectively unreasonable given the visibility of his property from the air. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, a warrant was required for law enforcement to use high-powered optics for aerial surveillance of a private property.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that conducting aerial surveillance of a person's property using high-powered optics constitutes a search that requires a warrant under the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that such surveillance has the potential to reveal intimate details of a person's private life and could discourage Alaskans from using their private outdoor spaces. The court concluded that the chilling effect of such surveillance outweighed the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique. View "State of Alaska v. Mckelvey" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the eligibility of Jennie Armstrong, the winning candidate of Alaska’s House District 16 2022 general election. The losing candidate, Liz Vazquez, along with four House District 16 voters, challenged Armstrong's eligibility, arguing that she had not been a resident of Alaska for at least three years before filing for office, as required by the Alaska Constitution. Armstrong maintained that she became a resident on May 20, 2019, while Vazquez argued that her residency did not begin until June 7, 2019. The superior court ruled in favor of Armstrong, declaring her eligible to serve in the legislature.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that Armstrong established her residency on May 20, 2019, but disagreed with the lower court's use of Title 15 to determine state residency. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Title 1, which states a person establishes residency in the state by being physically present with the intent to remain indefinitely and to make a home in the state, governs the state residency requirement for determining the eligibility of a legislative candidate. The Supreme Court found that Armstrong met the requirements of Title 1 and was therefore eligible to serve in the legislature. View "Vazquez v. Dahlstrom" on Justia Law