Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas Kyte and Deidre Stallings are the parents of a daughter, born in 2002. Child Support Services Division (CSSD) entered an administrative order in 2005 requiring Kyte to pay child support of $576 per month, based on his estimated annual income. Stallings later moved that child support be made retroactive to 2002, and Kyte moved for a prospective modification; the superior court denied both motions in a 2007 order that maintained the monthly amount set by the earlier administrative order. In January 2008 Kyte filed a form request for review and modification of the 2007 order. A few months later, he received a response, captioned in bold letters: “Notice of Denial of Modification Review.” The notice was signed by a CSSD child support manager. Nothing in the record indicated either party responded to this notice. Over three years later, in 2011, Kyte filed a motion in superior court, seeking to modify his child support obligation because of a serious hip injury and consequent reduction in his income. He asked for modification both prospectively and retroactively to March 2008. Recognizing that retroactive child support modifications are generally not allowed, Kyte asserted in his motion that his January 2008 request for modification still remained open; he contended that CSSD’s notice of denial did not constitute a valid final order under Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). CSSD intervened in the court proceeding in order to address the issue of retroactive modification; Stallings did not participate. The superior court denied Kyte’s request for retroactive modification, finding that CSSD’s May 2008 denial notice was a final order from which Kyte could have appealed. Kyte then appealed the superior court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded that CSSD’s decision of the father’s 2008 request was an appealable final order satisfying Appellate Rule 602, and therefore affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that the father was not entitled to a retroactive modification of child support. View "Kyte v. Stallings" on Justia Law

In May 2011, plaintiffs, six Alaskan children acting through their guardians, filed suit against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and equitable relief. The plaintiffs contended that the State breached "its public trust obligations [under] [a]rticle VIII of the Alaska Constitution" by failing "to protect the atmosphere from the effects of climate change and secure a future for Plaintiffs and Alaska's children." The minors argued that the superior court erred when it dismissed their complaint on grounds that their claims were not justiciable, specifically, that the claims involved political questions best answered by other branches of state government. The Supreme Court concluded the claims for declaratory relief did not present political questions, and affirmed their dismissal, because in the absence of justiciable claims for specific relief, a declaratory judgment could not settle the parties' controversy or otherwise provide them with clear guidance about the consequences of their future conduct. View "Kanuk v. Alaska, Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Through a prisoner grievance process, William Osborne unsuccessfully challenged the Department of Correction's (DOC) calculation of his sentence. Afterward, he filed an administrative appeal in superior court. Osborne argued the DOC incorrectly computed his sentence following a parole revocation - failing to credit time he spent in custody pending the revocation proceedings. The superior court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court has previously held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to consider such an appeal: the superior court lacks statutory appellate jurisdiction to review DOC grievance decisions, and an exception allowing the superior court to review alleged constitutional violations did not apply because the prisoner grievance process is not sufficiently adjudicative and does not produce a record capable of review. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Osborne's appeal. View "Osborne v. Alaska, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Alaska Judicial Council recommended that the electorate not retain a sitting district court judge. Susan Kruse and a handful of other voters1 challenged the constitutionality of AS 22.15.195, which granted the Council power to make such recommendations. The superior court concluded that the statute was constitutional but enjoined the Council from releasing new information about the judge in the 60 days prior to an election. On appeal, the Supreme Court also found that AS 22.15.195 was constitutional and does not limit the Council's dissemination of new information. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's ruling in part but reversed and vacated the superior court's injunction prohibiting the Council's public dissemination of new information in the 60 days preceding an election. View "Alaska Judicial Council v. Kruse" on Justia Law

Appellant James Price appealed a superior court order affirming the Kenai Peninsula Borough Clerk's rejection of his ballot referendum application. The proposed referendum would have repealed Borough Ordinance 2008-28, which authorized the general law cities within the Borough to tax non-prepared food items on a year-round basis. The Borough Clerk and the superior court rejected the application on the ground that it violated AS 29.26.100's prohibition on local or special legislation. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the referendum did not violate the prohibition on local or special legislation and would be enforceable if passed. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker’s "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother's parental rights based on evidence of her chronic delusions and the danger these delusions posed to her child. On appeal, the mother argued that several aspects of the court's decision were not adequately supported. Namely, she argues that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) should have required an assessment of her psychiatric condition and monitored the course of her psychological therapy. The Supreme Court's review of the record revealed that the mother did receive a psychiatric evaluation at OCS's direction and that it would likely have been harmful to disrupt the positive relationship she had with her counselor. Therefore, the Court concluded that the record supported the superior court's conclusion that OCS fulfilled its duty to make active efforts to provide this mother with services designed to prevent the breakup of her family. View "Grace L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Schlumberger Limited conducts its business in Alaska through a wholly owned subsidiary, Schlumberger Technology Corporation. Schlumberger Technology's primary business is oilfield services, but it also owns all of Schlumberger Limited's associated companies incorporated in the United States and operates all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic businesses. Schlumberger Technology files a consolidated federal tax return for all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic subsidiaries. For tax years 1998-2000, Schlumberger Technology filed Alaska corporate income tax returns that included only the domestic subsidiaries working in the oilfield services business. In September 2003, a Department of Revenue auditor concluded that Schlumberger Limited was engaged in a unitary business with Schlumberger Technology. Based on these conclusions, the Department issued a notice of assessment for additional corporate income taxes of $429,739 plus interest. Schlumberger Technology argued on appeal of the assessment that under the Internal Revenue Code, domestic corporations were taxed on their worldwide income, but entitled to claim a tax credit against their United States income tax liability for taxes paid to foreign countries. Foreign corporations, on the other hand, are taxed differently. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Alaska's Net Income Tax Act (ANITA). ANITA incorporates certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, unless the federal provisions are "excepted to or modified by other provisions" of the act. ANITA required a corporation to report its income and the income of certain affiliates and to exclude "80 percent of dividend income received from foreign corporations." The Internal Revenue Code had a different formula; it required a foreign corporation to report only income "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States." Schlumberger Technology argued that since ANITA has no explicit exception for Internal Revenue Code (section 882), this sourcing rule was incorporated by reference. Thus, Schlumberger Technology argued that the foreign dividends paid to Schlumberger Limited should not have been included in its taxable income under ANITA. In response, the State argued that the provisions of ANITA applied to all business income of the taxpayer, not just income derived from sources in the United States. Upon review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the Internal Revenue Code provision in question here was not adopted by reference because it was inconsistent with the formula provided by ANITA. The Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Revenue. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law