Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A client sued his lawyer for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and professional negligence in a fee agreement dispute. After a jury found in favor of the lawyer and judgment was entered, the client appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by issuing certain jury instructions regarding contract interpretation and by denying the client's motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in the superior court's jury instructions was not prejudicial, and affirmed the superior court's decision to deny the client's post-trial motions because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find for the lawyer on each of the claims. View "Zamarello v. Reges" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the issuance of a permit by the State Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Environmental Health to the Alaska Railroad Corporation for the use of herbicides to control vegetation along a railroad right-of-way. Two public interest organizations, Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT) and Alaska Survival, contended that the Department’s issuance of the permit violated due process and the public notice requirement of AS 46.03.320; that the Department abused its discretion in accepting the permit application as complete and in denying standing and intervenor status to a third organization, Cook Inletkeeper; and that ACAT and Alaska Survival should not have been ordered to pay the costs of preparing the administrative record on appeal. The Department and the Railroad cross-appealed on the issue of attorney’s fees, contesting the superior court’s conclusion that ACAT and Alaska Survival were exempt from fees under AS 09.60.010(c) as constitutional litigants. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the challenges to the permit were moot due to its expiration and changes in the governing regulatory scheme. The Court affirmed the agency’s decisions regarding costs; the cross-appeals on attorney’s fees were withdrawn by agreement. View "Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Hartig" on Justia Law

Gregg Conitz filed suit against his employer, Teck Alaska Incorporated, alleging discrimination in its internal promotional decisions. The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights dismissed Conitz's complaint, and the superior court dismissed Conitz's appeal as moot. The superior court fount that the same claims had already been decided by a federal court and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded further pursuit of the claims if they were remanded to the Commission. Conitz appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

In 2010, the superior court issued a final order requiring David and Jane Szabo to pay unpaid fines assessed by the Municipality of Anchorage or failing to remove junk stored on their property. The Szabos did not appeal the order. A year later, they filed an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The superior court denied the motion and also denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Szabos appealed, arguing that the fines assessed in this case were unconstitutionally excessive and the municipal code provision under which the Municipality proceeded is unconstitutional. Because the Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that the Szabos' claims did not assert a basis for relief under any section of Rule 60(b), the Court affirmed. View "Szabo v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

When Appellant Todd Christianson was sued by a former employee for severe personal injuries suffered while working for appellant's landscaping business, appellant tendered his defense to his general liability insurer. It did not accept his tender - instead, it sent him a letter that told him he should defend himself, noting an exclusion for claims of employees. Appellant then began to incur defense expenses. No insurer on the policies obtained by appellant's insurance broker, Conrad-Houston Insurance (CHI), ever defended him in the lawsuit. Nearly four years after receiving the insurer’s letter, appellant sued CHI for malpractice. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court applied the discovery rule and dismissed the malpractice lawsuit because it was filed after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had run. The superior court ruled that because the insurer’s letter put appellant on notice he might have a claim against CHI, the statute of limitations had begun to run more than three years before appellant sued CHI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Christianson v. Conrad-Houston Insurance" on Justia Law

Daniel G. appealed an ex parte order authorizing a 72-hour psychiatric evaluation issued after his emergency detention. The evaluation personnel determined that Daniel did not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, and he was released before the expiration of the 72-hour period. He argued the evaluation order violated his constitutional right to due process because it was issued on an ex parte basis, without notice and a hearing, while he was safely in protective custody. The superior court denied the motion to vacate the evaluation order as moot in light of Daniel’s release. After careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that although Daniel's appeal was moot, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Court therefore reached the merits of his due process claim: the 72-hour evaluation order and the statutory evaluation procedures did not violate due process, and the Court affirmed the evaluation order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G." on Justia Law

Hiland Mountain Correctional Center inmate, Doctor Suzette Welton filed three appeals over the dismissal of her administrative appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In all three cases, Welton appealed decisions in Department of Corrections (DOC) grievance proceedings. In order to qualify for the administrative appeal procedure, Welton had to show that: (1) she was alleging a violation of her constitutional rights; that (2) the proceeding was adjudicative in nature; and (3) she produced a record capable of appellate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior courts that the underlying DOC grievance proceedings were not adjudicative proceedings, and they did not produce a record capable of appellate review. View "Welton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Stephen O.'s parents were concerned that he had suffered a possible psychotic break. They reported his behavior to a mental health clinician. The clinician obtained an ex parte order to take Stephen into custody and transport him to the hospital in Juneau for examination and treatment. The police took him into custody, but due to bad weather he remained in jail for six days before he was transported for evaluation. After a contested hearing, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that Stephen was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.915(7)(B) and issued an order for a 30-day involuntary commitment. Stephen appealed that order. Because the superior court’s conclusion that the man was gravely disabled was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the superior court’s 30-day involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Stephen O." on Justia Law

Responding to a domestic disturbance call, police officers entered a residence without a warrant and pepper sprayed and handcuffed a resident. The family sued for excessive force and unlawful entry. The superior court dismissed the claims on summary judgment, granting qualified immunity for the excessive force claims and holding that the family had not raised a cognizable unlawful entry claim. The superior court later denied the family’s Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(2) motion to set aside the rulings based on newly discovered evidence. The family appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment ruling and the denial of the Rule 60(b)(2) motion, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the family’s trespass and invasion of privacy claims. View "Lum v. Koles" on Justia Law

Jimmy Jack Korkow was convicted of first-degree murder for beating and stabbing his wife to death while the couple’s young children were present in the family home. The trial court sentenced Korkow to 99 years in prison with no possibility for parole until he served 50 years. The court of appeals reversed the 50-year parole restriction as mistaken; the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review. Because the trial court correctly applied the statutory restriction on parole after making sufficient findings supported by the record, the Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the restriction was not excessive. View "Alaska v. Korkow" on Justia Law