Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Arizona Supreme Court
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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona addressed two key issues related to the City of Scottsdale's decision not to award a license to operate competitive youth swimming programs at its public aquatic centers to Neptune Swimming Foundation, despite Neptune submitting a financially lucrative proposal through a request-for-proposal (RFP) process. Instead, the City chose to extend an existing license agreement with Scottsdale Aquatic Club (SAC), which had operated programs at the centers for over fifty years.The court first addressed whether a bid from a higher bidder should be considered when determining whether the City violated the Arizona Constitution's Gift Clause, which prohibits public entities from making donations or grants to any individual, association, or corporation. The court held that the higher bid in the RFP process was relevant, but not conclusive, in determining the fair market value of the license. A public entity does not necessarily violate the Gift Clause by choosing a less profitable arrangement. The court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue.The second issue was whether the City abused its discretion by failing to follow its own procurement process rules when it canceled the RFP and extended SAC's existing license agreement. The court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the City violated its own procurement process, which should have precluded summary judgment for the City on this issue. The court therefore reversed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NEPTUNE SWIMMING FOUNDATION v CITY OF SCOTTSDALE" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, Phoenix Police Sergeant Stefani McMichael-Gombar appealed against her suspension for posting content on Facebook that violated the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy. She argued that the policy was overbroad and violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that she reasonably believed she had a First Amendment right to make the post. The Phoenix Civil Service Board upheld the suspension, and McMichael-Gombar sought relief in the superior court. The superior court dismissed her complaint, stating that the Phoenix City Charter neither requires nor authorizes the Board to consider the constitutionality of the City’s policies, and this is only tasked with determining if the allegations against an employee are true and if the level of discipline was appropriate. The court of appeals vacated this ruling, determining that the Board must consider whether the disciplinary action properly regards McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Board does not have the authority to decide whether a city policy is unconstitutional, as this power is not explicitly granted to it by the Phoenix City Charter, the rules governing disciplinary proceedings, or the Peace Officers Bill of Rights. However, the court did agree that McMichael-Gombar was entitled to argue and introduce supporting evidence that she reasonably believed she was acting within her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that McMichael-Gombar did not meet her burden to show that the Board precluded her from doing so. Thus, the court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing McMichael-Gombar’s special action complaint. View "MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the "anti-abrogation clause" set forth in Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 6 guaranteeing that the "right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated" does not extend to dram-shop actions because they were recognized after statehood.At issue was whether the anti-abrogation clause extends to rights of action created after the Arizona Constitution was ratified, such as the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983). Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the owner of Jaguars Club in Phoenix, under theories of statutory and common law dram-shop liability. The jury found Defendant was liable under the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros but not liable under the dram-shop cause of action codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. 4-311(A). The jury apportioned forty percent of the fault to Defendant. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that the legislature's limitation of dram-shop liability to actions brought under section 4-311 did not run afoul of the anti-abrogation clause by abrogating the common law dram-shop action recognized in Ontiveros. View "Torres v. JAI Dining Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this murder case, the Supreme Court established a standard a defendant must satisfy to compel extraction of GPS data by a defendant's third-party agent from a crime victim's automobile for the trial court's in camera inspection and held that remand was required in the instant case.Defendant was charged with the second-degree murder of Grant Draper, making his brother Lane Draper a victim by virtue of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4401(12), a statute that implements the Arizona Constitution's Victims' Bill of Rights. During plea negotiations and without notice to Lane, Defendant obtained a court order to access GPS data to support his third-party defense identifying Lane as the possible killer and for cross-examination regarding the time Defendant argued he was asleep. The trial court allowed the data to be extracted for a limited in camera interview. Lane filed a petition for special action, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court held (1) a defendant is entitled to discovery from a victim if the defendant seeks evidence of a constitutional dimension and the defendant establishes that the requested discovery is very likely to contain such evidence; and (2) remand was required in this case. View "Draper v. Honorable Gentry" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 19-118.01 does not facially violate the First Amendment where it only prohibits per-signature compensation to petition circulators.A political action committee (PAC) hired AZ Petition Partners to collect signatures for the Invest in Education Act initiative. Initiative opponents brought this action for declaratory judgment against the PAC, alleging that Petitioner Partners' hourly rates and incentive programs violated section 19-118.01. Thereafter, the State filed fifty charges against Petition Partners. The court of appeals concluded that section 19-118.01(A) bans more than just per-signature payments, and therefore, the statute facially violates the First Amendment. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case, holding that section 19-118.01 only prohibits per-signature compensation. View "AZ Petition Partners LLC v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that felony resisting arrest constitutes a single unified offense, thus affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony resisting arrest and other offenses and sentencing him accordingly.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of resisting arrest under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2508(A)(2) improperly conflated subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2). The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 13-2508 is ambiguous because it may be reasonably read as setting forth a single unified offense or distinct crimes, and this Court concludes that subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) are alternative means of committing one offense; (2) this Court's interpretation of section 13-2508 comports with the Sixth Amendment; and (3) because the two subsections set forth a single unified offense the jury instruction regarding this crime did not constitute error. View "State v. Luviano" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that legislative amendments to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(5) enacted in 2019 did not provide a basis for post-conviction relief under Ariz. R. Cim. P. 32.1(a), (c), (g), or (h) for a sentence of death imposed in 1996 because the amendments were prospective only and the death sentence was constitutional.In 1996, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder - felony and premeditated. The trial court sentenced him to death. In 2020, Defendant filed this successive post-conviction relief (PCR) petition alleging that his death sentence was now unconstitutional as a consequence of 2019 legislative amendments. The superior court granted relief and vacated Defendant's death sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that the sentence was lawfully imposed and did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights under either the United States or Arizona Constitutions. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that certain statements made on air by a radio talk show host about a political figure could not serve as a basis for a defamation action given each statement's content, the overall context, and the protections afforded to core political speech by the First Amendment.Respondent Daniel McCarthy, a "Republican political hopeful," sued James Harris, a radio host on a local station owned by iHeartMedia, Inc. (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that statements made by Harris on his radio show were defamatory. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statements were rhetorical hyperbole incapable of being proved false and thus protected by the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the statements at issue were actionable because none of them could be reasonably interpreted as asserting or implying false statements of fact that defamed McCarthy. View "Harris v. Honorable Warner" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court determining that Appellant raised a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ordering him to disclose certain materials, holding that the PCR court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the records.Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In these PCR proceedings, the PCR court determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in III(A)-III(E) of the PCR petition was colorable. The court then ordered Appellant to disclose materials associated with trial counsel's interviews of three of Appellant's family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of trial. Appellant filed a petition for special action, claiming that he should not have to disclose the records at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was good cause for the disclosure of materials associated with the interviews under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b)(2). View "Naranjo v. Honorable Sukenic" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1043.01(B), which limits workers' compensation claims for mental illnesses to those that arise from an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation, does not violate Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, 8 or equal protection guarantees under Ariz. Const. art. II, 13.Plaintiff, an officer with the Tucson Police Department, filed an industrial injury claim arising from an incident in June 2018, claiming that it exacerbated his preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff's claims for mental injuries non-compensable because the June 2018 incident was not an "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress" situation under section 23-1043.01(B). The court of appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 23-1043.01(B) does not unconstitutionally limit recovery for stress-related workplace injuries. View "Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law