Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on sixty-seven counts, including nine counts of first-degree murder. The jury returned death verdicts on all nine murder charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) any error in the denial of Defendant’s request to observe or participate in the State’s DNA testing procedures that consumed certain DNA samples was harmless; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to sever; (4) Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel; (5) Defendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence other-act evidence, pretrial and in-court identifications, firearms expert testimony, and an autopsy photograph; (7) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a complete defense; (8) although the prosecutor made some improper remarks during trial, they did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (9) the trial court did not prejudicially err during the penalty phase; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding death sentences appropriate for each of the nine murders. View "State v. Goudeau" on Justia Law

Patients filed suit to set aside accord and satisfaction agreements and to recover the amounts paid to release liens. Hospitals, health care providers who treated patients injured by third parties, were paid by the Patients' insurer, AHCCCS, which had negotiated reduced rates with the Hospitals. The Hospitals then recorded liens against the Patients pursuant to A.R.S. 33-931 and A.R.S. 36-2903.01(G) for the difference between the amount typically charged for their treatment and the reduced amount paid by AHCCCS. In order to receive their personal injury settlements with the third parties, Patients settled with the Hospitals by paying negotiated amounts to release the liens. At issue is the validity of these accord and satisfaction agreements. The court assumed, without deciding, that Arizona’s lien statutes are preempted by federal law. But, because there was a bona fide dispute about the enforceability of these liens when the Patients and Hospitals entered into settlement agreements to achieve lien releases, the agreements were supported by adequate consideration and addressed a proper subject matter. Therefore, the accord and satisfaction agreements are valid. View "Abbott v. Banner Health Network" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) and taken to a police station, where he was read an “admin per se” form. The form provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant subsequently submitted to breath and blood tests and was subsequently charged with five counts of aggravated DUI. Defendant moved to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the tests. The trial court denied the motion. Based on the parties’ stipulated facts, the court dismissed three counts and convicted Defendant on the remaining counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Defendant’s consent was not freely and voluntarily given in this case; but (2) because the admonition was given in good faith reliance on precedent, exclusion of the test results was not required. View "State v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a motorized watercraft while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI) and transported to an aid station used by the sheriff’s office. Defendant read an “OUI Admonishment” form, which provided that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood, or other bodily substance tests chosen by law enforcement. Defendant agreed to submit to a blood draw and was subsequently charged with two counts of OUI and one count of extreme OUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the test results, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not voluntarily consent to the test. The justice court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not consent to giving blood samples in this case. Remanded. View "Brown v. Hon. Crane McClennen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and juror misconduct. The trial court summarily dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Appellant’s trial counsel nor his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (2) even if Appellant properly raised his juror misconduct claim, he failed to show prejudice. View "State v. Kolmann" on Justia Law

While executing a warrant authorizing the search of a home, police found Defendant, who was not named in the warrant, in the home. Police proceeded to search Defendant’s purse. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, arguing that the search of her purse was unlawful because she was not named in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that police were permitted to search the purse. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting the possession test, under which officers may search personal items that are not in their owners’ possession when police find them in executing a premises search warrant, holding that because Defendant did not physically possess her purse when the officers found it, they were authorized to search it for the items listed in the warrant. View "State v. Gilstrap" on Justia Law

After a police officers had a consensual encounter with Defendant, they asked Defendant if he had any firearms. Defendant replied that he had a gun. The officers then frisked Defendant, removed the gun, and arrested Defendant as a prohibited possessor of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that once the officers became aware that Defendant had a gun, they were allowed to remove the gun and conduct a pat down for safety purposes. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that, during an initially consensual encounter with an individual, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before frisking the individual. View "State v. Serna" on Justia Law

Appellant was placed on probation. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal. The Office of the Public Defender assigned the case to an attorney. Appellant informed the trial court, as well as her attorney, that she wished to represent herself on appeal, but her requests were ignored. Appellant’s counsel then filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking leave for Appellant to represent herself. The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that although there was no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, self-representation was permitted if the request was timely, and Appellant’s request was untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution provides a defendant with a right to self-representation on appeal, and (2) the request for self-representation on appeal must be made no later than thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Hon. Johnsen" on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of Phoenix started installing light rail tracks along Jefferson Street, which abutted Appellant’s property. As part of the installation, the City erected a permanent concrete barrier between the tracks and Appellant’s property, thus blocking two driveways providing vehicular access from Jefferson Street to Appellant’s property. The property, however, still had access via Madison Street. The City subsequently filed an eminent domain action to determine the compensation it owed to Appellant for a temporary construction easement Appellant granted the City. Appellant counterclaimed, seeking damages for his permanent loss of access to Jefferson Street. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for loss of access if he retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling, concluding that the government may not eliminate a property owner’s established access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the property owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, an owner may claim compensable damage to private property within the meaning of Ariz. Const. art. II, 17, even if other streets provide access to the property. View "City of Phoenix v. Garretson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder for stabbing his pregnant girlfriend, killing her and the unborn baby. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and death sentences, holding that the trial court did not (1) err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his post-arrest confession; (2) err in striking a juror for cause; (3) err in screening and limiting questions used in a written questionnaire sent to prospective jurors; (4) err in precluding or limiting the testimony of three defense witnesses; (5) commit fundamental error by allowing evidence of statements Appellant made four years before the murders; (6) abuse its discretion in finding that the State’s mental health expert qualified as an expert in intellectual disability and in therefore allowing the expert to testify on the issue of Appellant’s intellectual ability; and (7) violate Appellant’s right to counsel by not declaring a mistrial based on the alleged ineffectiveness of Appellant’s trial attorneys. In addition, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding aggravating circumstances and in determining that death was the appropriate sentence. View "State v. Naranjo" on Justia Law