Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found Benjamin Cota guilty of two counts of first degree murer, two counts of armed robbery, one count of possession of narcotics, and one count of unlawful flight. Cota was sentenced to death on one first degree murder count and to prison terms for the other counts. The trial judge stated that he believed Arizona law "required" him to make the sentences on the "non-capital" counts consecutive, and he did so on all but the flight count. The Supreme Court affirmed Cota's convictions and death sentence but remanded for resentencing on the non-capital counts, holding that although the judge here imposed one concurrent sentence, the Court was not convinced the judge was aware of his discretion to do the same with all other sentences under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-708.

Jacob Braden, an adult with developmental disabilities, died as a result of injuries suffered while residing at an Arizona Integrated Residential and Educational Services (AIRES) facility. AIRES is a licensed private corporation that contracts with the Arizona Department of Economic Security's Division of Developmental Disabilities. Jacob's estate sued the State, alleging a statutory claim under the Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) for abuse and neglect. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding it was not a proper defendant under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 46-455, which permits an action under APSA against a "person" or an "enterprise." The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State was not exempt from liability under section 46-455. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court after applying the rules of statutory construction to section 46-455, concluding that the State was not liable under APSA because the legislature did not intend to include the State in its expressly enumerated list of potential APSA defendants.

After Petitioner was indicted on child abuse, the State extended a plea offer in May 2009 without imposing a deadline for its acceptance. A new prosecutor was assigned to the case in August 2009 and notified Petitioner that the offer was no longer available. Petitioner moved under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, which authorizes sanctions if a prosecutor imposes a plea deadline and fails to disclose certain information to the defense at least thirty days before the offer lapses, to preclude any evidence disclosed after July 29, 2009. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals granted relief to Petitioner, holding that rule 15.8 applied because the State effectively imposed a deadline on the offer by withdrawing it. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) rule 15.8 does not apply when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer; and (2) in such a situation, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7 governs the imposition of sanctions for any failure to make required disclosures. Remanded.

Plaintiff Marshall Home brought an action in superior court to disqualify Jonathan Rothschild as a Democratic candidate for mayor of the city of Tuscon, arguing that Rothschild was ineligible to serve as mayor because he was a member of the state bar of Arizona and, thus, was also automatically a member of the judiciary. Therefore, Home argued that Rothschild should be disqualified from non-judicial office by the separation of powers doctrine in the Arizona Constitution. The superior court dismissed Home's complaint, finding Home's argument "spurious." On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding there is no incompatibility between the private practice of law and serving as the mayor of a municipality. The Court also found Home's appeal frivolous and awarded defendants attorney fees and costs.

A jury found James Styers guilty of the 1989 murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, kidnapping, and child abuse of a four-year-old. After finding three aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances, the trial judge sentenced Styers to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. Styers then filed a habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied. The court of appeals reversed and granted relief, finding that in independently reviewing Styers' death sentence, the Supreme Court erroneously refused to consider as a mitigating circumstance the PTSD Styers suffered from as a result of military service in Vietnam. The Supreme Court granted the state's request to conduct a new independent review. On review, the Court affirmed Styers' sentence, holding that Styers' PTSD, in combination with all other mitigating evidence previously considered by the Court, was not sufficient to warrant leniency in light of the aggravating factors proven in this case.

Michael Hummons agreed to speak with a police officer on the sidewalk. During the encounter the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Hummons' arrest. The officer arrested Hummons, and in a search incident to that arrest discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in Hummons' backpack. At trial Hummons moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer's encounter with Hummons consensual. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court overemphasized the importance the warrant as an intervening circumstance in dissipating the taint of any prior illegality and that the court should have applied the third Brown v. Illinois factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court held the totality of the circumstances militated against suppressing the evidence and upheld the judgment of the trial court.

In May 2006, Mesa police responded to an aggravated assault call. Officers went to the apartment complex where Appellant Laquinn Fisher lived. Officers knocked and announced their presence. Appellant and two others came to the door. None had weapons, and all there were cooperative. Appellant matched a description given by the alleged assault victim. Despite having this information, officers thought further investigation was necessary because a gun used in the assault was still "unaccounted for. Without asking whether anyone else was inside, police entered the apartment to see if anyone else was there. Inside, officers smelled marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing drugs. After the sweep, officers obtained written consent from Appellant's roommate to search the apartment, and then seized the drugs. Appellant was charged with various crimes, including possession of marijuana. Appellant moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana that was seized. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently found Appellant guilty on the possession charge. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the police lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a suspect's home when the suspect and the only other occupants were detained outside. The Court held that the protective sweep in Appellant's case violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court vacated Appellant's possession conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Appellant Wayne Prince, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his step-daughter and for the attempted murder of his wife. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. The sentence was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court. Under the law in effect when Appellant killed his step-daughter, the trial judge decided whether to impose the death penalty, but a jury needed to determine whether there were mitigating circumstances from the case that might warrant life imprisonment. A penalty-phase was impaneled, and it found no mitigating factors to spare Appellant from the death sentence. The second jury sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant appealed, citing among other issues that the second juryâs sentence gave the State a second chance to seek a death sentence thus violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellantâs ex post facto argument, and affirmed the trial courtâs death sentence.

Appellant Clarence Dixon was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. At trial, he represented himself. A jury found him guilty on all counts. When Appellant elected before trial to represent himself, the judge warned him that he would have sole responsibility for his defense, including examining and cross-examining witnesses. Appellant requested that an advisory counsel handle the examination of witnesses. The trial court rejected this proposal. On appeal, Appellant claimed multiple errors by the trial court entitled him to a new trial, including the trial courtâs denial of his proposed âhybrid representation.â The Supreme Court noted that âthere is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.â The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellantâs motion. Finding no other errors from trial, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision and Appellantâs death sentence.

The Arizona Constitution entitles victims of crimes to be present and informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present. In this case, Petitioners Morehart and Duffy challenged a court decision that denied them the opportunity to attend an ex parte hearing on the return of summonses issues as part of defense counselâs pretrial investigation and mitigation of evidence in a capital case. The Defendant was charged with five counts of fist-degree murder. The State sought the death penalty. In 2006, the trial court found the defendant indigent, and approved an ex parte motion for the appointment of a mitigation specialist and an expert. Defense counsel filed a motion for a hearing on the matter. The court granted the ex parte request, and the Victims objected to it. The Victims sought special action relief from the appellate court, arguing that state law âdoes not displace a victimâs right to be present at all criminal proceedings." The Supreme Court held that because the defendant had no right to attend such a purely procedural hearing, the victims had no right to attend it too. The Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.