Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Hummons agreed to speak with a police officer on the sidewalk. During the encounter the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Hummons' arrest. The officer arrested Hummons, and in a search incident to that arrest discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in Hummons' backpack. At trial Hummons moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer's encounter with Hummons consensual. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court overemphasized the importance the warrant as an intervening circumstance in dissipating the taint of any prior illegality and that the court should have applied the third Brown v. Illinois factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court held the totality of the circumstances militated against suppressing the evidence and upheld the judgment of the trial court.

In May 2006, Mesa police responded to an aggravated assault call. Officers went to the apartment complex where Appellant Laquinn Fisher lived. Officers knocked and announced their presence. Appellant and two others came to the door. None had weapons, and all there were cooperative. Appellant matched a description given by the alleged assault victim. Despite having this information, officers thought further investigation was necessary because a gun used in the assault was still "unaccounted for. Without asking whether anyone else was inside, police entered the apartment to see if anyone else was there. Inside, officers smelled marijuana and observed open duffle bags containing drugs. After the sweep, officers obtained written consent from Appellant's roommate to search the apartment, and then seized the drugs. Appellant was charged with various crimes, including possession of marijuana. Appellant moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana that was seized. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury subsequently found Appellant guilty on the possession charge. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on whether the police lawfully conducted a protective sweep of a suspect's home when the suspect and the only other occupants were detained outside. The Court held that the protective sweep in Appellant's case violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court vacated Appellant's possession conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Appellant Wayne Prince, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his step-daughter and for the attempted murder of his wife. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant to death. The sentence was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court. Under the law in effect when Appellant killed his step-daughter, the trial judge decided whether to impose the death penalty, but a jury needed to determine whether there were mitigating circumstances from the case that might warrant life imprisonment. A penalty-phase was impaneled, and it found no mitigating factors to spare Appellant from the death sentence. The second jury sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant appealed, citing among other issues that the second juryâs sentence gave the State a second chance to seek a death sentence thus violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellantâs ex post facto argument, and affirmed the trial courtâs death sentence.

Appellant Clarence Dixon was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. At trial, he represented himself. A jury found him guilty on all counts. When Appellant elected before trial to represent himself, the judge warned him that he would have sole responsibility for his defense, including examining and cross-examining witnesses. Appellant requested that an advisory counsel handle the examination of witnesses. The trial court rejected this proposal. On appeal, Appellant claimed multiple errors by the trial court entitled him to a new trial, including the trial courtâs denial of his proposed âhybrid representation.â The Supreme Court noted that âthere is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.â The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellantâs motion. Finding no other errors from trial, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision and Appellantâs death sentence.

The Arizona Constitution entitles victims of crimes to be present and informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present. In this case, Petitioners Morehart and Duffy challenged a court decision that denied them the opportunity to attend an ex parte hearing on the return of summonses issues as part of defense counselâs pretrial investigation and mitigation of evidence in a capital case. The Defendant was charged with five counts of fist-degree murder. The State sought the death penalty. In 2006, the trial court found the defendant indigent, and approved an ex parte motion for the appointment of a mitigation specialist and an expert. Defense counsel filed a motion for a hearing on the matter. The court granted the ex parte request, and the Victims objected to it. The Victims sought special action relief from the appellate court, arguing that state law âdoes not displace a victimâs right to be present at all criminal proceedings." The Supreme Court held that because the defendant had no right to attend such a purely procedural hearing, the victims had no right to attend it too. The Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.