Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 28-672(G), which limits the amount of restitution that can be awarded to a victim for an unconstitutional limitation on the right to receive restitution or a valid legislative enactment, is unconstitutional and void.The Victims' Bill of Rights (VBR), Ariz. Const. art. II, 2.1, guarantees a victim's right to receive prompt restitution for loss or injury caused by a defendant's criminal conduct and authorizes the legislature to enact laws to define, implement, preserve and protect victims' rights. At issue was whether section 28-672(G), which limits the restitution that can be awarded to a victim for loss resulting from a violation of specified traffic offenses, was unconstitutional, either as a limitation on the right to receive restitution or a valid legislative enactment. The Supreme Court held (1) the constitutional right under the VBR to receive restitution is a right to receive the full amount of economic loss or injury caused by a defendant's criminal conduct; and (2) therefore, section 28-672(G)'s limitation on a restitution award is an unconstitutional limitation on the right to receive prompt restitution, as guaranteed by the VBR. View "State v. Patel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01 cannot apply to require a city to consolidate local elections with state and national elections if the city's charter provides otherwise.Section 16-204.01 requires political subdivisions to consolidate local elections with state and national elections when voter turnout for local elections significantly decreases. At issue in this case was whether the home rule charter provision barred application of section 16-204.01 to the City of Tuscon, whose charter required electing local officials on non-statewide election dates. The Supreme Court held that section 16-204.01 was unconstitutional as applied to the City charter and therefore could not preempt the City's election-scheduling provision. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the City of Peoria violated Ariz. Const. art. IX, section 7, the Gift Clause, by spending public funds to induce a private university to open a branch campus in Peoria.In 2015, Huntington University, Inc. (HU), an accredited private institution based in Indiana, and the City entered into an agreement for HU to open a campus in Peoria. In return, the City promised to pay HU almost $2 million for developing the campus and programs. Plaintiffs, Peoria taxpayers, brought this lawsuit asserting that the City's payments to HU violated the Gift Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the City's payments to HU violated the Gift Clause. View "Schires v. Carlat" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that neither the United States nor the Arizona Constitution requires a search warrant or court order for a law enforcement officer to obtain either a user's Internet Protocol (IP) address or subscriber information the user voluntarily provides to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) as a condition or attribute of service.Defendant was indicted on twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under fifteen years of age. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the United States Fourth Amendment and Ariz. Const. art. II, 8 required a warrant or court order to obtain his IP address and ISP subscriber information. The motion was denied, and a jury convicted Defendant on all counts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State lawfully obtained the challenged information with a valid federal administrative subpoena because neither the Fourth Amendment nor article 2, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution requires law enforcement officials to secure a search warrant or court order to obtain IP addresses or subscriber information voluntarily provided to ISPs as a condition or attribute of service. View "State v. Mixton" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit brought by the Attorney General against the Arizona Board of Regents challenging certain tuition policies, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action, holding that the Attorney General was not authorized to proceed with its first set of claims but that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss the latter challenge.The Attorney General alleged that the Board's tuition-setting policies violate Ariz. Const. art. XI, 6 and that subsidizing in-state tuition for students who are not lawfully present constitutes an unlawful expenditure of public funds. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Attorney General lacked authority to bring it. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's decision, holding (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-212 did not provide a basis for counts I-V, and therefore, the trial court properly dismissed those claims for lack of authority on the part of the Attorney General to prosecute them; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing count VI because the Attorney General was entitled to prove that, in providing in-state tuition on behalf of students were not not lawfully present, the Board illegally expended funds beyond the amount of tuition collected. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. Arizona Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and child abuse, holding that no prejudicial error occurred during the trial proceedings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by admitting a pretrial identification of Defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Batson challenges to the State's peremptory strikes of two jurors; (4) the trial court did not err by admitting a video demonstrating the location and movement of Defendant's and the victim's cellphones on the day of the murder; (5) the trial court did not err by restricting Defendant's cross-examination of the State's former case agent; (6) the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to reinstruct the jury at the close of the aggravation stage; (7) substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Defendant killed the victim for pecuniary gain; (8) the jury was properly instructed; (9) the State did not engage in prosecutorial error; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to death. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that consecutive sentences imposed for separate crimes, when the cumulative sentences exceed a juvenile's life expectancy, do not violate the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).Defendants in these cases argued that their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. At issue was whether Graham, Miller, and Montgomery prohibit aggregated consecutive sentences for separate crimes that exceed a juvenile's life expectancy. The Supreme Court held that Graham, Miller, and Montgomery do not prohibit such de facto life sentences, and therefore, Graham and its progeny do not constitute a significant chance in the law under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). View "State v. Soto-Fong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the constitutional prohibition on state and local governments from imposing or increasing taxes or other "transaction-based" fees on services does not extend to "trip fees" imposed by the City of Phoenix on commercial ground transportation providers who transport passengers to and from an airport.The Attorney General filed a special action pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-194.01(B)(2) asking whether the City's newly adopted ordinance adjusting passenger pick-up fees and imposing new trip fees for dropping off departing passengers at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport violates Ariz. Const. Art. IV, 25 as to commercial ground transportation providers. The Supreme Court held (1) the ordinance does not violate section 25 because the fees are not "transaction-based"; and (2) the bond provision in section 41-194.01(B)(2) is incomplete and unintelligible and therefore unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a defendant presenting an appellate claim of fundamental error due to cumulative prosecutorial misconduct does not need to assert fundamental error for every allegation in order to preserve for review the argument that misconduct occurred.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed several instances of misconduct. For all but three of the alleged incidents of misconduct, the court of appeals concluded that Defendant waived argument that error occurred because he failed to set forth an argument of fundamental error for each allegation. The court then determined that Defendant failed to successfully argue misconduct for any of his allegations. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) when a defendant raises a claim on appeal that multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, for which the defendant failed to object, cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial, the defendant need not argue that each instance of alleged misconduct individually deprived him of a fair trial; and (2) Defendant indisputably argued that cumulative error entitled him to a new trial due to pervasive prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Corporation Commission may appoint an interim manager to operate a public service corporation (PSC) based on its permissive authority under Ariz. Const. art. XV, 3.Under article 15, section 3, the Commission has permissive authority to make and enforce reasonable orders for the convenience, comfort, safety, and health of the public. Concluding that it was necessary to protect public health and safety, the Commission appointed EPCOR Water Arizona as an interim manager for Johnson Utilities, LLC, an Arizona PSC. Johnson filed a special action seeking to enjoin its enforcement, but the court of appeals denied relief, holding that the Commission has both constitutional and statutory authority to appoint an interim manager of a PSC. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, holding that the Commission may appoint an interim manager based on its permissive authority under article 15, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution. View "Johnson Utilities, LLC v. Arizona Corp. Commission" on Justia Law