Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of unidentified crimes. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, contending that the circuit court erred in finding that his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the circuit court's change of venue and by failing to introduce the testimony of a witness at trial or offer transcribed testimony of the witness from a pretrial hearing to rebut an inference that Defendant had contemplated raping the victim. The Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of Defendant's argument because Defendant's brief did not comply with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8) and he had failed to file a sufficient record for the Court's review. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 480 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed three postconviction petitions, one filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, the second for reduction of sentence under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, and the third to correct an illegal sentence under 16-90-111. The trial court denied the petitions in one order and denied Appellant's two motions related to the Rule 37.1 petition in a second order. Appellant appealed both orders. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the trial court correctly denied the petitions. View "Murphy v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and first-degree terroristic threatening and sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his defense counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to obtain and present testimony of a medical expert, (2) failing to investigate and present to the jury the lack of physical evidence in his case, (3) failing to present to the jury a timeline of events, and (4) failing to call Appellant as a witness on his own behalf. The circuit court denied the requested relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. View "Hickey v. State" on Justia Law

Pulaski County issued an assessment and taxation of property owned by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). On behalf of UAMS, Appellant (the University) filed a tax-exemption application seeking an exemption from ad valorem property taxes based on sovereign immunity. The county assessor's office and county equalization board denied the request. The county court also denied the exemption. On appeal, the circuit court denied the University's motion for summary judgment and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the University's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the University failed to establish an exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. View "Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Alpha Marketing brought this cause of action against the Arkansas Lottery Commission seeking declaratory relief that Alpha's registered trademarks of "Arkansas Lottery," "Arkansas Lotto," and "Lottery Arkansas" were valid and that it held exclusive rights to use them. Alpha also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Commission's alleged acts of trademark infringement and monetary damages. Alpha later amended its complaint, alleging ultra vires acts and an unconstitutional taking. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Alpha's lawsuit on the basis that the Commission had sovereign immunity from the trademark-infringement claims. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission was an entity of the State entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity; (2) Alpha's claims for injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief were barred by the defense of sovereign immunity; (3) the exceptions for waiver; ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith acts; and takings did not apply. View "Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Mktg." on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiff was hired as the chief of police for the City of McRae. The Mayor terminated Plaintiff's employment in 2009 for allegedly falsifying fire-department records and for insubordination. The city council voted not to overturn the Mayor's decision to terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2009 against the City, the Mayor, and City alderman, asserting (1) Defendants failed to comply with the provisions of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act because they did not give sufficient notice of the city council meeting; (2) Plaintiff's due process rights were violated; (3) the Mayor's termination of Plaintiff's employment violated her rights under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act; and (4) Plaintiff's termination without just cause violated her rights under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's claims, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion. The Mayor appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in not granting the Mayor qualified immunity on the claims brought by Plaintiff. Remanded. View "Sullivan v. Coney" on Justia Law

Appellee pleaded guilty to first-degree false imprisonment and aggravated assault. Appellee subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking the circuit court to vacate the entry of his guilty plea due to a lack of advice from counsel about immigration consequences as required under Padilla v. Kentucky. After multiple hearings, the circuit court granted the petition and vacated Appellee's guilty pleas and sentence. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by expanding the grounds for a writ of error coram nobis to include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the result of the circuit court's decision was to improperly expand the grounds for coram-nobis relief to include claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore the court erred as a matter of law in granting the writ. View "State v. Tejeda-Acosta" on Justia Law

The circuit court found Defendant guilty, as a habitual offender, to two drug offenses. The court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction with an additional ten years' suspended imposition of sentence plus costs and fees for each conviction. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court (1) illegally sentenced Defendant because the statutory-minimum sentence for a habitual offender was not imposed, and (2) erred by not imposing a fine against Defendant pursuant to the applicable statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a sentence of five years when at least a ten-year sentence was required; and (2) did not err by failing to impose a fine pursuant to the controlled-substances statute. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. O'Quinn" on Justia Law

In 2011, the State filed a petition to remove Sheriff Kenny Cassell from office, alleging that Cassell had pled guilty in 1979 to a violation of 18 U.S.C. 659, that Cassell had committed the crime while serving as a deputy sheriff, that Cassell acknowledged the conviction, that Cassell was elected sheriff in 2010, and that, under the Arkansas Constitution, Cassell was barred from holding office. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Cassell, concluding that Cassell's crime was for theft by receiving, and although the crime involved dishonesty, the theft conviction was not sufficient for removal because it did not impugn the integrity of the office or directly impact Cassell's ability to serve as an elected official. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense was an "infamous crime" under Ark. Const. art. V, 9 because it involved dishonesty; and (2) the circuit court erroneously determined that Cassell's theft conviction alone was not enough to require removal without some proof that the conviction impugned the integrity of the elected office or directly impacted Cassell's ability to serve. View "State v. Cassell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death and life imprisonment, respectively. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition after a hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in finding Appellant's counsel provided effective assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court failed to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Rule 37.5(i). Remanded for entry of a written order in compliance with Rule 37.5(i). View "Sales v. State" on Justia Law