Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Croft appealed the superior court's order denying their petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to return fees it collected when Croft applied for building permits. As an initial matter, the court concluded that Croft's facial challenge is time barred pursuant to Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B)-(C) where Croft raised its challenge more than 90 days after the City enacted the Ordinance and adopted the fee schedule. The court also concluded that Croft’s as-applied challenge improperly places the burden on the City and incorrectly states how the fee must be reasonable. In this case, the reasonableness test applies to the creation of the fee schedule, not its application. Croft mischaracterizes the nature of the reasonableness inquiry and does not present evidence relating to the correct inquiry; even if it had, the claim related to such an inquiry would be facial and time barred. Finally, the court concluded that the City correctly calculated the parks and recreation fee; Croft abandoned its traffic fees claim on appeal; and the City collected the fees at an appropriate time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood" on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court's order granting defendant Julia Huerta's Proposition 47 petition to re-designate a prior felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Huerta pled guilty to one felony count of second degree commercial burglary for the theft of eight bottles of perfume worth $463 from a Sears Department Store. Huerta sought to have her conviction redesignated as the newly created misdemeanor of shoplifting, "entering an open commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of $950 or less." Huerta’s petition stated "the value of the . . . property does not exceed $950.00." At a hearing, the People did not contest the value of the stolen property, but contended Huerta’s burglary offense did not qualify as shoplifting because she entered the store with another person with whom she shared the intent to commit conspiracy. On appeal, the State argued the trial court erred by: (1) reaching the merits when Huerta failed to satisfy her initial burden by attaching evidence to her petition; and (2) concluding Huerta was eligible for relief when her conduct could have been punished as felony burglary even after Proposition 47, because she entered Sears with the intent to commit conspiracy. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Huerta" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause in response to William Ilasa's petition based on his allegations that he was denied due process of law when, at the conclusion of a prison-reduction procedure developed pursuant to the order of the three-judge federal court, the Board of Prison Hearings did not grant him parole as a non-violent, non-sex-registrant second-strike (NVSS) inmate. The federal court order at issue was issued in a prison class action litigation after the court found that California state prisoners' federal constitutional rights had been violated as a result of overcrowding, after the court found that a prison release order was the only relief capable of remedying the constitutional deficiencies, after the United States Supreme Court affirmed those rulings, after the three-judge court issued its remedial order in reliance on the state defendants' representation and agreement that they would develop comprehensive and sustainable prison population-reduction reforms, and after the state defendants agreed not to contest the remedial order. The California Court of Appeal concluded that, because the Board's decision involved a constitutionally protected liberty interest, Ilasa was entitled to judicial review of the decision. The Court further concluded that, because the record of what was presented to the Board during the review process contained some evidence to support the Board's decision, Ilasa's due process rights were not violated. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal considered Ilasa's petition on its merits and denied it. View "In re Ilasa" on Justia Law

In July 2014, prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant-appellant James Varner entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of receiving stolen property, specifically a 1986 Yamaha M300 motorcycle. Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence stating that his felony conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied his Petition on the grounds that his conviction was not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. Defendant claimed on appeal the trial court erred by finding his conviction did not qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47 because: (1) Proposition 47 redefined all theft-related offenses with the value of the property under $950 as misdemeanors; and (2) if the Court of Appeal found Penal Code section 496d (the section under which defendant was convicted) was not affected by Proposition 47, the omission from Proposition 47 violated his equal protection rights under the state and federal Constitutions. The Court of Appeal affirmed: a conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle in violation of section 496d was not an eligible offense under Proposition 47. Defendant also did not show an equal protection violation. View "California v. Varner" on Justia Law

Allstate filed a qui tam action on behalf of itself and the State against defendants under the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act, Insurance Code 1871.7. Following entry of the qui tam judgment, Allstate began efforts to collect it. During its investigation, Allstate learned of a series of real estate transactions conducted by defendants designed to transfer away their assets. Allstate, on behalf of the State, filed an action to set aside the fraudulent transfers of real and personal property. Allstate subsequently obtained a stay of the fraudulent conveyance action and returned to the qui tam court where it filed a motion for an order allocating the qui tam judgment proceeds. The motion was based on a stipulation entered into between the People and Allstate allocating to Allstate 50 percent of the civil penalties and assessments, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Allstate's allocation motion and entered the stipulation as judgment. Defendants appealed. The court held that judgment-debtor defendants in qui tam insurance fraud actions are not aggrieved by such allocation orders under section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A), with the result that they do not have standing to appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dahan" on Justia Law

In July 2012, defendant Richard Cortez plead guilty to one felony count of possessing methamphetamine, one misdemeanor count of possessing drug paraphernalia, and one misdemeanor count of being under the influence of methamphetamine. Defendant admitted a prior strike and a prison prior. The court sentenced defendant to three years’ probation on condition he serve 270 days in county jail. Approximately two years later, defendant violated the terms of probation for the second time and was sentenced to 16 months in prison on count 1, which was the low term, and a concurrent term of six months in jail on each of the two misdemeanor counts. As a basis for choosing the low term on count 1, the court stated, “Defendant pled at an early stage of proceedings, Small amount of contraband, and no violence.” In June 2015, defendant petitioned for resentencing of his felony conviction as a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (f). Because defendant was still under supervision, the court found he was still serving his sentence and denied the petition under subdivision (f), but granted the petition under subdivision (a). The court resentenced defendant to 364 days in county jail on count 1, 129 days consecutive in county jail on count 2, and 129 days concurrent on count 3, for a total jail term of 493 days. The court found defendant had 494 days of custody credit. It imposed one year of parole pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (d), and credited the extra day to defendant’s parole period. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, when a court recalls a felony sentence and imposes a misdemeanor sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a) (Proposition 47), the court could revisit the sentence imposed on other misdemeanor counts not subject to Proposition 47, and impose a harsher punishment. The Court of Appeal found that yes, the trial court may do so, provided that the new aggregate sentence did not exceed the prior sentence. View "California v. Cortez" on Justia Law

In 2007, Blackwell, then 17 years old, committed a burglary and attempted robbery with an accomplice and shot and killed Carreno in the course of those offenses. The district attorney elected to directly file the case in adult court under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d). Blackwell was convicted in 2009 of first-degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code 187(a), 189, 190.2(a)(17)(A)) and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2013 the court of appeal remanded for resentencing pursuant to the constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, which held mandatory LWOP sentences for homicide amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment when imposed on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. On remand, the trial court considered the factors outlined in Miller, and again imposed an LWOP sentence. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that it was unpersuaded that Blackwell’s LWOP sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in his particular case. View "People v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Trigg seeking rescission of the settlement agreement in Suarez I based on Trigg’s fraudulent concealment of the prospects for sale of the company, and quantum meruit. Trigg filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Civil Procedure section 425.16, asserting that plaintiff's claims arise out of communications that occurred during the course of Suarez I. The trial court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that plaintiff's causes of action arose from litigation activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute - the right of free speech - and that he failed to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Suarez v. Trigg Labs." on Justia Law

Deandre Ellison was shot to death as he drove into his driveway in the Del Paso Heights neighborhood of Sacramento. Four other men, including Latrele Neal, were also in Ellison’s car. Before the car came to a stop in the driveway, an SUV driven by Jesse Cornejo slowly drove past Ellison’s house; the SUV's front and backseat passengers, Adam Cornejo and Isaac Vasquez, opened fire on Ellison‘s car. After crashing the SUV while being pursued by law enforcement, Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were taken into custody a short time later. Each was a Norteno gang member. Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were tried together and convicted by jury of one count of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Jesse was also convicted of one count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer. With respect to the murder, the jury found the offense was committed by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury. The jury also found the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. Various firearm enhancement allegations were also found to be true. The trial court sentenced Adam and Isaac to serve an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 9 years 4 months. Jesse was sentenced to serve the same indeterminate term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. Defendants appealed. Having reviewed the trial court record and the briefs submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeal concluded that the holding in "California v. Prunty," (62 Cal. 4th 59 (2015)) required reversal of the gang enhancement findings as to all defendants. Also, because each defendant was found to qualify for vicarious firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), which required violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b), as an element of that enhancement, the Court reversed these vicarious firearm enhancements as to all defendants too. The Court affirmed as to all other alleged errors at trial and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "California v. Cornejo" on Justia Law

In February 2011, plaintiff Harald Mark Galzinski filed a citizen’s complaint to the Sacramento Police Department against three of the department’s officers related to the taking of biological samples from him following his arrest in December 2003. In July 2014, the department’s internal affairs division notified Galzinski that the division had “reviewed [his] complaint” but “no further action” would be taken on it because, “[b]ased upon the information [Galzinski] provided, the issues [he] raised pertain[ed] to points of law which should have been litigated during [his] criminal trial in 2005. Therefore, the proper venue for resolving [his] complaint would be through the appeals process.” Galzinski sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel defendant Samuel D. Somers Jr., Chief of the Sacramento Police Department, and three sergeants in the department’s internal affairs division to “properly investigate” his complaint and to “make official findings as to the validity of [his] allegations.” The superior court denied Galzinski’s petition, concluding that the department had “essentially” found the officers Galzinski accused of misconduct were “ ‘exonerated’ ” and that, in any event, the department did not abuse its discretion “in responding to the complaint in the way that it did.” After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in denying Galzinski’s petition: the procedure for addressing citizen complaints the department established and published obligated the department to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the complaint was sufficient to allow the Chief of Police to make one of four possible findings. Defendants did not comply with these obligations, and Galzinski was entitled to a writ of mandate compelling defendants to perform their ministerial duty to satisfy the obligations imposed by the department’s published procedure. View "Galzinski v. Somers" on Justia Law