Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, defendant was charged in the County of San Diego with driving under the influence and for possession of cocaine and oxycodone. Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts. After defendant was sentenced to probation by the Superior Court of the County of San Diego, the "entire jurisdiction" of his case was transferred under Penal Code section 1203.9 to the Superior Court of the County of Riverside. The State contended defendant’s petition had to be decided by the trial court in San Diego that originally sentenced defendant. "Based on established principles of statutory construction and considerations of judicial resources," the Court of Appeal held that the Riverside Superior Court had entire jurisdiction over defendant’s case and could decide defendant’s petition. Additionally, the Court held that defendant waived his right to have his petition decided by the San Diego court. View "California v. Adelmann" on Justia Law

The People filed a nuisance abatement action against defendants, alleging that Weedland was an illegal medical marijuana business under the City of Los Angeles Municipal Code, and seeking an injunction against the continuing operation of Weedland. The trial court found that Weedland did fall under the statute, and therefore the People showed a likelihood of prevailing. The court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, concluding that the applicable Municipal Code section broadly defines a “medical marijuana business” as any location where medical marijuana is “distributed, delivered, or given away.” Weedland is a location that distributes medical marijuana to its “members,” and is therefore a medical marijuana business as defined in the Municipal Code. View "People ex rel. Feuer v. FXS Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, DHE, alleging causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that, when DHE hired him to work as a truck driver in 2010, he told DHE he had a disabled son who required dialysis on a daily basis and he (plaintiff) was responsible for administering the dialysis. Plaintiff requested work schedule accommodations that his supervisor initially granted, permitting him to attend to his son in the evening. Plaintiff was terminated in 2013 when a new supervisor took over and fired plaintiff for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motion to tax costs. The court reversed the judgment and the order denying the motion to tax costs, concluding that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

In 2014, loss prevention agent Marcus Nealy and manager Stephanie Garza, were working at a Sears department store in Yuba City, when they observed "H.W." enter the store via the store’s closed circuit surveillance system. Nealy saw the minor enter with “a backpack that looked empty” and noticed he was “looking around very suspiciously.” Nealy and Garza took up separate positions on the sales floor and communicated by cell phone as they continued to observe the minor. Garza told Nealy the minor removed the antitheft tag from a pair of jeans using a pair of pliers, carried the jeans into the restroom, and, when the minor came out of the restroom, Garza no longer saw the jeans. Nealy checked the restroom but found no jeans. Meanwhile, Garza alerted Nealy the minor was leaving the store without stopping at a cash register or attempting to pay for the jeans. Nealy headed outside to apprehend the minor, stopped him, and called police. When Yuba City Police Officer Joshua Jackson arrived at the store, Nealy and Garza informed him the minor used “a pair of diagonal cutters or wire cutters” to remove the security tag on the jeans and placed the jeans in the backpack before leaving the store without paying for them. A search of the minor’s backpack revealed the jeans and a pair of pliers. The minor had no wallet, no money, no credit cards, and no identification. A delinquency petition was filed, alleging the minor committed theft, possessed of burglary tools, and trespassed. Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the theft and burglary tool possession allegations, but found the trespass allegation had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on juvenile probation. The juvenile court committed the minor to two days in juvenile hall with credit for time served, and set a maximum term of confinement of eight months. The minor appealed, challenging the evidence presented against him. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

Defendant Erik Flores was the father of three young children (John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and Jane Doe). The information alleged that, from 2011 to 2014, Flores tortured the children, and abused his children. The information specifically alleged that Flores personally inflicted great bodily injury on the children in on certain counts. Defendant Mariah Sugg had an "off-and-on" girlfriend relationship with Flores, and was separately charged with the same set of offenses against the same victims, but with differing windows of commission. The trial court sentenced each defendant to two life terms plus six years, and imposed but stayed the sentence on the remaining convictions and true findings. On appeal, Flores argued the court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury it could return guilty verdicts on the torture counts as an aider and abettor of Sugg under the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine. He also argued the evidence was insufficient to support the torture convictions because there was no evidence either he or Sugg had the specific intent to "cause cruel or extreme pain or suffering for the purposes of revenge, persuasion or any sadistic purpose." In Sugg's separate appeal, she claimed Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a), was unconstitutional based on vagueness and, alternatively, that the court was sua sponte required to instruct that the jury could not find her guilty of violating section 273a under the "willfully . . . permits" prong of that statute unless the jury found she had a duty to control Flores's conduct. The Court of Appeal remanded these cases back to the trial court with instructions that the court correct the minute orders and abstracts of judgment to reflect imposition of life terms on counts 3 and 7 as to Flores and counts 1 and 5 as to Sugg and, as so modified, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

The trial court revoked defendant-appellant Jesse Wagner's parole, ordered that he serve 120 days of local custody, and reinstated his parole. After the time to appeal from the order revoking his parole had passed and after Wagner completed his term of custody, Wagner discovered evidence which he argued showed that in pursuing revocation of his parole, a parole officer acted in retaliation for litigation Wagner initiated against another law enforcement officer and testified falsely at the revocation hearing. Upon discovering this evidence, Wagner filed, and the trial court denied, a motion for relief under Penal Code section 1473.6. The trial court did not reach the merits of Wagner's motion but instead found that it did not have jurisdiction under section 1473.6 to consider Wagner's claims. Wagner filed a timely notice of appeal. Contrary to the trial court's determination, the Court of Appeal found that section 1473.6 did give it jurisdiction over its earlier order revoking Wagner's parole. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for a hearing on the merits of Wagner's motion. View "California v. Wagner" on Justia Law

To combat the practice known as “pension spiking,” by which public employees use various stratagems to inflate their income and retirement benefits, the County Employees Retirement Law, was amended, effective 2013, to exclude specified items from the calculation of retirement income. The trial court concluded application of the new formula to current employees did not amount to an unconstitutional impairment of the employees’ contracts. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not act impermissibly by amending Government Code section 31461. While a public employee does have a “vested right” to a pension, that right is only to a “reasonable” pension; it is not an immutable entitlement to the most optimal formula of calculating the pension. The Legislature may, prior to the employee’s retirement, alter the formula, thereby reducing the anticipated pension, as long as the modifications do not deprive the employee of a “reasonable” pension. The Legislature did not forbid the employer from providing the specified items to an employee as compensation, only the purely prospective inclusion of those items in the computation of the employee’s pension. View "Marin Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Marin Cnty. Employees Retirement Ass'n" on Justia Law

Babyray Hudson appealed the denial of his petition to reduce his second degree burglary and forgery convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. Hudson's convictions stemmed from a 2011 incident in which he entered a bank, falsely impersonating another person, with the intent to commit a felony by signing someone else's name to a check. After review of Hudson's arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly denied the petition because Hudson failed to establish his eligibility for resentencing. View "California v. Hudson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Chatman pleaded no contest to a felony count of robbery and was placed on five years‘ probation. Two years later, he was convicted of misdemeanor reckless driving with alcohol involved. He successfully applied under Penal Code 1203.4 to have both convictions dismissed. In 2008, Chatman was convicted of another misdemeanor, driving under the influence and was placed under three years‘ probation with a condition that he served 10 days in jail. The conviction was never dismissed. In 2011, the executive director of a community organization offered Chatman a job as an administrator of a group home for foster and delinquent youth. Chatman was statutorily ineligible for the position because of his felony conviction. (Health & Saf. Code, 1522(a), (d).) Chatman applied for a certificate of rehabilitation (Health & Saf. Code 1522(g)(1)(A)(ii)), acknowledging that the statute rendered him ineligible as a former felony probationer who had spent time in jail after obtaining dismissals of prior convictions. He argued that his ineligibility violated his right to equal protection. The trial court rejected his petition. The court of appeal reversed. While it might make sense to deny certificate eligibility to all subsequently incarcerated former felons, there no rationale to deny eligibility only to those who have served sentences of probation. View "People v. Chatman" on Justia Law

The State appealed the superior court’s order granting defendant Willie Abarca Jr.’s Proposition 47 resentencing petition. Abarca pled guilty to one felony count of second degree burglary based on his attempt to pass a forged check for $300 at a bank. After voters passed Proposition 47, Abarca sought to have his felony conviction redesignated as the newly created misdemeanor of shoplifting, entering an open commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of $950 or less. The State contended Abarca’s offense did not constitute shoplifting because banks are not commercial establishments. The superior court concluded banks were commercial establishments, granted Abarca’s petition, and resentenced him. The State raised three issues on appeal: (1) the superior court erred in reaching the merits because Abarca did not carry his initial burden by attaching evidence to his petition; (2) the superior court erred in determining a bank was a commercial establishment; and (3) the superior court erred because Abarca’s underlying conduct could have been punished as felony burglary even after Proposition 47, because Abarca’s act of passing a forged check constituted identity theft. The Court of Appeal disagreed with each asserted error and affirmed. View "California v. Abarca" on Justia Law