Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, all raised the issue of whether Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibited military diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.80 for defendants charged with driving under the influence offenses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that military diversion was not available for defendants charged with driving under the influence offenses in violation of sections 23152 and 23153. View "California v. VanVleck" on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant Clifton Gibson was tried as an adult and convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances, assault with a firearm, and robbery. These offenses were committed when he was 17 years old, with two adult codefendants. Gibson was ultimately sentenced to life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murder, consecutive to a determinate term of 12 years, four months, in prison. In 2014, he filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), which was denied by the trial court on the ground he failed to demonstrate he had been rehabilitated or that he was remorseful. Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court: (1) improperly limited applicability of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) relief to juvenile defendants who did not actually kill the victim; (2) abused its discretion in denying the petition despite evidence to support the existence of all the statutory factors; and (3) “flouted Miller [v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)] and Gutierrez[58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)].” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and four of her neighbors appealed an order dismissing as an anti-SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, action their complaint against the city council of Culver City and five of its council members for allegedly violating the state’s open meeting laws, Gov. Code, 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act). In this case, plaintiffs sought personal relief in the form of a halt to any attempts by the church to undo the long-standing parking restrictions. Therefore, the court concluded that the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP provisions does not apply. The court further concluded that plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' action. View "Cruz v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two medical cannabis collectives/dispensaries and three medical cannabis patients, alleged 11 causes of action against the City and/or its employees. Plaintiffs' claims arose from the City's enforcement of municipal ordinances that first regulated and then entirely prohibited the operation of medical marijuana dispensaries within the City’s borders. Plaintiffs primarily allege that the city ordinances regulating, and then banning medical marijuana dispensaries discriminate against persons with disabilities. The court concluded that this claim has no merit and that the trial court properly sustained the city’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ causes of action for violations of the Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Civil Code section 54; the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 41 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court's conclusion is controlled by now well-established principles that the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), Health & Saf. Code, 11362.5, and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP), Health & Saf. Code, 1162.7 et seq., remove state-level criminal and civil sanctions from specified medical marijuana activities, but they do not establish a comprehensive state system of legalized medical marijuana; or grant a right of convenient access to marijuana for medicinal use; or override the zoning, licensing, and police powers of local jurisdictions; or mandate local accommodation of medical marijuana cooperatives, collectives, or dispensaries. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims of constitutional violations and state tort claims and affirmed the judgment. View "The Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Avongard, d/b/a Hydraulx, filed suit against petitioner John Doe 2 for libel, alleging that Doe 2’s anonymous emails to a film producer and a film industry executive harmed its reputation. After Doe 2 filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the trial court granted Hydraulx’s request to conduct special discovery that would reveal Doe 2’s identity. Doe 2 filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking reversal of the discovery order. Under Krinsky v. Doe 6, First Amendment protection for anonymous speech requires a libel plaintiff seeking to discover an anonymous libel defendant’s identity to make a prima facie showing of all elements of defamation. Paterno v. Superior Court similarly holds that a libel plaintiff cannot establish good cause for special discovery under section 426.16, subdivision (g) without a prima facie showing the allegedly libelous statements are false and unprivileged. The court granted Doe 2's petition in this case, concluding that Hydraulx failed to make a prima facie showing that Doe 2’s emails are provably false and defamatory statements of fact or that the emails caused Hydraulx to suffer actual damage. View "Doe 2 v. Superior Court (Avongard Products)" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Dywon Levell Byrd guilty of first degree murder (court 1), and driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (court 3). The jury found true the special allegation that defendant used a firearm in committing first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for first degree murder, a consecutive 25 years to life on the firearm allegation, plus a consecutive two-year sentence for driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury with the last bracketed paragraph of CALCRIM No. 226. Furthermore, he argued his conviction for the wanton driving charge was not supported by substantial evidence because there was no proof that either of the pursuing officers wore a distinctive uniform. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant's latter contention, and reversed on that ground (count 3). The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "California v. Bryd" on Justia Law

"The facts as alleged in the complaint and in plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the motion to strike are not at all clear." Plaintiff Un Hui Nam, a new medical resident in the anesthesiology department at UC Davis Medical Center, "got off to a rocky start" in July of 2009. The Court of Appeal surmised that there appeared to have been some tension and misunderstandings right from the beginning of plaintiff's residency. What occurred thereafter and why was the subject of the underlying lawsuit and appeal. Plaintiff labeled the hospital's actions as "retaliation" when she questioned whether residents were allowed to intubate patients. She expressed her disagreement with any policy that would compel the residents in an emergency to wait for the on-call team rather than independently intubating a patient. The week prior to this email, she had received excellent performance evaluations. Plaintiff copied all of the residents in her email. Some of these residents thereafter informed her that she should expect retaliation for sending it. Defendant, however, insisted the e-mail excited no such reaction. Defendant’s version of plaintiff's residency file consisted of a series of complaints, warnings, investigations, and leaves of absence necessitated by plaintiff’s "shortcomings" over a three-year period and culminating in her ultimate termination. The record contained both complaints and testimonials about plaintiff’s performance. Apparently she had a particularly good rapport with nurses. Defendant built a paper trail of warnings for unprofessional conduct and an inability to get along with other doctors. But many of defendant’s allegations were not substantiated during the internal investigations that ensued, and the anesthesiology department was criticized repeatedly for what it did, and did not do, to teach plaintiff the clinical and interpersonal skills needed to succeed in the program. Plaintiff requested, without success, a formal hearing to contest the termination. In January 2013 she filed her complaint for retaliation, discrimination, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, violations of the Business and Professions Code, and breach of contract. Defendant filed a motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that plaintiff’s complaint constituted a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) and arose from written complaints made in connection with an official proceeding. Defendant argued that the investigations and corrective action were protected conduct. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to strike was affirmed: "It is hard to imagine that a resident’s complaint alleging retaliatory conduct was designed to, or could, stifle the University from investigating and disciplining doctors who endanger public health and safety. The underlying lawsuit may or may not have merit that can be tested by summary judgment, but it is quite a stretch to consider it a SLAPP merely because a public university commences an investigation." View "Nam v. Regents of UC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Flowers, a parapalegic, along with his wife and stepsons, filed suit alleging violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code 512, and intentional infliction of emotional distress when defendants refused to rent them a room unless they first paid a non-refundable cleaning fee relating to their service dog. Because plaintiffs left the hotel without paying the fee, defendants argued, they did not have standing to assert an Unruh Act cause of action. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. While the court agreed with the result of Surrey v. True Beginnings, the court concluded that its bright-line rule that, under the Unruh Act, a person must tender the purchase price for a business’s services or products in order to have standing to sue, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Section 52, which provides remedies for violations of the Unruh Act, states that any person aggrieved by conduct that violates the Unruh Act may bring a civil action. The court concluded that plaintiffs have stated facts sufficient to establish standing under the Act. The court held that a plaintiff is not required to pay a discriminatory fee to establish standing to sue under the Unruh Act, as long as the plaintiff alleges facts showing that he or she has directly experienced a denial of rights as defined in sections 51 and 52. In addition, when a disabled individual has standing to sue under section 52, subdivision (c), any person “associated with” that individual has standing if the associated person has also directly experienced the discriminatory conduct. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Osborne v. Yasmeh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Department, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq. The trial court dismissed the complaint after sustaining a demurrer on the statute of limitations ground. The court agreed with plaintiff that the order sustaining the demurrer must be reversed because the complaint sufficiently alleges that the FEHA one-year limitations period was equitably tolled during the period of the EEOC investigation. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal and reinstated the first amended complaint. View "Mitchell v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

Branden Johnson appealed a superior court order denying his petition to recall his felony sentence for receiving stolen property and to resentence him to a misdemeanor, as allowed in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47. On appeal, Johnson argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he, not the State, had the burden of establishing eligibility for Proposition 47 relief. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the order without prejudice, to allow Johnson, if he chose to do so, to file a new petition attempting to meet his initial burden of demonstrating his entitlement to relief under Proposition 47. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law