Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted petitioner Jim Davis of three counts of first degree murder with enhancements. The trial court sentenced petitioner to multiple terms of life without the possibility of parole. Toward the end of 2011, petitioner notified the trial court that he sought postconviction discovery under section 1054.9. On January 26, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner’s request and ordered petitioner and real party in interest the State to informally resolve the issues of what discovery materials petitioner would receive but informed petitioner he would need to pay for copies before anything would be released. The parties subsequently exchanged several letters on this topic. On March 4, 2015, petitioner once again wrote the trial court about receiving postconviction discovery. He indicated that, in correspondence with the State, he had narrowed the list of items he wanted to six items, including police reports, the “Murder book,” all suspects questioned, all fingerprints collected, all DNA collected, and all witness statements. He also argued he could not be forced to pay for copies of discovery because he was indigent and could not be treated differently from wealthier defendants. Real party in interest filed a written opposition to petitioner’s March 4, 2015 request. It contended petitioner’s discovery requests were vague and/or overbroad and asserted petitioner could not evade paying for copies of postconviction discovery. On April 22, 2015, the court issued a minute order regarding petitioner’s March 4, 2015 request under section 1054.9. It flatly denied the request for postconviction discovery without explanation. Petitioner immediately appealed. "[P]etitioner, multiple attorneys involved in this case, and two courts have now spent a good amount of time attempting to decipher who may or may not have turned over what to whom, what might still need to be produced, and how production should occur. At oral argument . . . counsel for both petitioner and real party in interest agreed that the parties were able to agree upon a way to produce all relevant discovery at very low cost after [the Court of Appeal] appointed counsel for petitioner. Section 1054.9 appears to attempt to strike a balance between ensuring the availability of discovery materials to those inmates serving very long sentences while still conserving judicial and financial resources by requiring a good faith attempt to obtain the discovery materials from trial counsel before seeking judicial intervention and placing the burden of payment or reimbursement for discovery costs on the defendant. We suggest this balance would be struck better, and with significantly more convenience to courts and parties alike, if the Legislature provided for the right to counsel in preparation for filing a motion for postconviction discovery under section 1054.9." The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, directing the Superior Court to vacate its order denying postconviction discovery, and for the parties to reach an agreement on materials and costs. View "Davis v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

MediMarts, a nonprofit collective, paid the Marijuana Business Tax (MBT) for a year, then began submitting returns showing no money due. The City of San Jose sent notices and found that MediMarts owed $58,788.53 as of August 2012, plus future penalties and interest. MediMarts owed $215,111.17 as of November 2013. The city sued MediMarts and its president, Armstrong, for $767,058.60. Defendants filed a cross-complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, arguing that payment of the MBT would subject them to self-incrimination because it “forces [defendants] to admit to the sale or possession for sale of marijuana.” The tax also violated defendants’ due process rights by failing to provide for notice or a hearing before declaring MediMarts a nuisance and forcing it to cease operations. Armstrong was not afforded a hearing on his personal liability for the taxes. Finally, the cross-complaint alleged that the MBT “unjustly treats collectives and medical marijuana patients differently from other similarly situated individuals and organizations.” Applying the “collective entity rule,” the court determined that neither MediMarts nor Armstrong was entitled to assert the Fifth Amendment to resist the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. Neither assertion of Armstrong’s constitutional rights nor their accommodation would abate MediMarts’s duty to pay the tax. View "City of San Jose v. MediMarts, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the evidence showed defendant Mouris Ghipriel, who weighed 240 pounds, kept one of his employees, who weighed approximately 100 pounds, in a very small office and sexually assaulted her. He appealed his ultimate conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient evidence to show that he used additional force or menace required to establish felony false imprisonment. The Court of Appeal rejected Ghipriel's contention the record does not support his three felony false imprisonment convictions. The Court also rejected Ghipriel's contention the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the victim with respect to his attempt to digitally penetrate her. Accordingly, Ghipriel's convictions were affirmed. View "California v. Ghipriel" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old M.H. used his smartphone to surreptitiously record a fellow high school student, Matthew B., in a school bathroom stall while Matthew was either masturbating or jokingly pretending to do so. The video, taken inside the bathroom, but about 20 feet away from the bathroom stall, did not show Matthew's face, but did reveal his distinctive socks and shoes, which were visible in the gap between the stall wall and the floor. M.H. uploaded the 10-second video to Snapchat with the caption, "I think this dude is jacking off [sic]." M.H. intended the video to be funny and to get a laugh. But about two weeks later, Matthew took his own life, stating in a suicide note, "I can't handle school anymore and I have no friends." The San Diego County District Attorney's Office filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging M.H. engaged in an unauthorized invasion of privacy by means of a cell phone camera. The trial court found true the allegation that M.H. violated Penal Code section 647(j)(1). The trial court sentenced M.H. to probation on numerous conditions, including several restricting his use of social media. On appeal, M.H. argued: (1) no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he had the requisite specific intent "to invade Matthew's privacy" as required by section 647(j)(1); (2) (raised for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) incorporated by reference the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy, and assuming that to be true, he asserts there is a "newsworthy" defense that immunizes him from criminal liability in this case; and (3) (also for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) violated his First Amendment rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Snyder appealed his conviction on nine counts of child molestation and one count of possessing child pornography. He argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported one count of committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting into evidence nearly 100 images of child pornography confiscated from defendant’s residence. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first contention but disagreed with his second after a review of the trial court record. The Court accordingly reversed in part, and affirmed in part. View "California v. Snyder" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Adam Ranlet of two counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years by use of force,1 four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years, and one count of attempted lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years. The jury also found true the allegation the offenses were committed against two or more victims under the age of 14 years. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a term of 93 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his participation in a private online discussion group called "ptcruzers" (in which participants made thinly veiled references to sexual molestations of minors); (2) the trial court should have excluded evidence that defendant showed the victim a video tape depicting the rape of a 10- to 12-year-old girl as unduly prejudicial; (3) the jury was misinstructed that his participation in the "ptcruzer" online chat group was an uncharged crime; (4) that the Court of Appeal should review the sealed documents relating to Child Protective Services (CPS) records for the victim; and (5) the Court of Appeal should strike one of his 15-years-to-life terms imposed for his two convictions of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years by use of force against the same victim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the online discussion group evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to show defendant's intent to sexually molest the two victims in this case. Defendant's argument regarding admission of the video tape was not preserved for review. As to the instruction regarding the online discussion group, the Court concluded the trial court erred in stating to the jury that defendant's participation was an uncharged crime. However, the error was harmless. The Court reviewed the sealed record and determined the trial court did not err in ordering part of the CPS record to be disclosed to the parties. Finally, the Court struck one of the prison terms imposed for defendant's two convictions of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), against the same victim on the same occasion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Ranlet" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Fusting sought to have his second-degree felony burglary conviction reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. The trial court denied the petition because entry into a building with the intent to commit theft by false pretenses did not qualify as shoplifting. According to the change of plea form, Fusting entered a building with the intent to sell a stolen surf board. Fusting argued on appeal that the trial court's analysis of Penal Code sections 459.5 and 490a was flawed. He argues that the intent to commit larceny as used in section 459.5 should have been read consistently with the case law analyzing the same language in section 459. The State contended Fusting did not commit shoplifting when he entered the surf shop with the intent to commit theft by false pretenses because shoplifting required an intent to commit larceny. Also, the State argued section 490a was inapplicable because it did not redefine larceny as any theft. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded by these arguments. As such, the "intention to commit larceny" requirement of section 459.5 could be satisfied by the broader sense of an intent to commit theft. Thus, an intent to commit theft by false pretenses would satisfy that element. "Not only is this consistent with prior case law regarding the interpretation of the term 'larceny' as used in section 459, but it is also consistent with the voters' intent in passing Proposition 47." The order denying Fusting's petition to reduce his burglary conviction to shoplifting reversed, and the matter remanded with directions to grant the petition. View "California v. Fusting" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kristie Hamernik was a licensed vocational nurse employed at the Vista Cove Care Center in Corona. Defendant was suspended from work but returned to the facility purportedly to retrieve personal items. While at the facility, she entered the room of one of her former patients, Eiko Dorsch, who used a mechanism called a "CADD pain pump." After defendant visited Eiko, the medication in the pain pump was empty. Defendant was found guilty of attempted possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by finding that attempted possession of a controlled substance was a lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance; thereby substituting the attempted possession of a controlled substance for the drug possession charge after granting defendant's motion to dismiss the greater charge at the end of the People's case-in-chief; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting prior acts evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by substituting attempted possession of a controlled substance for the possession of a controlled substance. Moreover, the Court rejected that it could correct the error by ordering the trial court to amend the information or that such error was harmless. As such, the Court reversed defendant's conviction. View "California v. Hamernik" on Justia Law

The trial court denied the Proposition 47 petition for resentencing of defendant-appellant James Mutter. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred because the crime for which he sought resentencing (possession or receipt of counterfeit currency) was a misdemeanor after the passage of Proposition 47. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant's offense qualified as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded: if defendant was still serving his sentence, the trial court was mandated to resentence defendant to a misdemeanor unless it determined that resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public sentence. If defendant has completed his sentence, the Court directed the trial court to reduce defendant's felony conviction. View "California v. Mutter" on Justia Law

Defendant Joson Vang and his cousin, Ronnie Vang, broke into Keith Fessler's house to steal some property. Fessler was home at the time. When he came out of a back bedroom and confronted the burglars, they beat him, tied him up, and Ronnie executed him with two shots to the back of the head. After taking several items from the house and leaving with these items in Fessler's car, defendant and Ronnie came back and set fire to the house. Defendant and Ronnie were tried together before separate juries. Defendant's jury convicted him of first degree murder, first degree burglary, robbery, arson of an inhabited structure, and the unauthorized taking or driving of a vehicle. With respect to the murder, the jury found the crime was committed during the commission of both a burglary and a robbery. The jury also found a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murder, burglary, and robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive determinate term of nine years eight months. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the arson conviction because Fessler was dead when he and Ronnie set the fire; and (2) the trial court violated the "Aranda/Bruton" rule, and thereby violated defendant's right of cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment by admitting certain out-of-court statements Ronnie made to two individuals that implicated defendant in the charged crimes and defendant conceded were non-testimonial in nature. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant's arson of an inhabited structure conviction had to be modified to convict him of arson of a structure. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court rejected defendant's remaining claim his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of certain statements made by Ronnie because they were of a non-testimonial nature. View "Califronia v. Vang" on Justia Law