Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Smith appealed the denial of his Proposition 47 resentencing petition. Smith sought to have two felony second degree commercial burglary convictions (counts 1, 2) designated as misdemeanor shoplifting. As part of his petition, Smith declared as to both counts that “[t]he value of the check or property does not exceed $950.00.” The State responded by representing Smith “is entitled to resentencing” on count 2 and requesting a hearing to determine the new sentence. The State did not contest the value of the loss in count 1, but did request a hearing to determine eligibility because the “People do not believe count one is eligible as” the victim check exchange business “is not a commercial establishment,” which was a required element of shoplifting under new Penal code section 459.5. The superior court agreed the victim in count 1 was not a commercial establishment and denied relief, and also summarily denied Smith’s petition as to count 2 without explanation. Smith argued on appeal that the victim check exchange business was a commercial establishment and there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the court’s denial of his petition as to counts 1 and 2. The Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for resentencing and further proceedings. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Lamonte Jefferson stole an ink cartridge worth $24.99 from a Riverside Kmart store. While serving a 32-month sentence for commercial burglary, defendant petitioned the trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him as if he had been convicted of misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. The parties agreed that defendant’s commercial burglary conviction qualified as a misdemeanor shoplifting conviction. The parties also agreed that, had defendant’s petition been granted at the January 12, 2015, hearing on the petition, defendant would have been eligible for immediate release from prison. However, the court denied the petition on the ground defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to its unreasonable risk of dangerousness determination. He argued the prosecution was required to prove his dangerousness to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or, at the very least, based on clear and convincing evidence. He also claimed the court abused its discretion in finding he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under any standard of proof. After review, the Court of Appeal found no error or abuse of discretion, and affirmed. View "California v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, Casey Jones, Jr. appealed an order denying his petition to designate his conviction for burglary as misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. Jones also appealed the order denying his motion to strike the one-year prison prior enhancement imposed in this case on the basis of a conviction in a prior case which the superior court had previously designated a misdemeanor. Jones argued on appeal that the superior court erred by inadvertently denying his petition to designate the burglary conviction a misdemeanor and by denying his motion to strike the enhancement because the redesignated misdemeanor conviction could not have supported an enhancement had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of his offenses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court did not err in refusing to strike the prison prior enhancement. However, the Court concluded the superior court erred in summarily denying Jones’s petition to have his burglary conviction reclassified as misdemeanor shoplifting. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law

Martin Field was committed to a mental hospital after a jury found he was a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. Field appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to provide a certain pinpoint jury instruction; (2) the repeated use of the term "sexually violent predator" during trial violated his due process rights; (3) the court prejudicially erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the meaning of the word "likely"; (4) cumulative error required reversal; (5) the SVPA violated the equal protection, double jeopardy, due process, and ex post facto clauses of the federal constitution; and (6) his equal protection rights under the state and federal constitutions were violated when the court permitted the District Attorney to call Field as a witness over his objection. Regarding that last contention, Field argued that because a person found not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity (NGI) may not be compelled to testify at hearings to extend his or her commitment, neither should a person found to be an SVP be compelled to testify. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Field's equal protection claim involving testifying at trial may have had merit and remanded the matter to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. The Court rejected all of Field's other contentions. View "California v. Field" on Justia Law

Carreon, on bail and awaiting sentencing for two commercial burglaries, and her young son were staying in a converted garage unit of a residence leased by probationer Anderson. Officers arrived to conduct a probation search of the residence. The garage unit was accessible from inside the house through a laundry room and a closed, unlocked door. The probation officer who entered the garage unit to search it believed it was Carreon’s room and not the residence of Anderson, the female probationer he had come to search. In that room, he found a pay/owe sheet in a drawer and, in a purse, a plastic bag containing a crystalline powder that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. Carreon was charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) while released on bail (Pen. Code, 12022.1). After her suppression motion was denied, she entered a no contest plea; the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years. The court of appeal reversed. Anderson’s probation search condition, without more, did not authorize officers to look into a purse or drawers located in a separate living unit. View "People v. Carreon" on Justia Law

The trial court issued a permanent injunction in 2014 barring the union from conducting demonstrations inside stores owned by Walmart. The union argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the injunction because the matter was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, the high court established an analytical framework to determine San Diego Unions v. Garmon preemption issues, including the application of the local interest exception, in the context of a California trespass case. Sears indicates that at least with respect to trespass claims, the trespass issue may properly be seen as distinct from violations of federal labor law arising out of the same conduct, and therefore not preempted; the Sears analysis is premised on the idea that two different legal controversies may arise out of one set of facts or form of conduct; and Sears indicates peaceful trespass may be an issue deeply rooted in local feeling such that the local interest exception to preemption may apply. Determining that Sears governs this case, the court concluded that Walmart's trespass action is not preempted by the NLRA because the local interest exception applies. Here, the gravamen of Walmart’s claim in the trial court was that the union activities were unlawful because they were occurring inside Walmart stores. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Walmart v. UFCW" on Justia Law

Defendants Kiesha Smith and Michael Mitchell appealed their convictions for the murder of Josephine Kelley. Defendants were tried together before separate juries. Smith raised two contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing her jury that any testimony from an accomplice required corroborating evidence before the jury could accept it as true; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in discharging Juror No. 8 during the jury's deliberations. For his part, Mitchell raised a number of claims challenging the trial court's admission of certain evidence regarding statements Smith purportedly made to acquaintances that inculpated both Smith and Mitchell in Kelley's murder. The Court of Appeal reversed Smith's first degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in instructing about accomplice testimony, so the Court did not address the discharge of Juror 8. With regard to Mitchell's argument, the Court disagreed with Mitchell's contention that the admission of certain statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, but agreed that the statements should not have been admitted against him under California's rules of evidence. The Court further concluded that the admission of these statements was prejudicial to Mitchell under any standard of prejudice review, and that Mitchell's conviction had to therefore be reversed. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sergio Romo was charged with unlawfully importing controlled substances (i.e., heroin) into California from Mexico; unlawfully possessing controlled substances (i.e., heroin) for sale; unlawfully importing controlled substances (i.e., methamphetamine) into California from Mexico; and unlawfully possessing controlled substances (i.e., methamphetamine) for sale. A jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts and on enhancements. The court sentenced defendant to a total term of seven years. Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument when the prosecutor allegedly improperly reversed the presumption of innocence; (2) that the court prejudicially erred when it admitted hearsay evidence; (3) that the State's experts should not have been allowed to opine that defendant was not a "blind mule" when he crossed into the United States from Mexico; and (4) that defendant was entitled to seven additional days of presentence credits. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed defendant was entitled to seven additional days of presentence credit. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "California v. Romo" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kevin Bollaert of extortion (counts 3, 16, 18, 21, 27, 29) and the unlawful use of personal identifying information ( counts 2, 4-15, 17, 19, 20, 22-24, 26, 28), stemming from his operation of Web sites, "UGotPosted.com," through which users posted private, intimate photographs of others along with that person's name, location and social media profile links, and "ChangeMyReputation.com," through which victims could pay to have the information removed. As to some of the victims, the jury unanimously found that Bollaert committed the unlawful act of an invasion of privacy by disclosure of private facts. The trial court declared a mistrial as to one of the identity theft charges (count 25) and a conspiracy charge (count 1). It sentenced Bollaert to a split sentence of 18 years: eight years of local confinement followed by 10 years of mandatory supervision. On appeal, Bollaert argued his convictions under Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) had to be reversed for insufficient evidence because: (1) he was immunized from liability under section 530.5, subdivision (f) as an "interactive computer service" or "access software provider" within the meaning of the Communications Decency Act (CDA); (2) he did not take action to develop or create the content of his Web site, and therefore was not liable as an "information content provider" as defined by the CDA; and (3) he did not willfully obtain the personal identifying information for an unlawful purpose. Bollaert further contended the evidence was insufficient to support his extortion convictions because he did not directly or implicitly threaten any of the victims to expose any secret; the alleged secrets (photographs) were already in the public domain; and he merely engaged in a business practice whereby legally posted information could be removed. Further, Bollaert argued the trial court erred by giving the jury instructions on civil liability regarding intrusion into private affairs and public disclosure of private facts. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Bollaert" on Justia Law

A petition was filed with the juvenile court alleging that George F. committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14, and that George willfully annoyed and molested a child under the age of 18. The State offered to dismiss count 1 if George admitted to count 2. George admitted to count 2 and the juvenile court found a factual basis for that admission. The court then granted the State's motion to dismiss count 1, declared George a ward of the court, and ordered him to juvenile probation on various terms and conditions. George appealed, contending that the conditions of his probation restricting his use of electronics or requiring the submission of those electronics to search were invalid under "California v. Lent (15 Cal.3d 481 (1971)) and (2) unconstitutionally overbroad. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re George F." on Justia Law