Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Paul Brodeur is a well-known author in the environmental field, pointing out health dangers of the use of various electrical devices and other household items. Defendants are producers and distributors of the motion picture American Hustle. A character in the film, Rosalyn, says that she read, in a magazine article by plaintiff, that a microwave oven takes all of the nutrition out of food. Based on Rosalyn's statement, plaintiff filed suit alleging causes of action for libel, defamation, slander and false light, asserting that he had never made the quoted statement. Plaintiff further alleged that, by misquoting him, defendants suggested to the movie audience that he made a scientifically unsupportable statement, damaging his reputation. The court held that plaintiff‘s causes of action arise from defendants‘ protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code Civ. Proc. 425.16, subd.(b)(1), where plaintiff, by his own account, is a public figure, and the views expressed in his pioneering articles on the health hazards associated with exposure to microwave radiation were plainly a matter of public interest in the 1970‘s. Further, plaintiff's claims that the government safety standard for microwave ovens was inadequate have been rejected by numerous authorities. The court also concluded that plaintiff has failed to produce admissible evidence that, as his unverified complaint alleges, he has never written an article or ever declared in any way that a microwave takes all the nutrition out of food. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying the motion to strike. View "Brodeur v. Atlas Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Arlon Buchanan of possession of heroin for sale (count 1), transportation of heroin for sale (count 2), possession of methamphetamine for sale (count 3), transportation of methamphetamine for sale (count 4), possession of a firearm by a felon (count 5), and possession of ammunition by a felon (count 6). The jury also found true the allegations defendant was armed during the commission of the four narcotics-related offenses (counts 1, 3, 4), had a prior strike conviction, and had served four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 32 years and 8 months in state prison. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erroneously excluded from the evidence a signed statement by a person who claimed to own some of the drugs and drug paraphernalia, and the handgun that were found; (2) defendant's convictions for possession and transportation of heroin should have been reversed because the police violated his rights under "California v. Trombetta" by destroying exculpatory evidence when they mixed together the similar-looking contents of two bindles before detecting heroin in the combined mass; (3) the mixture of the contents of the two bindles rendered the evidence of his possession and transportation of heroin insufficient; (4) Penal Code section 654 precluded multiple punishments for his simultaneous transportation of methamphetamine and heroin for sale; (5) Penal Code section 654 also prevented multiple punishments for his possession of a firearm as a felon and being armed in the commission of the narcotics offenses; and (6) multiple sentence enhancements were precluded under section 654 for being armed in the simultaneous commission of the four narcotics-related offenses. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a hearsay statement from the owner of the vehicle where the contraband were found because the defense did not demonstrate due diligence in attempting to secure the testimony of the proposed witness. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the mixed substance that tested positive for heroin. The police did not destroy the evidence by combining the similar-looking contents of the two bindles nor did they discard any of the packaging materials from which they originated. The Court rejected defendant's insufficiency of the evidence argument because it was undisputed that what the police found in defendant's possession was heroin. The Court also rejected defendant's contention the trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for defendant's methamphetamine and heroin-related offenses. The Court accepted the State's concession that section 654 applied to stay one of defendant's separate sentences for possession and transportation of heroin for sale, and also applied to stay one of defendant's sentences for possession and transportation of methamphetamine for sale. Finally, the Court concluded section 654 barred separate punishments for defendant's possession of a single firearm on a single occasion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's convictions but reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Branden Johnson sought to recall his sentence for felony receiving stolen property, and to be resentenced for a misdemeanor under that part of the Penal Code enacted as part of Proposition 47. The superior court denied Johnson's petition, and Johnson appealed. Johnson argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he, not the State, had the burden of establishing he was eligible for Prop. 47 relief. After review of the superior court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Johnson's contention and affirmed the denial. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Marcia Tate appealed an order revoking probation and imposing a seven-year prison term. Tate contended that the trial court erred in awarding her zero days of Penal Code section 4019 conduct credits, by concluding she had waived all conduct credits, including future credits, by virtue of an agreement in which Tate admitted violating parole and agreeing to waive her credits in exchange for reinstatement of probation. The State argued that Tate's waiver included a waiver of future section 4019 credits that she might otherwise have earned. After its review of the record, the Court of Appeal found that Tate agreed to waive past conduct credits under section 4019. The Court therefore reversed the award of zero days of section 4019 conduct credits in the order revoking probation and imposing the seven-year prison term, and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of determining Tate's eligibility for conduct credits under section 4019 for the time period after she waived section 4019 credits at a October 18, 2013 hearing. View "California v. Tate" on Justia Law

In May 2015, defendant- appellant Marc Endsley, then-committed to Patton State Hospital, petitioned for conditional release to an outpatient program pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. The trial court summarily denied his petition without stating its reasons for doing so. Endsley appealed, arguing 1026.2 entitled him to a hearing. The State acknowledged a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a petition for conditional release, but contend Endsley’s petition was “deficient on its face” pursuant to section 1026.2, subdivision (l) because it “failed to include the requisite recommendation by the state hospital director.” Endsley countered that section 1026.2, subdivision (l) required the court, not the defendant, to obtain the medical director’s recommendation in advance of the hearing. The Court of Appeal agreed with Endsley: "Once a defendant initiates a petition for conditional release, section 1026.2, subdivision (l) requires the court to obtain a recommendation regarding the appropriateness of conditional release from the person in charge of the defendant’s treatment." The Court reversed the trial court's order summarily denying the petition for a hearing, and remanded for the trial court to request a recommendation from Patton’s medical director in advance of the hearing. View "California v. Endsley" on Justia Law

Ochoa was the middleman in a drug ring supplying methamphetamine for the Nuestra Familia criminal street gang. In 2008, he and his suppliers were charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The defendants included no known members of Nuestra Familia; the complaint charged no gang-related offenses or enhancements. After defendant pleaded no contest to conspiracy and possession charges, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 10 years in prison. One month later, Ochoa and 28 others were indicted for active participation in Nuestra Familia. Ochoa was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine for the benefit of Nuestra Familia. Ochoa unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, citing the bar against multiple prosecutions, Penal Code section 654, and double jeopardy grounds. Ochoa then pleaded no contest to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine for the benefit of a criminal street gang, reserving the right to appeal. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the prosecution was aware that the same course of conduct formed a significant part of the offenses charged in the 2008 complaint. The court did not reach the claim of double jeopardy. View "People v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

Appellant Eddie Dunley appealed a judgment extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contended that because persons subject to civil commitment after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) had a statutory right not to be compelled to testify in proceedings to extend their commitments, so should a person facing commitment as an MDO. The Court of Appeal held that MDO’s, sexually violent predators, and NGI’s are all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege provided for in section 1026.5(b)(7). However, this appeal was moot because a subsequent petition for recommitment was denied by the trial court on or about March 7, 2016, based on the court’s finding that appellant no longer met the criteria for commitment as an MDO. View "California v. Dunley" on Justia Law

An information alleged that in 2014, defendant Charles Brown committed two counts of resisting or attempting by threats and violence to deter an executive officer from performing a lawful duty. It also alleged that defendant had served two prior prison terms, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). A jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor resisting arrest as to count one and returned an arguably ambiguous guilty verdict as to count 2. The prior prison term allegations were found true in a separate bench trial. The court imposed the upper term of three years as to count 2, a consecutive one-year term as to count 1, and a consecutive one-year term for the prior prison term enhancement. This term was to be served in county jail prison consecutive to the term defendant was already serving. Defendant appealed, arguing that the ambiguous jury verdict form mandated reversal of his conviction on count 2, and resentencing solely on his misdemeanor resisting a peace officer conviction. In the alternative, he contended that the full term consecutive sentence imposed for the misdemeanor count was not authorized by law. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed both the felony conviction and the sentence. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Adrian Montgomery appealed a postjudgment order denying his application to have a felony conviction for cocaine possession redesignated under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (f), the portion of Proposition 47 that permitted a person who completed a sentence for a felony conviction to have it changed to a misdemeanor. Montgomery pleaded guilty to the drug charge in 1989; at the same time, he was convicted on a separate charge (in another case) of attempted murder. The trial court denied his application for redesignation of his cocaine conviction under Proposition 47 because the attempted murder conviction was a "prior conviction," rendering Montgomery ineligible for redesigation. Montgomery argued that his attempted murder conviction was a contemporaneous conviction, not a prior one, and therefore was not a disqualifying conviction. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court: "prior conviction," as used in the statute was ambiguous, and based on its review of Proposition 47 as it was presented to voters in 2014, the Court concluded California voters did not intend people convicted of violent crimes to benefit from the new law, regardless of when they were convicted of disqualifying crimes. View "California v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerad Potts was convicted by jury of, inter alia, escape from his home detention program. He was sentenced to an eight-month term on the escape conviction as part of an aggregate term of four years eight months, which included a sentence on another case. On appeal, defendant challenged the escape conviction, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that his escape conviction required the willful failure to return to his place of confinement no later than the period he was authorized to be away. The Court of Appeal concluded that any instructional error was harmless. View "California v. Potts" on Justia Law