Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Omar Mariscal was charged with five counts of raping his daughter when she was 15 years old and three counts of committing lewd and lascivious conduct against her when she was 10 years old. The last paragraph of the information, alleged defendant inflicted great bodily injury upon a person "within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(6)." At the preliminary hearing and at trial, the prosecution presented testimony that the victim had become pregnant and given birth to a child as a result of one of the rape offenses. At trial, the jury heard evidence the victim suffered extreme pain while giving birth. At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that if it found defendant guilty of one of the rape charges, had to decide whether it was also true defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in committing the crime. The court instructed the jury that committing rape does not by itself constitute inflicting great bodily injury and great bodily injury “may or may not be established by pregnancy.” The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found he did personally inflict great bodily injury on the victim in committing a rape offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life in state prison on count 1 under the version of the “One Strike” law that took effect in 2010, after the offenses occurred. The court also imposed consecutive upper term sentences of eight years for the other four rape counts (counts 2-5) and consecutive two-year terms (one-third the midterm) for each of the lewd conduct counts (counts 6-8). Defendant’s total prison term was a determinate term of 38 years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant challenged the sentence on count 1. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err by sentencing defendant under the One Strike law, but defendant had to be resentenced on count 1 to a term of 15 years to life. View "California v. Mariscal" on Justia Law

Lupe Garcia, an employee of Gerawan, requested the Board‘s permission to attend and peaceably observe the mandatory mediation and conciliation (MMC) process that had been ordered between Gerawan and United Farm Workers (UFW). The Board rejected Garcia‘s request and proceeded to issue a broad policy decision that members of the public have no right to attend MMC proceedings. Gerawan filed a declaratory relief action in the trial court, seeking a judicial declaration that the Board‘s ruling violated a right of public access protected under both the federal and state Constitutions. Garcia intervened in the same action and filed a similar pleading in the form of a complaint-in-intervention. The trial court agreed with the Board and sustained its demurrers without leave to amend. The court held, as to Labor Code section 1164.9, that its absolute preclusion of superior court jurisdiction, even in exceptional circumstances where (as with Garcia) the sole statutory mechanism for judicial review was unavailable and constitutional rights were assertedly at stake, impermissibly divested the superior court of its original jurisdiction without an adequate constitutional foundation for doing so. Therefore, the court concluded that section 1164.9 is unconstitutional, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2003, defendant Tony Johnston entered guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a firearm (case No. F2763), and to first degree burglary, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, and arson of a vehicle (case No. F2825). The trial court sentenced him to state prison for over six years in the two matters. In 2011, defendant entered guilty pleas to possessing methamphetamine and receiving stolen property (case No. 11F5155). The trial court sentenced him to a two-year state prison term. In May 2015, defendant filed a petition in propria persona to reduce these felony convictions to misdemeanors (as well as a 1999 receiving stolen property conviction not pertinent to this appeal). He asked the trial court to “broadly and liberally” construe Penal Code section 1170.18 to apply to all of these offenses, even if they did not all “fi[t] squarely into [the] mold set forth in this act.” The prosecution opposed reduction of the 2003 convictions because they were not eligible offenses. It did not object to reduction of the 2011 methamphetamine conviction, but stated the value of the property at issue in the other 2011 conviction was a vehicle worth more than $950. The trial court denied relief for the facially ineligible offenses, reduced the methamphetamine conviction to a misdemeanor, and after holding a hearing (at which defendant appeared through counsel) denied relief on the other 2011 conviction because it involved property valued at more than $950. Defendant appealed the adverse rulings. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Johnston" on Justia Law

The amended information in this matter charged defendant Travis Brown with one count each of murder (count one) and active participation in a criminal street gang (count two). It alleged the murder was for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang, and further alleged a special circumstance allegation that the victim was “intentionally killed” while defendant was an active gang member and that the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang. There were also firearm charges: one that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death; personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder; and vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The defense was that defendant was not the shooter. The person defendant contends was the shooter, Kevin Martinez, was the only witness to say defendant was the shooter. Martinez, who was interrogated by the police about the shooting, pled guilty to a lesser crime in exchange for a six-year sentence and his agreement to testify against defendant, after following a police officer’s lead to say he was not the shooter and did not know there was going to be a shooting. There was evidence the shooter was left-handed, Martinez was left-handed, defendant was right-handed, and Martinez matched the general description of the shooter. Defendant was prosecuted for first degree murder under three different theories: he was the actual killer (shooter); he aided and abetted the murder with the intent to kill; and he was liable under the natural and probable consequence theory of aider and abetter liability. Late in the day following deliberations, the jury informed the bailiff it had a verdict, but would prefer to return to court the next day to render its verdict. The bailiff retrieved the verdict forms for the court to review and the matter was continued to the next day. The court reviewed the verdict forms and saw the signed and dated not guilty verdict form on the murder count had “withdrawl [sic]” and “void” written across it in large letters. The court did not notify counsel of the irregularity. The court asked that the jury re-complete the form and sign it. The next day, with the forms properly complete, the jury found defendant guilty for first degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang, and found all the special allegations true, including that defendant both personally discharged and vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Only after the jury had been excused did the court explain what had occurred the day before regarding the prior not guilty form. Defendant appealed the conviction and sentences he received. Under the totality of the circumstances the Court of Appeal found in this record, it concluded that a number of factors here, "besides being confounding," resulted in prejudice to defendant in this close case. The conviction on count one (first degree murder) and its attendant special allegations were reversed and the matter was remanded. The judgment on count two was affirmed. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant John Fruits guilty of elder abuse (count one), assault with a deadly weapon (count two), making criminal threats (count three), exhibiting a deadly weapon (count four), and attempting to dissuade a victim or witness (count five). The trial court also found true enhancements for defendant having served a prior prison term, and that defendant committed count one while on bail or while released on his own recognizance in connection with other cases. Combined with three other cases, defendant was ultimately sentenced to an aggregate term of 8 years 4 months. On appeal, in connection with count three, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony concerning alleged prior threats against his mother to prove the less specific current threats charged in this case. He also argued that the trial court made a series of errors in imposing restitution and parole revocation fines. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of prior threats and other misconduct. Defendant asserted that the trial court misunderstood how he planned to deal with the evidence of prior threats in trial and based its Evidence Code section 352 balancing analysis on this erroneous understanding. The Court concluded that defendant forfeited any claim related to the trial court’s balancing analysis, because defendant did not inform the court how the defense planned to handle the prior threat evidence so that the court could factor that into the Evidence Code section 352 analysis. In the unpublished portion of this case, the Court concluded that defendant forfeited a number of his contentions with regard to restitution and parole revocation fines. However, the Court agreed that the trial court erred in imposing a restitution fine and parole revocation fine related to a stayed sentence. Finally, the Court concluded the trial court erred in failing to impose sentences on two felony counts, and then stay execution of those sentences. The Court modified the judgment to: (1) decrease the restitution fine and parole revocation fine; (2) impose a sentence of four years plus a one-year enhancement on count two and stay execution of that sentence; and (3) impose and stay execution of a sentence of one year on count four. As so modified, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Fruits" on Justia Law

Phillips & Cohen, a law firm, issued a celebratory press release following the verdict in false claims act litigation in which the jury found J-M had knowingly misrepresented to Phillips & Cohen’s governmental clients that its PVC pipe had been manufactured and tested in a manner that assured it had the strength and durability required by applicable industry standards. J-M filed suit against the law firm for defamation and trade libel. The trial court denied Phillips & Cohen’s special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), finding it was a question of fact for the jury whether the press release was privileged as a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 47, subdivision (d). The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the special motion to strike where J-M failed to establish a likelihood it would prevail on the merits of its defamation and trade libel claims. In this case, Phillips & Cohen's description of the evidence at trial and the jury’s special verdict in the press release falls comfortably within the permissible degree of flexibility and literary license afforded communications to the media concerning judicial proceedings. The court found the substance of its report was accurate and the release was privileged under section 47, subdivision (d). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "J-M Manufacturing Co. v. Phillips & Cohen" on Justia Law

John Valdez appealed an order denying his petition for recall of his indeterminate life sentence and resentencing in accordance with the Three Strikes Reform Act. Although the trial court determined appellant was eligible for resentencing, it denied his petition based on a discretionary determination that “resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Appellant argued the court erred because: (1) Proposition 36 established a presumption in favor of resentencing eligible inmates, and authorized denial of a resentencing petition on the basis of dangerousness only in extraordinary circumstances; (2) the definition of what constituted “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was adopted by the electorate in the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) must also be applied to resentencing petitions filed pursuant to Proposition 36; (3) if the Proposition 47 definition was not applied, then the “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” standard used in Proposition 36 must be deemed void for vagueness. Appellant also contends he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his dangerousness and that the factual findings underlying the court’s determination he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety were unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant’s contention that the more specific definition of “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” contained in Proposition 47 was the appropriate standard to apply to resentencing petitions under Proposition 36. Having concluded the appropriate standard for assessing appellant’s dangerousness the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to reconsider the issue in accordance with that standard. "[A]n inmate has no constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the sentence properly imposed upon him in accordance with the law should be reduced. Because that is the remedy offered by section 1170.126, appellant had no right to a jury determination of any factual issue, and no right to have adverse factual finding subjected to proof beyond a reasonable doubt." View "California v. Valdez" on Justia Law

John F. Stephens and Razmik B. Ekmekdjian appealed an order denying a motion to strike two causes of action in a second amended complaint for damages filed by Yasser and Daria Abuemeira. The Abuemeiras filed suit after Stephens and Ekmekdjian videotaped and distributed a video-recording of the parties to news agencies and various members of the public. The video-recording was taken while the parties were engaged in a road-side brawl. Stephens and Ekmekdjian responded with a motion to strike, challenging two causes of action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court concluded that the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion because Stephens's conduct did not involve an act in furtherance of his constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Moreover, Stephens did not present any evidence to establish that the Abuemeiras were anyone other than "private, anonymous" parties or that the dispute was anything other than a private controversy. The court also concluded that the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, does not protect Stephens because he has not established that the speech recipients are connected with the litigation or that his communications achieve any objective of the litigation. Also, Stephens's communications to the general public through the Internet and the media are not protected by the litigation privilege. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Abuemeira v. Stephens" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether an appellate court was required to independently review an appellate record for the existence of meritorious issues in a matter where the superior court extended the civil commitment of an individual previously found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), when the individual's appointed counsel informed the court he or she has found no arguable issues on appeal, the client has been notified of that fact, and was given the chance to file a brief, but did not raise any issues for appeal. Defendant-Appellant Jose Martinez was found NGI; his appointed appellate counsel found no arguable issues, and Martinez did not file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. Counsel raised the issue of due process, and contended that the Court of Appeal had an obligation to review the appellate record as was the rule in first criminal appeals of right. California courts have found no such obligation on an appeal from the establishment of a conservatorship after the denial of a petition for outpatient treatment of an NGI or of an order committing an individual as a mentally disordered offender. The Court of Appeal held that due process did not require an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the appellate record for possible issues in an appeal from an extension of an NGI's civil commitment. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant Dawson McGehee stabbed his mother ten times in the neck, chest, and abdomen with a kitchen knife; eight of the stab wounds were independently fatal. By all accounts, defendant was mentally disturbed when he did so. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, during the commission of which he personally used a deadly weapon, and further found he was legally sane when he committed the crime. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive determinate term of one year for the use of a deadly weapon, and imposed other orders. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed and rejected defendant's claims that: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury, during the guilt phase of the trial, with CALCRIM No. 362 on consciousness of guilt along with CALCRIM No. 3428 on the limited use of evidence of mental impairment; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant's remaining contentions that the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by excluding certain out-of-court statements defendant made (e.g., that demons were coming after him), and admitting other out-of-court statements establishing the same, but limited the jury's consideration of these statements to circumstantially prove defendant's state of mind, rather than allowing the jury to consider the statements to prove the truth of the matters asserted. The therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. McGehee" on Justia Law