Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, nine students who were attending California public schools filed suit against the State and several state officials, seeking a court order declaring various provisions of California’s Education Code unconstitutional. Plaintiffs alleged that the provisions, which govern how K-12 public school teachers obtain tenure, how they are dismissed, and how they are laid off on the basis of seniority, violate the California Constitution’s guarantee that all citizens enjoy the “equal protection of the laws.” The trial court declared five sections of the Education Code unconstitutional and void. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish that the challenged statutes violate equal protection, primarily because they did not show that the statutes inevitably cause a certain group of students to receive an education inferior to the education received by other students. Although the statutes may lead to the hiring and retention of more ineffective teachers than a hypothetical alternative system would, the statutes do not address the assignment of teachers; instead, administrators - not the statutes - ultimately determine where teachers within a district are assigned to teach. Critically, plaintiffs failed to show that the statutes themselves make any certain group of students more likely to be taught by ineffective teachers than any other group of students. Because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the statutes violate equal protection on their face, the court reversed the judgment. View "Vergara v. State of California" on Justia Law

In 2013 and 2014, minor Y.A. had two petitions filed against her alleging offenses for unrelated incidents. For each petition, she was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation. Y.A. satisfactorily completed the terms of probation for only the offense alleged in the later-filed petition, which was then dismissed and all records pertaining to it sealed. Records relating to the prior petition were not sealed. The issue in this appeal was whether, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court could seal the records pertaining to a prior petition against a minor when the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not. View "In re Y.A.." on Justia Law

In 2015, a felony complaint was filed in Nevada County Superior Court to charge petitioners with one count of possession of cash money in excess of $100,000 for unlawful purchase or sale of marijuana. The face of the complaint was stamped: “Assigned to Judge Robert L. Tamietti For All Purposes.” The court’s docket indicates it calendared the matter for arraignment before Judge Tamietti in “Dept A – Main Courtroom” of the Truckee branch of the Nevada County Superior Court. The district attorney sent petitioners a notice to appear informing them a complaint had been filed and instructing them to appear in court. However, the notice to appear did not include a copy of the complaint. At a hearing in August, defense attorney Ravn Whitington appeared on behalf of petitioners. Petitioners, who lived in Georgia, did not personally appear because they had filed waivers of personal appearance. At the continued hearing one month later, Whitington still had not received a copy of the complaint. Whitington had received a copy of the complaint produced through discovery. That copy was not file-endorsed nor did it bear a stamp indicating that the case had been assigned to Judge Tamietti for app purposes. This constituted the first notice the defense received regarding assignment of the case. Whitington and Ward filed peremptory challenges on behalf of petitioners to disqualify Judge Tamietti under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The trial court filed an order denying the peremptory challenges as untimely on grounds that more than 30 days had elapsed since the initial appearance in a court with only one judge. The question in this case concerned whether the one-judge-court deadline under section 170.6 had become irrelevant because there were no longer any counties with only one superior court judge, or whether the one-judge-court deadline should be adapted to apply to branches of superior courts for which there is only one assigned judge. The Court of Appeal concluded a branch of the superior court with only one assigned judge was not a court for which a single judge was authorized for purposes of the one-judge court deadline under section 170.6. Petitioners’ challenges were timely because they complied with the deadline imposed by section 170.6 that provides 10 days to file a peremptory challenge after receiving notice of an all-purpose assignment. The Court issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the challenges to disqualify Judge Tamietti and to accept the challenges. View "Jones v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted petitioner Jesus Lopez of one count of first degree murder and one count of street terrorism. As to count 1, the jury found true a vicarious firearm use enhancement and a criminal street gang enhancement. Petitioner was 17 years old at the time of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 50 years to life in prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a prior opinion. Petitioner then applied for habeas relief, seeking to challenge the sentence of 50 years to life. He sought relief based on two claims: (1) under "California v. Chiu," (59 Cal.4th 155 (2014)), his first degree murder conviction should have been vacated because it was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine; and (2) his 50-year-to-life sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). As a remedy for the first claim, Petitioner asked for relief from the first degree murder conviction with the prosecution given the choice of accepting a reduction to second degree murder or retrying the murder charge. As a remedy for the second claim, Petitioner asked for an order resentencing him with respect to "Miller." After review, the Court of Appeal held that "Chiu" was retroactive to convictions, such as Petitioner’s, that were final on appeal when Chiu was decided. The Court also concluded Petitioner was entitled to relief because the record reflected his conviction for first degree murder was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine impermissible under Chiu. The Court therefore granted relief and vacated Petitioner’s conviction for first degree murder. On remand, the State could accept a reduction of the conviction to second degree murder or elect to retry the greater offense. In light of the Court's decision on Petitioner’s first claim, Petitioner’s second claim was moot or not yet ripe for adjudication. View "In re Lopez" on Justia Law

The principal of a Pleasanton high school observed that P.O., who was then 17 years old, appeared to be under the influence of drugs. P.O. admitted to using hashish oil earlier that morning, and a search revealed 11 tablets of Xanax in his pockets. The juvenile court order declared P.O. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of public intoxication. A condition of his probation required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” The court of appeal modified the condition and struck two other conditions. While electronic search condition is reasonably related to future criminality, the condition was overbroad. Another condition, requiring him to “be of good behavior and perform well” at school or work and another requiring him to “be of good citizenship and good conduct” are unconstitutionally vague. View "In re P.O." on Justia Law

USC found that John Doe violated USC's student conduct code as a result of his participation in a group sexual encounter at a fraternity party. Another student (Jane) alleged that she had been sexually assaulted by a group of men at the party. She reported that her sexual contact with John was consensual, but certain contact with the other men was not. USC's office of Student Judicial Affairs and Community Standards (SJACS) found that John violated nine sections of the student conduct code, including the section prohibiting sexual assault. The Appeals Panel found that there was insufficient evidence of any sexual assault, but held that John violated two sections of the student conduct code. John petitioned for a writ of mandate. The trial court rejected John's fair hearing challenge and held that there was substantial evidence to support the Appeals Panel's finding that John violated Student Conduct Code section 11.44C by encouraging and permitting the other students' behavior, but that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that John violated section 11.32 by endangering Jane. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that John was denied a fair hearing because USC failed to provide John fair notice of the allegations that resulted in suspension, or an adequate hearing on those allegations. The court also concluded that the evidence does not support the Appeals Panel's findings as to either Student Conduct Code violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Univ. of Southern California" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Eagle appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for transporting methamphetamine. He contended that if the transportation was not for sale, his felony conviction for transportation should have been reduced to a misdemeanor conviction for the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine. The State conceded that defendant was entitled to the benefits of the amendments to Health and Safety Code section 11379, but disagreed as to the remedy. Instead, the State argued the matter should have been remanded to allow defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea and the State should be allowed to proceed on the original charges. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "California v. Eagle" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis, plaintiff filed suit against DHE alleging claims for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. For several years, plaintiff’s supervisors scheduled him so that he could be home at night for his son’s dialysis. That schedule accommodation changed when a new supervisor took over. The court concluded that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment and denial of plaintiff's motion to tax costs. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

Defendant Santiago Sanchez was convicted by jury of four sex offenses: one count of sexual penetration, one count of attempted sexual intercourse, and two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct. These acts were committed against an eight-year-old girl, D.C. He was convicted of two additional sex offenses: two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct, committed against D.C.'s ten-year-old sister, M.C. The jury also found defendant committed lewd or lascivious acts against more than one victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 65 years to life in state prison and imposed other orders. Defendant appealed. After reviewing his arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded the matter for resentencing. The Court found that while there was no direct evidence of the specific act of sexual penetration defendant was convicted of committing, other than his confession during interrogation, the circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence purportedly relevant to impeach S.S. or by allowing the challenged CSAAS testimony. Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is forfeited by his failure to object and request a curative instruction. Nor did defense counsel's failure to so object amount to constitutionally deficient performance. Defendant's assertion of cumulative prejudice also failed. With regard to resentencing, the Court concluded that the trial court's imposition of three consecutive life terms was not unauthorized, and therefore defense counsel's failure to object to this sentence below arguably forfeit the issue on appeal. However, "it is apparent from the record that the trial court believed it was required to impose full, separate, and consecutive terms pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d), and rule 4.426 of the California Rules of Court that were not applicable to this case. Assuming the issue is forfeited, we conclude defense counsel's failure to object and correct the trial court's misunderstanding amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel." View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law