Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant David Root petitioned for relief under Proposition 47. His burglary convictions involved incidents in which Root entered banks, during regular business hours, for the purpose of cashing forged checks in amounts less than $950. Although the precise issue in dispute had been challenged, the question presented to the Court of Appeal was whether entry into a bank to commit theft by false pretenses in amounts under $950 qualified as "shoplifting" under newly enacted section 459.5. The Court concluded that proper application of statutes and case law compelled the Court to conclude such crimes fit within the shoplifting offense, as then defined, and therefore Root's petition for relief had to be granted. View "California v. Root" on Justia Law

Foy was convicted of seven counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (former section 12021(a)(1)). Foy was sentenced under the three strikes law to 120 years-to-life in state prison. The court of appeal reversed, finding that Foy‘s Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights were violated by the trial court‘s admission of a witness‘s videotaped conditional examination testimony without a showing of unavailability. View "People v. Foy" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant Phillip Pernell entered a bank in Moreno Valley and attempted to cash a check for $587.64. The check was made out to defendant and was drawn on the account of Innovative Design Concepts. Defendant was charged with second degree burglary and check forgery. The information also alleged a prison prior and a strike prior. Defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior allegations. The trial court sentenced him to three years eight months in state prison. Then in 2014, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Over the People's objection on the ground that defendant was not eligible for resentencing, the trial court granted the petition, resentenced defendant for a misdemeanor violation of section 459.5, and gave him credit for time served. The State appealed the trial court's order, arguing defendant failed to meet his burden of proving eligibility for resentencing, and the trial court erred in granting defendant's petition because he remained guilty of second degree burglary, not misdemeanor shoplifting. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Bias" on Justia Law

Defendant drove away from a gathering at which he and his passengers had been drinking. A passenger testified that after visiting a liquor store, defendant began to “drive crazy,” ultimately causing the vehicle to flip. Three passengers fled the scene. Two others were injured, one with a brain injury. Defendant was taken to Santa Clara Medical Center where he was arrested. A blood sample was drawn, while defendant was unconscious, disclosing a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent. Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, causing injury; felony driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent, causing injury; and misdemeanor driving without a license. Several enhancements were charged because of the passengers' bodily injuries. The court denied a motion to suppress, finding that blood extraction was permissible, without a warrant or a showing of exigent circumstances, under California’s “implied consent” law, which declares that one who drives a motor vehicle is “deemed” to consent to blood alcohol testing. The court of appeal affirmed. While the consent imputed to drivers under that law cannot alone justify a seizure without a duly issued warrant, the officer reasonably relied on the statute, bringing the case within the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. View "People v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County under Government Code section 12940, alleging disability discrimination based on the County’s removing him from his job as bailiff and placing him on an unpaid leave of absence because of its incorrect assessment that he could not safely perform his duties as a bailiff even with reasonable accommodation. Principally at issue on appeal is how to instruct a jury on the employer’s intent to discriminate against a disabled employee and, more specifically, what role “animus” plays in defining that intent. The court concluded that the instruction and special verdict form in this case contained error. Under Harris v. City of Santa Monica, plaintiff could prove the requisite discriminatory intent by showing his actual or perceived disability was a “substantial motivating factor/reason” for the County’s decision to place him on a leave of absence. The Legislature decided that the financial consequences of an employer’s mistaken belief that an employee is unable to safely perform a job’s essential functions should be borne by the employer, not the employee, even if the employer’s mistake was reasonable and made in good faith. The court further concluded that the instructional error was prejudicial and remanded plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim for a limited retrial. View "Wallace v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

In 1993, Kristopher Kirchner, age 16 at the time, and Damien Miller, age 15, executed a plan to rob a gun store in Vista owned by Ross Elvey. Once inside the store, Kirchner repeatedly hit 59-year-old Elvey in the head with a metal pipe causing severe trauma that ultimately resulted in Elvey's death after languishing in a coma for 40 days. Kirchner was initially charged in juvenile court, however, the court found Kirchner unfit to be prosecuted as a juvenile and he was charged as an adult. Kirchner was found guilty of one count of first degree murder, and remanded to the California Youth Authority (CYA). CYA concluded there was a reasonable probability that Kirchner's likelihood to commit further crimes could be reduced or eliminated within the available confinement time if sentenced as a juvenile. The trial court declined to follow the recommendation of the CYA and sentenced Kirchner to LWOP on the murder conviction, plus one year consecutive for the weapon enhancement. Kirchner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in October 2014 contending that under "Miller v. Alabama" and "California v. Gutierrez," his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The district attorney's return argued Miller and Gutierrez could not be applied retroactively and Kirchner was, therefore, barred from collaterally attacking his sentence. The court granted the request to file a supplemental return. Kirchner filed a supplemental denial. In 2015, the superior court granted Kirchner's petition. The district attorney appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the trial court correctly concluded the holdings of Miller and Gutierrez applied retroactively in state collateral proceedings such as the one presented here and that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution required that when inmates, such as Kirchner, were serving life terms for crimes committed while they were juveniles, they must, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be given an opportunity to seek parole. However, where, as was the case in California, a legislature has provided inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed while they were juveniles with an opportunity to obtain a parole hearing, the state has remedied any constitutional defect in the inmate's sentence. View "In re Kirchner" on Justia Law

An information accused defendant Victor Quiroz of committing assault with a deadly weapon, with an enhancement for great bodily injury; and battery with serious bodily injury, with an enhancement for personal use of a weapon. The information also alleged defendant had previously been convicted of arson, a prior strike conviction. The trial court first found defendant incompetent to stand trial in March 2007 and committed him for treatment. In November of that year, the state hospital certified defendant was mentally competent, and criminal proceedings resumed. However, in August 2008, the court again found defendant incompetent to stand trial and committed him for treatment. In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether a trial court had jurisdiction to convene a competency hearing after a state hospital certified that a defendant, who has been involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to stand trial, was not likely to regain competency. After review, the Court concluded the relevant statutory scheme did not authorize a trial court to hold such a competency hearing. As a result, the Court held the trial court in this matter exceeded its jurisdiction when it held a competency hearing for defendant after the state hospital determined he was not likely to regain competence, found him competent, and subsequently pronounced judgment against him. View "California v. Quiroz" on Justia Law

Respondent Daniel Paramo, Warden at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (collectively RJDCF), appealed a superior court order granting petitioner Kevin Andres's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court found that Andres properly prepared and timely submitted via institutional mail an administrative appeal involving an incident that occurred on January 20, 2013, despite the fact the RJDCF appeals office never received the appeal. Without reaching the merits, the court merely ordered RJDCF to process Andres's appeal as being timely received. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Andres" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Jerson Garcia, Fransisco Mendoza, and Irwin Guzman were convicted of charges arising out of robberies they committed together in Escondido. Garcia was a member of the Eastside gang in San Diego; Mendoza and Guzman were members of the Diablos gang in Escondido. Each defendant received an enhancement of their respective sentences for committing gang-related crimes. Defendants all appealed, claiming: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to bifurcate trial of the gang enhancements; (2) pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive; (3) jury instructions allowed the jurors to equate motive with intent, lessening the burden needed for conviction; and (4) the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that the charged offenses benefited a criminal gang for the purposes of the alleged gang enhancements. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed defendants' convictions. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Inmate Chung Kao appealed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandate. Kao wanted to compel the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to process a disciplinary appeal he submitted in 2012. The trial court dismissed the petition after sustaining the Department's demurrer without leave to amend on the grounds the petition was untimely and Kao had failed to establish justification for the delay in filing it. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review concerned what limitation period applied to Kao's petition. The Department contended the appropriate limitation period was the 60-day rule used to assess the timeliness of nonstatutory writ petitions filed in appellate courts. Kao contended the appropriate limitation period was the four-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 343.1. The Court of Appeal disagreed with both parties: the appropriate limitation period was the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivision (a). Kao's petition was timely under this code section and the defense of laches could not be determined from the face of the petition. As such, the Court concluded the trial court erred in sustaining the Department's demurrer. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kao v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law