Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury acquitted defendant Tyree Hudson of possessing heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine base for sale, finding him guilty instead of the lesser included offenses of simple possession of each. The trial court sustained a number of recidivist allegations. After finding by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing that defendant possessed the contraband with the intent to sell, the court denied a grant of “drug probation.” It then sentenced him to county jail for half his term and mandatory supervised probation for the other half. Defendant argued the trial court erred in determining that he was ineligible for drug probation based on its own finding at sentencing that he possessed the contraband for the purpose of sale. Defendant alternately argued that any finding of ineligibility must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and that in any event the evidence at trial did not support a finding of possession for sale. Furthermore, defendant argued the abstract of judgment had an error in listing one conviction (count two) as possession of methamphetamine for sale. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, but directed the issuance of a corrected abstract of judgment. View "P. v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Alex Navarro appeals from a postjudgment order finding him in violation of a special condition of parole, special condition No. 89 (the Special Condition), restricting his use of the Internet. In January 2009, Navarro pleaded guilty to attempted kidnapping. The then-19-year-old Navarro grabbed the 13-year-old victim’s arms at a bus stop and threatened to rape her. Four months later, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to one year in jail and three years of formal probation and he agreed to register as a sexual offender. The trial court later found Navarro violated probation, ordered probation revoked, and sentenced Navarro to 30 months in prison. On appeal, Navarro argued the Special Condition did not reasonably relate to his criminal conduct or to preventing future criminality and was vague and overbroad. The Attorney General argued the issue was moot because Navarro’s parole has expired and the Special Condition was valid. While the Court of Appeal agreed the issue was moot, the Court exercised discretion to decide the case on its merits as something of public importance likely to reoccur. The Court agreed with Navarro the Special Condition was vague and reversed the postjudgment order. View "California v. Navarro" on Justia Law

In May 2006, Lonnie Kocontes and his long-time partner, Micki Kanesaki, went on a Mediterranean cruise; they had a balcony room. Early one morning, Kocontes reported Kanesaki missing. Kocontes disembarked the ship, stayed in Italy for one evening, and returned to the United States. That day, the Italian Coast Guard recovered Kanesaki’s body off the Italian coast. An Italian chief medical examiner conducted the autopsy while an Italian pathologist and a United States Army pathologist observed. The examiner concluded Kanesaki was strangled by one assailant and put in the water where she remained between 36 and 38 hours. Kocontes was charged with Kanesaki's murder. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. In his habeas corpus petition, Kocontes argued the trial court erred by overruling his demurrer and denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because collateral estoppel prevented him from reconsidering another judge's ruling granting his previous motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court ordered the Orange County Sheriff’s Department to show cause before the Court of Appeal “why the relief prayed for should not be granted.” The Court of Appeal concluded Kocontes’s contentions had no merit, and his petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Kocontes" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Goolsby set fire to two motor homes he owned at a time when he and his girlfriend were living in one of them. As a result, he was convicted of arson of an inhabited structure, with a multiple structure enhancement. In its original opinion, the Court of Appeal held that there was insufficient evidence that the inhabited motor home was a “structure.” The Court also held that Penal Code section 654 barred a retrial on the lesser related offense of arson of property. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review. Defendant then argued (for the first time) that a retrial on the lesser related offense was barred by principles of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 654 did not bar a retrial. However, it remanded so that the Court of Appeal could consider defendant’s double jeopardy contention. After review of the parties' supplemental briefs, the Court concluded that double jeopardy barred a retrial for arson of property and for any other lesser related offense on which the jury was instructed. View "California v. Goolsby" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant Karen Brown pleaded guilty to one count of receiving stolen property. The State dismissed two additional felony counts of receiving stolen property and three felony counts of identity theft. The plea agreement anticipated defendant would serve two years in county jail. The trial court accepted defendant’s plea and sentenced her to two years in county jail. Shortly thereafter, California voters approved Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act). Defendant promptly petitioned the trial court for resentencing; the trial court granted defendant’s petition and resentenced her to 364 days in county jail. In this appeal, the State argued the trial court erred by granting defendant’s petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed: "[w]hile we may be sympathetic with the People’s assertion that our reading of Proposition 47 permits some defendants to obtain the full benefits of their plea agreements without fully performing their side of the bargain, nothing in defendant’s plea agreement insulated it from changes in the law." View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant Osman Gerardo ZarateCastillo appealed his conviction on eleven sex offenses committed against his cousin's daughter when she was seven years old. He argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of committing a lewd or lascivious act by touching the victim’s chest over her clothing a second time; (2) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process in admitting evidence of prior sexual offenses he committed against the victim’s older half-sister; and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the crimes of sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger and forcible sexual penetration are general intent crimes. The Court of Appeals accepted the State's concession that there was insufficient evidence to support a second conviction of committing a lewd or lascivious act based on defendant touching the victim’s chest over her clothing, but the Court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of the prior offenses evidence. The Court agreed the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the crimes of sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger and forcible sexual penetration are general intent crimes, it found the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court reversed defendant’s conviction on the second count of committing a lewd or lascivious act by touching the victim’s chest over her clothing, modified his sentence to reflect that reversal, and affirmed the remainder of the judgment as modified. View "California v. ZarateCastillo" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Garner received a third strike sentence based on the commission of knowing receipt of stolen property. He unsuccessfully filed a Proposition 47 petition to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. However, the State advised the trial court that defendant was eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36, and conceded defendant posed no risk of danger to public safety, therefore he was entitled to resentencing under that act. The trial court granted defendant relief under Proposition 36, but resentenced him on all charges that had been pending against him including prior prison term enhancements, which purportedly had been stricken during the original sentencing proceeding in light of the third strike life sentence. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court, in recalculating his sentence, was limited to resentencing on the base offense, and could not impose any sentence for the previously stricken prison term enhancements. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirm. However, the Court agreed with both parties that defendant was entitled to custody credits earned in prison prior to resentencing. The Court modified the judgment to award defendant the credits the parties agreed he had earned. View "California v. Garner" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Joanna Gonzalez pled guilty to one felony count of grand theft from a person and one misdemeanor count of battery. As part of the plea agreement, the State dropped charges of robbery and burglary. The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 36 months of formal probation on the condition she serve 365 days in a work release program, with 51 days of presentence custody and behavior credits. California voters subsequently passed Proposition 47. Relevant to Gonzalez, Proposition 47 converted grand theft from a person into a misdemeanor where the amount of the theft was less than $950. She petitioned for resentencing, and the trial court granted the petition, deemed her conviction on count 3 a misdemeanor, vacated her sentence of formal probation, and resentenced her to summary probation. The State appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting the petition on the grounds that: (1) Gonzalez was not eligible for resentencing because she was convicted under a negotiated plea agreement under the terms of which the State dismissed other felony counts in return for Gonzalez receiving a sentence of formal probation; and (2) Gonzalez did not carry her burden of showing her offense would have become a misdemeanor because she did not show the underlying conduct would not have constituted felony robbery and burglary, as originally charged. In the alternative, the State argued the trial court erred by refusing to find Gonzalez breached the plea agreement by petitioning for resentencing and by refusing to allow them to withdraw from the plea agreement and restore the dismissed counts. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Eric Cunningham was convicted by jury on one count of attempted murder and one count of robbery. The jury found true as to both counts the allegation defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury which caused the victim to become comatose due to brain injury. Defendant admitted to serving one prior prison term, and being convicted of two prior serious violent felonies. The trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life for count 1 and a term of 25 years to life for count 2, to run consecutively. In addition to other enhancements, the trial court imposed a consecutive five-year enhancement in count 1 and a concurrent five-year enhancement in count 2 based on the jury finding that defendant’s attack caused the victim to become comatose due to a brain injury. Defendant appealed, contending the evidence that the victim’s treating physicians sedated her to conduct surgery and relieve pain associated with use of a respirator was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the victim was comatose. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Christopher Carrea appealed the denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 motion to dismiss a one-year prison prior enhancement, imposed at his 2013 sentencing for conviction of inflicting corporal injury to a former cohabitant. He argued that because, after his sentencing, he obtained a section 1170.18 order reducing the 2004 convictions on which that prison prior enhancement was based from felonies to misdemeanors, the trial court should have stricken or dismissed that enhancement pursuant to section 1170.18 and Proposition 47. Because the Court of Appeal concluded section 1170.18 did not provide for retroactive redesignation, dismissal, or striking of final pre-Proposition 47 sentence enhancements based on prior convictions that were subsequently reduced from felonies to misdemeanors pursuant to section 1170.18, the court correctly denied his motion. View "California v. Carrea" on Justia Law