Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In an inverse condemnation action, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was a unique situation, where a state agency assumed control of a local flood control process, and it determined to provide less flood protection than historically provided by a local agency in order to protect environmental resources. Plaintiffs, whose properties suffered flooding damage when the lagoon level rose above eight feet msl, filed this action in 2007 for inverse condemnation. They alleged they suffered a physical taking from the Department’s actions, and a regulatory taking by the Commission retaining land use jurisdiction over the subdivision throughout this time instead of transferring it to the County. Plaintiffs also sought precondemnation damages and statutory attorney fees. The trial court found the Department and the Commission (collectively, the State) liable for a physical taking and awarded damages, but it concluded plaintiffs’ claim for a regulatory taking was barred. It rejected the State’s arguments that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ complaint. It awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount they incurred under a contingency agreement, but it denied plaintiffs any precondemnation damages. Both the State and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the state agency liable in inverse condemnation for a physical taking of plaintiffs’ properties, and not liable for a regulatory taking. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent the court found another state permitting agency liable in inverse condemnation. View "Pacific Shores v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

Deandre Ellison was shot to death as he pulled into his driveway. Four other men, including Latrele Neal, were also in Ellison’s car. Before the car came to a stop in the driveway, an SUV driven by defendant Jesse Cornejo slowly drove past Ellison’s house; the SUV’s front and backseat passengers, Adam Cornejo and Isaac Vasquez, opened fire on Ellison’s car. Neal managed to return fire with Ellison’s gun before the SUV drove away. After crashing the SUV while being pursued by law enforcement, Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were taken into custody a short time later. Isaac was 16 years old with a developmental disability; Adam and Jesse were 17 and 18 years old, respectively. Adam, Jesse, and Isaac were tried together and convicted by jury of one count of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Jesse was also convicted of one count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer. With respect to the murder, the jury found the offense was committed by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury. The jury also found the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. The trial court sentenced Adam and Isaac to serve an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 9 years 4 months. Jesse was sentenced to serve the same indeterminate term of 120 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years. All defendants appealed. Having reviewed the parties' briefing, the Court of Appeal concluded the gang enhancement findings should have been reversed as to all defendants. Also, it was error to enhance defendants' sentences based on vicarious firearm enhancements. The Court agreed with the Eighth Amendment challenge brought by both Adam and Isaac: the record was unclear as to whether the trial court properly took into consideration all mitigating circumstances attendant in each juvenile offender’s life, including but not limited to his chronological age at the time of the crime and his physical and mental development, before imposing a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence. "In light of the importance of this constitutional right, and uncertainty as to whether the trial court appropriately took such mitigating circumstances into account, we conclude the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new sentencing hearing as to Adam and Isaac." The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "California v. Cornejo" on Justia Law

Defendant Todd White appealed an order denying his petition for recall of his "Third Strike" indeterminate life sentence. In 1996, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. He was also found to have been previously convicted of two serious felonies and to have served two prior prison terms. For this "third strike," he was sentenced to a term of 27 years to life in prison. Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the record of his underlying conviction demonstrated he was “armed” during the commission of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm because (1) the case it relied upon, "California v. White," (223 Cal.App.4th 512 (2014)), was inapposite; and (2) the disqualifying factor of being “armed” during the commission of the offense for which the indeterminate life sentence was imposed cannot apply to a mere possessory offense. In affirming the sentence, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant attempted to distinguish White on the basis the evidence in that case “inexorably established” the defendant actually, rather than constructively, possessed the gun in question because he was observed throwing the gun away. Here, the police did not observe defendant discard his gun into the trash can where it was later found. But it was nonetheless clear defendant’s conviction was based on either the inference he discarded the gun into the trash can on that occasion or he had placed it there earlier. Either way, his possession amounts to being armed. Consequently, White was not materially distinguishable. View "California v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Proposition D, the current medical marijuana ordinance of the City of Los Angeles. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court held that there is no constitutional or statutory right to possess, cultivate, distribute, or transport marijuana for medical purposes. The court concluded that Prop D's enactment did not violate Government Code Section 35804; if regulation of medical marijuana is a matter of statewide concern, Prop D, which regulates medical marijuana solely within the City’s borders, is still a municipal initiative on a wholly municipal matter – which was properly enacted without a planning commission hearing; Prop D's enactment did not violate City Charter Section 558; Prop D does not grant the equivalent of a conditional use permit or variance; and Prop D survives all of plaintiffs' substantive challenges regarding due process, equal protection, unconstitutional "special" law, drug house abatement, improper exercise of local regulatory power, violation of rights of privacy and association, disability discrimination, improper threats of criminal sanctions for plaintiffs' exercise of rights, taking without just compensation, waste of public funds, Fifth Amendment right/privacy, unnecessary regulation without rational basis/unfair stigma, and attorney's fees. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs are not entitled to leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 1996, real party in interest Leonard Rangel, was convicted of felon in possession and two misdemeanors. As a “third striker,” he received an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. In 2012 the electorate, by initiative measure (Proposition 36), amended Penal Code section 667 so that many of those defendants who have two prior strikes but whose current conviction is not for a “serious and/or violent felony” are subject only to a doubled base term sentence rather than the minimum 25-to-life terms reserved for more serious current violators. At the same time, the electorate added section 1170.126 as a mechanism by which inmates sentenced as “third strikers” under the old law could seek to be resentenced under the new provisions, if they would have been subject only to the lesser term had they been sentenced under the new law and met specified other requirements. In November 2012, Rangel filed such a request, which the court granted in 2014. Rangel was resentenced to the upper term of three years for the weapons offense, doubled to six years, plus three additional prior prison term enhancements for a total of nine years. The State challenged the trial court’s failure to place Rangel under community supervision was based on the theory that such supervision was by statute mandatory, (which was not disputed) to the extent that parole was also mandatory. The State also pointed out that Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a) did not include the term of community supervision as one which may be reduced by excess credits, although it does expressly include the period of parole. Rangel casted the problem in terms of a violation of the equal protection clause. He argued that he was similarly situated with those released from prison who are subject to parole, and that there was no rational basis for applying excess credits to a parole term but not a community supervision term. Finding no error with the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal agreed and denied the State's challenge to Rangel's sentence. View "California v. Superior Court (Rangel)" on Justia Law

In 2007, Corona was shot to death during an attempt to kill a cast-out gang member. After three mistrials in which juries deadlocked, Verducci was convicted of first degree murder of Corona (Pen. Code, 187(a)). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting due process arguments. Fundamental fairness did not require dismissal of the charges after the mistrials. The trial court properly allowed “hearsay” testimony concerning a phone call. View "People v. Verducci" on Justia Law

During a custodial interrogation of murder suspect Fabian Perez, a police sergeant told Perez that if he "[told] the truth" and was "honest," then, "we are not gonna charge you with anything." The sergeant continued, telling Perez that he was either a "suspect that we are gonna prosecute," or a "witness," and added that Perez had "witnessed something terrible that somebody did." The sergeant followed up this statement by telling Perez that if he was honest and told the truth during the interview, "[Y]ou'll have your life, maybe you'll go into the Marines . . . and you'll chalk this up to a very scary time in your life." Immediately thereafter, Perez stated that he had "some information" and, shortly after that, confessed his involvement in a robbery during which Perez's accomplice killed the victim. The People charged Perez with first degree murder and alleged that the murder had been committed in the course of a robbery. A jury found him guilty and sentenced Perez to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, among other claims, Perez argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Perez's statements were clearly motivated by a promise of leniency, rendering the statements involuntary, and that the trial court thus erred in denying Perez's motion to suppress the statements. View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

In January 2015, pro se defendant Pharaoh Haywood filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.181 to redesignate his 1996 felony conviction for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle to a misdemeanor. He waived personal appearance if the matter was not contested. The trial court, acting ex parte, appointed a public defender, then summarily denied the petition in a minute order “due to ineligibility based due to: [c]urrent [sic] conviction(s).” Defendant appealed, arguing that even if unlawful taking/driving of a vehicle was not expressly included among the offenses “in accordance with” which he can be resentenced to a misdemeanor, it can constitute a “theft conviction,” and thus the Court of Appeal should construe section 1170.18 as including it because of the purpose of the initiative enacting it. Defendant contended the trial court erred as a result in summarily denying his petition. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected this effort to have it "engage in judicial legislation." The Court therefore affirmed the order denying the redesignation petition. View "California v. Haywood" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Mark Goode guilty of: burglary (count 1) for opening a metal storm door on a residence; and attempted burglary (count 2) for jiggling a window on the same residence a few seconds later. The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months in prison for the burglary at the front door and to a consecutive eight months for the attempted burglary at the window, finding that defendant had “[t]wo separate intents to enter and burgle [the victim’s] home.” On appeal, defendant argued his conviction for burglary should be reversed because, in his view, “[t]he evidence was insufficient to establish [he] actually opened the metal door,” and, in any event, “there was zero evidence . . . that he actually put some part of his body on the interior side of that door.” He further argued that he could not be separately punished for the burglary at the front door and the attempted burglary at the window because the evidence showed only a single, indivisible intent: to enter the victim’s residence to commit a theft. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed a completed burglary at the front door, but agreed that he could not be separately punished for burglarizing the victim’s home at the front door and then, only a few seconds later, attempting to burglarize the home through a nearby window. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to stay an eight-month term on defendant’s conviction of attempted burglary at the window (count 2) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654 and will affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Goode" on Justia Law

On November 4, 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act; it went into effect the following day. Penal Code section 1170.18 was added and provided that a person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who would have been guilty only of a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time the plea was entered, or at the time of trial, may petition for a recall of the sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing. Prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 for unlawfully driving and taking a 2002 Chevy Suburban. Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence, arguing that his conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 10851 should be reduced to a misdemeanor violation of petty theft under Penal Code section 490.2. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that all Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions were not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that: (1) Penal Code section 1170.18 should have been broadly interpreted to include violations of Vehicle Code section 10851; (2) the trial court should have provided the parties an opportunity to litigate the value of the loss to the victim prior to ruling on his Petition to determine if the offense committed was petty theft (loss to the victim was less than $950) within the meaning of Penal Code section 490.2; (3) the People had the burden of proving at the hearing on the Petition that the value of the vehicle taken exceeded $950; (4) the valuation of the loss for a temporary taking of an automobile should be that amount of compensation to make the victim whole, not the market value of the automobile; and (5) equal protection requires that offenses under Vehicle Code section 10851 be treated like violations of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (d)(1), and be reduced to misdemeanors. Finding none of these arguments availing, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the Petition. View "California v. Gomez" on Justia Law