Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners were 13-year-old girls who were dependents of the juvenile court. While they were residing at the Polinsky Children's Center, they knocked over a vending machine and took items from inside it. When staff confronted them, petitioners fled but later returned to the Center. Staff then reported the incident to police, who arrested petitioners and booked them into Juvenile Hall. The district attorney filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging petitioners committed two misdemeanors, petty theft and vandalism. The district attorney asked the court to declare them wards. The probation officer prepared detention reports recommending petitioners be detained in Juvenile Hall, on the unexplained grounds they were likely to flee the court's jurisdiction and such detention was necessary for the protection of person or property and of petitioners. The reports included detention screening forms that showed no grounds for mandatory secure detention and that petitioners' risk assessment scores did not warrant discretionary secure detention. Petitioners promptly challenged the detention orders by filing petitions for peremptory writs of mandate in the first instance directing the juvenile court to vacate the orders. The Court of Appeal treated the petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners' detention in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing. The juvenile court made no findings regarding its decision to order petitioners' continued detention in Juvenile Hall. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted petitioners' petitions. View "In re Bianca S." on Justia Law

In July 2014, Justin Cuen was charged with six felonies: two counts of possession of a controlled substance (counts 1, 2), one count receiving stolen property (count 3), possession of blank checks (count 4), two counts of theft of access card information (counts 5, 7), and forgery (count 6). It was also alleged he had served a prior prison term. A few months later, Cuen pled guilty to counts 1, 3, 5, and 7 and admitted the prior prison term in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and a three-year split sentence. Cuen appealed an order denying his petition to recall and resentence as misdemeanors his two felony convictions for theft of access card information. The trial court ruled a conviction under section Penal Code 484e(d) was not subject to recall and resentencing, because it is not one of the offenses listed in section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Cuen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the landlord, filed an unlawful detainer action against Coolwaters, the commercial lessee. On appeal, Coolwaters challenged the trial court's order denying its special motion to strike the complaint and awarding plaintiff attorney fees as sanctions for the expenses of responding to the special motion to strike. The court concluded that a nonpaying tenant should not be permitted to frustrate an unlawful detainer proceeding by initiating litigation against the landlord in order to bring a special motion to strike the landlord’s subsequently filed unlawful detainer complaint, on the asserted ground that the unlawful detainer action arose out of the tenant’s protected activity in filing the initial lawsuit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the special motion to strike and imposing monetary sanctions against Coolwaters. View "Olive Properties v. Coolwater Enter." on Justia Law

California imposes criminal liability on a person aiding and abetting suicide. Plaintiffs contended Penal Code section 401 was inapplicable to physician aid-in-dying because prescribing a lethal dose of drugs a patient may or may not have filled or take is not direct participation in suicide and, in any event, the legislative history of section 401 showed the Legislature never intended that section 401 apply to a person furnishing the means of suicide. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended section 401 as applied to physician aid-in-dying violated the state constitutional right to autonomy privacy. On October 5, 2015, Governor Jerry Brown signed the End of Life Option Act, which authorized a terminally ill patient with the capacity to make medical decisions to request a prescription for a lethal dose of drugs, insulated a prescribing physician from criminal liability, and set forth rigorous procedures and safeguards to protect against abuse. The parties agreed Assembly Bill 15 did not render the appeal moot because it would likely not become effective in time to benefit plaintiffs, particularly Christy Lynne Donorovich-Odonnell, given her life expectancy. Opponents to the Bill filed paperwork with the Attorney General to challenge it by referendum on the state ballot in 2016. “We have great compassion for plaintiffs, but we conclude their statutory and constitutional arguments lack merit.” The Court of Appeal agreed with defendants that physician aid-in-dying, and attendant procedures and safeguards against abuse, were matters for the Legislature. The Court affirmed the judgment for defendants entered after their demurrers to the complaint were sustained. View "Donorovich-Odonnell v. Harris" on Justia Law

Legislation, effective in 2004 requires that injured workers’ requests for medical treatment be evaluated through a process called utilization review (UR). Under the UR process, a request for treatment cannot be denied by a claims adjustor and must be approved unless a clinician determines that the treatment is medically unnecessary. Workers can challenge decisions denying requested treatment, but employers cannot challenge decisions approving it. The 2004 legislation called for administrative adoption of uniform standards for physicians to use in evaluating treatment. In 2013, additional reforms went into effect, establishing a new procedure, independent medical review (IMR), to resolve workers’ challenges to UR decisions. Stevens challenged the constitutionality of the IMR process, arguing that it violated the state Constitution’s separation of powers clause, its requirements that workers’ compensation decisions be subject to review and the system “accomplish substantial justice,” and principles of due process. The court of appeal rejected those claims, but remanded Stevens’s request for a home health aid. The Legislature has plenary powers over the workers’ compensation system under article XIV, section 4 of the state Constitution. California’s scheme for evaluating workers’ treatment requests is fundamentally fair and affords workers sufficient opportunities to present evidence and be heard. View "Stevens v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd," on Justia Law

Convicted for a lewd act committed on a minor, DeLeon was released to parole, with conditions, including prohibitions against possessing pornographic material or devices for viewing sexually explicit programming. On August 23, DeLeon’s parole agent conducted a compliance check and found DeLeon with a mobile phone, containing pictures of adults exposing themselves and engaged in sexual acts. He was charged with parole violation, booked into jail, and given written notice on August 26. The petition to revoke was referred to the court on August 30, and a petition to revoke parole was filed in court on September 4. A judicial officer revoked DeLeon’s parole on September 6. DeLeon appeared at a September 11 hearing and moved to dismiss on grounds that he did not get a probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest (Penal Code 3044_. On September 25, the court determined that, given the Department of Corrections’ authority to subject a parolee to flash incarceration for up to 10 days, the petition was not unreasonably delayed. The motion was denied. At a merits hearing on October 3rdm the court concluded that DeLeon violated parole. The court of appeal affirmed. Given the judicial probable cause determination within 14 days of DeLeon’s arrest, his appearance on the 20th day and the other procedural protections afforded to DeLeon, the hearing within 45 days of arrest afforded him constitutionally adequate process. Because he suffered no prejudice, any error was harmless. View "People v. DeLeon" on Justia Law

Jan Goldsmith was the San Diego City Attorney. League of California Cities was an association of 473 California cities and their public officials, which, among other purposes, advocates to protect and restore local control for cities to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Real Party in Interest, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), submitted a request under the Public Records Act to the City of San Diego (the City) seeking "[a]ny and all e-mails sent to or from [Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account] . . . that pertain in any way to the official business of the City of San Diego." Among other records, the City asserted an exemption to the disclosure of e-mails between a purported legal assistant for the League and attorney members of the League on the grounds they were not public records because they did not concern city business, or were otherwise privileged. SDOG filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Goldsmith to compel disclosure of the e-mails. In a minute order, the trial court directed the City to provide SDOG with a privilege log identifying the documents not produced, along with the legal objection for not producing the documents. After considering the parties' briefing, the trial court declined to perform an in camera review of certain challenged e-mails. The court found the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the e-mails were privileged or exempt under the Act, and ordered the City to produce the e-mails by a certain date. The League filed the instant petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the first instance, or an alternative writ or order to show cause seeking to vacate that part of the court's order requiring disclosure of the e-mails. The Court of Appeal concluded the term "a party," as used in the Act, was not limited to an actual party to the action. Accordingly, the nonparty here had standing to file the instant petition challenging the trial court's order. The Court further concluded the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the documents as requested by the party asserting the documents were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand the matter for further proceedings. View "League of Cal. Cities v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kimberly Mendoza was charged with four drug-related offenses. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation in connection with the case. Nearly two years later, defendant was convicted of a new felony in a different county. Defendant was sentenced to 16 months imprisonment, to be served in the county jail. Defendant filed a request in the first case to terminate probation and to impose sentence in absentia under Penal Code section 1203.2a. Defendant waived her right to be present and her right to an attorney. A petition to impose sentence in absentia, when a prison sentence has been ordered to be served in the county jail, has never been expressly provided for by the terms of Penal Code section 1203.2a. In addition, the “petition” defendant filed lacked attestation by the prison warden, or the warden’s designate, as required under the statute. The trial court called for hearing. The prosecutor was present, but defendant was not. When the court found that defendant was not present, it stated, “We’ll just drop it.” The court never acted on defendant’s request for sentencing. Several months later, defense counsel filed a motion in the first case for termination of probation under Penal Code section 1203.2a, because of the court’s inaction. The trial court apparently viewed the motion to terminate probation as inconsistent with the plea agreement to admit violations of probation and to reinstate probation. The court ordered the motion to terminate probation withdrawn, and proceeded to accept the negotiated disposition of the violation of probation allegations. Defendant admitted the violations, and was reinstated on probation. Counsel did not join in defendant’s waivers and admissions. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the violations of probation, because it had failed to act on defendant’s demand under 1203.2a. The Court of Appeal concluded after review of the provisions of Penal Code section 1203.2a, that the trial court’s failure to act on defendant’s petition for over 60 days after it was filed in January 2013 deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose any sentence or reinstate probation on the first probation offense. The trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to terminate her probation. Accordingly, the order reinstating probation (and requiring defendant to withdraw her motion for dismissal as a condition of her plea bargain) was reversed. The matter was remanded with directions to the trial court to terminate defendant’s probation and to discharge her from probation. View "California v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Inmate Steven Williams,housed at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Williams alleged the appeals coordinators at Donovan abused their discretion and violated his due process rights and his rights under California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations by improperly cancelling his inmate appeal in which he requested that prison officials "accept liability" for various items of his personal property he claims were lost or damaged when he was transferred to Donovan from the Correctional Medical Facility (CMF). The Court of Appeal concluded Williams failed to demonstrate he has a protected liberty interest in the prison's administrative lost-property appeal process, and he failed to satisfy the habeas corpus jurisdictional requirements under California law. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Page pled guilty to several charges, including one count of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. In this appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47 with respect to his Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction. He argued that the trial court erred by determining that he was not eligible for relief. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Page" on Justia Law