Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Grey Woods appealed after a jury convicted him of 16 counts related to sexual misconduct involving his girlfriend's underage daughter. Woods pled guilty to a 17th count, for possession of child pornography. Woods contended that his convictions on counts 1 through 15 should have been reversed on either of two grounds: (1) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on lesser included offenses to the charged offenses of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation of a minor over the age of 14, and forcible oral copulation in concert of a minor over the age of 14; and (2) that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of "consent" as it related to his case. The State conceded, and the court of Appeal agreed, that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offense of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor with respect to the charges of forcible oral copulation of a minor over the age of 14 and forcible oral copulation in concert of a minor over the age of 14. The State argued, however, that the error was harmless. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeal could not conclude that there was no reasonable probability that Woods would have received a more favorable result if the court had provided the instructions on the lesser included offense. Further, the Court disagreed with Woods that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury regarding the offense of statutory rape as a lesser included offense of the offense of forcible rape; the statutory rape offense that Woods identified was not a lesser included offense of the substantive offense of forcible rape, even under the accusatory pleading test. The Court rejected the remainder of Woods's arguments for reversal. The Court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, and 15. Woods could be retried on these counts. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against SCIS, alleging that it violated California meal and rest break laws and wage laws. The trial court concluded that plaintiff's claims are preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). The court reversed and remanded, concluding that it is pure speculation and conjecture that requiring SCIS to provide meal and rest breaks consistent with California labor and employment law would have any relation to airline prices, routes, or services. The court did not reach the merits of whether class certification is appropriate or whether SCIS complied with state laws. View "Valencia v. SCIS Air Security Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that they had violated the duty of loyalty owed to her under the Rules of Professional Conduct by pursuing her business partner's interests in the underlying dissolution and copyright actions. Plaintiff alleged that she had an implied attorney-client relationship with each defendant based on her status as a 50 percent owner of Purposeful Press, the company she and her business partner created. The trial court denied defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP). In this case, plaintiff's claims arise out of defendants’ breach of professional obligations they allegedly owed to plaintiff as the result of an implied attorney-client relationship arising out of defendants’ representation of Purposeful Press. The court concluded that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff's claims arise from protected activity and did not address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sprengel v. Zbylut" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Bryan Watt of receiving stolen property and he was granted probation. He appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, the jury was misinstructed and two of his probation terms were invalid. After review, the Court of Appeal disagree with Watt's first two contentions, agreed with the third, and, therefore, struck the probation terms at issue while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "California v. Watt" on Justia Law

Defendant Rudy Francisco De La Rosa appealed an order committing him to the trial competency program at Napa State Hospital. He contended insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was not competent to stand trial. He also contended that after the court decided his placement at Napa State Hospital, the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to be heard. While defendant’s appeal was pending with the Court of Appeal, defense appellate counsel advised the Court that on April 2, 2013, the trial court terminated defendant’s commitment, finding that defendant had been restored to competency, and reinstated criminal proceedings. Defendant then entered a plea and the court granted probation. The State argued the issues on appeal were rendered moot due to defendant’s restoration to competency and the resumption of criminal proceedings during which defendant entered a plea and was granted probation. Defendant disagreed the issues were moot, arguing that State ignored post-"Lindsey" cases discussing the continuing stigma of a wrongful commitment. The Court of Appeal found that the issues on appeal were not moot, and that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial. View "California v. De La Rosa" on Justia Law

Los Alamitos Unified School District (the District) filed an action to validate its lease-leaseback agreement with a contractor performing improvements on the track and athletic field of the District's high school. Another contractor, Howard Contracting, Inc. (Howard), filed an answer, claiming the lease-leaseback agreement was unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid because the District did not obtain competitive bids for the project. The primary issue presented by this appeal was legal: did Education Code section 17406 exempt school districts from obtaining competitive bids when entering into what are known as "lease-leaseback" agreements to improve school property? After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the answer was yes. "More than 40 years ago, the California Attorney General concluded the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, and explicit, and does not impose bid requirements on school districts. We agree, and nothing has occurred in the interim that would change our conclusion." View "Los Alamitos Unified etc. v. Howard Contracting" on Justia Law

The State alleged that defendant Ricardo Chaides had a prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (b)(3) and that this conviction constituted a strike for purposes of the three strikes law. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the strike prior allegation; it ruled that defendant’s prior conviction constituted only a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). The State appealed. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. "In ruling on the demurrer, it had to accept the allegations of the complaint as true; those allegations indicated that defendant had been convicted of an offense that would also constitute a felony violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). On remand, however, the evidence may show that Defendant’s offense of carrying a concealed firearm would constitute only a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). In that event, defendant would be entitled to have the strike prior allegation found not true." View "California v. Chaides" on Justia Law

Defendant Larry Jason Batchelor appealed his conviction (from two separate trials) of implied malice murder (count 1) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (count 2).As to the first trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter, and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial and improperly vouched for the State's case. As to the second trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of implied malice murder; (2) the statute under which he was charged violated principles of due process because it authorizes disparate treatment for the prosecution and defense with respect to the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove implied malice; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to read or present to the jury section 188 and case law regarding implied malice; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on gross vehicular manslaughter and/or to inform the jury that defendant had been convicted of that offense in the first trial; (5) the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that if it did not convict defendant of murder he would be a free man and by appealing to the passion and prejudice of the jury; (6) he was denied due process by being sentenced by a judge who had not presided over either trial and who had failed to read the trial transcripts or the defense sentencing memoranda; and (7) the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by instructing defendant’s second jury in a manner that gave the jury the false impression that defendant would be left entirely unpunished for his actions if the jury did not convict him of murder. Moreover, the trial court’s error was compounded by the prosecutor’s argument to the jury: “And now is the time that you have to hold this person accountable. Now is the time that you have to send the message that you drink and drive and kill someone, you’re going to be held accountable. There is only one count in this case that you have to decide on. This is it. Hold him accountable for killing someone.” The Court reasoned: "[a]lthough perhaps the argument was technically correct, in that only one count remained for the jury to decide in the second trial, the argument certainly created the misleading impression that unless the jury found him guilty of the murder charge, he would not be held accountable at all for [the victim's] death." The Court concluded, therefore, the error required reversal. View "California v. Batchelor" on Justia Law

Defendant Melvin Anderson appealed the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The Court of Appeal appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asked the Court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Counsel also advised defendant that he had a right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and the Court received no communication from defendant. It therefore concluded defendant was not entitled to Wende review on an appeal from the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to the Act. Because appointed appellate counsel filed a brief indicating that there were no arguable issues on appeal, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "California v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Larry Steven Schinkel, Jr. had prior strike convictions (specifically, he had six prior burglary convictions), when he engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor. After he was arrested on the charges related to the minor, he solicited another inmate to have the minor killed so that she could not testify against him. Convicted of four counts of sexual intercourse with a minor and solicitation of murder, defendant was eventually sentenced under the Three Strikes law to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for solicitation of murder with two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for two of the sexual intercourse counts, for an aggregate term of 75 years to life. Two 25-year-to-life terms for the other sexual intercourse counts were imposed concurrently. In November 2012, California voters passed Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, amending 667 and 1170.12 (relating to Three Strikes sentencing) and added section 1170.126 (relating to resentencing of defendants previously sentenced under the Three Strikes law). Defendant, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. Without a hearing, the court denied the petition. The court held that defendant was not eligible for resentencing because, with respect to the solicitation of murder conviction, defendant intended to cause great bodily injury. The Court of Appeal treated defendant's appeal of the order denying his petition for resentencing as a petition for writ of mandate and concluded: (1) the trial court properly determined that defendant was ineligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 because his conviction for solicitation of murder necessarily included the intent to cause great bodily injury; (2) defendant was not eligible for resentencing on other nondisqualifying current convictions because the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 excluded defendant's class of dangerous criminals from the benefit of resentencing; and (3) defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on whether he is eligible for resentencing. Having found no merit in defendant's contentions, the Court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Schinkel, Jr. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law