Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Orange County District Attorney appealed the dismissal of robbery charges against defendants Daniel Alvarez, Jr., Juan Jose Renteria, and Michael Abel Cisneros. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the case based primarily on "California v. Trombetta," (467 U.S. 479 (1984)), arguing the prosecution and the police had failed to preserve evidence from two police controlled cameras in the vicinity of the robbery. The trial court determined on the night of the incident in question, Cisneros, specifically asked the senior officer on the scene, to check any relevant video. The detective replied, "If I had video cameras of what took place, that’s part of my job. My job is not to arrest people that aren’t guilty of something." Yet the detective later admitted he had never reviewed the video himself, nor asked anyone else to do so. He asserted it was not his responsibility. The court also found the issue of retaining video was raised during a hearing shortly after the defendants’ arrest, giving the prosecution notice the defense wanted to review any available video evidence. Given these facts, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly dismissed the cases of defendants Cisneros and Alvarez, but substantial evidence did not support the court’s factual findings as to Renteria. The Court therefore affirmed as to Cisneros and Alvarez and reversed as to Renteria. View "California v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Christensen was convicted of multiple counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14. In his first trial, he was convicted with respect to his acts against one victim, Spencer S., but the jury deadlocked with respect to his acts against another victim, Joshua K. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court made various errors in the retrial on the counts pertaining to Joshua. He says the court erred in admitting both the testimony Joshua gave in the first trial and the evidence of the prior offense against Spencer. He also argued that his convictions should have been reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct and that his sentence of 27 years to life was excessive. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed as to both of defendant's contentions and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "California v. Christensen" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendants, Michael Canizales and KeAndre Windfield of first degree murder, during which a principal discharged a firearm proximately causing death, and two counts of attempted willful, premeditated and deliberate murder, during which a principal discharged a firearm. The jury found that all the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Canizales was sentenced to 25 years to life and two terms of 15 years to life and Windfield was sentenced to two terms of 25 years to life and two terms of 15 years to life plus 40 years. They appealed, claiming jury instruction and sentencing errors. The Court of Appeal rejected their contentions. But since the Court originally decided this case, the California Supreme Court in "California v. Chiu," (59 Cal.4th 155 (2014)) held that "a defendant cannot be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine." Because the Court of Appeal could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict of first degree murder for Canizales on the legally valid theory that he aided and abetted premeditated and deliberate murder, the Court reversed his conviction for that offense and offered the State the opportunity to retry him for first degree murder as an aider and abettor of that offense or to accept a reduction to second degree murder. View "California v. Canizales" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought a petition for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to their two causes of action for financial elder abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Welf. & Inst. Code 15600 et seq. At issue was whether to allege a "taking" of a property right under the Act, it is sufficient to plead that an elder has entered into an unconsummated agreement which, in effect, significantly impairs the value of the elder's property, or whether the Act requires that the agreement have been performed and title have been conveyed. The court concluded that because property rights include, among other things, the right to use and sell property, petitioners' allegations that Petitioner Bounds entered into an executory agreement which significantly impaired the value of the property owned by the Trust adequately pleads a taking - that Bounds has been deprived of a property right by means of an agreement within the meaning of section 15610.30(c). Accordingly, the court granted the petition and issued the writ compelling the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to petitioners' financial elder abuse claims. View "Bounds v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case centered two policy issues that are often viewed as controversial: (1) racial, ethnic, and gender preferences; and (2) the decennial redistricting process. In 2008 and 2010, the People of California, exercising their reserved initiative powers, changed the way California's State Senate, State Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization voting districts are adjusted after each national census, assigning the corresponding duties to the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Plaintiffs Ward Connerly and the American Civil Rights Foundation (collectively, Connerly) sued defendants State of California (State), the State Auditor, and the Commission, alleging the method of selecting members of the Commission violated Proposition 209 (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 31), in that it gave improper preferences based on race, ethnicity, and gender. Connerly then filed an amended complaint, again asserting the selection process for the last six commissioners violated Proposition 209, but adding that the "Applicant Review Panel" also improperly considered race, ethnicity, and gender. These were characterized as “facial” challenges to Government Code section 8252, subdivision (g) based on Proposition 209, for which various remedies were sought. The State and State Auditor demurred in part on the grounds that Proposition 209 did not apply to the selection of public officers, only to public employees. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this ground. Connerly appealed. Connerly effectively abandoned his amended complaint, and proposed a new legal theory on appeal--but no new facts--in his opening brief, explicitly citing the authority of Code Civ. Proc. section 472c, subdivision (a). Both the State and State Auditor contended it was unfair for Connerly to raise this theory on appeal because they did not get a chance to disprove it factually. They almost entirely ignored section 472c, which allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal. "Connerly has not strayed from his central factual claim that the composition of the Commission was infected by invidious discrimination. There is no reason to deviate from the well-established rule that section 472c allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [. . .] The fact that the instant complaint was found wanting raises precisely the circumstance section 472c was designed to address--to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to propose new facts or legal theories to establish a cause of action. Thus, from the parties' briefing, it appears Connerly can plead at least a prima facie case of equal protection violations. The answer is to apply section 472c, subdivision (a), allow Connerly to amend the complaint again to clarify his new theories, and give respondents the chance to defend the Commission's selection provisions to try to show they comport with federal equal protection principles." View "Connerly v. California" on Justia Law

A jury convicted David Kent of possessing child pornography and distributing child pornography. It also convicted him of possessing methamphetamine for sale and possessing cocaine. The court imposed a sentence of three years and four months, but suspended execution of the sentence and placed Kent on probation under various terms and conditions, including a 365-day jail term and lifetime registration as a sex offender. The trial court found Kent violated probation and lifted the suspension of his sentence. Kent’s appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in "California v. Wende. Counsel summarized the facts of the case, the procedural history, and “possible” legal issues with citations to the record and appropriate authority, but raised no specific issues, and asked this court to review the record to determine whether there were any arguable issues. Counsel did not argue against her client or assert the appeal was frivolous. Counsel submitted a declaration stating she reviewed the case, she advised Kent of the nature of the brief, she sent Kent a copy of the brief and the appellate record, and informed him he could file a brief on his own behalf. Counsel did not seek to withdraw, but she advised Kent he could move to have her relieved. The Court of Appeal gave Kent 30 days to file a supplemental brief, but he did not respond. The Court of Appeal took the opportunity of this case to emphasize for appointed counsel to represent indigent defendants on appeal that briefs identifying possible appellate issues in what turn out to be Wende matters remain welcome. "While an appellate court need not delve into or even pass on the merits of issues noted in a Wende brief, presenting those issues can ensure counsel does not discharge his or her duty in a merely summary fashion, and guides the court to pertinent legal issues and principles, thereby aiding the court in its Wende review. We therefore encourage counsel to continue to submit such briefs." View "California v. Kent" on Justia Law

FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets (the underlying action). The former employees prevailed in the underlying action and they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay their attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, the former employees filed suit against the attorneys who represented FLIR in the underlying action, Latham, for malicious prosecution. Latham moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the former employees were unable to establish a probability of prevailing on their malicious prosecution action because the action was untimely brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. However, the court agreed with the former employees that section 340.6 is not the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action and that the former employees have presented sufficient evidence that they otherwise have a probability of prevailing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

Police officers contacted and detained not only an individual in the driveway in front of a house, whom they observed stripping copper wire from an air conditioner, but also the occupant of the house, suspecting that "maybe possibly" a burglary was in progress. The officers were aware of no facts particular to the occupant of the house suggesting that he was a burglar, rather than a resident. And they made no reasonable attempt to ascertain such facts until after he was detained. It was later determined he was in fact a resident. "The Fourth Amendment does not countenance warrantless intrusion by police into a private home and detention of a resident under the circumstances of this case. The police had no probable cause with respect to the resident of the house (who was the defendant in this case) so suspected exigent circumstances do not justify the officers' actions." As such, the detention was unlawful, and defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of that unlawful detention should have been granted. View "California v. Lujano" on Justia Law

While imprisoned after being convicted of several offenses, defendant J.S. was declared a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 2962. In Spring 2012, J.S. was placed on parole and began her initial one-year term of involuntary treatment. After the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) rejected her challenge to her MDO classification and initial commitment, she filed a petition requesting counsel and judicial review, pursuant to section 2966 (b). That petition, however, was not heard within the initial year of commitment. A year later, the trial court granted the People's motion to dismiss the petition as "moot" on that basis. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that she was entitled to have her petition heard on the merits, because it was filed during the initial year of commitment, and even though the initial term was already completed, her petition was not moot. The Court of Appeal agreed, and therefore reversed the order dismissing defendant's petition. View "California v. J.S." on Justia Law

Defendant, a founding member of a medical marijuana cooperative, was charged with a sale of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. The first jury was unable to reach a verdict, splitting six to six on the sales charge and nine to three for not guilty on the possession for sale charge. Defendant was permitted a defense under the Medical Marijuana Program Act. On retrial, he was denied the defense. The second jury was still unable to reach a verdict on the sales charge, but convicted defendant of possessing marijuana for sale. Because the Court of Appeal found he was entitled to a defense under the MMPA and the error in precluding the defense was prejudicial, the Court reversed. View "California v. Baniani" on Justia Law