Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant-appellant Jose Sanchez of grand theft of copper wire. He was sentenced to three years in county jail. On appeal, defendant argued that four statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial in two respects: (1) the prosecutor erred by implicating defendant’s failure to testify; and (2) the prosecutor made inflammatory statements about defendant and the jurors. The Court of Appeal held that one comment constituted error and another amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. However, the Court held that the errors, individually and cumulatively, were harmless. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The trial court denied Appellant-defendant Ronald James Adair's petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon and motion for reconsideration of the denial of his petition for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion because the timelines set forth in section 4852.03. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Adair" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) against the County. The County subsequently appealed from a judgment entered after a substantial jury verdict in plaintiff's favor and plaintiff appealed from the postjudgment order denying his request for attorney fees. The court initially affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past conduct and there was no substantial evidence to support the economic damages awarded to plaintiff. Both the County and the plaintiff petitioned for rehearing. The court granted the petitions and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of undisclosed reasons for terminating plaintiff where the record contained affirmative indications that the trial court considered and understood that the introduction of undisclosed reasons for the decision to terminate plaintiff was not relevant and was prejudicial. The court also concluded that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's award of economic damages. Accordingly, the court reversed in that respect but affirmed in all other respects. The court also affirmed the order denying plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. View "Hager v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In the November 2012 General Election, voters prospectively amended recidivist sentencing provisions for a defendant with two or more previous felony convictions. If a commitment conviction was not for a “serious” or violent felony (subject to a number of qualifications), the prescribed sentence now was double the term otherwise provided, instead of the formerly prescribed indeterminate term of life with varying minimums (generally 25 years). The voters simultaneously created a retrospective process for a qualified recidivist defendant who was “presently serving” a former indeterminate life term. A defendant could petition the original sentencing court for a recall of the sentence, and be resentenced to a determinate sentence of double the term that would otherwise apply to the commitment convictions (i.e., what a trial court would impose under the prospective amendments to the recidivist sentencing statutes) if this would otherwise not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public. Defendant Sidney Scott Hubbard filed a recall petition in December 2012. He alleged that in September 1996, a jury had found him guilty of attempted robbery and reckless evasion of a police pursuit, and sustained multiple allegations of prior convictions for serious felonies. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for the convictions, along with six years for the enhancements. Defendant requested that the trial court resentence him on his conviction for reckless evasion because it was not a serious or violent felony and did not otherwise come within an exception. The trial court denied the recall petition without a hearing, finding defendant did not qualify for relief because one of his two commitment convictions was a serious and violent felony. On appeal, defendant challenges this interpretation of section 1170.126. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. As a result, the Court affirmed the order, or in the alternative treated the appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied it. View "California v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Harquan Johnson and KeAndre Windfield of first degree murder, intentionally discharging a firearm causing death, and personally discharging a firearm causing death. Furthermore, the jury convicted defendants of attempted premeditated and deliberate murder, during which they personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury, and used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. Johnson and Windfield were members of the Ramona Blocc Hustla gang; an altercation between Johnson, Windfield and the victims gave rise to murder and weapons charges. As to both offenses, the jury found that defendants committed them for the benefit of the gang. Both were sentenced to prison for 90 years to life. They appealed, claiming the preliminary hearing testimony of a prosecution witness should not have been admitted into evidence at trial, the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of attempted murder, and the jury was misinstructed. Defendants also claimed that the firearms allegation findings as to the attempted murder should have been stricken. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed in part and directed some to be stricken. Both defendants also asserted that the abstracts of judgment should have been corrected. The Court agreed with this, and directed the trial court to correct Windfield’s, and, upon the resentencing of Johnson, to ensure that his abstract and the minutes of the hearing correctly reflect the year the crimes were committed and the award of pretrial custody credit. Each defendant claimed that the sentence imposed upon him, without consideration of his individual characteristics, was a violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To this, the Court disagreed as to Windfield and agreed as to Johnson. Therefore, the Court affirmed Windfield’s judgment except as to a few corrections. As to Johnson, the Court affirmed his convictions and remanded to the sentencing court for resentencing. View "California v. Windfield" on Justia Law

Sacramento Police received a call from Kennedy High School that there was "an uncontrollable, irate student in the hallways." While in the principal's office, the minor called his mother; he became more and more irate as he talked, "screaming [and] yelling" and pacing the floor. The responding officer asked the minor to sit down and calm down, but the minor did not listen. The minor slammed or threw the phone down on the table. About three to five seconds after the minor failed to obey the order to sit down and calm down, the officer detained him "based on [the officer's] safety and safety of the school and also the [minor]'s." The officer advised the minor he was being detained and ordered him to put his hands on his head with his fingers interlaced. In an attempt to put a control hold on the minor by grabbing the minor's interlaced hands with one hand and grabbing the minor's elbow from underneath with the other hand, the minor turned, pulled away, and started to walk away. The officer performed an arm bar takedown on the minor and detained him on the floor; he then handcuffed him and took him out to his squad car. After obtaining briefing from the parties on the legal and factual issues, the juvenile court issued a ruling sustaining both charges. As to the resisting charge, the court found that the minor's conduct before his detention was sufficient to justify the detention. The minor appealed the order of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court, arguing that one of the two allegations the court sustained was supported by sufficient evidence and that the other was founded on an unconstitutional statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Humberto Quinones of two counts of possession for sale of heroin, one count of transportation of a controlled substance, and possession by a convicted felon of a firearm, and found he was personally armed with a firearm during the drug offenses, and had two prior strike convictions for two 1981 robberies. In early 2013, defendant filed this petition, alleging his current felonies were not serious or violent. Regarding the arming allegation, he argued that the sentencing judge "did not just strike the punishment; rather, it struck the enhancement allegations completely." Defendant argued the arming allegation was not part of his record of conviction and he was eligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. The State opposed the motion, arguing the arming allegation had been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and had been stricken for sentencing purposes only, and therefore defendant was disqualified from relief. The trial court denied the petition, finding defendant ineligible under the Act because he possessed a firearm during the current offenses, notwithstanding that the sentencing judge struck the arming enhancement at defendant’s 1996 sentencing. Defendant then appealed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the arming enhancement found by the jury but dismissed for sentencing purposes indeed disqualified defendant for resentencing purposes.View "California v. Quinones" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal centered on whether an election held by the City of San Diego to authorize the levying of a special tax complied with articles XIII A, XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution. In the election at issue, the City did not permit the City's registered voters to vote on the special tax. Instead, the City passed an ordinance that specifically defined the electorate to consist solely of: (1) the owners of real property in the City on which a hotel is located, and (2) the lessees of real property owned by a governmental entity on which a hotel is located. The Court concluded the election was invalid under the California Constitution because such landowners and lessees were neither "qualified electors" of the City for purposes of article XIII A, section 4, nor did they comprise a proper "electorate" under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d). Furthermore, the Court concluded the election was invalid under the San Diego City Charter because City Charter section 76.1 required the approval of two-thirds of the "qualified electors" voting in an election on a special tax, and section 6 of the City Charter defined "[q]ualified [e]lectors" as those persons who are registered to vote in general state elections under state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment validating the special tax and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter judgment against the City. View "City of San Diego v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Guilford appealed an order denying his petition to recall his sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The Act sets forth a mechanism for relief for some existing three strikes inmates, creating a two-step process: (1) the trial court determines whether a defendant is qualified or disqualified from seeking a recall of sentence; (2) if and only if a defendant is found to be qualified, the trial court conducts a hearing, and then applies certain standards to determine whether the defendant’s sentence should be lessened. This appeal involved only the first step. Defendant contended: (1) the trial court improperly considered our prior opinion on direct appeal from defendant’s convictions in finding him ineligible for resentencing under the Act; (2) the Court of Appeal's prior opinion did not show he was ineligible under the Act; and (3) he was entitled to have a jury determine his eligibility under the Act. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order finding defendant ineligible for resentencing under the Act. View "California v. Guilford" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court in this case to enter judgment validating the authorization of a bond issuance for the purposes of the 2008 voter-approved Safe, Reliable, High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act. Questions regarding the project the Authority sought to build was the one voters approved in 2008. Furthermore, the Authority left substantial financial and environmental questions unanswered with regard to the final funding plan required for each corridor or useable segment of the project. In its review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) contrary to the trial court’s determination, the High-Speed Passenger Train Finance Committee properly found that issuance of bonds for the project was necessary or desirable; and (2) The preliminary section 2704.08, subdivision (c) funding plan was intended to provide guidance to the Legislature in acting on the Authority’s appropriation request. Because the Legislature appropriated bond proceeds following receipt of the preliminary funding plan approved by the Authority, the preliminary funding plan has served its purpose. "A writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the idle act of rescinding and redoing it." View "Cal. High-Speed Rail v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law