Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a tenured teacher, was dismissed based on charges that he had physically and abusively disciplined his students. Plaintiff contended that the Board's failure to consider or formulate written charges before initiating his dismissal nullified all further proceedings. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate, finding that the board's failure to consider or formulate charges before initiating plaintiff's dismissal was a nonsubstantive procedural error that was not prejudicial. The court concluded that plaintiff's informal notification of charges, eventual receipt of written charges, representation by counsel, involvement in the discovery process and participation in a four-day evidentiary hearing confirmed he was provided notice and a full opportunity to oppose the charges. Plaintiff has not shown the board's reliance on oral presentation of charges in initiating his dismissal undermined his preparation or otherwise prejudiced his defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying his mandate petition and the court affirmed the judgment. View "DeYoung v. Com. on Professional Competence" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Christopher London guilty as charged of cultivating marijuana and possessing marijuana for sale. He was sentenced to three years’ probation, subject to terms and conditions including that he serve 60 days in jail. At trial, defendant claimed he was lawfully growing 100 marijuana plants for a medical marijuana collective under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 and the Medical Marijuana Program Act (the MMPA) and was therefore not guilty of unlawful marijuana cultivation, possession for sale, or the lesser included offense of marijuana possession. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed defendant’s claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow his cannabis expert to give opinion testimony critical to his lawful cultivation defense, including that defendant was lawfully cultivating the marijuana under the MMPA and that a $20,000 sum he expected to be paid for his 100 marijuana plants, when fully grown, did not include an unlawful profit. The Court of Appeal concluded the expert’s testimony on these and other points was properly excluded because the expert lacked sufficient evidence to render the opinions. With regard to defendant’s additional claim that the court erroneously instructed the jury on his lawful cultivation defense under the MMPA., the Court agreed the instructions misstated the applicable law under the MMPA, but concluded defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt he was lawfully growing the 100 marijuana plants for himself and other qualified patients, and he was not earning a profit. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to support instructing the jury on defendant’s MMPA defense. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. London" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Steven Hernandez of having committed vandalism causing less than $400 in damages. Because the jury also found the vandalism was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, the crime was a felony. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The Court of Appeal appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief summarizing the facts of the case and, while not arguing against defendant, counsel’s opening brief stated he could not find any arguable issues to raise, though he did suggest some issues for the Court's consideration in conducting an independent review of the record. The Court declined to do so and published this opinion to reaffirm its long-standing rejection of "Anders/Wende" briefs presenting "'arguable-but-unmeritorious’ issue[s].'" View "California v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Louis Van Leonard and Charles Dwayne Walser of two counts each of pimping, two counts each of pandering, and one count each of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury also convicted Leonard of one count of making a criminal threat. Following a bench trial, the court found Leonard had a prior prison term, a prior serious felony conviction, and a "[s]trike prior" conviction. The court ordered that Leonard's prison prior be stricken for purposes of sentencing. Furthermore, the court stayed punishment on Leonard's and Walser's convictions for pimping. Leonard was ultimately sentenced to 23 years in prison, and Walser was sentenced to eight years four months. Both Leonard and Walser appealed, contending: (1) the operative amended information at trial was not properly filed; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the defendants' convictions on certain counts; (3) the court erred in not giving a unanimity instruction on pandering; (4) the court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding the culture of pimping and pandering; (5) the court erred in limiting cross-examination of the victims regarding their bias and credibility; (6) the defendants' sentences on their assault convictions and on Leonard's criminal threat conviction should have been stayed under section 654 [of the Penal Code]; (7) the court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss Leonard's "strike prior" under "California v. Superior Court (Romero)" (13 Cal.4th 497 (1996)); and (8) the judgment against Leonard erroneously stated that his prison prior was stayed by the court. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment against Leonard to provide that his prison prior was stricken by the court, rather than stayed, and affirmed it as modified. The Court affirmed the judgment against Walser in full. View "California v. Leonard" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Christian Castillo of possessing methamphetamine for sale and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied a pretrial request to enforce a negotiated disposition because there was agreement for the court to enforce, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the trial court should not have denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of statements he made to police as having been taken in violation of his Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Petitioner-defendant Floyd Lowe was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced under the "Three Strikes" law more than 15 years ago. He petitioned for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court denied the petition because defendant was armed with a firearm and intended to cause great bodily injury when he possessed the firearm. Treating defendant's appeal of the denial of his petition for resentencing as a petition for writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err and denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Lowe v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Officer Woelkers saw 15-year-old J.G. walking across a parking lot toward his brother, D.G. Woelkers parked his patrol vehicle, without turning on lights or siren, and “casually” approached the brothers. He was wearing his uniform. J.G. said they were going to a party. Officer Klier arrived in his patrol vehicle to “assist.” Woelkers asked D.G. for identification, and D.G. gave him a Honduran identification card. J.G. stated that he had no identification and gave a name. J.G. Woelkers ran a check and learned that no California driver’s license or identification card had issued to either boy. The boys consented to a pat-down and the officers found nothing illegal. Meanwhile, two more officers arrived, displaying a gun. J.G. agreed to a search of his backpack. Woelkers located a semiautomatic pistol inside. The D.A. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) alleging felony possession of a concealed firearm by a minor. J.G. first admitted that allegation, then successfully moved to withdraw his plea, and moved to suppress the pistol from being introduced into evidence. The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed. The totality of the circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable person—juvenile or adult—that he was not free to refuse the request. Woelkers clearly conveyed that he suspected the brothers of unlawful activity. He asked them whether they had anything “illegal,” conducted a records check, and searched them, physically restraining them, while the police presence and show of force grew. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent Yelp, a popular website, from making claims about the accuracy and efficacy of its "filter" of unreliable or biased customer reviews. The trial court granted Yelp's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because Yelp's statements at issue were matters of public interest. The court concluded that Yelp's representations about its review filter constitute commercial speech squarely within the public speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c) where Yelp's statements about its review filter consists of representations of fact about Yelp's website that are made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing advertisements on Yelp's website, and Yelp's statements were made in the course of delivering Yelp's website. Further, Yelp's intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer. The court rejected Yelp's assertion that the federal Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order. Finally, plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to move to amend his complaint to substitute the real party in interest in this action as plaintiff. View "Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc." on Justia Law

Marvin Estuardo Catalan pleaded guilty to four felonies, including grand theft, identity theft, and two counts of forgery. The court imposed a four-year hybrid or split sentence comprised of a one-year, four-month jail term followed by two years and eight months of mandatory supervision on specified terms and conditions. After Catalan violated the terms of his mandatory supervision, the trial court revoked and reinstated his supervision and added 550 days to his jail sentence. Catalan argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence exceeding the recommended term under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Catalan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 288.3, subdivision (a), which prohibits contacting a minor for the purpose of committing various crimes, including, as alleged here, sexual penetration with a person under the age of 18 years. The court ordered defendant placed on formal probation for five years subject to various conditions, including that defendant serve 240 days in the Orange County jail. Defendant’s interactions with the victim were entirely over the Internet, primarily through chat rooms. At the time he met "Jane Doe," she was 14 years old and he was 59 years old, but he represented himself to be only two or three years older than her. The two developed a close relationship, and when Jane Doe was 16 years old, they began having cybersex, which involved watching pornographic videos together, describing various sexual acts they would do to one another, and masturbating together. Defendant was in California during these online interactions, and Jane Doe was in Indiana. Defendant raised numerous contentions on appeal: Jane Doe was not a minor because the age of consent in Indiana was 16 years old, and in any event, he could not have caused the sexual penetration from thousands of miles away; his conviction under section 288.3 violated his constitutional rights to equal protection, privacy, and free speech; and his conviction violated the dormant commerce clause. The Court of Appeal affirmed: "[d]efendant’s seduction of Jane Doe under false pretenses, together with his repeated suggestions that she masturbate, satisfied the statutory elements of intending to participate in causing sexual penetration. Even if Jane Doe was an adult for purposes of applying Indiana law, she was a minor for purposes of applying California law. And we reject the various constitutional challenges defendant raises to the validity of section 288.3 and his conviction in particular." View "California v. Shapiro" on Justia Law