Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, doing business as iWorld, filed suit against Westfield, a shopping center, alleging that Westfield violated a lease agreement. The trial court stated that Westfield's service of a notice of termination was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that each count was based in part on Westfield's service of the notice. The trial court concluded that the litigation privilege, Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b), "arguably" was a complete defense to the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not arise from protected activity and was not subject to a special motion to strike. Therefore, plaintiff need not establish a probability of prevailing on her claims and the court need not decide whether she did so. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the special motion to strike and the order awarding attorney fees to Westfield. View "Ulkarim v. Westfield, LLC" on Justia Law

Eric Speight appealed after a jury convicted him of two counts of premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted murder and found true various enhancements. Speight argued on appeal: (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she misstated the law concerning homicide and the error was compounded by the trial court’s statements and omission of an instruction on the interaction between attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter; and (2) his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment and he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to part of his sentence. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury but concluded Speight was not prejudiced. With respect to his sentencing claim, the Court concluded defense counsel’s performance was deficient regarding sentencing. The judgment was affirmed, Speight's sentence reversed, and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "California v. Speight" on Justia Law

Police were dispatched to "Julie N.'s" high school after she presented a personal essay explaining that a family member had sexually assaulted her. Julie was 15 at the time of her interview; she was 11 or 12 when the assault allegedly occurred. An information charged defendant Randy Huynh with committing a felony lewd act on a child under 14 years old. The complaint alleged he committed the offense against Julie N., and again against more than one victim. Huynh filed a demurrer to the information on the grounds the information alleged only one victim. The prosecutor conceded, and the trial court sustained the demurrer. An amended information charged Huynh with committing a forcible lewd act on a child under 14 years old, and this time alleged "that prior to the commission of the above offense," Huynh suffered a conviction of violating section 288, subdivision (b) (Penal Code sec. 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(1)). Huynh filed a motion to dismiss the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation pursuant to section 995. The court concluded section 667.61 was a recidivism statute. The District Attorney appealed the order dismissing the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal was what the term "previously convicted" meant with respect to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1). The Orange County District Attorney argued "previously convicted" meant a defendant was convicted of a qualifying offense but it was immaterial whether the qualifying offense occurred before or after the currently charged offense and the trial court erred in dismissing the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. Defendant argued "previously convicted" meant a defendant was convicted of a qualifying offense before the commission of the currently charged offense and the court properly dismissed the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant and affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), allegation. View "California v. Huynh" on Justia Law

Mother Y.Z. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her children, G.P. and A. P., and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. Mother contended the court erroneously found that the children should have been removed from their relative caregiver and placed in a foster home under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 387 deprived her of the ability to raise an exception to the adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Mother also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception to the adoption preference was inapplicable. "Jose P.," the presumed father of G.P. and A.P., joined Mother's arguments and argued his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without having made a detriment finding as to him. Upon review of the juvenile court order, the Court of Appeal concluded the court's findings under section 387 as well as its determination that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply were supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that Father invited the error he appealed, and even if he did not do so, the juvenile court's findings were sufficient to support termination of Father's rights. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Michael DeVaughn of 16 counts of identity theft, nine counts of money laundering, two of which involved sums greater than $50,000 and less than $150,000, two counts of causing a false financial document to be filed, four counts of operating an unlicensed escrow agent, three counts of recording a false document, six counts of grand theft, and two counts of elder abuse. The jury further found that Michael had committed more than one felony, an element of which was fraud or embezzlement, involving sums in excess of $500,000. The same jury convicted Stepfon Macey of two counts each of money laundering and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, and one count of possession of ammunition by an ex-felon. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found Macey had suffered four strike priors, three of which were later stricken. Although all three defendants were tried together, Anthony DeVaughn, Michael’s younger brother had a jury different from the one that determined the guilt of Michael and Macey. Anthony’s jury convicted him of four counts of money laundering. Michael was sentenced to prison for 33 years, 4 months, Macey to 14 years and Anthony to 3 years, 4 months. They appealed, arguing, inter alia, the evidence presented against them was insufficient to support their convictions, in ineffective assistance of trial counsel. some of which we accept, some of which we reject. The Court of Appeal affirmed some of the convictions, reversed others, reversed an enhancement finding, stayed some of the terms imposed, directed the trial court to correct credits awarded to Anthony, to resentence him and Macey and to recalculate Michael’s sentence in light of the conclusions the Court drew in this opinion. View "P. v. DeVaughn" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an incident in which defendant Emmanuel Juarez fought with the victim, John Doe. Prior to the fight, Emmanuel handed a gun to defendant Gerardo Juarez. During the fight, Gerardo handed the gun back to Emmanuel. Emmanuel then shot John Doe. John Doe’s companion, Jane Doe, attempted to flee, but defendants caught up with her and Gerardo shot her in the thigh. In June 2011, the State filed its initial complaint against defendants, alleging, among other things, two counts of attempted murder. After defendants were held to answer, the State filed an information alleging two counts of attempted against both defendants, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon against Gerardo. Nearly eight months later, in June of 2012, the State filed an amended information that added counts for assault with a firearm. For reasons not disclosed in the record, in July 2012 the court granted the State's motion to dismiss the case. That same day, the State refiled the same charges. In November 2012, the State was not ready to proceed to trial and requested a continuance. The court granted the continuance to December 10, 2012, but warned that December 10 would be day 10 of 10. On December 10, the State was again not ready to proceed, so the court dismissed the case in its entirety. The State then filed a third case against defendants, this time alleging two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. The facts recited in the complaint indicated the charges were based on the same incident as the previous complaints. Defendants moved to dismiss this complaint. The magistrate denied the motion without comment. The issue before the Court of Appeal centered on Penal Code section 1387 and how many times the State could file a complaint for the “same offense.” In the case of a felony, the State may file twice. Here, twice the State filed attempted murder charges, and both cases were dismissed. The State then filed a third complaint. Instead of filing charges of attempted murder, which would be barred under section 1387, the People alleged conspiracy to commit murder, which arose out of the same underlying incident. The trial court held this was the “same offense,” for purposes of section 1387, and dismissed the complaint. The People appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Defendants may attempt murder without conspiring to murder, and may conspire to murder without attempting to murder. Thus, they were not the same offense, and section 1387 did not bar the filing of the third complaint." View "California v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Twenty California counties were plaintiffs in this petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants the State and its pertinent officials (DHCS and DMH). In their petition, the Counties alleged that a DHCS 2009 Memorandum and a DMH 2010 Letter were invalid. Under federal Medicaid law, the federal government did not pay for services to IMD patients between the ages of 21 and 65. In 1999, California added a state-only Medi-Cal benefit by enacting Welfare and Institutions Code section 14053.1. The section provided that the State would pay for "ancillary outpatient services" for IMD patients within the federal IMD exclusion. The specific focus of this appeal involved two Assembly Bills: No. 2877 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) and No. 430 (2000-2001 Reg. Sess.) that concerned subsequent sunsetting legislation regarding section 14053.1. Assembly Bill 2877 (enacted in 2000) sought to extend the original sunset provision an additional year, and Assembly Bill 430 (enacted in 2001) sought to eliminate the sunset provision altogether, thereby making section 14053.1 effective indefinitely. The counties argued the memorandum and letter were: (1) inconsistent with section 14053.1; and (2) they constituted underground regulations adopted in violation of the state Administrative Procedures Act (Gov. Code, 11340.5, subd. (a)). The Counties similarly sought a writ/injunction prohibiting the State from applying them against the Counties. The trial court denied the Counties' petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief, and issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the State. The court concluded that the subsequent sunsetting amendments (Assem. Bills 2877 & 430) were void because they were enacted after the statute had already sunset by its own terms in 2000. Thus, in the absence of section 14053.1, the State did not promulgate an underground regulation by issuing the DHCS 2009 Memorandum and the DMH 2010 Letter and ancillary outpatient services for Medi-Cal eligible IMD patients within the federal IMD exclusion. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 14053.1 remained a valid law, and that 14053.1's presence in the California statutes was not the result of a legislative amendment to a repealed act. The Counties' petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was granted: the DHCS 2009 Memorandum and the DMH 2010 Letter contravened section 14053.1 and were therefore invalid. The State was enjoined from applying them. The judgment of the trial court was reversed. View "Colusa County v. Douglas" on Justia Law

In 2000, a jury convicted Davis of first degree burglary and found that he had four prior first degree felony burglary convictions. The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed. Davis is currently serving his sentence. In 2012, the San Francisco District Attorney’s office sought discovery of the personnel file of a police officer who testified at the Davis trial. The superior court conducted an in-camera review and issued an order finding that the officer’s records were not material to Davis’s case, either as evidence bearing on guilt or sentencing or as impeachment evidence. Although not a party to the 2012 motion, Davis sought independent appellate review of the records to determine whether they contain material that should have been produced pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and sought an order compelling the trial court to conduct a new hearing at which Davis would have the opportunity to be heard. The court of appeal held that Davis failed to establish that he has a right to appeal the post-judgment Brady order or that he is entitled to a writ of mandate. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1992, applicant Michael Hansen was convicted by jury on one count of second degree murder, and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The Supreme Court affirmed Hansen's conviction. The Supreme Court rejected Hansen's argument that shooting at an inhabited dwelling merged with a homicide that resulted from such a shooting. As such, the offense of shooting at an inhabited dwelling could have formed the basis for a second degree felony-murder conviction. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court reconsidered the scope of second degree felony-murder and expressly overruled its earlier holding. Relying on "California v. Chun" (45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009)), Hansen petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Supreme Court's holding in "Chun" applied to the theory of second degree felony murder presented at his trial, that it was therefore error for his jury to have been instructed that second degree felony murder was a valid theory for a conviction, and that his conviction for second degree murder should have been reversed. The trial court agreed and granted Hansen's petition. The State argued on appeal that the trial court erred in giving "Chun" retroactive effect, and as such, erred in finding reversible error. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not err in giving Chun retroactive effect, and affirmed the trial court's order. View "In re Hansen" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Aaron Campbell met Silvester Leyva at a bar where they exchanged telephone numbers and discussed buying and selling marijuana. A few days later, Campell and defendant-appellant Xavier Fort (among others) went to Leyva's house to get the marijuana. Leyva and his friend, Samuel De La Torre, met Campbell in Leyva's front yard. After De La Torre handed marijuana to Campbell, Campbell pulled a gun and began to back away toward two waiting vehicles. Fort, who was standing near the vehicles, fired his gun in the direction of the house. Leyva was killed by one of the bullets. A jury convicted defendants of first degree murder and two counts of robbery, and found true a robbery special-circumstance allegation. Defendants appealed their convictions: Fort argued that based on the accusatory pleading, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in his case on first degree felony murder only (with robbery as the underlying felony); the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. Both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at trial. The Court of Appeals, in the published portion of its opinion, agreed that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. In the nonpublished portion, the Court held that the instructional error was harmless, and we rejected defendants' argument that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of the robbery of Leyva. Furthermore, the Court also concluded that the court's stay of a sentence enhancement term as to Fort constituted an unauthorized sentence, which was corrected. View "California v. Campbell" on Justia Law