Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Scott Relkin appealed his sentence following entry of pleas in case numbers CM040863 and CM041966. He contended the sentence exceeded the maximum to which he specifically agreed. He further contended the trial court erred by imposing certain conditions of mandatory supervision that were vague, overbroad, unconstitutional, and unrelated to rehabilitation. After review, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court to modify probation condition No. 13. The Court also modified the judgment to correct an unauthorized sentence on count 2 in case No. CM041966, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Relkin" on Justia Law

After defendant Kyle Brown and victim Rebekka Chartier broke up, he demanded that she “get friendly and get over it,” or he would “pop [her] tires.” She refused, so he punctured her tires with a knife. This violated a restraining order then in effect. About two weeks later, defendant phoned Chartier; he threatened to “take [her] life” unless she went to the police and recanted. This violated the same restraining order. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of witness intimidation, a serious felony; vandalism, a misdemeanor; and two counts of violation of a court order, a misdemeanor. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to a total of 35 years to life in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and miscellaneous sentencing orders. Defendant appealed, arguing only that his conviction for witness intimidation under Penal Code section 136.1 was actually properly punishable as a different form of witness intimidation under Penal Code section 137. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contentions. However, the Court found that the sentence had be modified in one minor respect that did not affect the aggregate term. Hence, the Court affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant Michelle Franske and the State both appealed a resentencing proceeding pursuant to Proposition 47, which created a new resentencing provision, Penal Code section 1170.18. The trial court granted defendant's request under Proposition 47 to reduce her November 2010 conviction for felony second degree commercial burglary to misdemeanor shoplifting and reduced her punishment for that offense only. In doing so, the court rejected the State's argument that defendant's conduct actually did not constitute shoplifting and also rejected defendant's additional request to strike the associated on-bail enhancement. Defendant and the State appealed these rulings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court got it right on both rulings and affirmed. View "California v. Franske" on Justia Law

Defendant Craig Danny Gonzales, in custody in state prison, filed a petition in January 2015 to recall his sentence pursuant to "Proposition 47." The petition simply recited the statutes defendant violated without any further information about the convictions in a consolidated 2003/2005 case for which he was sentenced in February 2008. After receiving opposition from the prosecutor, the trial court denied the petition without elaboration beyond checking a box on its form order that defendant was ineligible for relief based on his "[c]urrent convictions." Defendant contended, inter alia, that the only basis on which the trial court could have determined that he was entirely ineligible for any relief was the prosecutor's claim (as opposed to the petition) that defendant's conviction for identity theft in a transactionally independent 2006 case (that was part of the same sentencing proceeding in February 2008) disqualified him from relief, because this would exclude his convictions from misdemeanor status under Penal Code section 473(b). The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that section 473(b) was ambiguous about the manner in which its exclusion applied, and the voter materials referencing section 473(b) made it clear that an identity theft conviction had to be transactionally related to other counts in order to exclude them from misdemeanor treatment under section 473(b). The Court accordingly reversed the order denying relief (except as to one conviction) and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Ray M. appealed an Imperial County juvenile court order denying his motion to conduct a new assessment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.11 and declaring him a delinquent ward under section 602. Ray filed his motion after the Kern County juvenile court determined he should be deemed a ward, and not a dependent, without providing notice to his dependency attorney or to the Imperial County court as required by section 241.1 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.512.2 Ray also argued, and the Imperial County Department of Social Services conceded, that the juvenile court erred at the outset of the dependency by failing to provide notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal agreed with Ray that because the Kern County juvenile court did not comply with the notice requirements set forth in section 241.1 and rule 5.512, the Imperial County juvenile court had the authority to revisit the Kern County court's assessment under section 241.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the orders and remanded the case for the juvenile court assigned to hear Ray's dependency matter to conduct a new assessment under section 241.1 and, if Ray was deemed a dependent, to comply with the notice provisions of ICWA. View "In re Ray M." on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was a development by Sunroad Enterprises and Sunroad Centrum Partners L.P. (together, Sunroad) of an office, residential, and retail project in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. Since 1997 the City of San Diego (the City) Council has approved the area for development under a master plan and over the ensuing years has thrice assessed the project for environmental impacts as required by CEQA. In 2012, Sunroad obtained a permit from the City to begin certain phases of residential development, including constructing several multilevel buildings over parking and ground level retail space. By the next year, Sunroad modified its design plans, ostensibly to meet real estate market demands, and sought the City's approval of the modified plans through a process known as substantial conformance review (SCR). The City's staff found that the modified plans substantially conformed with the conditions and requirements of the previously issued development permit and there was no need for further environmental impact documentation under CEQA. San Diegans for Open Government and CREED-21 (together, plaintiffs) appealed the staff's decision to the City Planning Commission. Following a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted to uphold the SCR decision. The City denied plaintiffs' appeal to the City Council. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to appeal the SCR decision to the City Council under CEQA and the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from defendant Jamie Manuel Pinon’s petition to be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, adopted by the voters as Proposition 47. In its prior decision in this case, the Court of Appeal held: (1) defendant was still serving his sentence while on Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) and was thus subject resentencing under section 1170.18(b), including a one-year period of parole under subdivision (d); (2) defendant was entitled to apply any excess custody credits against his period of parole; (3) the parole term may not exceed the remaining time on defendant’s term of PRCS; (4) the court’s sentence did not violate the prohibition against multiple punishment for indivisible offenses (section 654); and (5) defendant was exempt from registering as a drug offender. The California Supreme Court granted review of that decision and held it pending the outcome of "California v. Morales," (63 Cal.4th 399 (2016)). In "Morales," the Supreme Court held that excess custody credits did not reduce the one-year parole period. The Supreme Court then transferred this case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider it in light of Morales. On remand, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed its original holdings on the issues not decided by the Supreme Court: (1) defendant was still serving his sentence while on PRCS; (2) defendant is subject to parole, but the parole term may not exceed the remaining time on defendant’s term of PRCS; (3) the court’s sentence did not violate the prohibition against multiple punishment for indivisible offenses (section 654); and (4) defendant was exempt from registering as a drug offender. The appellate court also asked the parties to brief the question of whether excess custody credits could reduce applicable punitive fines, an issue not addressed in Morales. Having received briefs from both parties, the Court held they may. View "California v. Pinon" on Justia Law

Defendant John Evans appealed his 2015 sentence, arguing it improperly included a one-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5(b) for an offense the trial court designated a misdemeanor shortly after imposing the enhancement. The State argued the sentence was lawful because the offense was a felony at the time the court imposed the enhancement and Proposition 47 did not apply retroactively to enhancements. While the Court of Appeal agreed Proposition 47 did not apply retroactively to enhancements, the Court concluded that, under the California Supreme Court’s holding in "In re Estrada," (63 Cal.2d 740, 748 (1965)), Proposition 47 applied to Section 667.5(b) enhancements in judgments that had not yet become final. Because the offense on which Evans’s Section 667.5(b) enhancement was based was no longer a felony and his judgment was not yet final, Evans fell into the narrow class of offenders who are entitled to relief under Estrada. View "California v. Evans" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant David Byers’s motion to suppress evidence. Defendant then pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for sale and misdemeanor possession of nitrous oxide for the purpose of intoxication. The court imposed the upper term of four years on count 1, stayed sentence on count 2 under section 654, and then designated a split sentence of one year in jail followed by three years of mandatory supervision. On appeal, defendant contended law enforcement’s warrantless entry into his apartment pursuant to his absent housemate’s consent violated the Fourth Amendment. Related to these arguments, defendant requested that the Court of Appeal independently review the sealed transcript of the trial court’s in camera hearing, as well as the documents reviewed by the court in that hearing. The Court concluded substantial evidence supported the court’s finding defendant’s housemate’s consent was voluntary. But the Court held the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers complied with the knock-notice requirement. Nevertheless, the error was harmless because the appropriate remedy for a knock-notice violation here was not the suppression of the seized evidence, which was the only relief requested. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "California v. Byers" on Justia Law

Federal law makes undocumented immigrants ineligible for state and local public benefits, but allows a state to “affirmatively provide[] for such eligibility” through “the enactment of a State law.” 8. U.S.C. 1621(d). Plaintiff, a California taxpayer, filed suit against the Regents, alleging that none of its policies qualifies under section 1621(d) as a "State law" making undocumented immigrants eligible for postsecondary education benefits. The trial court sustained the Regents' demurrer, concluding that the Regents' policies satisfy section 1621(d). At issue in this case is whether three California legislative “enactments” affirmatively provide “eligibility” under federal law for postsecondary education benefits to qualified undocumented immigrants who attend the University of California, even though the statutes require only the California State University and California community colleges to provide such benefits. These laws include (1) Assembly Bill No. 540 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (A.B. 540), which makes qualified undocumented immigrants eligible for exemption from nonresident tuition (Stats. 2001, ch. 814, 1-2); (2) Assembly Bill No. 131 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) (A.B. 131), which makes qualified undocumented immigrants eligible for student financial aid programs (Stats. 2011, ch. 604, 3); and (3) Senate Bill No. 1210 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1210), which makes qualified undocumented immigrants eligible for student loan benefits (Stats. 2014, ch. 754, 3). The court concluded that, even though the California Constitution may preclude the Legislature from actually conferring postsecondary education benefits on undocumented immigrants attending the University of California, the Legislature has made these students “eligible” for such benefits within the meaning of the federal statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "De Vries v. Regents of UC" on Justia Law