Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Chuncey Garcia was convicted of human trafficking and pimping a minor. The 14-year-old minor ran away from home and obtained a job at a strip club (claiming she was 19). It was at the club that the minor met defendant; he supplied her alcohol and marijuana, and made her engage in sex for money under the threat of violence if she did not comply. The minor did not testify at defendant’s trial. Instead, the videotape of the minor’s conditional examination was played for the jury. The trial court sentenced defendant to 17 years to life: 15 years to life for the human trafficking offense, and one year for each prison prior. Defendant argued on appeal that his constitutional rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and due process were violated because his minor victim did not testify in person at his trial. Upon further review, the Court of Appeals disagreed, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former on-air radio personality for Univision, filed suit alleging disability discrimination, wrongful termination and related employment claims. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., claim for discrimination where plaintiff was not entitled to raise a medical condition as an alleged basis for discrimination for the first time in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; trial issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff had a disability under FEHA; and trial issues of fact exist as to whether Univision acted with discriminatory intent. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to engage in interactive process; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA), Gov. Code 12945.1 et seq., claims; and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's common law claim for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Brookside filed suit against the City alleging that the City Council's actions in proposing and advocating repeal of a 1990 ordinance - that prohibited the El Monte City Council from passing any form of mobilehome park rent control - violated an express prohibition of such activity in that ordinance. The superior court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the City. The court rejected Brookside's arguments concerning the scope of the prohibitory language in the 1990 ordinance and arguments that the City Council’s actions violated the California Constitution’s implicit withholding of authority for a local government to propose initiative measures that amend or repeal earlier voter-approved ordinances. View "Brookside Investments v. City of El Monte" on Justia Law

While intoxicated, defendant Richard Wilson drove his car into a house, severely injuring his passenger, his brother. His brother suffered a concussion, an orbital fracture, a partially collapsed lung, bruising to the lung, and a femur fracture. A jury convicted defendant of driving under the influence, causing injury; driving with a 0.08 percent or higher alcohol level, causing injury; and driving with a suspended license. As to counts one and two, the jury found he had inflicted great bodily injury. The court also found defendant had suffered a prior strike for attempted robbery. At sentencing, defendant objected to the imposition of a Penal Code section 12022.7(a) great bodily injury enhancement. He argued section 1170.1(g) allowed imposition of only the greatest enhancement, “[w]hen two or more enhancements may be imposed for the infliction of great bodily injury . . . .” He argued that in addition to the section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement, he would receive a section 667(a)(1) enhancement for committing a serious felony with a prior serious felony conviction, but his current felony qualified as a serious felony solely because he had inflicted great bodily injury. Thus, both enhancements came under the ambit of section 1170.1(g). The trial court sentenced defendant to a 14-year aggregate term: the upper term of three years for count one, doubled for the prior strike; a three-year section 12022.7(a) enhancement; and a five-year section 667(a)(1) enhancement. The court then stayed imposition of sentence on counts two and three pursuant to section 654. The question presented for the Court of Appeals’ review centered on whether the enhancement for committing a serious felony, having been previously convicted of a serious felony (section 667 (a)(1)), was an enhancement “for the infliction of great bodily injury” (section 1170.1(g)) when the current felony was a serious felony solely because it involved the infliction of great bodily injury. The Court concluded it was not because the Legislature intended that section 667(a)(1) would apply to the defendant’s status as a recidivist, not his conduct of inflicting great bodily injury. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant Arthur Perkins appealed his convictions arising from the kidnapping and rape of a 17-year-old girl and the rape and sodomy of his 11-year-old former stepdaughter. He challenged: (1) his one-strike sentences on his sex crimes on numerous grounds; (2) the joinder of the two cases; (3) the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress DNA evidence; (4) the lack of instructions on his out-of-court admissions; (5) the lack of a "Marsden" hearing; and (6) cumulative error. He also sought a stay of one of his sentences and corrections to the abstract of judgment. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeals reversed the life without parole sentences imposed as enhancements under the one-strike rule for lack of substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case for resentencing only. View "California v. Perkins" on Justia Law

In 2011, Eslava fatally stabbed his roommate in a San Francisco single room occupancy hotel. The court of appeal affirmed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter with a weapons use enhancement, but reversed Eslava‘s 18-year prison sentence and remanded for determination of whether a 2009 conviction for battery resulting in serious bodily injury qualified as a sentence-enhancing strike and serious felony. To determine whether the record proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Eslava personally inflicted serious bodily injury on the battery victim, the trial court examined the complaint, the transcript of the plea colloquy, and a police report. During the plea colloquy, Eslava‘s counsel had stipulated that the police report—which describes Eslava hitting the victim with a wooden stick, injuring him seriously enough to require hospitalization—supplied a factual basis for the conviction. The court reimposed the 18-year sentence. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for a jury trial on the issue of personal infliction of serious bodily injury unless Eslava waives his constitutional right to a jury determination. Since personal infliction of serious bodily injury is not inherent to the conviction, it was improper for the court—rather than a jury—to make that finding. The court noted that the law has evolved significantly since it decided the first appeal. View "People v. Eslava" on Justia Law

While driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, defendant-appellant David Doyle swerved into oncoming traffic and hit Mark Norton (victim) who was riding a motor scooter. The victim died immediately. Defendant drove away from the scene with the scooter lodged under his vehicle. He was apprehended one mile from the scene of the accident. Defendant was found guilty after a court trial of vehicular manslaughter, driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs causing great bodily injury, and fleeing the scene of an accident involving great bodily injury or death. Defendant appealed, raising only one claim that he was not fully advised of his constitutional rights to a trial by 12 jurors prior to waiving his right to a jury trial and proceeding to a court trial. The Court of Appeals found that defendant's waiver of jury trial in this case was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Doyle" on Justia Law

After defendant was taken into custody for psychiatric evaluation and treatment for up to 72 hours pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, she was released and banned from owning, possessing, controlling, receiving, or purchasing any firearm for five years. The Superior Court of Kern County denied her petition to lift the prohibition and found that the preponderance of the evidence established that defendant would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner. The court found that the superior court’s order was appealable, but found that defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel; concluded that section 8103, subdivision (f)(6), employs a constitutional standard of proof and is not unconstitutionally vague; and concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s denial of defendant's petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "People v. Mary H." on Justia Law

Defendant Miguel Guarneros appeals from an order of the trial court denying his motion to reduce the restitution collection fee imposed on him in a criminal case. Guarneros ran a car dealership in Spring Valley, which was required to file and pay sales tax to the California Board of Equalization (BOE) on a quarterly basis from sales of cars. Between 2008 and 2011, Guarneros failed to remit to the state all of the sales tax that he collected from customers. Instead, Guarneros filed fraudulent tax returns with the BOE. Guarneros pled guilty and agreed to pay victim restitution. The court ordered victim restitution and imposed a restitution collection fee of 15 percent of the total restitution ordered, pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l) and San Diego County Code of Administrative Ordinances, article XX, section 363, subdivision (m) (Collection Fee Ordinance), which authorized the imposition of such a fee. Guarneros contended on appeal of that order that the trial court's denial of his request to reduce the 15 percent restitution collection fee was erroneous and/or amounted to an abuse of the court's discretion. The Court of Appeals rejected Guarneros's contention and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "California v. Guarneros" on Justia Law

Defendant Lorenzo Chavez plead no contest to charges that he offered to sell a controlled substance and then failed to appear. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for four years. After defendant successfully completed his probation in 2009, he filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, asking the trial court to dismiss the action in the interests of justice based on ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted legal errors. The trial court concluded that because the motion was brought pursuant to section 1385 rather than section 1203.4, it did not have authority after probation ended to grant the requested relief. The State argued the denial was not an appealable order. Defendant contended the order was appealable and the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to dismiss under section 1385. The Court of Appeals concluded the order was appealable and the trial court did not err. "Section 1203.4 is the exclusive method for a trial court to dismiss the conviction of a defendant who has successfully completed probation." View "California v. Chavez" on Justia Law